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This dissertation explores how to best measure poverty and vulnerability to poverty in 
microfinance clients in rural areas and provides the results of the test for Angkor 
Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea) (AMK), a microfinance institution operating in rural 
Cambodia.   
 
The objective is to find the best measuring tool available and to adapt it to the rural 
Cambodian context.  Thus, the first section of this dissertation discusses the theoretical 
framework for rural finance, microfinance, poverty and vulnerability to poverty and the 
second section explores the Cambodian context and its poverty profile.   
 
In the third section, two complementary but distinct poverty measuring tools are applied: a 
multidimensional relative poverty tool based on Principal Component Analysis (AMK-PCA 
Wellbeing Score) and a one-dimensional absolute poverty tool based on Daily Food 
Expenditure per capita.  Both tools are based on food security.  The analysis shows AMK’s 
extensive poverty outreach, and the comparison of the outputs from both tools further 
confirm the reliability of results.  
 
The main conclusion of this dissertation is that it is not possible to create a single poverty 
assessment tool that provides simultaneously absolute and multidimensional results.  What is 
possible is to apply two tools, as part of a combined research effort within the context of rural 
Cambodia, so that poverty and vulnerability can be assessed regularly as a multidimensional 
concept while adding a monetary tool that allows for easier comparisons at the national level.  
 
Key Words: Microfinance, Poverty, Vulnerability, Cambodia. 






Esta tesis doctoral explora cómo medir la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad a la pobreza en los 
clientes rurales de microfinanzas y aplica sus resultados al estudio de caso de Angkor 
Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea) (AMK), una institución microfinanciera que trabaja en las 
zonas rurales de Camboya.  
 
El objetivo es identificar la mejor metodología para medir el nivel de pobreza de los clientes 
de microfinanzas y adaptarla a la realidad del contexto rural camboyano.  Así, la primera 
sección de la tesis examina los aspectos teóricos de las finanzas rurales, microfinanzas, 
pobreza y vulnerabilidad a la pobreza y la segunda sección estudia el contexto camboyano y 
su perfil de pobreza. 
 
En la tercera sección, se presentan dos metodologías distintas pero complementarias basadas 
en el concepto de seguridad alimenticia: un índice multidimensional de medición de la 
pobreza relativa basado en el Análisis de Componentes Principales (el Índice de Bienestar 
AMK-PCA, por sus siglas en inglés) y un indicador unidimensional de pobreza absoluta 
basado en el Gasto Alimentario Diario per cápita comparado con el umbral de pobreza 
alimenticia.  El análisis indica que los nuevos clientes de AMK son más pobres que los 
hogares rurales en general; y la comparación de los resultados de ambas metodologías 
confirma su fiabilidad. 
 
La conclusión fundamental de esta tesis doctoral es que no es posible crear una única 
metodología que entienda la pobreza como un fenómeno multidimensional y al mismo 
tiempo permita su comparabilidad en términos absolutos.  No obstante, se pueden utilizar dos 
metodologías complementarias adaptadas al contexto rural Camboyano -como parte del 
mismo esfuerzo investigador-, que permiten medir la pobreza como un fenómeno 
multidimensional y simultáneamente, utilizar otra herramienta adicional que hace asequible 
las comparaciones en el ámbito nacional por ser exclusivamente monetaria y basada en el 
consumo alimentario. 
 
Palabras clave (no incluidas en el título): Finanzas Rurales, Camboya, AMK/Concern Worldwide. 
Título en Castellano: Medición de la Pobreza y la Vulnerabilidad en Microfinanzas. 
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RESUMEN AMPLIADO EN CASTELLANO 
 
Esta tesis doctoral explora cómo medir la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad en los clientes rurales 
de microfinanzas y aplica sus resultados al estudio de caso de Angkor Mikroheranhvatho 
(Kampuchea) (AMK), una institución microfinanciera que trabaja en las zonas rurales de 
Camboya. 
 
La investigación se basa en dos premisas fundamentales: que la pobreza es un fenómeno 
multidimensional y que explorarlo implica necesariamente la incorporación del concepto de 
vulnerabilidad a la pobreza, definido como el riesgo de caer en la pobreza en un futuro, 
incluso de personas no clasificadas como pobres en ese momento. El concepto de 
vulnerabilidad a la pobreza (abreviado como vulnerabilidad a lo largo de esta tesis), ha sido 
incluido por dos razones principales: (i) para poder estudiar la pobreza entendida como un 
fenómeno dinámico en vez de estático y (ii) porque el concepto de vulnerabilidad es, en sí 
mismo, una dimensión inherente a la medición del bienestar.  
 
La principal hipótesis de esta tesis doctoral es que si bien no es posible crear un índice 
universal para la medición de la pobreza que sea útil y aplicable a todos los programas o 
instituciones de microfinanzas en el mundo, sí es posible crear una metodología que sea 
relevante para los hogares rurales en Camboya.  
 
Puesto que el objetivo es identificar la mejor metodología para medir el nivel de pobreza en 
los clientes de microfinanzas y adaptarla a la realidad del contexto rural camboyano, la tesis 
se ha estructurado en cuatro secciones principales: la primera sección cubre el marco teórico 
de las finanzas rurales y las microfinanzas así como la bibliografía existente sobre la 
medición de la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad; la segunda abarca el contexto camboyano; la 
tercera profundiza en el estudio empírico de AMK; y la cuarta sección formula las 
conclusiones.  
 
En más detalle, la primera sección sienta las bases del marco teórico con respecto a las 
microfinanzas y la medición de la pobreza y de la vulnerabilidad a la pobreza.  El capítulo I 
estudia el marco teórico de las finanzas rurales y el capítulo II el de las microfinanzas, 
detallando las aportaciones más recientes en la disciplina: la sostenibilidad financiera, la 
v 
medición del nivel de pobreza de los clientes, el impacto y el desempeño social.  El capítulo 
III explora la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad a la pobreza, así como las metodologías de 
medición, incluyendo aquellas utilizadas por entidades microfinancieras.  
 
La segunda sección aporta la información básica del contexto camboyano. El capítulo IV es 
una descripción del contexto histórico y la situación económica y sociopolítica, a la que se 
suma un análisis detallado del perfil de pobreza del país.  El capítulo V estudia el sector 
financiero y la situación de las finanzas rurales y las microfinanzas.  El capítulo VI describe a 
AMK y la evolución seguida desde que surgió como un programa de la ONG irlandesa 
Concern Worldwide hasta convertirse en una entidad microfinanciera independiente con 
licencia de operaciones del Banco Central. 
 
En la tercera sección se expone cómo el análisis de la bibliografía ha desembocado en la 
utilización de dos metodologías diferentes pero complementarias para la medición de la 
pobreza.  El Capítulo VII cubre todos los detalles de la metodología aplicada al estudio 
empírico: el tamaño y la selección de la muestra y su representatividad, la encuesta aplicada y 
la definición, el proceso estadístico y el cálculo de cada una de las metodologías.  El capítulo 
VIII analiza los resultados de las dos metodologías y compara sus resultados.  
 
Finalmente, en la cuarta sección, el capítulo IX establece las conclusiones y las aportaciones 
fundamentales de esta tesis doctoral, así como sus implicaciones para futuros estudios sobre 





Este estudio es fruto del deseo de la autora de documentar los efectos del acceso a las 
microfinanzas en los clientes, empleando la metodología más rigurosa posible.  
Originalmente la tesis iba a analizar el impacto de las microfinanzas en la pobreza y la 
vulnerabilidad.  De hecho, una de las metodologías creadas por esta tesis y utilizadas en el 
estudio empírico servirá para un futuro estudio de impacto: concretamente, el índice 
multidimensional del bienestar de los hogares se analizará longitudinalmente comparando los 
resultados de los hogares de clientes y no-clientes.  Esa tarea queda pendiente y fuera del 
alcance de este documento.  Entretanto, esta tesis doctoral se concentra en una tarea más 
vi 
modesta pero igualmente crucial: la medición de la pobreza y de la vulnerabilidad a la 
pobreza.  
 
Antes de entrar en materia, conviene realizar algunas aclaraciones.  Este proyecto comenzó 
en el año 2002 cuando la autora se puso en contacto con la dirección de Concern Worldwide 
en Camboya para explorar la posibilidad de usar el precursor de AMK como un estudio de 
caso para esta tesis doctoral.  A su vez, los directivos expresaron su deseo de que los 
resultados (y los procesos) de una posible tesis pudieran ser útiles para las instituciones 
involucradas.  Finalmente, en el año 2003, la autora fue contratada por Concern Worldwide 
como parte del equipo directivo de AMK, con el objetivo explícito de establecer en AMK una 
metodología rigurosa para conocer en profundidad a los clientes y sus necesidades.  El 
acuerdo fue que la autora se concentraría en crear métodos de investigación sólidos y 
rigurosos que sirvieran, en primer lugar, para el estudio de caso de esta tesis doctoral y, 
simultáneamente, para la toma de decisiones en la microfinanciera, tanto a nivel estratégico, 
como en el día a día.  (La autora también se hizo cargo de otras responsabilidades no 
directamente vinculadas con la investigación.)  Las tareas de investigación habían de 
emprenderse al más alto nivel - no solo en un sentido metodológico y de rigor académico sino 
también en un sentido ético: la investigación tenía como objetivo la creación y análisis de 
indicadores de pobreza en el ámbito rural camboyano y, al mismo tiempo, debía producir 
información útil a nivel interno para la propia AMK, y no material publicitario.  La autora ha 
formado parte del equipo de gestión de AMK para garantizar que la microfinanciera 
mantendrá todos los sistemas creados y que el nuevo personal investigador (capacitado 
durante este periodo) podrá seguir produciendo información útil para la gestión y para la 
toma de decisiones.  De ahí también que el manuscrito original de esta tesis doctoral esté 
escrito en inglés: en reciprocidad por la confianza otorgada, era necesario producir un 
documento que cubriera tanto los resultados como los procesos en un idioma que dominara el 
personal de Concern Worldwide y de AMK.  La autora también cree que el manuscrito en 
inglés forma parte de un legado ético de transparencia: es justo devolver los resultados de la 
investigación a las organizaciones que han permitido un acceso sin restricciones a toda la 
información requerida.  
 
Dicho esto, el estudio analítico presentado en esta tesis doctoral es original y ha sido 
producido íntegramente por la autora, aunque lógicamente algunas secciones se basen en 
artículos y documentos de investigación previos.  Entre ellos destacan el trabajo de 
vii 
investigación producido para el Diploma de Estudios Avanzados (DEA) (Torres, 2003), el 
documento sobre Finanzas Rurales y el Sector de Microfinanzas en Camboya escrito para el 
Banco Mundial (Torres, 2004), así como otra documentación interna creada para AMK como 
los informes anuales, el perfil institucional y el estudio empírico de medición del nivel de 
pobreza de clientes producidos originalmente por la autora para uso interno en AMK durante 
los años 2006 y 2007.  
 
 
Resumen de la Tesis 
 
A continuación se resume esta tesis doctoral, siguiendo la misma estructura del documento: 
marco teórico, contexto camboyano, resultados del estudio empírico y conclusiones.  El 
resumen culmina con la formulación de las conclusiones y las aportaciones fundamentales de 
esta tesis, así como sus implicaciones para futuras investigaciones. 
 
El marco teórico establece los mecanismos que permiten a las microfinanzas servir a las 
poblaciones pobres y está dividido en dos secciones fundamentales: la primera se concentra 
en identificar los principales obstáculos que impiden que los mercados financieros formales 
se ocupen de los hogares más pobres y la segunda se concentra en analizar cómo las 
microfinancieras han sido capaces de vencer estos obstáculos.   
 
La primera sección documenta cómo los objetivos del desarrollo y la modernización agrícola 
se apoyaron en el mecanismo de concesión de créditos subsidiados, bajo la premisa de que el 
acceso a créditos con tasas de interés inferiores a las del mercado incitaría a los pequeños 
agricultores a invertir en nuevas tecnologías y cultivos.  Durante los años setenta y ochenta, 
estudios teóricos y empíricos documentaron cómo y por qué este mecanismo del crédito 
subsidiado no estaba cumpliendo los objectivos para los que se estableció ya que eran 
precisamente las élites las que más se beneficiaban de la existencia del subsidio.  
Simultáneamente, surgió un nuevo paradigma en el desarrollo de sistemas financieros rurales 
basado en el concepto de la eficiencia y como reflejo de un cambio aún más amplio en la 
conceptualización del desarrollo: el desarrollo entendido más allá del ámbito agrícola para 
abarcar el ámbito rural más general.  Esta nueva conceptualización del desarrollo rural incluía 
tanto actividades agrarias como no-agrarias e incorporaba el concepto de la movilización de 
los ahorros por instituciones financieras rurales.   
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Los obstáculos principales que impiden que los mercados financieros formales se ocupen de 
los hogares más pobres se explican dentro del marco teórico por la imperfección de los 
mercados financieros, particularmente por los problemas de asimetrías de información entre 
prestamistas y prestatarios y por el riesgo moral o riesgo inducido.  Los individuos que 
solicitan un préstamo tienen distintas probabilidades de impago y establecer estas 
probabilidades supone un coste al prestamista.  Estos costes se refieren tanto a la 
determinación del nivel de riesgo en el momento de la solicitud (el problema de “screening” 
o criba de clientes) como al fomento de incentivos para que los prestatarios tomen aquellas 
decisiones que maximicen su probabilidad de pago, una vez que el contrato de crédito ha sido 
formalizado (el problema de riesgo moral).  Por último, para aquellos individuos con 
capacidad de pago, el acreedor ha de enfrentarse a la dificultad y costo de hacer cumplir el 
contrato de préstamo pactado y por tanto garantizar el pago.   
 
Los mecanismos comúnmente utilizados por los prestamistas para vencer estos problemas o 
riesgos pueden ser directos o indirectos.  Los mecanismos directos son aquéllos en los que el 
prestamista invierte recursos en seleccionar únicamente a aquellos solicitantes con mayor 
probabilidad de repago.  Por otro lado, los mecanismos indirectos incluyen la creación y 
diseño de contratos de crédito en los que las respuestas de los prestatarios (basadas en su 
propio interés y beneficio) permiten al prestamista clasificar el riesgo de cada solicitante, y 
simultáneamente, induce a este solicitante a pagar y/o reducir sus probabilidades de impago.  
Los mecanismos indirectos más utilizados en los mercados financieros rurales incluyen: la 
tasa de interés; el incremento del valor del préstamo en base al historial crediticio (o historial 
de pago con la misma entidad prestamista/acreedora); planes de pago regulares que excluyen 
a los prestamistas menos disciplinados; el ahorro obligatorio o la garantía de bienes con valor 
sentimental para el prestatario como substitutos a las garantías físicas tradicionales; la 
amenaza de sanciones sociales de otros miembros de la comunidad; o los préstamos en los 
que el prestamista tiene derecho total a la producción de la tierra del prestatario hasta que el 
capital prestado sea reembolsado en su totalidad.   
 
La teoría de contratos idenfica los mecanismos necesarios para establecer un contrato de 
crédito satisfactorio tanto para el prestamista como para el prestatario.  Particularmente, la 
base teórica argumenta que las microfinancieras definen un contrato de crédito que consigue 
incluir a los pobres porque excluye a los ricos.  Los hogares más ricos pueden ser excluidos 
directamente mediante requisitos de participación que les excluyan (por ejemplo, poseer una 
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cantidad inferior a cierto número de hectáreas cultivables), o bien indirectamente, si la 
microfinanciera cobra tipos de interés de mercado; si proporciona préstamos tan pequeños 
que sólo los pobres los deseen; o si fija requisitos que inviten a las élites a auto-excluirse (por 
ejemplo tener que asistir a reuniones semanales para conseguir un préstamo).  
Frecuentemente, estos requisitos directos o indirectos de participación se combinan para 
maximizar las probabilidades de reembolso, así como el cumplimento de los objetivos de la 
entidad microfinanciera.  La teoría está apoyada por estudios empíricos que demuestran que 
los clientes de microfinanzas se concentran alrededor del umbral de la pobreza.   
 
La segunda parte del marco teórico se concentra en definir las microfinanzas y en exponer 
sus características principales, cubriendo las estructuras institucionales y metodológicas más 
comúnmente utilizadas: formales o informales; minimalistas o integradas; enfocadas al 
crédito individual o solidario; enfocadas al ahorro obligatorio o voluntario.  A su vez, el 
crédito solidario puede sub-dividirse de acuerdo a la metodología aplicada, siendo las más 
conocidas el método Grameen, el metódo solidario utilizado por ACCION, el de banca 
comunal utilizado por FINCA o el de las asociaciones de ahorro y crédito (o bancos 
comunales) independientes.  Este abanico de alternativas de estructura y de metodologías 
pretende resaltar la riqueza de opciones al alcance de las instituciones microfinancieras así 
como constatar que ninguna metodología o estructura institucional específica es mejor o peor 
a priori que cualquier otra de las alternativas existentes o sus combinaciones.  Las 
microfinancieras no son entidades homogéneas precisamente porque su éxito depende de su 
capacidad de adaptarse al entorno en el que operan.   
 
Las aportaciones más recientes en la disciplina de las microfinanzas incluyen los conceptos 
de sostenibilidad financiera, el servicio a los hogares pobres (incluyendo la medición de su 
nivel de pobreza), el impacto y el desempeño social.   
 
La sostenibilidad o viabilidad financiera se refiere a la capacidad de una entidad 
microfinanciera de cubrir todos sus costes con los ingresos generados por su actividad.   
 
El servicio a los hogares pobres (o alcance a los pobres) se refiere a la oferta de servicios a 
poblaciones previamente excluidas por servicios financieros formales y cubre dos conceptos 
complementarios: el número total de clientes u hogares así como la pobreza de cada uno de 
éstos.  Esta diferenciación entre el número total de clientes y el predominio de clientes pobres 
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en el mercado total merece ser recalcada: dado un número común X de clientes clasificados 
como pobres, éstos pueden acceder al mismo servicio financiero provisto por la entidad A si 
ésta se dedica exclusivamente a este segmento de la población o por la entidad B si ésta 
incluye el servicio al subgrupo de estos clientes pobres, aunque éstos sean solo una pequeña 
porción del mercado total de clientes de la entidad B.   
 
El impacto se refiere a los beneficios recibidos por los pobres como consecuencia del acceso 
a los servicios financieros e incluye aspectos sociales así como financieros.  La medición de 
impacto es muy compleja debido a la problemática de atribuir causalidad, es decir, de atribuir  
cambios en el bienestar de los hogares exclusivamente al acceso a servicios financieros. 
 
Finalmente, el término de desempeño social es una de las últimas adiciones a la disciplina de 
las microfinanzas, y se define como “la traducción efectiva de la misión institucional en la 
práctica.”  El desempeño social pretende medir el éxito de una entidad en función a valores 
sociales comúnmente aceptados en el ámbito de las microfinanzas incluyendo: servir a 
poblaciones pobres y excluidas; mejorar la calidad de los servicios financieros; mejorar la 
calidad de vida de los clientes y crear beneficios para sus familias, así como mejorar la 
responsibilidad social de la entidad microfinanciera.   
 
La distinción inequívoca entre los conceptos de desempeño social, el servicio o alcance a los 
hogares pobres y el concepto de impacto será necesaria para delimitar las conclusiones de 
esta tesis doctoral.  Si bien el alcance a los pobres es sólo una de las dimensiones del 
desempeño social, esta tesis doctoral pretende dar respuesta precisamente al interrogante de 
cómo medir la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad a la pobreza entre la totalidad de los clientes de 
una entidad microfinanciera, proponiendo metodologías de medición de la pobreza 
coherentes con el entorno en el que operen.  
 
El repaso de la bibliografía sobre las metodologías de medición de la pobreza y de la 
vulnerabilidad se divide entre metodologías unidimensionales (monetarias y no monetarias) y 
metodologías multidimensionales (tanto las participativas como las que están basadas en 
indicadores), e incluye ejemplos de metodologías e indicadores utilizados por entidades 
microfinancieras.  La complejidad en su medición radica precisamente en la falta de acuerdo 
universal sobre cuál es la definición de la pobreza y, como se indicó anteriormente, incluye el 
concepto de vulnerabilidad definido como el riesgo de caer en la pobreza en un futuro.  Entre 
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las medidas unidimensionales, la medida monetaria de la pobreza más conocida es el umbral 
de la pobreza basado en encuestas de hogares como el Living Standard Measurement Survey 
(LSMS).  Otras medidas unidimensionales no monetarias comúnmente utilizadas incluyen el 
consumo nutricional, los niveles educativos, la esperanza de vida, la mortalidad infantil o el 
acceso a servicios públicos tales como los centros de salud o el agua potable.  Por otro lado, 
las medidas multidimensionales más conocidas son el Índice de Desarrollo Humano o los 
métodos participativos de medición de la pobreza.  En el caso de la experiencia específica de 
las microfinancieras, tres de los ejemplos se basan en indicadores unidimensionales: el 
instrumento de medición basado en ingresos de ACCION, la sección de gastos de la 
herramienta de FINCA-FCAT y los Índices de Estado de la Vivienda.  Los otros cuatro 
ejemplos son metodologías multidimensionales: el índice de pobreza de 
CGAP/Grameen/Ford; los indicadores basados en modelos participativos; las medidas del 
patrimonio neto o listas de verificación; y el indicador de medición de la pobreza de 
CGAP/IFPRI.   
 
El objetivo es identificar una metodología de medición de la pobreza, entendida como un 
fenómeno multidimensional, que permita comparaciones no sólo entre distintas zonas 
operativas de una microfinanciera, sino también con otras microfinancieras que operen en 
otros países.  Como puede comprobarse en el cuadro en la siguiente página, ninguna de las 
metodologías analizadas cumple ambos requisitos.   
 
Las metodologías unidimensionales de carácter monetario son comparables pero no 
consiguen captar una imagen completa de la pobreza; las metodologías unidimensionales de 
carácter no monetario tienen el mismo punto débil y además son menos susceptibles a las 
comparaciones.  
 
Las metodologías multidimensionales basadas en modelos de medición participativos tienen 
la ventaja de cubrir varias dimensiones de la pobreza, permitiendo a los propios participantes 
priorizar y establecer los pesos relativos de estas dimensiones.  Sin embargo, las 
metodologías participativas no son recomendables para las entidades microfinancieras porque 
no permiten una comparación siquiera entre diferentes áreas operativas: un pobre en el 




Metodologías de Medición de Niveles de Pobreza en Clientes de Microfinanzas 
(Aspectos Positivos y Negativos) 
 





Instrumento Medición Ingresos de ACCION 
[ACCION Income Tool] 
? Medida absoluta ? comparable  
? Unidimensional 
? Basado en ingresos (en vez de consumo) 
? Fiabilidad de los datos cuestionable (datos 
parte del proceso de solicitud del préstamo) 




Sección de gastos de la herramienta de FINCA 
[DPCE section of FINCA-FCAT tool] 
? Medida absoluta ? comparable  
? Basado en consumo 
? Auto-consumo no incluido ni monetizado 
 
Índice de Pobreza CGAP/Grameen/Ford  
[Progress Out of Poverty Index (PPI)] 
? Medida multidimensional de la pobreza  
? Medida absoluta ? comparable  
? Demasiado reciente para una evaluación completa 
? La tarjeta de scoring estadístico no está disponible 
para Camboya y no es posible que una 
microfinanciera la cree (los estudios nacionales no 
están disponibles para uso público y no hay 
información específica del coste de la creación de 
la tarjeta)  





Índices de Estado de la Vivienda  
[Housing Indexes] 
? Fáciles y rápidos  
? Unidimensional 
? Medida relativa ? no fácilmente comparable 
(es unidimensional pero no-monetaria) 
? No es transferible a otros contextos geográficos 
(no es relevante en términos generales) 
Indicadores basados en Modelos Participativos 
[Participatory Wealth Ranking] 
? Medida multidimensional de la pobreza  
? Participantes definen la pobreza 
? Ránking subjetivo ? difícil verificación 
? Medida relativa ? no fácilmente comparable (ni 
siquiera para comparar dos poblaciones diferentes 
dentro del mismo país) 
? Posiblemente inadecuada para país post-conflicto 
? Requiere expertos en su implementación (difícil 
encontrar personal con experiencia en las 
microfinancieras, particularmente las minimalistas)  
 
 
Medidas del Patrimonio Neto / Listas de 
Verificación [Net Worth / Check Lists]  
? Medida multidimensional de la pobreza 
? Indicadores y sus correspondientes pesos 
relativos, son asignados arbitrariamente 
? Medida relativa ? no comparable 
 
 
Indicador de Medición de la Pobreza de 
CGAP/IFPRI [Poverty Assessment Tool]  
? Medida multidimensional  
? Metodología rigurosa 
? Medida relativa ? no comparable 
 
Análisis producido por la autora 
 
 
Las metodologías multidimensionales basadas en indicadores tampoco son comparables en 
valores absolutos pero al menos pueden compararse nacionalmente los resultados de las 
distintas áreas operativas.  En cualquier caso, se ha dado preferencia a las metodologías más 
rigurosas en la determinación del peso relativo de cada dimensión de la pobreza, sobre las 
metodologías que asignan pesos de forma arbitraria.  Del mismo modo, se ha dado 
xiii 
preferencia a aquellas metodologías que han sido probadas en otros contextos geográficos y 
que ya pueden proporcionar algunos resultados de su aplicabilidad.   
 
Como consecuencia, esta tesis ha basado sus métodos de médición en el indicador de 
medición de la pobreza multidimensional de CGAP/IFPRI y en la sección de gastos de la 
herramienta de medición del consumo de FINCA-FCAT, con los correspondientes cambios 
para adaptarlos al contexto rural camboyano que serán descritos en detalle en la tercera 
sección del estudio empírico.   
 
La sección que cubre el contexto camboyano establece que la pobreza en Camboya es un 
fenómeno rural: más del 84 por ciento de la población es rural y más del 90 por ciento de los 
pobres vive en las zonas rurales.  
 
Otro punto relevante de esta segunda sección es que las microfinanzas no son una panacea y 
no crean -por sí mismas- oportunidades económicas, pero el acceso a microcréditos permite a 
los individuos sacar un mayor provecho de las oportunidades económicas existentes.  En este 
sentido, la poca información fidedigna que existe sobre flujos de caja, actividades 
económicas, y fuentes y usos de crédito en los hogares rurales de Camboya, sugiere que éstos 
ya tienen deudas pendientes (aunque no necesariamente con el sector formal) y que 
probablemente requieren otros productos financieros además de los productos de préstamo.  
Sin embargo, es mas preciso referirse al sector microfinanciero camboyano como un sector 
de microcrédito, dada la falta de productos de ahorro y de seguro.  Los principales operadores 
microfinancieros que trabajan en las zonas rurales en la actualidad son un único banco 
comercial (ACLEDA), microfinancieras con licencia oficial del Banco Central, otros 
operadores autorizados, y el sector financiero informal.  Los nueve operadores principales 
son ACLEDA (incluyendo sólo su cartera de préstamos para micro y pequeños empresarios) 
y ocho microfinancieras con licencia del Banco Central: PRASAC,  AMRET, CEB, TPC, 
VisionFund, Hattha Kaksekar, AMK y CREDIT.  Estos nueve operadores captan 
conjuntamente el 93 por ciento de la cartera total y sirven al 94 por ciento de los clientes de 
préstamo.  ACLEDA es el líder de mercado en cuanto a la cartera de préstamos y depósitos; 
sin embargo, en lo referente al número de clientes, AMRET está lentamente superando la 
hegemonía de ACLEDA.  
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El análisis de la evolución de las microfinanzas en Camboya desde el año 2000 al 2006 
concluye que los micro y pequeños empresarios se han beneficiado más que los hogares 
rurales del aumento del volumen de préstamos (tanto provenientes de los operadores 
existentes como de los recién llegados al mercado) y que el sector se está dividiendo en dos 
grupos: las microfinancieras que se centran en préstamos con saldos pequeños y las 
microfinancieras que ofrecen una combinación de productos orientados fundamentalmente a 
microempresas y/o Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (PYMES).   
 
El último capítulo de esta segunda sección está dedicado a AMK y documenta el éxito de la 
transformación desde un programa de una ONG internacional (Concern Worldwide) a una 
institución microfinanciera camboyana independiente.  Las condiciones de los productos, la 
metodología aplicada y la cobertura geográfica indican que AMK se ocupa de poblaciones 
pobres y rurales.  En términos comparados, AMK ha mantenido el promedio de préstamo más 
bajo del mercado y es el operador de microfinanzas que presenta un crecimiento más rápido, 
pasando del 5 por ciento en el 2000 al 11 por ciento en el 2006.  Actualmente AMK es la 
cuarta institución de microfinanzas en el ránking del país respecto al número de clientes de 
préstamo que sirve y sigue creciendo a la tasa más elevada (promedio de 34 por ciento anual).  
El análisis de la información existente permite establecer que AMK es una entidad orientada 
hacia la sostenibilidad financiera.  No obstante, el éxito completo de una microfinanciera 
requiere un equilibrio entre el rendimiento financiero y el social, y esta información tan sólo 
puede ser confirmada por el estudio empírico que constituye la tercera sección de esta tesis.  
Como premisas básicas, las estructuras institucionales establecidas en AMK parecen 
orientarse a establecer este equilibrio entre el desempeño social y el financiero, con la 
existencia de un departamento de investigación interno y un Comité de Desempeño Social 
que depende directamente de la Junta Directiva.  Igualmente, los datos sobre los perfiles de 
los hogares de los clientes y los pueblos en los que viven también parecen corroborar esta 
imagen de AMK como una organización centrada en áreas y clientes pobres.   
 
A continuación, el estudio empírico resume los aspectos metodológicos más destacados y 
establece que las características de los hogares de los clientes de AMK (y sus pueblos) son 
bastante similares a las de los hogares de la población rural en general descritos por otros 
estudios, aunque los hogares de los clientes parecen ser relativamente más pobres. 
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Dada la falta de un candidato único y claro entre las metodologías estudiadas en el marco 
teórico, se han utilizado dos metodologías diferentes pero complementarias: un índice 
multidimensional de medición de la pobreza relativa basado en el Análisis de Componentes 
Principales (Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA) y un indicador unidimensional de pobreza 
absoluta basado en el Gasto Alimentario Diario per cápita comparado con el umbral de 
pobreza alimenticia.   
 
Ambos métodos son el resultado de un esfuerzo simultáneo de investigación e incluyen las 
modificaciones necesarias para garantizar su relevancia en el contexto camboyano rural.  De 
hecho, uno de los objetivos de esta tesis ha sido la incorporación de las conclusiones 
principales del marco teórico de pobreza y vulnerabilidad, así como del perfil de pobreza de 
las zonas rurales de Camboya, al diseño concreto de la encuesta, a los indicadores elegidos 
para medir la pobreza y también de forma específica al análisis de resultados.  Aunque sería 
excesivo desgranar todos los detalles, las siguientes líneas proporcionan algunos ejemplos de 
cómo se ha concretado está incorporación: 
 
? Respecto al diseño de la encuesta, se ha creado un módulo específico para monetizar 
el valor de la producción que se consume dentro de los hogares.  Este módulo es 
consecuencia directa del perfil de pobreza camboyana, que es fundamentalmente 
rural, y exhibe particularidades propias de los hogares rurales.  Por ejemplo, la 
estimación del consumo de arroz es anual en lugar de semanal o mensual, debido a 
que el arroz es el alimento básico de la dieta camboyana y su producción es tan 
generalizada en las zonas rurales que si la producción propia no es suficiente para 
cubrir las necesidades de la familia, los hogares calculan su consumo por el número 
de meses en los que compran arroz en sacos.    
 
? Respecto a los indicadores elegidos para medir la pobreza, ambos se basan directa o 
indirectamente en el concepto de la seguridad alimenticia, que en el caso de Camboya 
está intrínsecamente ligado al concepto de vulnerabilidad.  La conexión entre la 
seguridad alimenticia y el Gasto Alimentario Diario per cápita está clara pero también 
hay una conexión indirecta con el Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA.  En la metodología 
estadística utilizada para definir el Índice se barajaron dos posibles variables de 
referencia: el Gasto en Ropa y Calzado y el Gasto Alimentario.  Aunque el primero ya 
había producido buenos resultados en otros contextos geográficos, en este caso la 
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autora decidió basar el modelo estadístico en la variable de seguridad alimenticia, 
precisamente porque el concepto era compatible con el perfil de vulnerabilidad de los 
hogares rurales en Camboya y porque su uso permitía la inclusión de otras dos 
dimensiones clave de la vulnerabilidad a la pobreza (educación y salud).  Asímismo, 
hay otras variables incluidas en el Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA que cubren el 
concepto de vulnerabilidad definido por estudios cualitativos y cuantitativos.  
 
? Respecto a la inclusión en el análisis de resultados, el ejemplo más claro es el uso 
simultáneo de análisis en terciles y cuartiles.  Ambos se utilizan conjuntamente 
precisamente porque los hogares rurales que participaron en estudios con 
metodologías cualitativas participativas se auto-seleccionan con la misma frecuencia 
en tres categorías del bienestar (pobre, media, rica) como en cuatro categorías 
(paupérrima, pobre, media y rica).  El último ejemplo de cómo los resultados del 
análisis bibliográfico se han incorporado a este estudio es el uso la palabra “bienestar” 
en vez de la palabra “pobreza” al poner nombre al indicador del Índice de AMK-PCA.  
Nombrarlo “Índice de Bienestar” en lugar de “Índice de Pobreza,” es un intento 
consciente de centrarse en lo que los hogares rurales poseen y no en lo que les falta, y 
se inspira en el trabajo de Moser sobre la vulnerabilidad y la gestión de activos. 
 
La medición del nivel de pobreza en los clientes de microfinanzas ha de ceñirse al análisis de 
nuevos clientes en vez de utilizar los datos de todos los clientes.  La razón es que el nivel de 
pobreza actual de un cliente no debería ser el mismo que su nivel de pobreza en el momento 
de solicitar el primer préstamo, entre otras razones porque el acceso a los servicios 
microfinancieros debería haber contribuido a mejorar su situación.  En consecuencia, el grupo 
total de hogares de clientes se ha subdividido en tres categorías: clientes nuevos, principiantes 
y clientes fieles.  Los clientes nuevos son aquellos que solicitaron su primer préstamo hace un 
año o menos; los principiantes son aquellos que han sido clientes durante al menos un año 
pero menos de dos y los clientes fieles son aquellos que solicitaron su primer préstamo hace 
dos años o más.   
 
El Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA asigna a cada hogar rural una puntuación (cuanto más 
pequeña la cifra, más pobre es el hogar) pero sólo mide la pobreza en términos relativos y por 
lo tanto, sólo puede medir en qué medida un hogar está en peor situación o en mejor situación 
que otros hogares entrevistados.  Tres tipos de análisis se han llevado a cabo para establecer 
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las conclusiones concernientes al Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA: las frecuencias 
acumulativas del Índice para clientes y no-clientes, el Índice promedio para clientes y no-
clientes, y el análisis de terciles y cuartiles.   
 
Tanto el análisis de frecuencias acumulativas como el promedio del Índice muestran que los 
hogares de clientes tienden a ser más pobres que los hogares de no-clientes.  No obstante, el 
análisis más interesante para comparar la pobreza relativa de los clientes nuevos y el grupo de 
control de no-clientes lo proporciona el análisis de terciles y cuartiles. 
 
Una vez establecida la puntuación del Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA asignada a cada hogar 
entrevistado, el análisis de terciles divide a la población de hogares de control (los no-
clientes) en tres grupos iguales: pobres, medios y ricos, con 30 hogares en cada uno de estos 
grupos.  A continuación, se utilizan las dos cifras concretas del Índice del primer y último 
hogar de no-clientes en la categoría media para asignar los hogares de clientes en los mismos 
tres grupos.  Si la población general (representada por el grupo de control de no-clientes) y el 
grupo de clientes son similares en cuanto a su nivel de pobreza, la distribución proporcional 
de clientes y no-clientes también será similar, con un 33% de clientes en cada una de las tres 
categorías de pobreza: pobres, medios y ricos.  En caso contrario, cualquier variación en esta 
distribución relativa del grupo de hogares de clientes permitirá establecer las diferencias 
relativas en el nivel de pobreza.  El análisis en cuartiles sigue la misma lógica pero define 
cuatro categorías de pobreza: los más pobres, pobres, medios y ricos.   
 
Los resultados se presentan en los siguientes dos gráficos. 
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La conclusión principal del análisis de terciles sobre el Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA es que 
los hogares de clientes nuevos son más pobres que los hogares rurales en general: los clientes 
nuevos están sobre-representados en el tercil de la categoría de los pobres y sub-
representados en el tercil de la categoría de los más ricos.  Es decir, comparados con el grupo 
de control y proporcionalmente, entre los clientes de AMK hay más hogares pobres y menos 
hogares ricos.  Se obtiene la misma conclusión cuando el análisis se basa en cuatro grupos, 
con los clientes nuevos sobre-representados en la categoría de los pobres y en niveles 
similares en la categoría de los más pobres.  
 
Finalmente, se compara la cifra de Gasto Alimentario Diario per cápita con la cifra que define 
el umbral de pobreza alimenticio en las zonas rurales de Camboya (1.550 Rieles) y se 
concluye que los nuevos clientes de AMK son más pobres que el nivel de pobreza encontrado 
en la población rural general.  Las conclusiones del análisis se pueden observar gráficamente 
a través de histogramas (ver gráfico) o comparando porcentajes: el 75 por ciento de los 
nuevos clientes de AMK gastaron en alimentación menos que la cantidad necesaria para 
situarse por encima del umbral de pobreza alimenticia en las zonas rural de Camboya, 
mientras que sólo el 57 por ciento de los hogares de no-clientes gastaron menos de lo 
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La conclusión del estudio empírico es que proporcionalmente hay más pobres entre los 
clientes de AMK que en la población general de las zonas rurales; esta conclusión es




La comparación de las dos metodologías confirma su fiabilidad: el grupo de hogares de 
clientes clasificados como pobres (y más pobres) tiende a tener cifras de Gasto Alimentario 
por debajo del umbral de pobreza alimenticia.  Al mismo tiempo, los hogares de clientes 
Gastos Alimentarios Diarios por debajo del umbral de pobreza alimenticia tienden a ser 




Conclusiones y Aportaciones Fundamentales de la Tesis 
 
La conclusión principal de esta tesis doctoral es que la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad a la 
pobreza pueden evaluarse en los clientes de microfinanzas rurales utilizando dos 
metodologías de medición diferentes pero complementarias: el Índice de Bienestar AMK-
PCA que incorpora de forma estadísticamente rigurosa el concepto de multidimensionalidad 
de la pobreza y, simultáneamente, un indicador monetario simplificado que se concentra 
exclusivamente en el consumo de alimentos.   
 
Por último, cabe resaltar que los dos indicadores han incorporado, en distintas formas, la 
dimensión de seguridad alimenticia: el Índice de Bienestar AMK-PCA lo ha utilizado como 
variable de referencia y el indicador basado en el consumo alimentario ha monetizado el 
valor de la producción que se consume dentro de los hogares.  De todas las metodologías 
utilizadas para medir el nivel de pobreza de los clientes de microfinanzas, la autora no tiene 
conocimiento de ningún otro estudio que haya aplicado el concepto de seguridad alimenticia 
como variable de referencia en las distintas fases estadísticas requeridas por el Análisis de 
Componentes Principales, ni ningún otro estudio que monetice los alimentos producidos y 
consumidos dentro de los hogares en el cálculo del Gasto Alimentario Diario per cápita; 
ambos aspectos se sitúan entre las aportaciones fundamentales al área de conocimiento de 
esta tesis.  Otras aportaciones relevantes de esta tesis incluyen el análisis del sector 
microfinanciero camboyano y la síntesis del nuevo concepto de desempeño social.  
 
Las conclusiones de esta tesis tienen otras implicaciones más generales.  Meyer y Zeller 
(2002) en su análisis del “triángulo de las microfinanzas” alegan que la falta de metodologías 
rigurosas para medir el nivel de pobreza de los clientes de microfinanzas ha limitado el 
conocimiento de los efectos de la disfunción entre la sostenibilidad financiera, el nivel de 
pobreza de los clientes y el concepto de impacto.  Armendáriz de Aghion y Morduch (2005) 
argumentan que aún si existiera una metodología “perfecta” que permitiera probar un impacto 
neto positivo, éste no se traduciría instantáneamente en un éxito para la institución, porque el 
éxito de una microfinanciera ha de ser juzgado midiendo tanto los costes como los beneficios 
y requiere la inclusión del concepto de rentabilidad, así como la evaluación de otras 
alternativas para dar acceso a servicios microfinancieros.  Sharma y Buchenrieder (2002) 
señalan que el mayor reto es reducir los costes en la prestación de servicios financieros a la 
población pobre y que - independientemente del impacto alcanzado -, cualquier mejora en el 
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beneficio por dólar invertido dependerá de las innovaciones creadas por la microfinanciera 
para reducir estos costes.  Sólo aquellas microfinancieras (y sus accionistas) que cuenten con 
metodologías rigurosas podrán evaluar si están alcanzando los objetivos trazados respecto al 
desempeño financiero así como al desempeño social.  Y sólo esas instituciones podrán 
evaluar adecuadamente si las innovaciones de reducción de costes previstas en las estrategias 
a largo plazo están dando los frutos previstos y se crean sinergias en vez de disfunción entre 
el desempeño financiero y el desempeño social.  
 
Esta tesis doctoral ha podido demostrar que en el caso de AMK, no hay disfunción o 
descoordinación entre el desempeño financiero y el desempeño social sino más bien una 
sinergia entre ambos.  En AMK se ha alcanzado simultáneamente la sostenibilidad financiera, 
el incremento en el número de clientes, y el predominio de clientes pobres.  Así lo señala la 
comparación de los principales indicadores operativos desde el año 2003 al año 2006,  que 
permite evaluar su desempeño financiero, así como su estrategia de crecimiento en número de 
clientes y expansión geográfica.  Por su parte, la comparación de los resultados de las dos 
metodologías propuestas permite evaluar su desempeño en lo relativo al nivel de pobreza de 
los clientes que sirve.  Los datos y resultados hasta el momento no indican ningún tipo de 
disfunción entre ambos tipos de desempeño, sino que –muy al contrario – indican la 
existencia de sinergias claras.  AMK (2007b), Chetan (2007) y Torres et al. (2007) 
proporcionan información adicional y corroboran este concepto de sinergias y equilibrio entre 
el desempeño social y el desempeño financiero en AMK. 
 
La autora confía en que esta tesis doctoral pueda contribuir a mejorar el conocimiento 
cuantitativo respecto a las sinergias entre el nivel de pobreza de los clientes y la 
sostenibilidad financiera y en que el trabajo del equipo de gestión de AMK (y del 
departamento de investigación) continúe suministrando información para evaluar las 
sinergias entre el impacto, el nivel de pobreza de los clientes y la sostenibilidad financiera.  
 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
This dissertation explores how to best measure poverty and vulnerability in microfinance 
clients and provides the results of the test for Angkor Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea) 
(AMK) – a microfinance institution operating in rural Cambodia.   
 
The research is based on two main premises: that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon 
and that examining poverty necessarily implies incorporating the concept of vulnerability (to 
poverty).  Vulnerability is understood as the risk of falling into poverty in the future (even if 
the person is not necessarily poor now) and is used as a shorthand for “vulnerability to 
poverty” throughout this dissertation.  The concept has been included because of two main 
reasons: (i) in order to study poverty as a dynamic phenomenon, instead of as a static one, 
and (ii) because vulnerability is, in itself, an inherently important dimension of wellbeing.   
 
The main underlying hypothesis of this dissertation is that while it may not be possible to 
create a universal poverty measure applicable to (and useful for) all microfinance programs 
or institutions in the world, it is possible to create a system that is relevant for households in 
rural Cambodia.   
 
With this objective in mind, this paper is structured in four main sections: the first section 
provides an overview of how microfinance reaches the poor and how to measure the poverty 
levels of these clients; the second section discusses the Cambodian context; the third section 
tests the best tools selected in the case of AMK and the fourth section provides the main 
conclusions. 
 
After discussing the theoretical framework of rural finance and providing an overview of 
microfinance (approaches, methodologies and its most recent changes), the first section 
reviews the theoretical framework of poverty and vulnerability to poverty.  In order to find 
the best tool for measuring poverty, this dissertation first reviews the literature on poverty 
and vulnerability and provides examples of tools adapted by and for microfinance 
institutions.  Secondly, it reviews thoroughly the Cambodian context and its poverty profile, 
where poverty is markedly a rural phenomenon.  Both qualitative and quantitative studies on 
Cambodian rural households and poverty profiles are discussed.  This is because the objective 
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 is to find the best measuring tool available but also to adapt it to the reality where 
microfinance operates: the rural Cambodian context.   
 
As a direct consequence of the literature review, two complementary but distinct poverty 
measuring tools have been applied: a multidimensional but relative wellbeing score and a 
one-dimensional but absolute benchmark with the food poverty line.  The multidimensional 
relative poverty tool is based on Principal Component Analysis (AMK-PCA Wellbeing 
Score) and the absolute one-dimensional poverty tool is based on Daily Food Expenditure per 
capita.   
 
In the empirical case study, the survey tool is tested on AMK in order to construct both 
measuring tools.  Careful consideration is put into including the main highlights of the 
literature review on poverty and vulnerability as well as the findings of the poverty profile of 
rural Cambodia into the design of both the survey and measuring tools as well as into the 
actual analysis of the data.  The tools were tested in a survey of 360 AMK client households 
and a control group of 90 nonclients.   
 
The main conclusion of empirical case study is that AMK is, indeed, reaching poor clients: 
AMK clients are poorer than those generally found in the population of rural Cambodia.  The 
conclusions of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score are based on the results of three main 
analytical tools: the cumulative frequencies of the score for clients and nonclients, the 
average wellbeing score by client status and the results of the seniority and the tercile and 
quartile analysis.  The conclusions from benchmarking the Daily Food Expenditure per capita 
with the Food Poverty Line in rural areas are explored both through histograms and through 
percentile analysis.  The analysis also confirms that the results of both measuring tools are 





The motivation of this study has been the desire of the author to document the effects of 
access to microfinance on clients, employing the most solid methodology applicable.  The 
original intention was to write this dissertation about the impact of microfinance on poverty 
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 and vulnerability.  In fact, one of the empirical measuring tools discussed in this paper 
becomes the basis for a future impact assessment - specifically, the multidimensional 
household wellbeing score defined in this dissertation will be analyzed longitudinally over 
time to establish conclusions about its evolution, dividing the results by client and nonclient 
households.  That remains as future work and is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
However and in the meantime, this dissertation concentrates on the more humble but equally 
crucial aspect of measuring poverty and vulnerability to poverty.   
 
Some kind of disclaimer may also be necessary.  This research started in 2002.  At that time, 
the author approached Concern Worldwide in Cambodia in order to explore the possibility of 
using the precursor of AMK as a case study for this dissertation.  In turn, Concern Worldwide 
in Cambodia wanted to make sure that the results (and the processes) of any potential 
dissertation was to be useful for the microfinance institution itself.  In 2003, the author was 
hired by Concern Worldwide to become one of the managers of AMK, with the explicit aim 
of making sure that AMK became a “learning organization,” where robust systems would be 
set in place to better understand clients and their needs.   
 
The agreement was that the author was to concentrate on creating research systems that could 
be directly useful for the strategic and day-to-day decision-making of the microfinance 
institution (including market research along with other responsibilities not directly linked to 
research) and that research was to be undertaken at the highest levels - not only in a 
methodological sense but also ethically: research was meant to improve learning within 
AMK, not to provide rosy pictures for external audiences.  At the same time, research was 
meant to be as robust and sound as social science research can claim to be.  Inherent to the 
fact that the author is part of the management team within the microfinance institution was 
that the systems set in place and the capacity built over time were meant to stay in AMK and 
continue producing information useful for the management and for decision-making.  This is 
also the main reason why the original manuscript of this dissertation has been written in 
English - the author believes that the trust of the management and staff of both Concern 
Worldwide and AMK had to be reciprocated with transparent reporting on both the processes 
and the results.  The author also believes that transparency is part of the ethical legacy meant 
for the research department and that it is only fair to give back these results to the 
organizations that allowed unrestricted access to information and to resources. 
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 That said, resources were only used from AMK or Concern when directly relevant for the 
future or current benefit of the institution; all the analytical work presented in this dissertation 
is original and has been produced by the author.  The first section of this dissertation 
(Theoretical Framework) has been produced exclusively (and quite interruptedly) for this 
dissertation over the course of the last seven years and presents the literature review that is 
relevant for the topics this dissertation discusses.  The literature review on rural finance and 
microfinance draws from a research paper produced by the author in 2003 in order to obtain 
the DEA (Diploma de Estudios Avanzados, the Spanish equivalent to All But Dissertation 
status) from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, but has since been updated.  The 
literature review on poverty and vulnerability to poverty has been produced exclusively for 
this dissertation.  The second section of this dissertation (National, Sectoral and Institutional 
Context) draws on and updates previous original work by the author.  Specifically, the 
chapter on the historical context and the current economic and socio-political environment of 
Cambodia draws from the DEA research paper previously mentioned, but has been 
thoroughly updated, particularly regarding the poverty profile of Cambodia.  The chapter on 
rural finance and microfinance in Cambodia draws on the same research paper as well as on a 
paper on Rural Finance and the Microfinance Sector in Cambodia written by the author for 
the World Bank in 2004, which again has been thoroughly updated following the dynamic 
evolution of the microfinance industry in Cambodia.  The last chapter of this section provides 
a summary of Concern Worldwide and AMK as institutions; the section on AMK is based on 
the author’s original work under her marketing responsibilities within AMK.  Finally, the 
earlier drafts of the third section of the dissertation (Empirical Study) were produced by the 
author for AMK use during 2006.  This empirical section has thus, benefited from the 
feedback and thorough reviews of many of AMK’s staff, managers, directors and, 
particularly, the members of the Social Performance Committee, who have been instrumental 
in verifying the quality of the methodology and of the final output.   
 
In fact, this whole dissertation has benefited from the advice and support of many people 
throughout the whole process.  The author hopes that the list of acknowledgements give all 
the deserved credit and appreciation to the many people who have contributed enormously to 




 Structure of the paper 
 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows.  The First Section provides the underpinnings 
of the theoretical framework regarding microfinance as well as poverty and vulnerability 
measures.  Chapter I provides an overview of rural finance and Chapter II provides an 
overview of microfinance, arguing that microfinance defines a credit contract that reaches the 
poor by excluding the wealthy and better-off either directly or indirectly.  In addition, the last 
section of Chapter II provides an overview of the most recent changes in microfinance along 
the lines of financial sustainability, outreach, impact and social performance.  Chapter III 
explores the measurements of poverty and vulnerability to poverty, dividing the literature 
review between one-dimensional measures of poverty (monetary and non-monetary) and 
multidimensional tools (participatory and indicator-based methodologies).  The chapter 
reviews some key examples of poverty assessment tools applied by microfinance institutions 
and other emerging trends in measuring poverty, and establishes the reasons behind the 
choice of poverty measurement tools applied in the empirical section of this dissertation.   
 
The Second Section provides an overview of the Cambodian context, first the historical 
context and current economic and sociopolitical environment and then the rural finance and 
microfinance situation in the country (Chapters IV and V, respectively).  Chapter VI provides 
an overview of AMK, the institution used for the case study, and its evolution over time from 
a program of Concern Worldwide to a licensed independent Cambodian MFI.   
 
The Third Section provides the empirical study undertaken in AMK.  Chapter VII provides 
details on the methodology: the sample and its representativeness, the survey tool applied for 
both poverty measures; the construction of the AMK Wellbeing Score and the construction of 
the AMK Food Expenditure measure.  Chapter VIII analyzes the results of both measuring 
tools and compares their results. 
 
Finally, Chapter IX in the Fourth Section provides the overall conclusions of this dissertation, 




 SECTION 1 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The First Section covers the theoretical framework for microfinance and for measuring 
poverty and vulnerability.  Chapter I and Chapter II summarize the theoretical underpinnings 
of rural finance and microfinance answering the question of why microfinance is able to 
reach the poor when other rural finance programs have been unable to do so.  Chapter III 
explores the different methodologies to measure poverty and vulnerability to poverty as well 
as the experience of microfinance institutions to date. 
 
Chapter I discusses the change in paradigm from agriculture-led development towards a 
rural finance development approach in order to explore the reasons why the poor were 
excluded from the subsidized direct credit approach.  The theoretical framework of rural 
finance explains the economic theory behind the main barriers that prevent the formal 
financial markets from serving poor rural households and is based on the imperfection of 
credit markets and contract theory.  Microfinance (or more specifically microlending) defines 
a credit contract that reaches the poor by excluding the wealthy and better-off either directly 
(by not allowing them to be eligible for the program) or indirectly (by using a combination of 
the mechanisms explored in the chapter).   
 
Chapter II defines microfinance, its main features and characteristics and discusses its three 
main objectives: financial sustainability, outreach and impact. 
 
Chapter III deals with the theoretical framework for measuring poverty, and defines 
vulnerability as shorthand for “vulnerability to poverty.”  The chapter provides a brief 
summary of the different methodologies for measuring of poverty applied in the last decades 
and divides the conceptual framework into one-dimensional and multidimensional poverty 
measures.  The one-dimensional tools to measure poverty are further divided into monetary 
and non-monetary.  Multidimensional tools are further divided into participatory and 
indicator-based methodologies.  For each of the main categories, the chapter covers the 
microfinance experience measuring poverty to date.  The chapter also includes the most 
recent addition to the measuring poverty debate:  subjective measures of welfare and the 
concept of vulnerability.  Finally, the last section of the chapter summarizes the reasons 





 Chapter I  – RURAL FINANCE  
 
The theoretical framework of rural finance covers how economic theory explains the main 
barriers that prevent the formal financial markets from serving poor rural households.  The 
first section covers the change in paradigm towards a rural finance development approach to 
discuss why the poor were excluded from subsidized direct credit in the agriculture-led 
development approach.  The second section identifies the main barriers to providing credit as 
information and enforcement problems, further studying the direct and indirect mechanisms 
commonly used by microfinance to overcome these problems.   
 
A financial market is a market for the exchange of capital and credit in the economy and is 
divided into the money market and capital market.  Thus, the rural financial market refers to 
the relationships and transactions between buyers and sellers of financial assets who are 
active in rural economies; their transactions include borrowing, lending and the transfer of 
ownership of financial assets. 
 
The relationship between the development of financial markets and economic growth has 
been established: financial markets develop as a consequence of economic growth and, in 
turn, financial markets act as a stimulus to the growth of the real economy (Lewis, 1995).  
Levine (1997) summarized the literature of the various functions performed by the financial 
system in economic growth and development, while empirical studies have detailed the 
causal relationship between finance and development (World Bank, 2001 and Levine et al., 
2000).  Finance provides important services to an economy such as providing payment 
services; mobilizing savings; allocating credit; and allowing actors to price, pool and trade 
risks (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000).  Further empirical evidence has attempted to document 
how the development of financial markets can reduce income inequality and poverty levels in 
the developing world, both directly through widening the poor’s access to financial services 
and, indirectly, through the impact of financial development-led growth on poverty reduction 
(Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2001 and Westley, 2001). 
 
While there is little disagreement in the literature that the lack of access to reliable financial 
services is a major constraint for poverty reduction, how to best develop financial markets in 
developing countries has been a contentious issue. 
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In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, it was thought that poor people were too poor to save and that 
developing countries were too poor to mobilize savings internally.  The solution was, 
therefore, the transfer from rich countries to poor countries and the disbursement of cheap 
credit to the poor (Quiñones et al., 2001).  While this strategy referred to the financial 
markets, it was also embedded in a wider policy objective for the development of third world 
countries.  In the context of the green revolution, the main objective of this development 
strategy was to increase agricultural production (rather than rural development per se) and it 
focused on subsidizing interest rates on loans and directing subsidized credit to priority crops 
and borrowers.   
 
On the policy level, the last decades have witnessed a gradual shift from a paradigm of 
agricultural credit to an emphasis on rural development as a whole.  With respect to the 
financial markets, since the 1980s the assumption that the poor cannot save and that poor 
countries cannot internally mobilize savings has gradually shifted: the poor do save and, 
indeed, their marginal propensity to save is usually higher than that of the non-poor 
(Quiñones et al., 2001).   
 
 
The Change of Paradigm 
 
In the 1970s, policy makers began to realize that the substantial donor investments in 
agricultural development projects with credit components were not achieving the desired 
results: that is, they were not encouraging agricultural modernization and growth.  
Simultaneously, a new paradigm1 was gradually emerging.  The main three factors that 
fostered the shift towards this new paradigm were the failure of directed subsidized credit, the 
simultaneous success reported by microcredit programs and the shrinking of donor resources.  
This section will explore each in turn. 
 
According to Meyer and Nagarajan (2000), policy makers in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
assumed that farmers lacked access to formal credit, that informal lenders charged usurious 
                                                 
1 “… the term paradigm… stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values [and] techniques… shared by the 
members of a given [professional] community” (Kuhn, 1970:175 cited in Vogel and Adams, 1997) 
10 
 rates and that these informal loans were unsuitable for financing the productive investments 
considered essential for agricultural development.  Thus, supply-led directed agricultural 
credit policies were implemented with the objective of enabling small farmers to adopt new 
(and often riskier) crop technologies.  In turn, this was meant to shift poor rural households 
from subsistence agriculture towards commercial agriculture.  The standard approach was to 
set up state-owned specialized institutions that received concessional loans to be on-lent at 
below-market interest rates to targeted agricultural producers, for specific types of inputs or 
investments (Yaron et al. 1997).  During the 1970s, countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia 
and Mexico used directed credit as their primary development instrument (Vogel and Adams, 
1997). 
 
However, two events were instrumental in the shift away from the directed credit paradigm:  
the 1972/73 Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the 1975 World Conference on Credit for Farmers 
in Developing Countries held in Rome at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000).  The findings of these two events 
implicitly challenged the direct credit approach by offering a radically different vision.  The 
main conclusions are captured in the following ten points (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000: 37-
38): 
 
? Small farmer credit projects are part of a larger rural capital market.  Small farmers 
tend to have greater access to informal sources, and the major increases that occurred 
in the formal finance have mainly gone to larger farmers. 
? The introduction of special, subsidized agricultural credit programs inhibits 
commercial lenders from expanding into rural markets.  This helps perpetuate the 
dualism observed in rural financial markets. 
? Low interest rates (in both nominal and real terms) are the most contentious issue.  
Many analysts argue that low interest rate policies are a major factor determining the 
observed distorted patterns of credit allocation. 
? Preferential interest rates for small farmers are especially detrimental to improving 
access to formal loans, and are not an effective way to transfer income to small 
farmers. 
? Low interest rates are more important in determining the ability of institutions to 
cover costs and risks rather than they are in influencing farmer demand for loans.  The 
11 
 profitability of new technology, the supply of related farm inputs, and the prices 
received by producers are more important in determining farmer adoption than access 
to low interest loans. 
? When interest and other subsidies are provided, they should be utilized to build up 
institutions rather than passed on to farmers in low interest loans.  Savings 
mobilization should be given more emphasis in financial policies.  The low interest 
rates paid on savings are detrimental to rural savings mobilization. 
? Loan default rates are high and demand more attention but crop and credit insurance 
and loan guarantees are not likely to be good solutions for the problem. 
? The administrative costs of lending are high and require cost-reducing innovations 
such as partial service bank branches, mobile banks, village bank agents, and the 
creation of rural banks.  Group lending contributes potentially more to cost reduction 
than to improving debt recovery. 
? There is no single best type of institution to provide rural financial services.  
Commercial banks, agricultural development banks, and farm cooperatives have all 
experienced successes and failures in serving agriculture. 
? The benefits of small farmer credit projects may not cover costs.  When the conditions 
for successful credit projects are not met, other programs may be capable of raising 
small farmer welfare at lower costs.  
 
During the late 1970s and the 1980s, additional research was undertaken on rural financial 
markets.2  The results generally tended to support the critical observations made in the Spring 
Review and FAO conference as well as the follow-up World Bank and USAID-funded 
colloquium that took place in Washington DC in 1981.  The book Undermining Rural 
Development with Cheap Credit (Adams et al., 1984) summarized the factors that hampered 
the evolution of financial markets: agricultural credit programs served principally large 
farmers; had substantial amounts of credit funds diverted to other uses due to the fungibility 
of money; crowded out alternative funding sources (lack of savings mobilization); did not 
support a sustained expansion of new technologies by farmers; resulted in low bank profits; 
and did not service the total financial needs of farm households which include also non-farm 
and off-farm activities.  
 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Adams et al. (1984), Adams and Vogel (1986) and Braverman and Guasch (1986). 
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 In several cases, including countries in Latin America, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and 
Indonesia, large subsidized credit programs collapsed in the 1970s and early 1980s, adding to 
the criticism of the directed credit paradigm (Vogel and Adams, 1997).  According to Seibel 
(1994), loan recovery was poor because targeted farmers perceived the loans as a free gift and 
because loans of the wrong size were provided at the wrong moment for the wrong 
customers.  Thus, cheap credit undermined development rather than enhancing it. 
 
These ideas are still popularly known as the ‘Ohio School’ in honor of a group of economists 
at Ohio State University who provided the intellectual underpinning.3  Hulme and Mosley 
(1996) challenge the views of the Ohio School approach, stating that the fundamental 
problem is the School’s assumption (usually implicit rather than overt) that informal financial 
markets in developing countries are characterized by perfect competition and that those 
producers who can use credit productively are able to reap the advantages of such 
competition.  The authors argue that it is a cliché that such informal markets do exit and that 
when they to exist, they are often monopolistic (1996:4).  Further the authors state that in 
such a situation “it is disingenuous to propose ‘the closure of development finance 
institutions,’ hoping that the private sector will take up the slack, since that is the last thing 
which the private sector, anxious to limit its own risks, is likely to volunteer to do” (1996:5).  
However, Hulme and Mosley acknowledge the positive contributions of the Ohio School, 
noting the emphases on the behavior of financial markets as a whole rather than of individual 
institutions within those markets; on the practicalities of how voluntary savings are 
mobilized, and on the political threats to the viability of rural financial institutions (1996:3). 
 
Simultaneous to the documentation of the shortcomings of agricultural credit, studies began 
to appear documenting that the microcredit approach produced superior results.  The 
emergence of microfinance started in the 1970s and efforts gained momentum during the 
1980s, especially in Bolivia, Bangladesh and Indonesia.  One of the most well-known 
innovators was Professor Muhammad Yunus, who started an action-research project in 1976 
in the village of Jobra, Bangladesh that eventually would become known as the Grameen 
Bank. 4  Both Yunus and the Grameen Bank shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 "for their 
                                                 
3 The best-known members of the Ohio School are Dale Adams, Carlos Cuevas, Gordon Donald, Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega and J.D. Von Pischke (Hulme et al., 1996). 
4 Grameen transformed into a bank in 1983.  Grameen Bank is often considered to be the first organization to 
start microcredit.  However, Opportunity International (a not-for-profit religious organization) begun making 
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 efforts to create economic and social development from below" (El País, 2006).  By the mid-
1980s microfinance experiences were beginning to be researched systematically and by the 
early 1990s suggestions for best practice emerged (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000).   
 
Although Hulme and Mosley state that the Ohio School’s claim that interest rate subsidies are 
captured by the rich is not often put to the test, they also acknowledge the careful study of 
Costa Rica by Vogel (1984) that demonstrated that “approximately 80 percent of bank 
agricultural credit and hence about 80 percent of the subsidy went to the large farmers who 
received the largest 10 per cent of the loans” (1996:7).  Gonzalez-Vega (1984) provided 
additional information on how subsidized interest rates, which were designed to reach the 
poor, in fact benefited the rich who successfully competed to obtain scare resources.  The 
elites or the politically-connected entrepreneurs were able to benefit from subsidized credit 
through two main mechanisms: corruption and a better position to compete for credit.  In a 
corrupted credit delivery mechanism, the wealthy and powerful were able to tap the resources 
intended for a poorer segment of the population.  In the cases in which corruption was not an 
issue, credit still ended up in the hands of larger and wealthier farmers.  This was because 
lending to small farmers entailed higher delivery and transaction costs.  Because transaction 
costs tend to be constant per loan (regardless of the loan size) banks often preferred to 
allocate high-volume loans to a few larger farmers and thus they neglected the small farmers 
and the poor.   
 
As shown by the literature reviewed in this dissertation, in order to prevent the interest rate 
subsidy being captured by the rich, the Ohio School proposes to eliminate subsidies all 
together.  On the contrary, Morduch (2000) argues that the lesson from the failures of the 
1960s and 1970s is not to avoid subsidies altogether but rather to avoid excessive subsidies.  
Morduch further argues that while the problems are fully avoided when subsidies are 
eliminated, they may also be greatly reduced by just partial elimination of subsidies. For 
instance, loans at 0 percent real rates will seem appealing to the politically-powerful when 
their alternative, formal sector sources, charge 15 percent per year or less; however loans 
around 15-20 percent will seem much less appealing. At the same time, rates around 15-20 
                                                                                                                                                        
small-scale loans in Colombia in 1971 and Accion International started operating in Brazil in 1973 (Wampfler et 
al., 2006: 15).  Other similar key success stories include Pancho Otero with the Fundación para la Promoción y 
Desarrollo de la Microempresa (PRODEM) that eventually became BancoSol in Bolivia and the innovators 
developing the Unit Desas of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). 
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 percent provide meaningful subsidies for poor households but are not perceived as gifts 
(2000:9). 
 
Thus, there are two apparently contradictory arguments about the lessons learned from the 
failures in 1960s and 1970s: on one hand the Ohio School’s claim that subsidies must be 
eliminated and, on the other hand, an argument by Morduch that claims that what must be 
eliminated is excessive subsidies rather than eliminating subsidies all together.   
 
These two arguments, however, concur in two crucial points: (1) that there were failures in 
the last decades and that these failures were linked to the capture of the subsidies by the elites 
and (2) that direct subsidies in the interest rate are likely to benefit the elites unless these 
interest rates are set at a level that does not appeal to the elites and thus, the interest rate 
should be much closer to the level of market rates or the formal sector rates.  The first point 
provides the answer to why rural finance programs that offered subsidized directed credit 
have failed in reaching the poor.  This is further corroborated by the empirical evidence 
compiled by the Ohio School.  The second point of concurrence of both arguments will be 
further explored in the second section of this chapter to show how microfinance operators are 
able to reach the poor, in part by setting interest rates at levels that are unattractive for the 
elites.   
 
In fact, even Hulme and Mosley -who criticized the Ohio School’s proposition of ‘closing 
development finance institutions,’ in the hope that the private sector would take over the task- 
also acknowledge that since their critique to the Ohio School assumptions, “the financial 
landscape has changed over the last fifteen years in a way in which it makes the use of the 
term ‘development finance institution’ of questionable value.  This is due to the emergence of 
innovative financial institutions in the developing world that offer extremely varied solutions 
to both the screening and the enforcement problems” (1996:7).  These innovative financial 
institutions are precisely the microfinance institutions that will be discussed in Chapter II 
(page 29 onwards). 
 
The success of microfinance (and of microcredit in particular) and, more importantly, the 
existence of a better alternative to the directed credit approach undoubtedly contributed to the 
development of the new paradigm.   
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 Finally, the reduction of donor funding to directed credit offers a less sophisticated but 
equally important piece in the puzzle of the paradigm shift: subsidized credit programs was 
not reaching the poor and not recovering loans, while microfinance presented the possibility 
not only of reaching the poor but also of doing so in a sustainable way and thus becoming 
(eventually) independent of donor funding.   
 
This reduction of donor funding has affected all development interventions: the Official 
Development Aid (ODA) from rich countries never reached the target of 0.7 percent of total 
gross national income (GNI) recommended by the UN back in 1970.  The ODA was 0.52 
percent in 1960-61 but remained at 0.33 percent in 1970-71 and 1980-81, increasing 
marginally to 0.34 percent in 1990-91 (Fürher, 1996: 42).5  In addition, the rural development 
funding available was gradually shifting towards a more pragmatic approach after bilateral 
and multilateral donor started publicly accepting the failures of subsidized credit programs 
and signing on principles of “best practice.”  Some examples include the “Pink Book” in 
1995,6 the “Key Principles of Microfinance” endorsed by the group of eight most 
industrialized nations in June 20047 or the “Building Inclusive Financial Systems: Donor 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Microfinance” in December 2004, where these key principles 
were translated into concrete operational guidance for donor staff (Helms, 2004).8   
 
All of these factors collided gradually, encouraging the shift, starting in the 1980s, from the 
old paradigm of directed subsidized credit to a new paradigm oriented towards financial 
market efficiency (Robinson, 1997; Vogel and Adams, 1997; Adams, 1998).  The new 
financial system development approach emerged in the 1990s with the dual aim of creating 
                                                 
5 ODA as a percentage of GNI currently remains at just 0.3 percent of GNI (with the exceptions of Denmark, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands Norway and Sweden).  Donors argue that this reduction in ODA comes from a 
fatigue of the limited effectiveness of development aid (Ortiz, 2007:2).   
6 The full title of the Pink Book is “Guiding Principles for Selecting and Supporting Intermediaries,” and was 
jointly developed by the Donors’ Working Group on Financial Sector Development and the Committee of 
Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development. 
7 G8 is composed by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and U.S.A.  These Principles were 
drawn up by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a consortium of 28 public and private member 
donors and a clearinghouse for microfinance. 
8 It is estimated that the donor community (i.e. public bilateral and multilateral agencies) spent US$800 million–
US$1 billion per year on microfinance.  However, “the funding landscape for microfinance looks radically 
different today from how it looked 10 years ago” (GGAP, 2006).  As Reille and Forster (2008) state 
“Microfinance is experiencing an unprecedented investment boom.  The past five years have seen remarkable 
increases in the volume of global microfinance investments. Between 2004 and 2006, the stock of foreign 
capital investment—covering both debt and equity—more than tripled to US$4 billion.  The entry of private 
investors is the most notable change in the microfinance investment marketplace” “Today there is an 
increasingly sophisticated network of international private investors looking for ways to invest in microfinance 
on an ever larger scale” (2008:1, 15). 
16 
 an infrastructure for the provision of effective financial intermediation services and creating 
efficient and viable financial institutions.  The key aspects are outreach, sustainability and 
performance with emphasis on market orientation, decentralization and savings mobilization.  
Thus, the rural financial system development approach covers all financial institutions, 
financial markets and instruments; the legal and regulatory environment; and financial norms 
and behavior (FAO and GTZ, 1998).  In other words, the new financial market paradigm 
adopted a three pronged framework for building financial markets: creating the policy 
environment, building financial infrastructure and developing institutions that combine good 
client outreach with financially sustainable services.  Table I-1 provides a brief summary of 
the main features of both paradigms. 
 
Table I-1: Main Features of the Paradigms 
Features Directed Credit Paradigm (old) Financial Market Paradigm (new) 
Problem definition Overcome market imperfections Reduce risks and transaction costs 
Role of financial 
markets 
- Promote new technology 
- Stimulate production 
- Implement state plans 
- Help the poor 
Intermediate resources more efficiently 
View of users Borrowers as beneficiaries selected by targeting 
Borrowers and depositors as clients 
choosing products 
Subsidies Large subsidies through interest rates and loan default. 
Few subsidies; Create independent 
institutions 
Sources of funds Governments and donors Mostly voluntary deposits 
Associated information 
systems Designed for donors Designed for management 
Sustainability Largely ignored A major concern 
Evaluations  Credit impact on beneficiaries  Performance of financial institutions 
Source: Adapted from Adams, Dale W. (1998) 
 
 
While the change in paradigm from directed credit to the financial system development 
approach reflected the changes at the financial market level, at the policy level it reflected a 
wider change from agriculture-led development to rural finance development.  Thus, by the 
late 1980s the focus on agricultural credit expanded to a wider perspective of rural finance, 
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 encompassing the financing of both farming and rural non-farm activities, as well as local 
savings mobilization by the same rural financial institutions.9   
 
Interestingly enough, evidence from this new paradigm shift and new policy thinking is more 
frequently found in microfinance than in rural finance policies per se (Meyer and Nagarajan, 
2000).  By 1997, only a few countries such as Chile and El Salvador applied the new 
financial market paradigm countrywide.  Partial adoption to specific institutions or sectors 
took place in the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, and Uganda.  
Reforms of credit unions in Guatemala, Honduras and Niger also used the new paradigm 
(Vogel and Adams, 1997).  One of the most commonly mentioned adherents of the new 
paradigm was Indonesia, with the transformation of the Bank Rakjat Indonesia (BRI) from a 
near-extinct state to a success story (Robinson, 2001).   
 
Vogel and Adams (1997) argue that the new paradigm’s relatively short list of success stories 
is due to the time required for implementation: while a program following a directed credit 
approach can lend funds very quickly once a need has been identified, the general reforms 
and the institutional development required by the financial market paradigm may require a 
decade to show effects (e.g. the reforms in BRI).  According to Yaron and Benjamin, the new 
paradigm has spread relatively slowly in many countries, owing in large measure to vested 
interests in the traditional model and to the challenges involved in selecting and 
implementing a sharply different set of policy alternatives and institutional designs 
(2002:339). 
 
Simultaneously with the failure of subsidized direct credit and paradigm shift, the literature 
started to discuss the success of microfinance.  The last section of this chapter will provide an 
overview of the main barriers to providing credit according to economic theory as well as the 
theoretical underpinnings of why microfinance has been able to overcome these barriers.  
Chapter II will delve into the specific characteristics of microfinance, common institutional 
structures, approaches and delivery methodologies applied.   
 
 
                                                 
9 Regarding the rural non-farm economy and activities, income data from household surveys has revealed that 
non-farm activities are even more important than suggested by the employment data because the income 
estimates include non-farm work performed by farm households (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000:11). 
18 
 Theoretical Framework: Imperfection of Credit Markets and Contract Theory 
 
Poor households were not usually served by formal financial institutions because they were 
thought to be unable to save and too risky as borrowers.  On the savings side, poor 
households were thought to be unable to save by definition: the poor cannot save precisely 
because they are too poor and therefore do not have extra cash.  On the lending side, 
traditional commercial banks (and the formal financial sector in general) typically had no 
interest in lending to poor rural households because of their lack of viable collateral and the 
high transaction costs associated with the small loans that are best suited to them (Diagne et 
al., 2001).  The lack of collateral becomes a deterrent for the formal lender because it 
increases the lender’s risks in case of default.10  Furthermore, lending to the poor is 
associated with high transaction costs because the transaction costs are a fixed cost regardless 
of the size of the loan.  Thus the costs for the bank (or formal lender) to lend a given amount 
of money are much higher when providing a multitude of small loans to a multitude of 
borrowers, as opposed to offering larger loans to fewer borrowers.  When the potential 
borrower is poor, he is more likely to demand loans of small sizes, and thus increase the 
lender’s transaction costs.  Additionally, the poor are not likely to offer business plans 
specifying their intended use of the loan and this increases the costs for the lender to assess 
the likelihood of repayment. 
 
There is little controversy in the literature about the fact that the formal credit markets have 
not been able to reach the poor.  The theoretical frameworks that attempt to explain why this 
is the case can be found in the imperfection of credit markets and contract theory.   
 
 
Imperfection of Credit Markets 
 
According to Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) the problems of serving poor households are explained 
by economic theory through the imperfection of credit markets.  Here, the imperfection of 
credit markets refers to both imperfect information and imperfect enforcement.  These 
                                                 
10 The financial contractual procedures usually applied by formal financial institutions to dilute the risk cannot 
be applied because the poor lack collateral.  It can be argued that the same is true when there is a lack of an 
adequate legal system to guarantee repossession of collateral in case of default. 
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 information and enforcement problems reinforce one another and under such conditions, 
markets for credit and insurance may not exist (Hulme et al. 1996:2).   
 
When examining rural credit markets, Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) identify three important 
problems from the lender’s point of view that make the rural credit markets behave the way 
they do: the screening problem, the incentives problem and the enforcement problem.  The 
screening problem (or adverse selection problem) refers to the fact that borrowers differ in 
the likelihood that they will default and it is costly to determine the extent of that risk for 
each borrower; that is, it is costly to acquire information about the characteristics of loan 
applicants.  The incentives problem (or moral hazard problem) refers to the fact that it is 
costly to ensure that borrowers take those actions which make repayment most likely.  Thus, 
while the screening problem refers to the asymmetries of information that exist at the time of 
contracting, moral hazard refers to the asymmetries of information that develop subsequent to 
the signing of a contract.11  The third problem is the enforcement problem (or willingness to 
pay problem) and refers to the fact that it is difficult to compel repayment – that is, it is 
difficult to implement mechanisms to increase the likelihood of repayment by individuals 
who are able to do so (1990: 137). 
 
Hoff and Stiglitz also summarize the main mechanisms for solving these information and 
enforcement problems.  These mechanisms can be divided into direct and indirect 
mechanisms.  Direct mechanisms are the ones in which the lender expends resources to 
screen applicants and enforce loans.  Indirect mechanisms concentrate on the lender 
designing contracts such that when a borrower responds to these contracts in her own interest, 
the lender obtains information about the riskiness of the borrower; at the same time, the 
contract induces the borrower to take actions to reduce the likelihood of default and to repay 
the loan whenever he/she has the resources to do so (1990: 238). 
 
                                                 
11 The literature’s use of the term moral hazard is not entirely uniform.  The term “moral hazard” originates in 
the insurance literature, which first focused attention on two types of information imperfections: the “moral 
hazard” that arises when an insurance company cannot observe whether the insured exerts effort to prevent a 
loss and the “adverse selection” problem that occurs when the insured knows more than the company at the time 
he purchases a policy about his or her likelihood of an accident.  However, some authors use moral hazard to 
refer to either the hidden action or the hidden information variants of the principal-agent problem (Mas-Colell et 
al., 1995:477).  The most common use of the term refers to moral hazard as the original sense of the hidden 
action problem and this is the use referred to in this dissertation.   
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 An example of an indirect mechanism is the interest rate.  The level of interest rate has a dual 
function in credit markets: it sets the price and it also functions as a screening and incentive 
mechanism.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that, given adequate circumstances, a high 
interest rate induces applicants to undertake projects with lower probability of success but 
higher payoffs when successful.  Therefore, banks may be able to increase their profits by 
lowering their interest rates to borrowers, because such a measure would lead to a higher 
proportion of ‘safe types’ in the portfolio, maximizing the lender’s profit.  Thus, the interest 
rate is not only the price of the loan; it is also a screening and incentive mechanism that 
‘filters’ applicants and it affects the quality of the loan in a manner that matters to the lender. 
 
According to Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) other indirect mechanisms and devices commonly used 
in the rural credit markets include the reputation effect; market interlinkages; regular 
repayment schedules; collateral substitutes; social sanctions; and collateral and usufruct 
loans.  The reputation effect (also known as progressive or step lending) induces the desired 
borrower behavior by lending small amounts and increasing loan size only upon satisfactory 
payments, with the threat to cut-off credit.12  Market interlinkages refer to the usage of 
contractual terms of other exchanges to affect the probability of default, as in the case of a 
lender who is also a landowner or a merchant.  For instance, a trader-lender might decide to 
offer the borrower pesticides at lower prices because that will reduce the borrower’s 
probability of default.  Regular repayment schedules screen out undisciplined borrowers.  
Collateral substitutes might include forced savings, or assets that do not have enough salvage 
value to be considered collateral but that are of sentimental value to the borrower and it is 
judged that the pledged items would be particularly problematic for the households to give-
up.  Social sanctions as used in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) are also 
efficient mechanisms.13  Lastly, collateral and usufruct loans are those in which the lender 
occupies and uses the land of the borrower until the principal is repaid.  
 
The mechanisms of collateral and usufruct loans are used in financial markets, but rarely in 
microfinance; and market interlinkages are used almost exclusively by moneylenders.  
                                                 
12 However, this mechanism only works if the borrower has some gain to achieve.  Morduch argues that in 
“progressive lending,” the threat to cut-off credit will not be effective in the last loan contract because the 
borrower will not have any incentive to repay the last loan (Morduch, 1999). 
13 ROSCAs explicitly pool savings and tie loans to deposits.  Members are usually familiar with each other and 
contribute a central sum every day, week or month.  The total sum of the savings is distributed to each member 
in turns and the ROSCA will dissolve or start a new cycle once all the members have had their turn.  More 
information on how ROSCAs link savings and loans is available in Besley et al. (1993). 
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 However, the other indirect mechanisms (progressive lending, regular repayment schedules, 
collateral substitutes and social sanctions) are commonly used in microfinance.   
 
 
Contract Theory: Why is microfinance able to reach the poor? 
 
Contract theory deals with the mechanisms that attempt to create a credit contract which 
satisfies the needs of the lender and the borrower.  According to Banerjee (2001), contract 
theory arguments in development economics go back at least to the work of Johnson in the 
1940s and 1950s in the context of land markets.  Stiglitz, in his 1974 paper on sharecropping, 
started a tradition of formal contract theory models that seek to explain why landlords and 
tenants often settle into arrangements that are, at least apparently, less than first best efficient.  
Similar principles have since been applied to the study of all the other important markets: 
capital, insurance and human capital (Banerjee, 2001:2). 
 
Indeed, most of these mechanisms are, in practice, used in sets: they are combined to achieve 
the specific objectives of the microfinance institution.  As discussed below, microfinance’s 
main achievements is to overcome these information and enforcement problems and reach 
poor rural households precisely by combining mechanisms created to serve the poor and 
exclude the rich. 
 
According to Hulme and Mosley (1996), credit must address three problems: (i) how to 
ensure that large numbers of poor borrowers can access loans; (ii) how to provide a 
mechanism for screening out bad borrowers, both in terms of character and in terms of 
projects in the absence of written records and business plans; and (iii) how to give borrowers 
who cannot offer collateral an incentive to repay or, failing this, compel them to repay on 
time.  According to the authors, each of these problems can be tackled in different ways by 
mechanisms that are often complementary.  The access problems can be overcome either 
directly, by excluding borrowers who are ‘too rich’ to be eligible, or indirectly by charging 
market-related interest rates (which do not encourage elite capture of loans); by providing 
loans so small that only the poor will want them; or by adopting requirements to which the 
wealthy will not agree (e.g. compulsory attendance at weekly meetings or contributions of 
physical labor).  The screening problems can be tackled by abandoning direct interest rate 
22 
 subsidies, so that borrowers take loans on the basis of prospective returns and not simply to 
capture subsidies; by providing loans for ‘fail-safe’ technical packages, fertilizer or milch 
cow rearing, that ‘cannot go wrong’; by using borrower groups to screen for both character 
and proposed loan use; or by using local power structures so that senior local officials have to 
approve loan applications.  The incentive to repay problem can be approached by the use of 
either sticks or carrots.  “Sticks” may include intensive loan monitoring and supervision, 
either directly by the lender or indirectly through joint liability groups while “carrots” may 
include offering progressively larger loans for good borrowers, or rewards to borrowers, bank 
staff, and even local officials for achieving repayment targets.  If all of this fails, compulsory 
savings schemes can be developed alongside the credit operations which will partially insure 
the lender against default (1996:8). 
 
On a more theoretical ground, what microfinance institutions have in effect done is to apply 
innovative credit contracts (which rely partly or exclusively on monitoring by the lender or 
the borrower’s peers) to serve borrowers who have little or no collateral (Madajewicz, 
2000:1). 14  At the same time microfinance institutions report loan repayment rates that are in 
almost all cases above 95 percent (Morduch, 1999: 1571). 
 
The success of microfinance programs is often correlated with (i) being subsidy free and with 
(ii) enforcing joint liability mechanisms, involving borrowers in sharing information and in 
decision-making.  Regarding the first, the absence of subsidy in microfinance is expected to 
(a) provide discipline and give borrowers an incentive not to try to grab more credit than they 
can afford to re-pay; (b) discourage the relatively wealthy from monopolizing the service; 
and (c) discourage management from trying to establish or expand programs mainly to get 
access to subsidies, patronage, rent-seeking or other improper benefits that these might 
generate (Yaron, 1992). 
 
Regarding the enforcement of joint liability mechanisms, Stiglitz (1990) sees group lending 
as a solution to high transaction costs in both identifying reliable borrowers and ensuring 
repayment; group lending becomes a solution because the group members engage in peer 
monitoring.  Microfinance schemes that focus on group-lending are able to overcome some of 
the problems cited above because a member will only participate in a group if it is composed 
                                                 
14 See Navajas et al. (2003) for a discussion of the adaptation of the terms of loan contracts for BancoSol and 
Caja Los Andes within the competitive environment of Bolivia. 
23 
 of other individual members who are likely to repay, and because in case of individual 
default, members jointly assume the repayment obligations.  The underlying assumption is 
that in group-lending, the potential defaulter will incur other “social costs” that create the 
incentive to repay.  Social costs are not included in the contract of the lender but refer to 
concepts such as loss of reputation in the community, loss of face and loss of trust.  Stiglitz 
(1990) further argues that peer monitoring has a cost and that it transfers risk from the 
lender/bank (which is supposedly in a better position to assume risks) to the cosigner of the 
loan; but joint-liability is of interest to the borrower because this transfer of risk leads to an 
improvement in the borrower’s welfare.  Although there is no theoretical basis for group 
contracts not to require collateral, in practice individual contracts tend to ask for collateral 
while group contracts tend not to require collateral.  Regarding individual contracts, 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (1999) provide an interesting argument of how the 
mechanisms generally used in group contracts can be potentially used in individual contracts 
as well.15 
 
Since the majority of the portfolio of the AMK case study follows a group-lending 
methodology, the following paragraphs will describe in detail how the credit contract for 
group-lending is able to overcome the screening, incentive and enforcement problems. 
 
Regarding the screening problem, groups tend to form with homogeneous types of risk-
bearers: safer types will tend to look for peers that are also safe types and risky types will 
tend to group together because safer types will not want them as peers.  This behavior is 
based on the assumption that applicants have more information about their possible peers 
than the lender or that they can obtain this information at no cost or at a cost they are willing 
to bear.16   
 
                                                 
15 The same authors in a more recent book state that “Empirical research on group lending lags behind theory, 
but the data so far suggest important challenges to the generally optimistic tenor of the theoretical research.” 
(2005:114) 
16 A safer type knows that associating with a risky type increases the probability that they will end up paying the 
debt of the risky ones (because risky applicants will invest in projects that, although having higher returns when 
successful, also have higher probabilities of failure).  If the project of the risky applicant has a higher probability 
of default and he is associated with a safe type and both are liable for the loan, that will imply that the safe type 
will have a higher probability of ending up paying his/her peer’s debt.  Thus, the safe type will prefer to 
associate with another safe type because that association reduces the probability of assuming someone else’s 
debt.  Even in the event that the risky type would try to offer the safe type an amount of money that pays-off for 
the increase in probability of having to repay someone else’s debt, this amount of money will not make the 
agreement worthwhile for the safe type (assuming that the terms of the contract are well designed and 
implemented). 
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 Regarding the incentive or moral hazard problem, if a group is jointly responsible for the loan 
then the group members will monitor each other (peer monitoring) to guarantee that the 
actions taken by each of the members will be “safe actions”.  The assumption, again, is that 
peers have access to information that the lender does not have or, if it is the case that 
obtaining the information is costly, then the peers are willing to undertake those costs 
because they are lower than the likely benefits from the loan.17  
 
Regarding the enforcement problem, since the group is jointly responsible for the repayment 
of the loan even if one member is unwilling to pay, the rest of the group members will force 
him or her repay or they will need to cover his or her debt and comply with the total 
repayment, i.e. peers will repay the loan of the one who cannot repay when their own benefit 
is at risk.18   
 
Both academics and practitioners agree that the specific implementation mechanism of a 
group-lending scheme is the key to its success.  Some of these implementation characteristics 
that have led to success have been pointed out by different studies.  Among them, it is 
thought that success depends on the participation of homogeneous groups (self-selection 
logic) that are jointly reliable and assume monitoring responsibilities, the ability to deny 
access to future credit to all group members if one of them defaults and (sometimes) the 
introduction of compulsory savings that are repaid only when the group loan is repaid fully.  
However, the specific combination of mechanisms a scheme will apply will depend on the 
concrete objectives of the microfinance institution and the conditions of the country or region 
where it operates.  A summary of some of the possible advantages and disadvantages of using 
groups as a delivery mechanism is provided in Table I-2 below.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Varian (1990) analyzed the group incentive scheme of having agents monitoring the performance of other 
agents in the specific case of the Grameen Bank to reach similar conclusions about the benefits of peer 
monitoring to solve incentive problems.  
18 However, there is also the risk that the whole group might default, even when some member would have 
repaid under individual lending.  This is because if the majority does not pay, the incentive for the individual to 
repay decreases or simply disappears.  In order to mitigate this latter problem, microfinance programs focus on 
social collateral (Besley and Coate, 1995). 
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 Table I-2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Group Loans 
Possible Advantages of Using Groups Possible Disadvantages of Using Groups 
• Mitigation of information asymmetry. 
• Reduction of moral hazard. 
• Group lending lowers costs of client selection, 
enforcement and collection (economies of scale and 
economies of scope).  
• It can reach the very poor (it substitutes individual 
collateral for joint liability). 
• The meetings become an opportunity for distributing 
information about productivity or social messages. 
• It can improve savings mobilization (especially if 
incentives are incorporated). 
• It can be based where the clients live or in the 
workplace (on-site or nearby delivery). 
o Covariance risks. 
o Increased transaction costs to borrowers. 
o Often they have high set-up costs.  
o Poor records and lack of contract enforcement.  
Also, in some occasions, covering other members’ 
debts in case of default might be difficult to enforce. 
o Elites might control the flow of services to their 
benefit or one powerful leader might control the 
whole group. Also, there is a risk of weakening in 
the group if the group-leader departs. 
o If there are repayment problems there might be a 
domino effect (all borrowers will default). 
o Group methodology might not fit heterogeneous 
groups. 
o Limited loan sizes often do not respond to the 
increasing needs of borrowers. 
Sources: Joanna Ledgerwood, 1999; Yaron & Piprek, 1997;  
and Mike Goldberg presentation (DL Microfinance October 18, 2001)19 
 
Practitioners have also been prolific in identifying the factors of success for microlending 
schemes.  In the case of individual lending, success seems to require frequent and close 
contact with the individual client and to provide credit products tailored to the specific need 
of his/her business.  Likewise, it is likely to be more successful for larger, urban-based, 
production-oriented business and for clients who have some form of collateral.  In group-
based approaches success seems to be linked to the following factors:  performance is likely 
to improve by imposing group penalties/incentives (e.g. no member will receive another loan 
if other group members default); repeated loans that increase gradually according to the 
borrower’s performance allows for screening out bad risks; disbursement schedules to group 
members that are based on the repayment performance of other members are likely to 
improve repayment rates; and small and homogeneous self-selected groups tend to be more 
effective.  Additionally, many group-based programs target the very poor (Ledgerwood, 1999 
and WBI, 2001b).  Indeed, the rigorous study performed by Navajas et al. (2000) in five 
                                                 
19 A brief summary of the definitions employed in the argument follows:  
Information asymmetry: The lender/bank/MFI lacks information about potential borrowers but the group has 
knowledge of the individual members such as their economic situation, their creditworthiness, etc.   
Moral hazard (hidden actions): The lenders are unable to observe the behavior of the borrowers regarding the 
loan (e.g. are they investing it in the activity they stated they would?).  Solidarity methodology allows for group-
supervision and monitoring as opposed to lender-supervision.   
Economies of scale: larger clientele with minimal increases in operating costs.  
Economies of scope: Increased capacity to deliver multiple services through the same group-mechanism.  
Covariance risks: The risk increases if the group is homogeneous and they all invest in the same production 
activity.  Transaction costs: The cost of time and voluntary management functions the borrowers are likely to 
incur. 
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 microfinance institutions in Bolivia finds that group lenders reach the poorest better than 
individual lenders and that rural lenders show a larger share of the poorest in their portfolio.20   
 
Madajewicz (2000) suggests that while for the poorest of the poor, group-loans with peer-
monitoring offer higher utility, individual loans (unmonitored or lender-monitored contracts) 
may offer higher utility to the wealthier among credit-constrained borrowers.21  As was 
discussed before, in practice there seems to be a higher tendency towards group lending in 
rural areas and a higher tendency towards individual lending in urban settings.  Studies also 
seem to suggest that group lending is more efficient in rural settings because communities are 
more tightly integrated and thus the social costs of defaulting are higher –thus decreasing the 
lender’s risk.   
 
The theoretical framework so far refers to the lending side of financial services and how 
economic theory explains why formal financial institutions are generally not interested in 
lending to poor rural households.  The reason is that the great majority of the literature about 
rural financial markets and their difficulty in reaching the poor refers to lending.  However, it 
should also be noted that formal financial institutions have not been particularly interested in 
providing other financial services such as savings.  Firstly, as noted in the previous section, 
for decades it was thought that the poor were, by definition, too poor to save and thus, formal 
financial institutions never thought about providing savings services.  Even when empirical 
evidence demonstrated that, actually, the poor do save,22 the high transaction costs of 
mobilizing a multitude of very small deposits was likely a powerful deterrent.  Nevertheless 
there is a very crucial difference between savings and credit:  savings mobilization does not 
imply risk for the lender, but rather for the client or depositor.  Thus the economic logic of 
why formal financial institutions have not attempted to offer savings services in the rural 
markets relies almost exclusively on the high costs involved in mobilizing a multitude of 
small savings and not in the risks involved in the operations.  This is one of the reasons why 
                                                 
20 Note however that urban lenders had more borrowers, and thus, the share of the urban poorest who were 
borrowers exceeded the share of the rural poorest that were borrowers. 
21 The implications of the Madajewicz’s study is that if both types of contracts are available (instead of a single 
contract which is the norm) the wealthier among the poor would benefit from access to individual loans instead 
of being restricted to group-loans and that different patterns of income growth for individual versus group loan 
programs could emerge.  This is because individual contracts tend to give a larger loan and thus they will likely 
produce larger profits when invested. Madajewicz’s evidence from Bangladesh further suggests that group loans 
have a larger impact on the business profits of poorer borrowers while the profits of wealthier borrowers are 
higher if individual loans are available (Madajewicz, 2000). 
22 See for example Deaton (1992) or Paxson (1992), as referred to in Kochar (2002). 
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 the literature is less prolific on rural financial markets in general while very prolific on rural 
credit markets in particular. 
 
Despite the fact that microfinance’s success has provided invaluable tools to better serve poor 
households, microfinance is not a panacea that will solve all poverty problems.  This is even 
more truthful when related to rural poverty.  Indeed, rural areas present especially difficult 
and costly problems in the provision of financial services.  It is no coincidence that many 
microfinance institutions serve urban clientele and that if they operate in rural areas, their 
lending methodologies tend to favor the non-farm trade and handicraft sector.  In fact, few 
microfinance institutions provide seasonal and term loans for crop, agro-forestry and 
livestock production and related processing and marketing of agricultural products.  This is 
mainly due to the specific conditions of rural areas, such as lower population density; lower 
level of transport and communication infrastructure; covariant risks in production and 
consumption; seasonality and lumpiness of agricultural cash flows; lower human capital; 
larger loan amounts and an urban bias in governmental policies.  Servicing rural poor 
households requires more than mere adaptation of models and best practices in microfinance 
(Zeller, 2003; Meyer and Zeller, 2002). 
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 Chapter II  – MICROFINANCE 
 
Chapter II defines microfinance, its main features and characteristics, common institutional 
structures, approaches and delivery methodologies applied.  The last section of the chapter 
covers the most recent developments in microfinance alongside the concepts of financial 
sustainability, outreach, impact and social performance. 
 
 
While most of the literature centers in microcredit or microlending, a conscious effort is 
made in this literature review to expand the discussion to microfinance in general and not 
only to the provision of credit or credit services.  However, the section that covers how 
microcredit overcomes market failures is obviously exclusively focused on microlending 
because that is where market risks for the lender concentrate in a way in which they would 
normally deter institutions from servicing rural markets.  A conscious effort is also made to 
summarize information about the diverse approaches undertaken by different Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs), with the aim of constantly reminding the reader that microfinance is not 
“a one size fits all” approach that can be replicated endlessly to overcome market failures and 
achieve success. 
 
Microlending institutions are intended to provide credit to those households that have limited 
access to credit, either because they are excluded from the formal lending institutions’ client 
pool, because families and friends cannot help or because moneylenders charge a rate that 
they cannot afford.  Poor households may lack access to formal lending institutions but are 
likely to be served by informal lending institutions.  These informal lending institutions may 
or may not have an explicit cost.  If poor households are served by family, friends or 
neighbors, these loans might not have an explicit economic cost but they might have some 
social costs (some future obligation might be expected by the lender).  If poor households are 
served by moneylenders they will likely be charged an explicit economic cost for the credit.23  
 
At the same time, as the field of microfinance develops, the focus is changing from the 
delivery of credit-only services to true financial intermediation.  Microfinance showed in 
                                                 
23 Moneylenders tend to charge high interest rates, but some studies have shown that this rate is not usurious but 
actually reflects the full costs that moneylenders have to bear: cost of capital (which includes unrecoverable 
loans), overhead, screening and monitoring, and pursuing delinquent loans (Aleem, 1990). 
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 practice that when choosing appropriate mechanisms, poor clients could both achieve high 
repayment rates for credit (even over the average of commercial banks) and be able to save.  
In the words of Hulme et al.: “what has now been established beyond all doubt, however, is 
that the option of lending at the bottom end of the capital market exists, and is not a financial 
black hole, if design is correctly done and the accompanying policy environment is not 
actively adverse […] it is possible to establish lending institutions which, given the choice 




Definition of Microfinance 
 
Microfinance is simply the supply of financial services to the poor, such as credit, savings, 
insurance or remittances.  Robinson provides a more elaborate definition: “microfinance 
refers to small-scale financial services –primarily credit and savings– provided to people who 
farm or fish or herd and who operate small enterprises or microenterprises where goods are 
produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; who provide services; who work for wages or 
commissions; who gain income from renting out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft 
animals, or machinery and tools; and to other individuals and groups at the local levels of 
developing countries, both rural and urban.  Many such households have multiple sources of 
income” (2001: 5). 
 
Because credit is the most common service offered by microfinance institutions, most of the 
microfinance definitions seem to be biased towards the provision of microcredit services (as 
opposed to microfinance services in general).  In a different but complementary and 
refreshing perspective of what is microfinance, Matin, Hulme and Rutherford (2002) argue 
that financial services for the poor are essentially a matter of helping the poor to turn their 
savings into lump-sums large enough to satisfy a wide range of business, consumption, 
personal, social and asset-building needs.  Thus, providing the poor with effective financial 
services helps them deal with vulnerability and can thereby help reduce poverty.  
Specifically, Rutherford (2000a) describes the three basic mechanisms to achieve a lump-
sum:  saving up, saving down and saving through.  Saving up (Figure II-1) refers to how a 
series of savings made now is exchanged for a lump-sum in the future.  Saving down (Figure 
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 II-2) refers to a lump-sum that is taken now in the form of a loan and exchanged for future 
savings (which are used for repayment installments).  Saving through (Figure II-3) is a 
continuous stream of savings that is converted when a lump-sum is required; if the amount 
needed is larger than the withdrawn savings, the saver also takes a loan, using both amounts 
to create the lump-sum needed, and then repays the loan from future savings.   
The simplified graphical explanation of these main mechanisms to achieve a lump-sum is 
provided below. 
 















Figure II-3: SAVING THROUGH 
 
Source of figures: Adapted from Rutherford (2000a) 
 
Matin et al. (2002) argue that providing the poor with effective financial services that allows 
them to achieve lump-sums helps them to cope with risks.  More importantly, this way of 




 Institutional Structures, Approaches and Delivery Methodologies 
 
Microfinance providers come in many shapes and sizes and have different types of 
institutional structures.  Ledgerwood (1999) has described how MFIs are commonly 
structured as formal institutions, semiformal institutions or informal providers.  Formal 
institutions are subject not only to general laws and regulations but also to specific banking 
regulation and supervision.  Examples of formal institutions include public and private 
development banks; savings and postal savings banks; commercial banks; and non-bank 
financial intermediaries (e.g. leasing companies).  Semiformal institutions are registered 
entities subject to all relevant general laws (including commercial law) but not (normally) 
subject to bank regulation and supervision.  Examples of semiformal institutions include 
credit unions and other multipurpose cooperatives (urban or rural), financial NGOs, and 
(some) Self-Help Groups (SHGs).  Informal providers are not known as institutions and are 
those for which neither special banking law nor general commercial law apply; disputes with 
informal providers are rarely settled by recourse to the legal system.  Examples of informal 
providers include moneylenders and traders; landlords; (most) SHGs; Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs, such as work groups or multipurpose SHGs); and friends and 
family networks (1999:97). 
 
However, the concrete factors that determine an MFI’s specific institutional structure include 
the objectives and mission statement; existing financial system; local economic setting; target 
clients; whether the MFI follows a minimalist or integrated approach; the investors’ 
preferences; the provision of saving services; and the legal options (Goldberg and Bruett, 
2001). 
 
Microfinance services can be provided as a component of a wider goal or in themselves.  A 
minimalist approach to microfinance is defined as an approach in which MFIs provide only 
financial intermediation (and sometimes social intermediation if groups need to be formed in 
order to provide them with loans).  Financial intermediation includes credit for working 
capital and fixed asset loans, savings, insurance, and other financial services.  On the other 
hand, an integrated approach is the one in which MFIs offer microfinance services alongside 
other development activities; that is, an approach that offers financial and nonfinancial 
services such as social services (education, health and nutrition, literacy training), social 
intermediation (such as group formation, leadership training, cooperative learning), or 
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 enterprise development services (such as marketing, business training, production training) 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). 
 
Concurrently, this paper is using interchangeably the term Microfinance Institution (MFI) or 
Microfinance Operator (MFO) to providers of microfinance regardless of whether they 
follow an integrated or a minimalist approach and regardless of their legal form (projects or 
programs of NGOs, dedicated NGOs, cooperatives, MFIs, banks, etc).  However, the term 
“Microfinance Organization” has been consciously avoided and replaced by the term 
“Microfinance Operator,” whenever possible.  While the most accurate term should be 
“organization” but the term “institution” and the acronym MFI are the most commonly used 
term within the microfinance industry.  Copestake reiterates that the distinction between 
organizations and institutions is useful and well established within the social sciences (if not 
in the world of microfinance).  Organizations are defined as legal entities or agencies.  
Institutions are defined as durable rules and norms governing how people behave.  To 
become an institution, a rule or norm of behavior (such as charging interest on loans) must be 
accepted across a community – such as the microfinance industry (2003:64).  However, this 
dissertation uses “microfinance operator,” “microfinance provider” and “MFI” terminology 
as it is quite common within both practitioner and academics writing on the subject.   
 
The message of the literature celebrating the achievements of the microfinance schemes is 
that if certain simple principles of design are observed, financial interventions sponsored by 
external agents of change can be a powerful instrument for combating innate imperfections in 
developing-country capital markets and for bringing about technical change in both 
agriculture and industry (Hulme et al., 1996:10). 
 
However the previous detailed description of how microlending overcomes market failures 
does not intend to be a recipe for success.  MFIs are not homogeneous and they adapt to the 
realities of the countries where they operate.  The choice of which financial services to 
provide and the method for providing these services depends on three main factors: the 
objectives of the MFI, the demands of its target market, and its institutional structure.  The 
combination of these three factors creates a wide range of financial services.  This section 
will briefly discuss the different institutional structures and the most common delivery 
systems for credit and savings services; it covers some of the most commonly known MFIs as 
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 it describes the methodology they apply precisely to display the rich heterogeneity of 
microfinance providers and how they have adapted to better overcome market failures.   
 
Almost all MFIs provide credit services, while some others also provide other financial 
products such as savings, payment services, credit or smart cards, and insurance.24  For each 
of these financial products, specific delivery methodologies have been developed over time.  
Since credit is the most common service and it is provided by almost all MFIs, most of the 
delivery methodologies have been developed around credit.  Savings and other financial 
products are relatively new to the market and there has been less innovation in how to deliver 
these services.   
 
The following section describes the common methodologies used for each of these financial 
products (credit, savings, and others).25 
 
 
Methods for credit delivery 
 
The methodology for credit delivery can be divided in two main groups: individual lending 
and group-based approaches.   
 
In an individual lending approach, credit is delivered to individuals based on their ability to 
provide the MFI with assurances of repayment and some level of security.  Loan amounts and 
terms are based on careful analysis by the credit officer and detailed financial analysis and 
projections are often included with the loan applications.  Legal and financial documentation 
is required.  The loan is usually disbursed at the branch office and periodic payments are 
made at the branch or through pre-approved payments.  In these MFIs, credit officers work 
with a relatively small number of clients (60 to 140) and supervise their clients regularly, 
developing close relations with them over the years.  Credit officers are often recruited from 
                                                 
24 As Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch highlight “Being able to save and borrow is, in itself, an important 
way to self-insure against uninsurable events. (2005: 172).  
25 Unless otherwise indicated, the information discussed in the section on delivery methodologies for credit, 
savings, and other services draws on the work of Ledgerwood (1999). 
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 the community, so they have knowledge of the clients’ creditworthiness (i.e. character-based 
lending).26   
 
In group-based approaches, credit is delivered to groups that guarantee the loan.  Peer-
pressure becomes a substitute to collateral; since there is joint-liability for the whole group, 
individual members will not default on the loan for fear of letting down or suffering social 
sanctions from other members of the group.  Groups are usually self-selected and range from 
3 to 50 members.  The loan can go either to an individual member of a group or to the whole 
group which in turn provides the loan to individual members.  There are different models of 
group-based lending.  A description of the methodology and operational approaches of the 
most well-known group-based lending models is provided below: 
 
Grameen Solidarity Group Lending was developed by Grameen Bank of Bangladesh to serve 
rural, landless women wishing to finance income-generating activities.  The Grameen Trust 
has more than 40 replicators in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  The Grameen methodology 
is based on self-formed peer groups of 5 unrelated members; group members mutually 
guarantee each other’s loans and are held legally responsible in case of default by other 
members.  No further loans will be available if all members do not repay their loans on time.  
No collateral is required, but the self-formed peer groups must attend weekly meetings and 
provide weekly savings contributions.  The meetings also provide activities to build self-
esteem and enforce discipline.  The peer groups are incorporated into village centers of up to 
8 peer groups.  After 4 to 8 weeks of contributing savings, members can apply for a loan 
(they need to save during the loan period as well).  Loan appraisal is performed by group 
members and center leaders.  Loans are made to individuals within a group by the local credit 
officer at the weekly meetings.  Branch staff verify information and supervise clients’ 
businesses.  Credit officers usually carry between 200 and 300 clients.27 
 
Latin American Solidarity Group Lending model was developed by ACCION International in 
Latin America and has been adopted by many MFIs.  The model makes loans to individual 
                                                 
26 Some examples of institutions following  an individual lending approach include: Caja Social in Colombia; 
ADEMI in the Dominican Republic; Cajas Municipales in Peru; FEDECAM in Benin; Alexandria Business 
Association (ABA) in Egypt; Agence de Crédit pour l’Entreprise Priveé (ACEP) in Senegal; Self-Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) in India; Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in Indonesia. 
27 Examples of institutions that follow the Grameen model include: Sahel Action in Cameroon; Grameen Bank 
and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh; Center for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (CARD) and Tulay Sa Pag-unlad Inc (TSPI) in the Philippines; Women’s Union in Vietnam. 
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 members in self-selected groups of 4 to 7 members.  The members cross-guarantee each 
others’ loans to replace traditional collateral (i.e. group members collectively guarantee loan 
repayment) and access to subsequent loans is dependent on successful repayment by all group 
members. Loan application is simple and reviewed quickly. Loan disbursement is made to the 
group leader at the branch office, who distributes it to individual members (group members 
normally receive equal loan amounts).  Loan amounts and terms are gradually increased over 
time if clients perform well.  Loan approval is the responsibility of the credit officers.  Credit 
officers regularly work with 200 to 400 clients and thus rarely know their clients very well.  
Some institutions encourage “intragroup emergency funds” to serve as a safety net.28 
 
The Village Bank model was developed in the 1980s by the Foundation for International 
Community Assistance (FINCA).  Village Banks are community-managed credit and savings 
associations established to provide access to financial services in rural areas, build 
community SHGs and help members to accumulate savings.  Membership is based on self-
selection and usually ranges from 10 to 50 people, most of whom are women.  Village Banks 
are financed by the internal mobilization of members’ funds as well as external loans.  A 
Village Bank consists of its members and a management committee (which receives training 
from the sponsoring MFI) and it has a high degree of democratic control and independence. 
All members of the Village Bank sign the loan agreement to offer a collective guarantee.  
Members’ savings are tied to loan amounts and are used to finance new loans or collective 
income generating activities.  No interest is paid on savings but the members receive a share 
from the bank’s investment profits (the dividend distributed is directly proportional to the 
amount of savings each individual has contributed to the bank).  Regular weekly or monthly 
meetings are held to collect savings deposits, disburse loans, handle administrative issues, 
etc.  Village banks have two sources of funds: external account and internal account. External 
account is the seed capital that the sponsoring MFI lends to the bank.  This amount is, in turn, 
re-lent to its members (the total amount lent is the sum of all individual members’ loan 
requests).  External account loans to the Village Banks are generally provided in a series of 
fixed cycles (usually 10 to 12 months each with lump-sum payments at the end of each 
cycle).  Internal accounts are the funds from the mandatory savings and the interest earnings 
from lending the fund to members.  The methodology anticipates that each member will save 
                                                 
28 Examples of institutions that follow the ACCION model include: Fundación para la Promoción y Desarrollo 
de la Microempresa (PRODEM) and Banco Sol in Bolivia; Asociación Grupos Solidarios in Colombia; Genesis 
and Prosem in Guatemala. 
36 
 a minimum of 20 percent of the loan amount per cycle.  Loans from the internal account set 
their own terms and are generally shorter with higher interest rates than those of the external 
account.29 
 
Self-Reliant Village Banks (Savings and Loan Associations) are established and managed by 
rural village communities.  This model was also developed by an NGO, the Center for 
International Development and Research, in the mid 1980s but Self-Reliant Village Banks 
differ from Village Banks in that they cover the whole village population and not a subgroup 
of 10 to 50 people.  In this model, the supporting program identifies villages with strong 
social cohesion and clear desire to set up a village bank.  The members of the village 
determine the organization and rules of the bank.  They elect the management and credit 
committee and 2 or 3 managers. Management is highly decentralized.  Central services are 
limited to internal control and auditing, specific training and representation.  These services 
are paid by the village bank, which guarantees the financial sustainability of the model.  The 
sponsoring program does not provide lines of credit and the bank must rely on its savings 
mobilization.  Self-reliant village banks mobilize savings and provide short-term loans to 
villagers on an individual basis.  Loans are individual and collateral is necessary but the 
emphasis to ensure repayment is on village trust and social pressure.  After 1 or 2 years the 
bank creates an association that acts as an intermediary and negotiates lines of credit with 
local banks (usually an agriculture development bank).  This links the village banks to the 
formal financial sector.30   
 
The following table outlines the basic distinctions between archetypical individual and group 
lending methodologies.  Please refer to Annex 1 for a comparison of the characteristics 
among individual and group-based approaches regarding the products and services they offer 
and the types of clients they tend to serve. 
 
                                                 
29 Examples of institutions that follow the Village Banking model include: Freedom from Hunger in Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Thailand; FINCA-Costa Rica and FINCA-Mexico; Save the Children in El 
Salvador; CARE in Guatemala; Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Benin and Thailand. 
30 Savings and Loan Associations models are found in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali, Sao Tome 
and The Gambia.  They are usually named Self-Managed Village Savings and Credit Associations or Caisses 
Villageoises d’Epargne et de Crédit Autogérées . 
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Collateral Loans are guaranteed by collateral and /or cosigners 




Potential clients are screened by credit 
checks and character references Potential clients are screened by their peers 
Loan Analysis Loan amount is based on thorough viability analysis 
Little or no analysis is made of the business, 
except by peers, who may be familiar with it. 
Loan Flexibility Loan size and term can be tailored to the needs of the business 
Loan size and term closely follow a 
predetermined gradual growth curve 
Loan Size and 
Term 
Loans can reach large sizes and lengthy 
terms, depending on client’s specific needs 
Loans are generally short and amounts small, 
to avoid breakdown of repayment incentives 
Staff-Client 
Relationships 
Program staff work to develop close, long-
term relationships with clients 
Program staff have a distant relationship with 
large number of clients 
Cost / Participant Each client represents a significant investment of staff time and energy 
Each client represents a small cost in terms 
of staff workload 
Cost / Portfolio 
Low cost, owing to relatively larger size of 
fewer loans, despite inefficiencies of 
working with fewer people 
High cost, owing to relatively small size of 
many loans, despite efficiencies grained by 
working through groups 
Source: Goldberg, Mike and Tillman Bruett. “Principles of Microfinance: Institutional Structure and Delivery 




Methods for savings delivery 
 
There are two main commonly used methods for savings delivery: compulsory savings and 
voluntary savings. 
 
Compulsory or mandatory savings are those that must be contributed by borrowers as a 
condition for receiving a loan (sometimes as a percentage of the loan, sometimes as a 
nominal amount).  Although they are an asset, usually clients perceive them as a part of the 
loan product, i.e. as a fee that must be paid in order to participate in the credit program.  
Besides serving as an additional guarantee mechanism to ensure the repayment of loans, 
mandatory savings have been found useful to demonstrate the value of financial saving 
practices to borrowers, to demonstrate the ability of clients to manage cash-flow and make 
periodic contributions (which is useful for loan repayment), and to help to build up the asset 
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 base of clients.  However, compulsory savings usually have stringent withdrawal conditions 
as long as borrowers have outstanding loans.  
 
Voluntary savings are not a mandatory condition for accessing credit.  Both borrowers and 
non-borrowers can save, the interest rates are variable and withdrawal conditions are flexible.  
The main difference is that while mandatory savings assume that the poor need to learn 
financial discipline (i.e. to be taught how to save), voluntary savings assume that the poor 
already know how to save (in fact, they already save) and what they need are flexible savings 
mechanisms adapted to their needs.  
 
Although few MFIs provide voluntary savings, there seems to be a strong demand for saving 
products in poor households in some countries: In 1991 BRI in Indonesia reported 2 million 
borrowers and 16 million depositors.  Savings has important direct advantages for low-
income households: they can build up a reserve to reduce consumption volatility over time, 
they can self-finance instead of having to turn to creditors and -if they decide to do so- 
savings allow them to build up assets to use as collateral (Robinson, 2001).  Additionally, 
there are other plausible benefits for the MFIs from saving schemes designed for poor 
households: savings can provide an inexpensive (or lower cost) source of capital for re-
lending as well as create a natural client pool (today’s depositors may be tomorrow’s 
borrowers).  But micro-savings also have inherent potential or real problems such as the high 
administrative costs of handling a large quantity of small deposit accounts, compliance with 
government regulations for saving institutions, the interest rate spreads and the question of 
how to manage the savings: re-investment opportunities that guarantee convenience and 
security in the context of inflation or investment in (volatile) foreign capital markets. 
 
In addition to offering credit and savings services, MFIs are experimenting with other 
products and services such as insurance, credit and smart cards and payment services, but 
these have appeared recently and fewer examples of delivery mechanisms are available.  
Examples of insurance services include the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and SEWA in 
Gujarat, India.31  Cards allow borrowers to access a line of credit when needed while 
reducing the administrative and operating costs.  Smart cards are similar to credit cards but 
                                                 
31 In the case of Grameen, each member is required to contribute 1 percent of the loan amount to an insurance 
fund which will cover the loan amount and the funeral costs in case of death of the borrower.  SEWA offers life 
insurance for women workers.   
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 they have a memory chip with information about the client’s available credit and are 
generally not available for use in retail outlets.32  Finally, examples of payment services 
include check cashing, check writing, transfer of funds and remittances. 
 
In conclusion, the institutional structure of an MFI (whether formal, semiformal or informal) 
and the methodology for delivery of services it chooses to apply (such as individual or group 
lending approaches in credit delivery) combine to create the specific characteristics of a 
particular MFI and thus its specific way of providing microfinance services and overcoming 
market failures.  Although we have identified best practices for specific methodologies of 
delivery, these cannot be understood as recipes for success.  Ultimately, the success or failure 
of one particular MFI will depend on how well its institutional structure and delivery 
methodology fit its objectives, how well it meets the needs of its clients and how well it 
adapts to the environment (legal, financial, economic, and geographic) where it operates. 
 
 
Recent Changes in Microfinance 
 
The most recent changes within the microfinance industry can be summarized into the 
“Triangle of Microfinance,” a term coined in the 2002 book edited by Manfred Zeller and 
Richard L. Meyer.  The critical triangle of microfinance reflects the three objectives of 
financial sustainability, outreach and impact.  Financial viability or sustainability refers to the 
ability of an MFI to cover all its costs with earned revenue (Ledgerwood, 1999:267).  
Outreach is defined as the expansion of the financial frontier to people previously excluded 
from accessing banking services while impact is defined as the benefits received by the poor 
(Meyer and Zeller, 2002:362).  The authors conclude that all MFIs attempt to contribute to 
these objectives, but many stress one particular objective over the other two.  Some may 
produce large impacts but achieve limited outreach.  Other may have smaller impacts but are 
highly sustainable (2002:5). 
 
Another relevant change within the microfinance industry is the introduction of the concept 
of social performance, as opposed to financial performance, as well as the different attempts 
                                                 
32 Some examples of institutions providing these services are ADEMI in the Dominican Republic for credit 
cards and Swazi Business Growth Trust in Swaziland for smart cards.   
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 to create a common framework for measuring the social performance of a microfinance 
institution.   
The following sections discuss these issues.  First, financial sustainability and its implications 
are defined.  Secondly, the concepts of outreach, impact and social performance are 
introduced, defined and differentiated.  Note, however, that the full review of outreach tools 
will be further discussed in Chapter III.  The third section summarizes the main trade-offs and 
synergies among these concepts.  
 
 
Financial Sustainability  
 
On the technical side, an MFI is considered to be sustainable when it can fully cover all its 
costs with internally generated income.33  While income is composed of interest and fees, 
costs include operating costs, the costs of obtaining the funds for loans and the cost of 
inflation.  The concept of sustainability can be also seen as a continuum subdivided in three 
levels:  operational sustainability, financial sustainability and institutional sustainability.  If 
an institution can cover all its operational costs (administrative expenses, salaries, rent, 
provision for loan losses, depreciation of fixed assets, etc.) with internally generated income, 
it is said that an MFI is Operationally Self-Sufficient (OSS).  If an institution can cover not 
only its operational costs but also all the financial costs (the costs of obtaining the funds for 
the loans and the costs of inflation, i.e. the adjusted cost of capital), it is said to be Financially 
Self-Sufficient (FSS).34  Please refer to Annex 2 for a technical description of how to 
measure sustainability. 
                                                
 
If an MFI can cover all its operational costs and financial costs, and it is also able to generate 
enough profits to meet all other institutional development needs, it is then said to be 
Institutionally Self Sufficient.  The development of the institutional capacity of an MFI does 
not only entail promoting good management but also improving its business orientation, 
ensuring an adequate governance structure (i.e. the board responsibilities and accountability), 
suitable human resources (improving staff capacity development and setting adequate staff 
 
33 The technical description of sustainability draws on Ledgerwood (1999).  Please refer to Annex 2 for a 
technical description of how to measure sustainability. 
34 Basically, this means that even when the MFI is partially subsidized (either through donation/grants or 
through soft loans below market value) the institution would calculate all its costs as if it were to obtain all its 
funds from commercial sources and at market interest rates.  Additionally, the cost of inflation will need to be 
added.   
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 incentives), and dependable Management Information Systems (MIS) to provide timely and 
accurate information on key performance indicators which are used in monitoring progress in 
operations as well as in controlling delinquency.35  Thus, sustainability and building 
institutional capacity in MFIs are not limited to setting adequate interest rates to cover the 
MFI’s full costs.  Success also involves offering customer-oriented products, minimizing 
delinquency and reducing costs. 
 
On the policy side, the concept of sustainability refers basically to the inappropriateness of 
subsidies to reach the poor and the necessity to provide services to their clients permanently.  
In this context, subsidies relate to two different concepts: subsidized credit rates and 
subsidized programs or institutions.  As already seen, subsidized credit rates are often 
inefficient, they tend to undermine savings mobilization and elites benefit from these 
subsidized rates more than do the poor for whom they are intended.36  On the other hand, 
subsidized programs or institutions refer to operators funded by grants or donations or 
financed with rates below market value. 
 
Regarding the first concept, it is relevant to provide some information about the level of 
interest rates charged by MFIs.  Morduch (1999a) reports that microfinance practitioners 
have different concepts of the elasticity of credit demand with respect to the interest rate.  
Thus, practitioners in Bangladesh think that the elasticity is high and they charge low interest 
rates of about 25 percent in real terms; on the other hand, practitioners in Latin America tend 
to believe that the elasticity is low and they set interest rates approaching 60 percent real.37  
Robinson (2001) provides additional examples of microfinance banks that provide nominal 
monthly rates below 5 percent.  Concretely, she reports that Banco Sol in Bolivia charges 
between 3.75 and 4 percent monthly in loans in bolivianos (between 2 and 2.5 percent per 
month in loans in US dollars) while BRI in Indonesia charges 2.8 per cent per month for 
                                                 
35 Financial performance indicators are the indicators and ratios commonly used to assess the performance of 
MFIs.  They attempt to provide measures about the MFI improvements in outreach, profitability, income and 
expense, efficiency, productivity, quality of the portfolio and capital and liability structure.   
36 Since the better-off capture most of the loans, they also capture most of the subsidies attached to the loans, 
heightening the credit-equity problems that initially induced policy makers to promote directed credit (Vogel 
and Adams, 1997:7). 
37 In November 2007, Fernando Prado (secretary of the Asociación de Entidades Financieras Especializadas en 
Micro Finanzas in Bolivia, ASOFIN) reported an interest rate of 19.8 percent in Bolivia – which covers the 
operational costs.  In addition he reported interest rates of 94 percent in Mexico; 52 percent in Ecuador; and 36 
percent in Peru (El Nuevo Día, 2007:B5). 
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 prompt payers.38  This further suggests that MFIs are adapting their interest rates to the 
specific realities of the countries and regions where they operate and to their objective of 
becoming sustainable; by doing so they are setting interests rates at a level that is not 
appealing for those elites that used to capture subsidized interest rates in the old paradigm. 
 
Regarding the second concept of subsidized programs or institutions, Morduch reports that 
most programs continue to be subsidized directly through grants and indirectly through soft 
terms on loans from donors (1999b:1571).  Hulme et al. (1996) argue for temporary subsidies 
for microfinance operators to compensate for the externalities of an environment 
characterized by market failure on a massive scale.  However, the authors reiterate that such 
subsidies should be provided to motivate higher performance of the institution through 
institutional development and they should not be provided for direct interest rate subsidies 
(1996:202). 
 
The degree of sustainability is not an uncontested issue: there are arguments against and in 
favor of totally financially sustainable MFIs.  The argument against totally financially 
sustainable MFIs is based on two main ideas.  The first is that subsidizing credit might be a 
more cost-efficient option than other development programs for poverty alleviation, (e.g. 
primary health, education. etc.) (Morduch, 1999).  The second idea is that moderately 
subsidized credit can be well targeted (i.e. to those poor households that cannot pay high real 
interest rates), delivered efficiently, and can be compatible with savings mobilization 
(Morduch, 2000). 
 
The arguments in favor of financially sustainable MFIs are mainly based on the idea that 
households desire access to credit, not cheap credit.  Raising interest rates (or the cost of 
borrowing) does not reduce the demand for credit because access to credit is often more 
important for the borrowers than the cost of borrowing.  In the context of limited donor 
resources, it is argued that sustainability is beneficial for both the client and the MFIs.  For 
                                                 
38 In contrast, the great majority of moneylenders in Asia charge nominal interest rates well over 5 percent per 
month (Robinson, 2001: 199-201).  High interest rates are not exclusive of moneylenders in the developing 
world.  According to a 2007 article in the New York Times, payday loan stores in the United States charge USD 
15 to USD 22 per two weeks for every USD 100 borrowed, or the equivalent of up to 572 percent annual 
interest.  In a payday loan store, a customer can borrow an amount in exchange for a check, postdated to the 
next payday, made out in the amount of the principal plus the corresponding fee (USD 15 to USD 22 per USD 
100 borrowed, with a client typically borrowing a few hundred dollars).  According to the same article, payday 
loan stores barely existed 15 years ago and now outnumber most fast-food franchises (Leland, 2007).  
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 the MFIs because they are independent from donors, can access commercial capital and have 
the capability to deepen the financial market, i.e. to reach wider ranges of clients from 
different economic sectors.  For the clients because of the long term survival of the institution 
and the subsequent continuous access to financial services;39 because larger numbers of 
clients are reached; and because additional financial products are likely to be provided (e.g. 
savings).  In addition, for both MFIs and clients, financial sustainability reduces the risk of 
MFIs being affected by donors changing the development assistance priorities or having to 
close or reduce operations if/when donor funds dry out. 
 
Nevertheless, few MFIs worldwide are financially self-sufficient.  There are over 10,000 
MFIs operating in the world and most of them are quite small.40  Morduch reports that 
“according to the estimation of some experts no more than 1 percent of NGO programs 
worldwide are currently financially sustainable – and perhaps another 5 percent of MFIs will 
ever cross the hurdle” (1999b:1587).  In 2007, of the 200 microfinance institutions from 57 
developing countries participating in the MicroBanking Bulletin, 142 were financially self-
sufficient.  However, this represents a notable increase from 2002, when there were only 62 
self-sufficient microfinance institutions of the corresponding 147 participating institutions.41  
The figures of self-sufficient microfinance institutions are not homogeneous across 
developing countries or across regions; for example of the MFIs reporting to the 
MicroBanking Bulletin in 2007, less than 35 percent of the ones in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
classified as self-sufficient but more than 85 percent of MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean were classified as self-sufficient.  
 
 
                                                 
39 Note that clients of subsidy-dependent MFIs also depend on (indirect) continuous support from donors.  
40 The figure is often quoted in CGAP reports, but it has also been attributed to Shari Berenbach, director of the 
Calvert Foundation. 
41 MBB (14) 2007 and MBB (8) 2002: 25.  The MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB) compares the performance of 
MFIs with their peers to establish industry benchmarks/performance standards as well as to enhance the 
transparency of financial reporting.  The Bulletin forms peer groups based on three main indicators: region, 
scale of operations and target market.  Note that the MBB 2007 figures seem to contradict Hashemi and Foose, 
who report more than 400 “sustainable institutions” reporting to the Microfinance Information eXchance (MIX) 
(2007:1).  The MIX is a leading source for market data and is, in fact, the electronic host of the MBB as part of 
their information exchange mission.  <http://www.mixmbb.org/en/index.html>.  Note that microfinance 
institutions participating in the MBB are likely to follow stronger financial and accounting principles (as well as 
a commitment towards sustainability) than are other non-participating MFIs.  As noted by Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005:232) “bear in mind that microlenders in the MicroBanking Bulleting data are a 
relatively impressive bunch, sustainability-wise…[…] Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, for example, is not 
included.  In terms of financial management, the programs are thus skimmed from the cream of the global crop” 
(2005: 232). 
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 Outreach, Impact and Social Performance: Are they synonyms? 
 
The terms outreach, impact and social performance are complementary but distinct.  However 
the terms are often confused in microfinance, and thus, the following sections will define 
them and highlight their complementarities as well as their differences. 
 
 
Outreach   
 
Meyer and Zeller defined outreach as the expansion of the financial frontier to people 
previously excluded from accessing banking services (2002:362).  Von Pischke (1991) 
described the frontier between the formal and informal financial sectors where those outside 
the frontier do not have access to formal financial services.   
 
In fact, the concept of outreach is twofold: depth of outreach and scale of outreach.  Outreach 
is a measure of the scale of lending and savings operations in terms of number of clients (i.e. 
the number of active depositors and borrowers) and the depth with which an institution is 
able to reach the very poor and the hard-to-reach clients.  As Ledgerwood notes, if depth of 
outreach is defined as providing financial services to those excluded from formal financial 
services, then “those sectors of society with little or no access to formal finance must be 
defined” (1999:225, as adapted from Paxton and Fruman, 1998).  According to the same 
author, there are at least four categories of people who are consistently underserved by 
financial institutions: rural inhabitants, women, the poor and the uneducated (1999: 226).  
Note that these four groups are not mutually exclusive. 
 
Nevertheless, within the microfinance literature the term outreach is often applied as a 
synonym of reaching the poor and thus used as shorthand for poverty outreach, and as such 
will be applied through this dissertation. 
 
The depth of outreach is often measured with a proxy: the average loan size or the average 
loan size as a percentage of the GDP per capita.  Alternatively, other proxies include the 
average first loan size or the average first loan size as a percentage of the GDP per capita.  
The underlying assumption is that only the poor would borrow small size loans.  But these 
proxies are of limited use.  As Ledgerwood highlights, “these proxy indicators can sometimes 
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 be misleading because the loans are for different terms and uses and may not reflect the 
income level of the client” (1999:225).  The proxies may in fact not reflect the level of 
poverty or the level of exclusion (however defined) of the clients.   
 
Outreach will be discussed again briefly in the final section of this chapter in the context of 
trade-offs and synergies among the four concepts of financial sustainability, outreach, impact 





Meyer and Zeller defined impact as the benefits received by the poor (2002:362).  Zeller, 
Lapenu and Greeley, define social impact as the change in welfare and quality of life (in all 
of its dimensions) among clients and non-clients (and the wider local, national and global 
community) due to the activities of an organization ( 2003:4-5).  Both definitions hint to the 
fact that impact is, indeed, difficult to measure.   
 
Zeller et al. (1997) have distinguish three pathways through which access to financial 
services potentially increase the income and food security of households and their individual 
members.  The first pathway is income generation through expanded production.  The second 
pathway focuses on consumption-smoothing by applying credit directly to finance urgent 
consumption.  The third pathway focuses on the efficient management of asset portfolios or 
asset (dis-) investment strategies to smooth disposable income over time at sufficient food 
consumption levels.   
 
In their literature review about the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction Morduch and 
Haley conclude that there is evidence substantiating a beneficial effect on increases in income 
and income smoothing/reduction in vulnerability (albeit with the caveat that “the quality of 
many studies could be improved” (2002:2)) but that there are fewer studies providing 
evidence to support a positive impact on health, nutritional status and increases to primary 
schooling attendance.   
 
Sharma and Buchenrieder (2002) also reviewed the main impact studies on microfinance.  
The authors divided the studies into two main categories: “investment-led” and “insurance-
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 led” impact studies.42  “Investment-led” impact studies compare outcomes for those 
households (or individuals) that have access to credit and those that do not.  “Insurance-led” 
impact studies look at the benefits of credit when it serves as an insurance substitute, that is, 
to borrow during a crisis and repay when things are better so that they can better manage their 
investment portfolio.  The authors highlight the attribution43 and timing of benefits44 
problems in producing robust conclusions in the investment-led impact studies and 
summarize the empirical evidence of both types.  The authors conclude that investment-led 
studies present mixed results on the impact of credit on various household outcomes while 
insurance-led studies show better evidence of consistent positive impact.  Their review 
suggests that “the very poor may benefit from microfinance largely by smoothing their 
consumption through borrowing or improved management of their savings.  Those just above 
or just below the poverty line may be able to use loans more effectively for productive 
purposes, which ultimately raise their income and asset base” (2002:6).  As Zeller and Meyer 
highlight, this fact has clear policy implications, since “expanding financial services may 
improve welfare of the very poor but not necessarily lift them out of poverty because [of] 
their lack of access to markets, technology, education, and other factors that raise incomes by 
expanding their production frontier” (2002:6).  The editors stress that the literature review by 
Sharma and Buchenrieder reveals two main gaps in impact assessments:  assessing the effects 
of savings products on the poor (both the type of product and the amount of savings held by 
households) and differentiating between the concepts of access to credit versus actual credit 
use.  This later point is important for microfinance because access to credit, even if there is 
not actual borrowing, may help to avoid risk-reducing, inefficient production practices such 
as mixed cropping, late planting and poor timing of input applications (2002: 371-372).45   
 
 
                                                 
42 Investment-led studies cover the first pathway (income generating) and insurance-led studies cover the second 
and third pathways (consumption-smoothing and asset management) of the conceptual framework detailed 
above. 
43 Controlling for other factors that simultaneously affect household welfare so that measured households’ 
outcomes can be attributed to credit and to credit alone.  Although, as Sharma and Buchenrieder state, the heart 
of the problems in econometric impact studies is that what is not observable and quantifiable cannot be 
controlled (2002:225). 
44 The costs are easy to measure but the benefits or yields accrue over time – this information is not captured in 
snap-shot household surveys which are the most commonly used (2002:224).   
45 The authors also provide a notable exception in Diagne’s study in Malawi within the same volume.  The study 
in Malawi differentiates between access to credit (measured as the credit limit) and participation in the credit 
market (measured by the actual amount borrowed) (Meyer and Zeller, 2002: 371-372). 
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 Social Performance  
 
The social performance of an organization (whether a private for-profit firm, cooperative or 
NGO) comprises the relations of the organization with its clients and with other stakeholders.  
In the case of an MFI, the measurement of social performance involves investigating its 
structure (i.e. mission, ownership, management principles, relation to and care for its staff) 
and its conduct in the market and community (services, products, market behavior, other 
relations with clients and other stakeholders, including community and social/political 
organizations).  Social performance is not the same as social impact.  Social impact has been 
defined previously as the change in welfare and quality of life (in all of its dimensions) 
among clients and non-clients (and the wider local, national and global community) due to 
the activities of an organization.  Social (and economic) performance thus precedes social 
(and economic) impact (Zeller, Lapenu and Greeley, 2003:4-5). 
 
In the context of microfinance institutions, the meaning of social performance, poverty 
outreach and social impact are often confused.  In an attempt to differentiate among these 
concepts, the 2003 literature review and synthesis of the work of CERISE’s Social 
Performance Initiative46 is a useful starting point.  In their efforts towards defining social 
performance, the initiative produced the following table to explain these differences and 
outline the main dimensions of social performance: 
 
Table II-2: Economic and Social Performance and Impact for MFIs 
















(intentions and actions of 
the MFI)  
? Who are the clients? Poverty outreach  
? Services and products targeted to the 
excluded population 
? Empowerment: participation in MFI 
decision making; “voice” for those being 
served to avoid “mission drift” 
? Social responsibility of the MFI 
 
? Portfolio quality 
? Efficacy and productivity 
? Financial management 
? Profitability 
? Quality and diversity of the 
financial services offered 
Impact assessment 
(outcomes) 
? Employment creation for the excluded 
population 
? Empowerment : position of individuals in 
their family and communities; social 
capital building 
? Health improvement 
? Child education, etc… 
 
? Change in income and 
expenses 
? Change in assets and living 
standard 
? Food security 
? Employment creation at 
community level 
 
Source: Lapenu and Zeller (2003:8)  
 
                                                 
46 The Social Performance Indicators Initiative (SPI) was launched in June 2002, supported by Argidius 
Foundation, administered by CERISE and coordinated by CGAP.  Further information on this initiative is 
available later on this section. 
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 As noted by Lapenu and Zeller and shown in Table II-2, social performance cannot be 
reduced to poverty outreach as poverty outreach is only one of the four dimensions of social 
performance (see highlighted line in grey in the white first quadrant) while impact assessment 
is a different concept that covers both social and economic/financial issues (see purple 
quadrants).   
 
According to the authors, the distinction between performance monitoring and impact 
assessment does not mean that the social dimensions of impact are not important, but rather 
that they cannot be routinely and reliably measured through simple indicators (2003:8).  
Zeller, Lapenu and Greeley (2003) further define these four main dimensions of social 
performance according to their proposed framework is summarized in Figure II-4 below.  
 
Figure II-4: Main Dimensions of Social Performance 
DIMENSION 1: 
Outreach to the poor and excluded 
 
1. How much weight does the objective of 
financial sustainability / outreach to the poor or 
excluded/ positive impact on income / education / 
social status carry for the MFI?  Mission drift: 
How does the MFI management keep to the social 
mission?  
2. What is the geographic and socio-economic 
focus in client-group targeting? (urban; rural;  
women; workers with insecure status; illiterate)  
3. Is there a tool for targeting? 
4. What is the size of transactions?  (distribution 
of loans as % of GDP pc; distribution of deposits as 
% of GDP pc; minimum and maximum sizes) 
5. Is physical collateral required? 
 DIMENSION 3: 
Improving social and political capital of 
tsclien ent 47 /  Empowerm
 
10. Transparency (loan statement differentiates 
between the amount of the principal and the 
amount of the interests / fees, clients receive 
written statements on transactions, access to 
annual accounts) 
11. Client representatives in consultation, 
decision making, control of the institution 
(meeting frequency; system of rotation; system of 
training; % of women among client representatives 
compared to % of women among all clients) 
12. Empowerment (strengthen the social cohesion 
of the local community; voice; leadership; MFI 
influence in government policies)  
 
   
DIMENSION 2: 
Adaptation of the services and products to the 
target clients 
 
6. What is the range of services? (type of loan 
products; type of savings products; type of 
insurance products; flexibility of repayment or 
deposits) 
7. What is the quality of services? (travel 
distance in rural areas; loan delivery; market 
surveys; client drop-outs) 
8. Are non-financial services accessible to the 
clients? (directly or through partnerships) 
9. Participation (involve clients in decisions) 
 DIMENSION 4: 
Social Responsibility of the institution 
 
13. Human resources policy (salary; bonuses; 
training; participation in decision making; health 
coverage; staff turnover) 
14. Social responsibility towards the clients 
(socio-economic studies; change services due to 
negative impact; insurance; coping mechanisms for 
natural disasters) 
15. Social responsibility towards the local 
community (respect for local culture and values, 
MFI assisted the local community through financial 
support for community projects) 
 
Source: Adapted from Zeller, Lapenu and Greeley (2003:8-11)  
 
                                                 
47 Social capital refers to those features of social organizations such as networks, norms, values, and social trust 
that facilitates coordination and cooperation and enables people to achieve goals for mutual benefit.  The term 
political capital has also been used to cover other non-material factors in poverty not contained in the term 
social capital.  Social capital is understood throughout this dissertation in terms of Putnam's work which focuses 
on the stocks of 'reciprocal networks of trust and norms embedded in the social organization of communities.’ 
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 Thus, CERISE’s definition of social performance, excluded the concept of impact among the 
main dimensions of study.  Zeller, Lapenu and Greeley (2003) further proposed to measure 
social performance through the “principles, the actions and the corrective measures 
implemented by the MFI” (2003: 5).  In fact, one the causes of the increasing interest in 
Social Performance may be indeed linked precisely to the impossibility of regularly and 
easily assessing the social and economic impact in the lives of clients with access to 
microfinance services (and attributing this impact exclusively to access or use of 
microfinance services).  This CERISE’s concept of social performance fills in the gap by 
pragmatically concentrating in what can be measured; it focuses on the areas within the 
control of the microfinance institution and on the entire process by which impact is created.  
Social impact cannot be easily assessed because impact assessments require very specific and 
often complex measuring methods and is extremely time/cost intensive.  However, an 
evaluator could look into the main objectives of a particular MFI and what systems are put in 
place within in order to achieve these desired outputs and outcomes.  In this regard, social 
performance becomes the counterpart of a typical financial performance assessment (i.e. 
white quadrant versus green quadrant in Table II-2): just as external auditors can verify the 
authenticity of financial transactions, external social evaluators should be able to assess social 
performance in a similar way using simple indicators that are easily verifiable.  In this 
manner, assessing impact becomes a tool for long-term policy analysis while social and 
financial performance become a routine assessment of the business strategies of the MFI.   
 
The most recent development within the overall microfinance industry may well be this 
emphasis on social performance but it is still a debated issue: not all actors agree on its 
importance48 or in how to best measure it.  In an attempt to bridge this gap, in March 2005, 
leaders from various social performance initiatives in the microfinance industry were brought 
together in to the Social Performance Task Force.  The objective was to come to an 
agreement on a common social performance framework and to develop an action plan to 
move social performance forward.49  Their first achievement was to agree on a definition: 
Social Performance has been defined as "the effective translation of an institution's social 
mission into practice in line with accepted social values that relate to serving larger numbers 
                                                 
48 See Jacquand (2005) for an opposite view. 
49 CGAP, the Argidius Foundation, and the Ford Foundation support the Social Performance Task Force (SP 
Task Force) along with the CGAP Donor Working Group on Social Performance.  Leaders participating in the 
Social Performance Task Force include donors; microfinance / regional networks; social investors; raters and 
consulting firms, action-research programs as well as microfinance operators worldwide, including AMK. 
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 of poor and excluded people; improving the quality and appropriateness of financial services; 
creating benefits for clients; and improving social responsibility of an MFI."  Thus, social 
performance has many different dimensions and refers to actions, corrective measures and 
outcomes, seeing impact as just one element of social performance.  Indeed, while traditional 
evaluations have focused on end results and impact, this new agreed definition on social 
performance looks at the entire process by which impact is created.  Therefore, this new 
definition brings back the concept of impact to social performance (i.e. the equivalent of 
adding the white quadrant and the purple quadrants from the previous Table II-2) by 
concentrating on those requirements deemed necessary for achieving social impact.   
 
The main underlying hypothesis is that it is not possible to have good social impact without 
good social performance, and thus, good social performance is a precursor –albeit not a 
guarantee- of good social impact.  In other words, good social performance is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for social impact.  This can also be seen graphically as a continuum 
in the social impact casual chain, which identifies five main elements: inputs, internal 
processes, outputs, outcomes and impacts.   In the case of microfinance, the inputs are further 
detailed as the intent, values and design of the institution and the outputs are further divided 
between outputs from portfolio information and outputs from clients. 
 

































Adapted from Hashemi et al. (2007: 4) and Sinha (drafts on M-CRIL social ratings).  
 
 
As currently understood, social performance includes not only an evaluation of end results 
(i.e. success in effecting positive changes in the lives of clients) but also the analysis of the 
declared objectives of institutions, the effectiveness of their systems and services in meeting 
these objectives as well as their related outputs, such as increasing depth of outreach.  In 
other words, social performance has been defined as both the results achieved (in terms of 
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 reaching clients, meeting client needs and change), and the process by which these are 
created (the actions and corrective measures that are taken to bring about those outcomes).   
 
Figure II-6 below shows the common framework agreed upon which covers the dimensions 
of intent and design, activities, outputs and outcomes or impact.50   
 
 Figure II-6: Social Performance Common Framework 
  SOCIAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
INTENT AND DESIGN 
What is the mission of the MFI? 










Does the MFI serve poor and very poor people? 




OUTCOME / IMPACT 
Have MFI clients experienced social and economic improvement 
 
 




Precisely because social performance is about many different dimensions, different social 
performance initiatives have chosen to assess social performance by focusing on specific 
dimensions and not necessarily on the whole.  Just as CERISE focused on intent, activities 
and output (but excluded outcomes and impact), initiatives financed by CGAP and Ford 
Foundation have assessed social performance including the concept of outcomes or impact.   
 
Two additional concepts are commonly linked to debates of social performance: the double 
bottom line and the triple bottom line.  The concept of “Double Bottom Line” refers to 
microfinance’s dual objectives of financial return and positive social impact and thus 
attempts to measure social and financial performance, while the term “Triple Bottom Line” 
                                                 
50 Note that these definitions are equivalent to the commonly applied concepts of outputs and outcomes applied 
by Logframes.  “Outputs” are the results of the completed activities (which are within the control of 
management and use the inputs provided).  The results of these activities should lead to the achievement of the 
expected impact and thus, “outcome or impact” is the intended effect on the target population.  Note that 
“inputs” are the resources (money, materials or staff) needed to carry out the activities and that the “wider 
objective” (which is the aim or purpose of the work) within the logic of a logframe would be the equivalent to 
the vision of the MFI. 
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 adds the concept of environmental sustainability and attempts to measure social, 
environmental and financial aspects of performance.  The introduction of the concept of 
environmental sustainability into the assessment of MFIs is a contested issue within the 
industry.  Most practitioners agree that the enterprises of microfinance clients have an 
environmental impact (positive or negative); what has not been agreed is whether MFIs are 
equally responsible for the (negative) impacts of microenterprises on the environment 
regardless of the size of the loan and the nature of the economic activity in which it becomes 
invested and whether it is ethically correct for MFIs to deny loans to microentrepreneur with 
little or no alternative means of subsistence based on environmental considerations.  The 
Triple Bottom Line is arguably linked to the efforts of Triodos Bank in incorporating 
microfinance into the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).  While both institutions are based in 
The Netherlands, Triodos Bank is one of the pioneering funders of microfinance and the GRI 
aims at developing and disseminating global standards in sustainability reporting. 51   
 
In addition to the dimensions covered, current or past initiatives on social performance can be 
categorized into two different but complementary areas of focus:  Social Performance 
Assessment and Social Performance Management.  According to the Social Performance 
Resource Center common website52 while social performance assessment is “about 
evaluating the extent to which institutions meet their social objectives,” social performance 
management is “about making an organization's social mission a reality.”  In practice, though, 
the division lines between both are not clear-cut and some approaches or initiatives are 
compatible while others are complementary.  Table II-3 summarizes the most well known 
initiatives on social performance, categorizing them by their main focus, their objectives and 
the corresponding tools or systems proposed.  Some of these tools will be reviewed in detail 
in Chapter III when discussing the MFI experience in applying poverty measures. 
 
 
                                                 
51 Triodos International Fund Management manages three microfinance funds: Triodos-Doen, Hivos-Triodos 
Fund and Triodos Fair Share Fund.  These funds offer (syndicated) loans and equity to MFIs as well as trade 
finance to producers/organisations with Fair Trade and/or organic certification.  GRI is an independent 
institution governed by multi-stakeholders.  Further information is available at www.globalreporting.org. 
52 The Social Performance Resource Center was created jointly by CGAP and the Social Performance Task 
Force and is seeks to promote a social performance bottom line in microfinance.  The site provides information 
on social performance tools, Social Performance Task Force activities, and highlights projects, research, and 
publications available on social performance management and assessment.  The site is hosted by the 
microfinance gateway at: http://www.microfinancegateway.com/resource_centers/socialperformance. 
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 Table II-3: Conceptualizing Social Performance (Review of Types and Tools) 
 SOCIAL PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT  (evaluating the extent to which institutions meet their social objectives) 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT  
(making an organization’s 
social mission a reality) 
Primary 
Focus  
TOOLS to Assess 
Institutional Processes
TOOLS to Assess Client
Conditions. 
TOOLS to Rate Social 
Performance 









evaluate their intentions, 
systems and actions to 
determine whether they 
have the capacity to 




Determine who are 
being reached and if 




ratings (some focus only 
on internal processes 




Three main concerns:  
1) managing for results, 
2) understanding client 
needs,  













• USAID –AMAP-Social 
Performance 
Assessment Tool 
• CGAP Poverty Audit. 
 
• ACCION SOCIAL 
• CGAP- Grameen-Ford 
Progress Out of 
Poverty Index 
• CGAP Poverty 
Assessment Tool  
• USAID-IRIS Poverty 
Assessment Tools.54 
 
Rely on information 
provided by MFI: 
• Planet Rating  
• Microfinanza 
Social Rating (slim 
version) 
Conduct direct client 
surveys: 







• Action research 
program of the Imp-
Act Consortium56 
• Action research 
program of the Asian 
Development Bank 
Institute57 




• “Progress out of 
poverty” initiative from 
the Grameen 
Foundation  
• The Action research 
of the Micro Finance 
Centre58 
• Client Impact Monitoring
System of Opportunity 
International. 
Adapted from Social Performance Resource Center website and Hashemi and Foose (2007:9).   
Further information and links available at 
http://microfinancegateway.com/resource_centers/socialperformance/article/35397  
                                                 
53 CERISE members include: CIDR (International Centre for Development and Research); CIRAD (Centre for 
International Cooperation in Agronomic Research for Development); GRET (Group for Research and Technical 
Exchange); IRAM (Institute for Research and the Application of Development Methods); and IRC, (Institute for 
Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture) (all based in France).  The initiative is also supported by Argidius 
Foundation and SDC - Swiss cooperation (Switzerland). 
54 USAID-IRIS PAT are available for: Albania; Bangladesh; Colombia; Ghana; Guatemala; Haiti; India; 
Indonesia; Jamaica; Kazakhstan; Madagascar; Mexico; Peru; Philippines; Tajikistan; Uganda; and Vietnam 
(www.povertytools.org/USAID_Tools/USAID_Tools.htm)  
55 M-CRIL and EDA Rural Systems (India) jointly created the social rating tool.  On February 2007, MicroRate 
and M-CRIL (the two largest microfinance rating agencies) announced the creation of a global alliance under 
the name of MicroRating International (MRI).  
56 Imp-Act Consortium members are: CARD MRI (the Philippines); EDA Rural Systems (India); Freedom from 
Hunger (USA); IDEAS (USA); Institute of Development Studies (UK); Microfinance Centre (MFC, Poland); 
and Microfinance Council of the Philippines (MCPI). 
57 Asian Development Bank Institute is based in Japan and is a subsidiary of the Asia Development Bank 
(ADB). 
58 Implemented by MicroFinanceCentre (Poland) in collaboration with MicroSave, Imp-Act, and Microfinance 
Opportunities and financed by the Ford Foundation. 
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 Social performance assessment is about evaluating the extent to which institutions meet their 
social objectives.  In turn, these social objectives can include: serving increasing numbers of 
poor and excluded people sustainably; improving the quality and appropriateness of financial 
services for target clients; creating economic and social benefits for clients and reducing their 
vulnerability; improving the social responsibility of financial institutions to their clients, their 
employees and the community they serve.  The analysis of social performance includes the 
declared social objectives of institutions, the effectiveness of their systems and services in 
meeting these objectives, related outputs (for example, reaching larger numbers of very poor 
households) and indeed success in effecting positive changes in the lives of clients.  As 
discussed previously, different social performance initiatives focus on different steps in this 
process.  Some focus on the institutional process and internal systems with the objective of 
helping institutions evaluate their intentions, systems and actions to determine whether they 
have the capacity to attain their social objectives.  Others assess social performance at the 
client level in order to determine who are being reached and if client conditions are 
improving.  Some are holistic and encompass both internal institutional level as well as client 
level indicators.  In addition, several rating agencies have developed tools to complement 
their financial ratings.  In turn, some of these focus only on internal processes while others 
consider both client-level indicators and internal processes 
 
Social performance management is about making an organization's social mission a reality 
and it is generally driven by three concerns: managing for results, understanding client needs, 
and reporting to external stakeholders.  The key reference in social performance management 
is the global action-research Imp-Act Programme.  The Imp-Act Programme was founded by 
the Ford Foundation Development Finance Affinity Group and has worked with more than 30 
organizations across the world to develop a framework for promoting Social Performance 
Management (SPM) as a core business function.  According to the Imp-Act Programme, in 
order to create and maintain an effective social performance management system the MFI 
must 1) set clear social goals and objectives, 2) collect information to monitor progress 
towards these objectives and 3) use social performance information to improve operational 
and strategic decision-making.  The Imp-Act framework combines regular monitoring of 
client status, analysis and communication of findings, and corresponding adjustments to 
products or service delivery that will improve the MFI’s program. To date Imp-Act has 
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 created a step-by-step guide and advocates for providing external stakeholders with reports 
on internally-generated social performance information.59   
 
Therefore, as opposed to financial or auditing standards, there is a lack of clear, industry-
wide accepted framework for social performance reporting and the distinctions among all of 
these initiatives and approaches are difficult to evaluate.  Some initiatives have been donor-
driven, others haven been MFI-driven.  Yet, some of the donor-driven tools or initiatives are 
more prone to replication (with the corresponding tweaks) than the MFI-specific tools simply 
because donor-driven initiatives have been tested in other contexts and fine-tuned for 
geographical and methodological variations.  Some have offered MFIs solid tools to 
implement while others have retained a theoretical focus.  Some have pushed donors and 
practitioners to think beyond how to measure social performance into thinking how best to 
approach incorporating social performance into decision-making.  Some see a trade-off 
between social and financial performance while others see synergies.  Yet, some strive to 
balance both, while some try to push for a social dimension to counterbalance a (perceived) 
financially oriented MFI (and vice versa).  Some concentrate on including social aspects into 
decision-making at the management level, others incorporate also governance and the role of 
the Board of Directors in balancing the double bottom line of financial and social goals.   
 
Also, all these tools, systems, or action research initiatives are dogmatic on what “good” 
social performance means: some are explicit about their preferences and some show their 
ideal archetype only tacitly.  Indeed, any performance assessment system is based on a 
particular value system (i.e. what does it mean by “good performance” and where are its 
limits?) and the crucial question is whether frameworks rely on values that all the parties 
agree upon.  At the same time, microfinance institutions have different objectives (i.e. the 
mission and the vision of an organization) and as such, assessments need to measure 
performance precisely against those particular objectives.  This may well be the crux of the 
matter.  While most people would agree on universal values such as eradicating poverty, 
                                                 
59 The guide includes the following 6 key questions that an MFI must initially think about before implementing 
an Social Performance Management system:  
1. What are your social performance objectives and how do you plan to achieve them? 
2. Who uses your programme’s products and services? Who does your programme exclude? 
3. Why and when do clients leave the programme or fail to fully utilize the available services? 
4. What is the effect of your programme on current clients? 
5. How will you use information about social performance to improve your services? 
6. How do you maintain and improve the quality of the systems you use to answer these questions? 
Further information at www.imp-act.org. 
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 equality or contributing positively to society at large; not everybody would agree in exactly 
how this should come about.  Further, the objectives of the microfinance institutions may not 
focus on these universal values with equal degree (e.g. some MFIs may focus on equality 
while some MFIs may focus on poverty reduction).  The fact of the matter is that, given 
appropriate minimum levels in each dimension, there is no a priori “good” or “bad” social 
performance of an institution.  It is each institution and its Board of Directors that will 
establish the weight that each of these dimensions should have in its overall social 
performance as well as the balance between social and financial performance.   
 
As experts usually point out, it took the microfinance industry over a decade to come up with 
an agreed set of financial indicators to measure the financial performance of an MFI.60  It will 
likely take at least as long to come up with the equivalent set of indicators to overlook the 
social sphere.  In fact, the recent attempts of the Social Performance Task Force to develop a 
“common format for social performance reporting” has produced “a much larger set of 
indicators than preferred” (Hashemi and Foose, 2007:10).  The next decade is likely to bring 
new perspectives into this topic as the experience accumulates and MFIs experiment creating 
efficient ways to assess social performance and to incorporate these conclusions into 
decision-making, both at the management level of day to day operations and at the board 
level of strategic decisions. 
 
 
Trade-offs and Synergies 
 
The trend towards sustainability gave rise to a debate within MFIs on whether there is a 
trade-off between sustainability and outreach.  Taking the size of the loan as a proxy of 
                                                 
60  A decade is a conservative estimate of how long it took to arrive at a consensus of how to measure financial 
performance within MFIs.  ACCION International’s CAMEL system for financial performance assessment for 
MFIs was first designed in 1992.  Up to 2003, there was no universally understood set of financial performance 
indicators in microfinance.  In fact, a “Roundtable Group” was created precisely to identify the names and the 
definitions of 20 financial performance indicators, and even when the results were published in 2003 the 
foreword reads that “It was not the intention of the group to select the “best” indicators or to try to interpret 
them, just to discuss names and definitions” (Inter-American Development Bank – MicroRate, 2003).  This 
Roundtable group included the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and rating agencies such as 
MicroRate (the precursor of the group), M-CRIL and Planet Rating.  Also note that the MicroBanking Bulletin 
(MBB, which originated in the Microfinance Program at the Economics Institute, Boulder, CO) became 
operational as the benchmarking source for the microfinance industry in 1997, while specialized microfinance 
rating companies were founded also at the end of the 1990s. 
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 poverty levels (under the assumption that only the poor will want a small loan) those MFIs 
which are sustainable (or close to being financially sustainable) tend to have wealthier clients 
(that is, just above the poverty line) with larger loan sizes, while the operators with smaller 
loans tend to serve the poorest.  Studies have shown that there is, indeed, a positive 
correlation between financial sustainability and reaching many poor people (Gulli, 1998: 25-
28).  The main argument is that sustainable programs can achieve enough scale to reach 
larger numbers of clients and thus make the greatest dent in poverty.   
 
The depth of outreach is yet another matter.  While empirical evidence demonstrates 
overwhelmingly that, indeed, the poor are being reached by microcredit programs, not all the 
poor are equally poor and this empirical evidence also demonstrates that most of the 
customers of MFIs are clustered around the poverty line while very few of them are the 
poorest of the poor.  The results of the few empirical studies that have assessed the impact of 
microcredit schemes on the ‘poorest of the poor’ seem to suggest that such schemes actually 
benefit the richest segments of the poor (Roth, 1997).  Empirical work by Hulme et al. (1996) 
indicates that the wealthier segments of the target groups (i.e. the poor) seem to benefit the 
most.  Cohen and Sebstad (2000), in a study of different microfinance programs, showed that 
their customers tend to be clustered around the poverty line, being predominately 
“moderately poor” or “vulnerable non-poor” and found virtually no “destitute” households in 
the sample examined.61  Navajas et al. (2000) study five MFIs in Bolivia and conclude that 
they reach not the poorest of the poor but rather those just above and just below the poverty 
line.  Wollni (2001) and later Zeller, Wollni, and Abu Shaban (2002) confirm the case for the 
Mexican MFI Compartamos which reaches a larger share of wealthier households (while 
simultaneously reaching 25 percent of the poorest).62  Matin (2004) in his study of BRAC in 
Bangladesh further corroborates the general consensus that the participation of the very poor 
is much lower than other poverty groups (2004:7).63   
 
                                                 
61 While the “very poor” were those in the bottom 10th percentile below the poverty line within a country, the 
“moderately poor” were the top 50th percentile of households below the poverty line.  The “vulnerable non-
poor” were households above the poverty line but vulnerable to slipping back into poverty. 
62 Note that Compartamos does not explicitly target the poorest and instead focuses on increasing breadth of 
outreach and financial sustainability.  Thus this result is coherent with its focus on sustainability and growth. 
63 Matin et al. (1999) further argue that improvements in product design and delivery methods (i.e. the supply 
factors) might alter demand in ways that create deeper outreach and further stress the need to research into the 
financial behavior and preferences of the poor.  The same authors also argue that financial services for the poor 
are essentially a matter of helping the poor turn their savings into sums large enough to satisfy a wide range of 
business, consumption, personal, social and asset-building needs (1999:3 and 26). 
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 As was discussed in Torres (2003), the fact that microcredit programs are not necessarily 
reaching the poorest of the poor is, actually, a great relief.  Loans offered to those too poor to 
borrow and who lack the necessary repayment capacity can actually harm the poor, with the 
unintended result of “locking some borrowers who are both very poor and very unlucky into 
a deepening spiral of debt and dependency” (Hulme et al., 1996: 205).  This is because an 
oversized debt level might force borrowers to sell their assets (including productive ones) to 
fulfill their financial obligations and further impoverish them.  A completely different matter 
is whether microfinance (as opposed to microcredit) does not serve the poorest of the poor: 
while credit is not indicated for the destitute, savings or insurance services are not only 
appropriate but also highly demanded by them.64   
 
Indeed, most microfinance programs lie in between two main approaches: the poverty 
approach and the self-sustainability approach.  The poverty approach targets very poor clients 
who are very costly to serve and measures success as how well it fulfills the needs of the 
poorest in the short term.  The self-sustainability approach targets less-poor clients on the 
fringes of the formal financial system and measures success by how well it expands the 
frontier of the mainstream economy in the long term (Von Pischke, 1991).65  In the poverty 
approach, donations cover the shortfall between revenue from clients and the cost of supply; 
in the self-sustainability approach, donations cover start-up costs and fund experiments meant 
to find innovations that reduce the cost of supply in order that revenue from clients can cover 
costs in the long term (Schreiner, 2002).   
 
Zeller and Meyer (2002) note that there are also potential synergies among financial 
sustainability, outreach to the poor and impact.  Financial sustainability can positively affect 
outreach on two fronts: first, if clients perceive it as an indicator of the MFI long term 
presence and permanence, thus influencing their decision on whether it is worthwhile in the 
long run to become clients (either for credit or for saving services).  Secondly, if striving for 
financial sustainability forces the MFI to be sensitive to clients’ demand and therefore 
                                                 
64 On the contrary, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch “strongly agree that access to financial services will not 
be the answer for everyone, but see neither systematic evidence nor theory that allows us to conclude that saving 
is more appropriate than credit for the poorest who seek financial services” (2005: 291).  Morduch and Haley 
state that “the literature confirms that most microfinance programs do not serve the poorest.  However, there are 
some institutions that do, and the evidence indicates that the poorest can definitely benefit from microfinance in 
terms of increased incomes, and reduced vulnerability” (2002: 6). 
65 ‘Financial frontier’ is a term coined to describe the conceptual point where formal financial transactions end 
and informal transactions begin. 
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 improve products, operations and outreach.  In turn, better financial products will generate 
greater benefits for the clients and so, financial sustainability can positively affect (indirectly) 
impact as well (2002:7).  This may well be the new challenge for financially sustainable 
MFIs:  to recover those clients that were thought to be too poor to be helped by their services.  
As Matin et al. summarize: “the first ‘microfinance revolution’ has shown that the ‘poor are 
bankable,’ the second revolution is faced with the challenge of showing that it is possible to 
offer a set of financial services to the poor that meet their livelihood needs” (1999:29).  
 
The synergies and trade-offs can be assessed through the interaction of innovations at the 
institutional level and improvements in the policy environment.  In the figure of the triangle 
of microfinance developed by Zeller and Meyer (Figure II-6) the inner circle represents 
institutional innovations and the outer circle represents the environment.  Institutional 
innovations may include cost-efficient information systems that contribute to improving 
financial sustainability, designing demand-driven financial products for the poor to improve 
impact or introducing lending methodologies that attract a particular segment of poorer 
clients in order to improve outreach.  The policy environment include the external 
socioeconomic environment and the macroeconomic and sectoral policies that affect (directly 
or indirectly) the performance of MFIs.  Thus, the overall performance of financial 
institutions requires innovations at the institutional level (the inner circle) as well as 
improvements in the policy environment (the outer circle) (2002:7). 
 





Macroeconomic and sectoral policy framework 
and socioeconomic environment
Macroeconomic and sectoral policy framework, socioeconomic 
environment, human and social capital and infrastructure 
Source: Zeller and Meyer, (eds.) (2002: 6) and Zeller (2003; 37) 
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 Meyer and Zeller argue that the lack of rigorous techniques for measuring depth of outreach 
so that they provide consistent information, results in very limited quantitative knowledge 
about the trade-offs between outreach and financial sustainability - and that impact analysis 
has even more limitations (2002:376).  Indeed, if there is little consensus on the techniques 
and result of poverty outreach studies, the lion’s share of the debate on trade-offs within the 
three main objectives in microfinance stems from the lack of robust and rigorous impact 
studies.  Jonathan Morduch has stated that “the boldest claim for microfinance –that it can 
single-handedly eliminate a large share of world poverty- outpaces, by a long distance, the 
evidence accumulated to date” (Bruck, 2006).  Meyer and Zeller also affirm that MFI field 
operations have far surpassed the research capacity to analyze them, so excitement about the 
use of microfinance for poverty alleviation is not backed up with sound facts derived from 
rigorous research (2002: 376).  Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch further confirm this lack 
of rigorous studies, stating that “there is no study yet that has achieved wide consensus as to 
its reliability; and this reflects the inherent difficulty in evaluating programs in which 
participation is voluntary and different customers use the services with varying degrees of 
intensity” (2005: 222).   
 
Meyer and Zeller argue that better measurement is essential for improving our understanding 
of the trade-offs and synergies among the three objectives of the triangle of microfinance 
(2002:376).  Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch further argue that even if a “perfect” 
impact evaluation were to be available that shows a positive net impact, this does not 
necessarily mean that the program is a good candidate for support.  Cost-effectiveness 
matters too and microfinance should be judged against the costs and benefits of alternative 
approaches, including other ways of doing microfinance (2005:224).  The literature review of 
Sharma and Buchenrieder on impact assessment also concludes that the challenge is to reduce 
the costs of providing financial services to the poor and that whatever the current size of 
impact, further improvement in the benefit per dollar invested depends on the cost-saving 
innovations.  Simultaneously, the authors argue, the impact studies themselves must improve 
in order to make more accurate assessments of benefits and that only through cycles of 
innovation, experimentation and evaluation can lasting institutions be established that 
alleviate the financial constraints faced by the poor (2002:237). 
 
In fact, the recent focus on social performance in microfinance may be due precisely to the 
need of focusing on synergies as opposed to trade-offs.  As argued by Hashemi and Foose, 
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 “the push for a double bottom line […] allows to shift energies away from a zero-sum 
tradeoff between poverty and sustainability and move toward understanding how these two 





 Chapter III  – MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY 
 
Chapter III covers a brief summary of the conceptualization of poverty, the definition of 
vulnerability (to poverty), and the corresponding measurement tools over the last decades 
dividing the conceptual framework into one-dimensional and multidimensional measures of 
poverty.  The one- dimensional tools are further divided into monetary and non-monetary and 
multidimensional tools are further divided onto participatory and indicator-based 
methodologies.  At the end of each of the main two categories, the MFI experience to date is 
presented.  The literature review completes with the most recent additions to the debate: the 
concept of subjective measures of welfare and its corresponding tools and the initial 
underpinnings of how to measure vulnerability to poverty.  To conclude, the last section of 
chapter specifies the reasons behind the choice of the tools selected to measure poverty in 
this dissertation: the relative poverty tool based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and 
the absolute poverty tool based on food expenditure per capita.   
 
 
Conceptualizing Poverty and Vulnerability to Poverty 
 
The complexity of measuring poverty is directly related to the fact that there is no universal 
agreement of what is poverty.  Terms often used to describe poverty include: income or 
consumption poverty; lack of basic needs; human (under) development; social exclusion; ill-
being; (lack of) capability; vulnerability or livelihood unsustainability (Maxwell, 1999). 
 
Of the myriad of typologies applied to poverty, this dissertation will structure the theoretical 
framework of poverty measurements along two basic categories:  
• Whether the measure is absolute or relative, i.e. whether it is defined in absolute terms 
and thus comparable across the board or measured against a specific group of people 
and thus it is only meaningful to compare precisely against that sample or group of 
the population. 
• Whether the measure relates to one dimension only or responds to a wider 
conceptualization of poverty.  Other dimensions that are relevant in the different 
measures of poverty include whether people themselves are given the chance to define 
poverty or wellbeing as well as the concepts of vulnerability; livelihoods; capabilities; 
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 gender; social exclusion; powerlessness and impact of choice and freedom; asset 
management; wellbeing vs. poverty; and the like.   
 
The distinction between relative and absolute measures of poverty is relevant because some 
MFIs may include urban or better-off in their areas of operations while other MFIs 
deliberately select very poor areas or areas below average in their geographical coverage.  As 
Zeller et al. (2001) and Henry et al. (2003) note, if the relative poverty assessment is 
conducted entirely in poor communities / locations, clients may be rated as less poor 
compared with the general population of that locality, even though they may in fact be poor 
when compared with the national population.  As such, relative poverty measures may 
penalize those MFIs that operate in poorer areas or in areas where poverty is more 
widespread (MkNelly and Dunford, 2002). 
 
One-dimensional measures of poverty can be monetary but also non-monetary.  
Multidimensional measures of poverty usually include a combination of monetary and non-
monetary indicators.  The following sections will deal with the main measuring tools in turn, 




Developing Concepts of Poverty: 1960s to the present 
 
Both Sumner (2007) and Maxwell (1999) provide brief summaries of poverty and their 
corresponding measuring tools:  up to the 1960s, poverty was economically determined and 
measured by macroeconomic indicators such as growth in income / GDP per capita.  Seers 
(1969) in the article ‘The Meaning of Development’ expanded the meaning into ‘basic 
needs,’ which included not only income but also the physical necessities for a basic standard 
of living such as food, shelter, and public goods (ILO 1976, 1977; Streeten 1984).  
Simultaneously, during the 1970s, the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) introduced the ‘levels of living’ indicators, the work of Morris 
(1979) and the foundations for Sen’s and later UNDP’s ‘Human Development’ indicators.  
The work of Chambers (1983) on non-monetary poverty (in particular isolation and 
disempowerment) shifted the debate towards the concept of participation.  During the 1980s 
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 and 1990s Amartya Sen argued that well-being was ‘the process of enlarging people’s 
choices’ and enlarged wellbeing as “capabilities”.  During the 1990s, the UNDP’s annual 
Human Development Report, inspired by Sen’s work, argued that well-being was ‘the 
process of enlarging people’s choices’ and defined poverty as “the denial of opportunities and 
choices…. to lead a long healthy, creative life and enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, 
dignity, self-esteem and the respect of others…” (UNDP, HDR 1997).  The 2000/1 World 
Development Report on Poverty and Development confirmed the centrality of well-being, by 
defining poverty as “pronounced deprivation in well-being.”  The report accepted a multi-
faceted model of well-being and proposed a strategy for attacking poverty in three ways: 
promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and enhancing security.66  Also, Voices of 
the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? (Narayan et al., 2000a)67 focused on capturing the local 
experiences of poverty, stressing the participatory poverty assessments while identifying risk 
and vulnerability as aspects of poverty.  In turn, vulnerability frameworks identified assets 
(including social capital) as buffers of risks and new lines of work were developed along 
copying strategies.  Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) also emerged to address the 
limitations of income-only measures.  New layers of complexity were added with the 
inclusion of livelihoods and gender analysis.68  Later on, the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies (Qual-Quant or Q-Squared) was advocated.69  The current 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were approved by 189 member states of the United 
Nations in September 2000 and stand at the end of this continuum.  The signatory 
governments pledged to reduce extreme poverty and hunger by half in poor countries by 2015 
and assigned targets and indicators to eight main goals as well as to monitor if progress was 
made or missed.70  Table III-1 below provides a summary of the main definitions and 
measurements of poverty in the last 50 years. 
                                                 
66 The World Development Report of 1990 had defined poverty mainly in terms of income (“the inability to 
attain a minimal standard of living”) (Maxwell, 2001). 
67 Also known as “Consultations with the Poor” or “Voices of the Poor;” consists of three books: Can Anyone 
Hear Us? (based on consultations with over 40,000 poor women and men in 50 countries); Crying Out for 
Change (drawing from a 23 country comparative study); and From Many Lands (which looks into regional 
patterns and country case studies).  They were part of a global research effort designed for the 2000/1 World 
Development Report mentioned above. 
68 Gender analysis moved gradually away from Women In Development (WID) to a wider Gender And 
Development (GAD) focus. 
69 Kanbur and Shaffer (2007) advocate for applying mixed qualitative and quantitative (Q-Squared) methods in 
the analysis of poverty but delve into the differences between approaches and their implications for the 
numerical transformation of data, the selection of validity criteria, the conception/dimension of poverty adopted 
and interpersonal comparisons of well-being. 
70 The Eight Millennium Development Goals are the following:  
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;  
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education;  
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 Table III-1: The Evolution of Poverty Meaning and Measurement (1950s-2000s) 
Period Concept of Poverty Measurement of Poverty 
1960s Economic GDP per capita growth 
1970s Basic needs (inc. economic) GDP per capita growth + basic goods 
1980s Economic GDP per capita 
1990s Human development (inc. economic) UNDP Human Development Indices 
2000s Multi-dimensional ‘freedom’ Millennium Development Goals 
Source: Sumner (2007: 6)  
 
 
According to Sumner (2007) the shift in poverty conceptualization (and its measurement) is 
also reflected in the broader shift of development studies away from its genesis in economics 
towards a multidisciplinary approach.  As such, the debate has shifted from regarding well-
being as economically determined to a broader conceptualization; from relying on few 
indicators to relying on many; from considering the ‘means’ of well-being to analyzing the 
‘ends’; and from identifying ‘needs’ to identifying ‘rights.’  However, as the author notes, 
despite the movement towards a multidimensional conceptualization of poverty, income 




Developing the Concept of Vulnerability to Poverty 
 
A single snapshot poverty measure does not tell how many people have escaped from poverty 
or why some have succeeded in moving out of poverty while others have not.  Likewise, it is 
not possible to establish how many people are born poor and how many become poor at some 
point within their lifetime. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women;  
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality;  
Goal 5: Improve maternal health;  
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;  
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability;  
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development.   
These 8 MDGs break down into 18 quantifiable targets that are measured by 48 indicators, among them the 
reduction in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015 (defined as 
people living on less than USD 1/day).  Further information available in 
http://www.undp.org/mdg/goallist.shtml  
The precursors of the current MDGs are linked to the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
guidelines and the International Development Targets (IDT).  
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 Throughout this dissertation vulnerability is defined as the risk of falling into poverty in the 
future (even if the person is not necessarily poor now); that is, vulnerability is the shorthand 
for vulnerability to poverty.   
 
Vulnerability is related to poverty but also distinct from poverty and is often associated with 
external or internal shocks such as natural disasters, an increase in food prices or sicknesses 
of an income earner within the household.  This dissertation covers both the concept of 
poverty and the concept of vulnerability; it considers the potential role and effects of risks 
and completes the overall description of poverty moving away from a static concept to a 
dynamic phenomenon.  Therefore, this dissertation incorporates the concept of vulnerability 
to poverty not only because it is an inherently important dimension of well-being, but also 
because of a crucial instrumental function: it allows studying poverty in a dynamic context 
and not confined within its static nature.   
 
As Chaudhuri (2003) details, poverty is a stochastic phenomenon: today’s poor may or may 
not be tomorrow’s poor and currently non-poor households may experience a large adverse 
shock and become poor tomorrow.  Conversely, some currently poor households will 
continue to be poor (or poorer) in the future becoming chronic poor while other households 
are only transitorily poor.71  Stated as such, poverty becomes an ex-post measure of a 
household’s well-being (or lack thereof), reflecting a current state of deprivation or of lacking 
the resources or capabilities to satisfy current needs.  In contrast, vulnerability can be 
construed as an ex-ante measure of well-being, reflecting the future prospects of becoming 
well off.  What distinguishes the two concepts is the presence of risk, if such risks were 
absent there would be no distinction between ex-ante (vulnerability) and ex-post (poverty) 
measures of well-being. 
 
Chaudhuri (2003) further understands vulnerability as an intrinsic aspect of well-being and 
upholds that exposure to risk and uncertainty about the future is one of the central tenets of 
the basic economic theory of human behavior, embodied in the assumption that households 
                                                 
71 Chronic poverty is the poverty that persists for many years or a lifecourse and that may be transmitted across 
generations (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003: 420).  Further information is available at 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org.  
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 and individuals are risk averse.  Results from participatory approaches further corroborate 
that uncertainty and risk are a central preoccupation of the poor.  Theoretical analyses and 
empirical evidence show that the nature and magnitude of the risks that households must face 
as well as the scope of the risk-management mechanisms they have access to, play a central 
role in the dynamics and scale of poverty. 
 
Unexpected shocks lead to fluctuations in household income.  In turn, vulnerability affects 
the behavior of households (in terms of consumption, investment, production patterns, and 
coping strategies) as well as the perceptions of their own situations.  As such, vulnerability 
becomes a key dimension of well-being (WBI, 2005).  The argument applies not only to 
unexpected shocks but also other predictable events such as death, unemployment or harvest 
failure, which are reasonably common and expected but where there is uncertainty about 
when they will hit.  While the conceptual boundaries are somewhat blurred, there are three 
main forms of risk management (depending on the timing and the quality of the intervention): 
ex-ante risk reduction, ex-ante risk mitigation and ex-post coping (Conway and Norton, 2002: 
534). 
 
In the absence of insurance policies, vulnerability affects the behavior of households in 
multitude of ways.  According to Morduch (1994), the second-best arrangement72 that 
provides insurance to households in low-income countries are also known as consumption-
smoothing mechanisms and include not only borrowing from neighbors and relatives or 
buying and selling durable assets but also exercising caution in production decisions.  
Examples of self-protection in production decisions include favoring traditional crops over 
riskier but more profitable varieties or favoring wage labor over riskier but more profitable 
entrepreneurial activities. 
 
When people lack the means to smooth consumption, they are often trapped in poverty 
(Morduch, 1994; Barrett, 1999).  If the household lacks sufficient assets or insurance to 
smooth consumption, shocks may lead to irreversible losses that lock them into perpetual 
poverty, such as distress sale of productive assets, reduced nutrient intake, or exclusion from 
or interruption of education that permanently reduces human capital.  Vulnerable households 
                                                 
72 The first-best arrangement would be to be able to buy an insurance policy. 
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 engage in risk mitigating strategies to reduce the probability of irreversible outcomes as well 
as in coping strategies to overcome shocks when they materialize, i.e. households engage in 
strategies aimed at preventing the shock as well as strategies aimed at minimizing the effects 
of these shocks, when they occur.  As highlighted by Morduch throughout his bibliography 
on the topic, some of these strategies are very effective, while others are less so – and none 





The following sections will discuss the main definitions and measuring tools in the 
development industry in general as well as the main poverty assessment tools developed 
within or for the microfinance industry within the last two decades.   
 
It is noteworthy to highlight that most of the methods applied in microfinance were originally 
designed as poverty targeting tools as opposed to poverty assessment tools.  Note that the 
objective of poverty assessment tools is to determine (ex-post) whether the MFI has reached 
poor people while the objective of the poverty targeting tool is to identify in advance poorer 
households in order to deliver microfinance services to them rather than to the relatively 
better-off or non-poor.  Therefore, even if a tool was designed for targeting, it can also be 
used for increasing the institution’s knowledge about their clients’ poverty profile and 
measure the depth of poverty.73  Thus, this section will present the experience of MFIs and 
their approaches to measuring poverty with these tools independently of whether they were 
originally designed as a targeting or an assessment tool.   
 
In addition, the review of the MFI experience will also include impact and market research 
indicators which could potentially become indicators of poverty.  This is because 
consumption, production and investment are not distinct and independent spheres in poor 
households. 74  As such, measuring poverty could include measuring assets whether they are 
used for productive purposes (i.e. as an investment) or as an indicator of a better living 
                                                 
73 A case can be made for applying a different tool when the objective is to evaluate the adequacy of the original 
targeting tool itself. 
74 For instance, the investment in a motorcycle in rural Cambodia may be seen as a family recreational purchase 
as well as a productive asset if it is used as the basis of a home-based transport microenterprise. 
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 standard (i.e. an outcome variable of their improved economic situation).  Examples of 
impact or outcome variables include questions on facts or perceptions regarding services or 
self-declarations by respondents.75  
 
Zeller (2004) identifies the following three commonalities among MFIs’ existing poverty 
measurements:  
? most are relative measurements rather than absolute measures (with only two 
exceptions, ACCION’s Income tool and FINCA’s tool in its expenditures section, as 
explained below in pages 75and 78 respectively);  
? most use multiple indicators and weighting methods (implicit or explicit) in order to 
arrive at a broad measure of relative poverty;   
? most tools apply the household as the unit of analysis and rarely delve into the 
individual level or relate to the community or other geographically bound levels of 
analysis.  (Note that assessments at the individual level provide better information on 
differences within households along gender, age or kinship lines.) 
 
In this regard, consistency comparisons among some alternative methods have produced 
encouraging results, with rankings of each measure reasonably consistent (Zeller, 2004: 12).  
Examples of consistency studies include Simanowitz (2000) comparing relative poverty 
assessments by participatory wealth ranking and visual methods and van de Ruit and May 
(2003) comparing participatory wealth ranking and the CGAP Poverty Assessment Tool.  
Van de Ruit and May compare the results for Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) in South 
Africa and find that there was substantial overlap in the results, matching almost 70 percent 
of the households at the poorer end of the distribution, with 75 percent of those categorized as 
poor (results statistically significant at the 95 percent level) (2003:27).  The authors also 
explore the relationship with the national Income and Expenditure Survey and conclude that 
households in the lower third of the distribution of the poverty score are more likely to be 
classified as poor using the conventional USD 1 a day money-metric measure: 60 percent of 
“USD 1 a day” poor households were also located in the bottom two deciles of the Poverty 
Assessment Tool score (2003:31). 
 
                                                 
75 Note that impact or outcome indicators that rely on self-declarations are not easily verifiable (Zeller, 
2004:15). 
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 Finally, this review does not intend to be an exhaustive list of all possible poverty measures 
and tools devised or applied by MFIs but rather, it concentrates on the most commonly 
known assessment tools, the ones that have been tested more often or that have more chances 
of replication and those that are particularly promising.76 
 
 
One-dimensional Measures of Poverty 
 
One-dimensional measures of poverty can be applied to both absolute and relative definitions 
of poverty and can refer to monetary or non-monetary indicators.   
 
 
Monetary Measurements (Income Poverty) 
 
In the most conventional view, poverty is defined in monetary terms and is measured by 
comparing the income or consumption of an individual or a household with some defined 
threshold below which they are considered to be poor.  This is often the starting point for 
most analyses of poverty and will be the starting point of analysis for this dissertation as well.   
 
The basic criteria used in assessing whether or not a household is poor is based on an 
evaluation of whether its income is sufficient to meet the food and other basic needs of all 
household members to lead a healthy and active life.  In order to make the assessment, a 
basket of goods and services satisfying a pre-set level of basic needs is constructed, 
corresponding to local consumption patterns.  The value of this basket of goods is then called 
the “poverty line.”   
                                                 
76 In particular, of those tools reviewed by Zeller for IRIS and USAID as part of the Developing Poverty 
Assessment Tools Projects (2004) four tools have been excluded from this review:  Opportunity International’s 
Client Impact Monitoring System (CIMS); Gary Woller’s “simple approach”; Freedom from Hunger’s Food 
Security Scales and the scorecards applied by PRIZMA and South Pacific Development.  The reasons for 
exclusion are the following: The two-page questionnaire of Opportunity International’s Client Impact 
Monitoring System (CIMS) does not suggest any weighting system for the indicators proposed.  Gary Woller’s 
“simple approach” (which consists of asking: “In a typical month, how much does your household spend for all 
goods and services?”) is unlikely to produce accurate results.  Freedom from Hunger’s Food Security Scales 
(which classify households into food-secure; food-insecure without hunger and food-insecure with hunger) are 
based on a one-dimensional indicator (albeit one relevant for rural Cambodia, though less so for transition 
economics and higher income populations).  Finally, methodologies based on scorecards will be explored in the 
ACCION tool (see page 75.  Note also that data collected by loan officers as part of the loan application process 
cannot guarantee reliability; this will also be explored in the same section). 
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 The Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) conducted by the World Bank is one of 
the most commonly known household expenditure surveys used nationally for poverty 
analysis.77   
 
As detailed by Grosh and Glewwe (1995), the LSMS started as a multi-faceted research 
project in 1980 with the following objectives:  
(a) improve the quality of household survey data;  
(b) increase the capacity of statistical institutes to perform household surveys;  
(c) improve the ability of statistical institutes to analyze household survey data for 
policy needs; and  
(d) provide policy makers with data that can be used to understand the determinants of 
observed social and economic outcomes.   
 
During the four phases of the project, existing household surveys were reviewed and the 
types of data needed were identified along with how best to design the actual fieldwork 
procedures.  The surveys became customized to the specific country circumstances, processes 
were documented and the methodological tools and research results were disseminated with 
the objective of making the process as efficient as possible.   
 
While there is a lot of variation in practice, the core LSMS questionnaire covers the following 
topics: household roster; housing; education; employment and wage income; health; 
agriculture; transfers and other non- labor income; and access to credit. Many LSMS cover 
additional topics as well, such as migration, fertility, anthropometric measures,78 assets, 
savings, and time use. A full-scale LSMS contains over a thousand questions and requires six 
to eight hours of interview time, with most of the time devoted to the income module. The 
expenditure module alone still requires about one hour of interview time.  In addition, to 
improve the quality of the expenditure data the recall time is “bounded” and so the LSMS 
questionnaires are divided over two visits to the household, usually two weeks apart with the 
                                                 
77 For more information on LSMS, see http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms  
78 Anthropometric measures are used in nutritional assessments and include: height-for-age; weight-for-age; 
weight-for-height, head circumference (in infants/toddlers); body mass index; waist-to-hip ratio; and percentage 
of body fat (the last three for adults).  Individual measurements are usually compared to reference standards on a 
growth chart or to reference standards to assess weight status and the risk for various diseases.  Weight-for-
height measures wasting, weight-for-age measures underweight and both are used to identify current (acute) 
malnutrition.  Height-for-age is used to detect stunting (retarded growth).  Note, that weight-for-height is the 
most practical measure of the three since the other two require knowing the age.  Conway reported the 
difficulties in establishing the age of children in Cambodia (1999:160). 
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 consumption and expenditure modules covered in the second visit, and with the questioning 
explicitly referring to the enumerator's first visit as the start of the recall period.  While the 
design and implementation methodology contributes to outstanding data quality, the 
administration of an LSMS is usually costly, particularly for their sample size.  Most LSMS 
consist of nationally representative samples of 1,500 to 5,000 households.  Costs have varied 
from USD 78 per household in Jamaica to over USD 700 per household in Brazil but the 
majority of cases fall between USD 150 and USD 250 per household.  In addition, 
preparation can take between 6 and 18 months, analysis between 6 to 12 months and the 
typical administration of a survey takes between two and three years (Zeller 2004: 5-6). 
 
The LSMS is a very flexible instrument for measuring the incidence of poverty and 
constructing poverty profiles and has proven its applicability among different geographic and 
cultural settings.  However it is not the right tool to apply for MFIs.  As stated by Henry et al. 
(2003), the LSMS method is a widely accepted and fairly precise tool in measuring poverty 
(as far as the income dimension of poverty is concerned) and allows for comparisons between 
clients and non-clients within one area of a country and between countries.  However, it uses 
large samples and detailed data collection that make it far too costly, time-consuming, 





A second approach involves assessing whether people are able to obtain a specific type of 
consumption good such as food, shelter, health care or education.  In this view the analyst 
would need to go beyond the traditional monetary measures of poverty because nutritional 
poverty might be measured by examining whether children are stunted or wasted; and 
educational poverty might be measured by asking whether someone is illiterate, or by the 
amount of formal schooling they have received (WBI, 2005).  Non-monetary measurements 
of poverty commonly applied include life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy or indicators 
of access to public services such as schools, health clinics or drinking water.  However, as 
Ravallion notes “one should be equally wary of relying exclusively on such indicators” 
(1992: 106).  The author further states that one-dimensional non-monetary indicators may 
also be overly sensitive in making comparisons.  This could be the case in assessing primary 
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 health care when starting from a high mortality rate.  Also, average consumption may 
increase while the poor gain nothing (1992:106).   
 
 
The MFI Experience in One-Dimensional Measurements 
 
Within the realm of MFIs measuring poverty, the MFI experience covers both monetary and 
non-monetary measurements of poverty.  The first section on the experience of MFIs in 
assessing the poverty of clients will cover the work of ACCION and FINCA with monetary 
measurements and the second section will cover the Housing Index. 
 
ACCION International is a private nonprofit organization that applies the solidarity group 
lending methodology reviewed in Chapter II.  ACCION International was founded in 1961 
and started as a student-run volunteer effort in the shantytowns of Caracas.  Currently they 
have a network of lending partners covering Latin America, the United States and Africa.79  
ACCION's work focuses on commercial viability and institutional growth (i.e. the financial 
systems approach) and currently provides technical assistance to improve operations and 
efficiency as well as loan guarantees to partners so that they can access commercial capital. 
 
The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) is a U.S. non-profit 
microfinance institution created in 1984 and that applies the village bank methodology 
reviewed in Chapter II.  The founder of FINCA, John Hatch, started by providing small loans 
to farmers in Bolivia and by 2007 the FINCA network covered 20 countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Eurasia.80  FINCA’s affiliates are wholly-owned subsidiaries who use 
both donations and investments to build equity.  The FINCA Capital Fund also provides loan 
guarantees to its network programs. 
 
                                                 
79 Over the 1980s ACCION helped start microlending programs in 14 countries in Latin America, applying a 
“partner model.”  In 1992, ACCION helped create BancoSol (Bolivia), the first commercial bank in the world 
dedicated solely to microenterprise, as well as more than 15 ACCION-affiliated organizations that have become 
regulated financial institutions.  In 1991, ACCION replicated the microlending model in the US, which became 
known as ACCION USA. In October 2000, ACCION began working in partners in sub-Saharan Africa and in 
2005 the Unitus-ACCION Alliance stated in India. 
80 The Village Banking methodology first expanded to El Salvador and then Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and 
Haiti.  During the 1990s, FINCA started working in Africa: Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  In 1995, FINCA started operation in Eurasia, opening a program in 
Kyrgyzstan, which was followed by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Tajikistan 
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 These particular two cases will be studied because they constitute the only two 
methodologies that attempt to measure monetary absolute poverty and thus can be compared 
with nationally constructed poverty lines or international USD 1 per day cut-offs or their 
classification within the national expenditure quintile. 
 
 
Monetary Measurements: ACCION’s Income Tool  
 
ACCION poverty assessments focus on profiling the poverty level of clients and the 
correlation between poverty, demographic variables, and its clients’ microfinance activity.  
ACCION uses a Poverty Assessment Tool that seeks to measure directly household-level 
income and expenditure data and compare it with national and international poverty lines.  
Concretely, ACCION’s Poverty Assessment Tool relies on existing data obtained through the 
Management Information System (MIS) of the institution and compared with national-level 
household surveys (Welch 2002).   
 
A six-page questionnaire is applied to all incoming clients as part of the loan application 
process, covering simple and direct questions on different components of income and 
expenditures (which ACCION labels as “standard of living” data).  This data becomes part of 
the internal MIS and is used in the “social score card,” which is the poverty outreach report 
that management regularly presents to the Board.  Further information on the ACCION 
Social Scorecard is available in Annex 3.  However, the most important feature of the 
ACCION Poverty Assessment Tool for this review is that this income or expenditure data is 
collected and then compared with a national benchmark, so that an absolute poverty 
measurement is achieved.   
 
While ACCION uses both income and expenditure data, MIS data commonly lacks detailed 
information on sub-items comprising total income and total expenditure and much of the 
detail and built-in cross-checking in ACCION’s tool is focused on income (Welch 2002:9).  
Welch provides three reasons for focusing on income rather than expenditures that are linked 
to the fact that data is collected as part of the loan application process:  
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 ? First, loan officers concentrate more on collecting information on income than on 
expenditure, because income allows them to better assess the likelihood of repayment.   
? Secondly, as part of the application process, generally income information receives 
greater focus than expenditure data.   
? Thirdly, even if the application form was to be designed to collect balanced 
information on income and expenditures, credit applicants have an incentive to inflate 
household income and/or underreport expenses in order to obtain credit approval 
while loan officers have an incentive to omit sources of income that they are unsure 
about (2002:8-9). 
 
To date, the ACCION tool has been compared with national-level benchmarks in 4 cases: 
Mibanco in Peru; SOGESOL in Haiti; BancoSol in Bolivia and Apoyo Integral in El Salvador 
and in all cases the results are well documented (see Welch and Devaney 2003, Dewez et al. 
2003, Dewez et al. 2005 and Dewez et al. 2006, respectively).  While the original intention of 
ACCION was to utilize the LSMS databases as its primary source of national household data 
as stated in Welch (2002: 8) of the four studies to date, only one applied LSMS as a 
benchmark while the other three had to use national-level income and/or expenditure 
surveys.81   
 
Welch (2002) herself identifies some shortcoming to the tool.  The first one is that 
ACCION’s data collection is focused on income while the LSMS surveys data tends to focus 
on expenditure rather than over income.  As Zeller (2004) notes, while the LSMS income 
module contains many pages of questions covering potential different sources of income and 
applies different recall methods directed to different recall methods, it is unlikely that the 
question : “What is your income?” could obtain reliable answers within the limited timeframe 
of an MFI’s assessments.  Other reasons commonly mentioned for rejecting income measures 
include the high fluctuations of income (which makes it not a good proxy for long-run 
wealth), the need to calculate regional price differences in countries with imperfectly and 
                                                 
81 Specifically: in the case of Mibanco in Lima, Peru ACCION used the LSMS as the benchmark; in the case of 
Sogesol in Haiti (where there was no LSMS survey), ACCION used Haiti Living Conditions Survey and the 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey; in the case of BancoSol in Bolivia, ACCION used the Inter-
American Development Bank Program for the Improvement of Surveys and the Measurement of Living 
Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean, [which is similar to the LSMS]; and in Apoyo Integral in El 
Salvador , ACCION applied the National household living standards survey or EHPM. 
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 poorly integrated markets and resulting analytical difficulties requiring significant skills and 
resources for their resolution (Zeller, 2004: 13 and 25).  Furthermore, Welch also points out 
that MFIs require documentation of income sources in order to include income in their credit 
application form, leading to some systematic underreporting of income for families with 
multiple income sources and no documentation (2002: 9).  
 
On the other hand, it is often argued that precisely because MFIs provide credit, questions 
regarding income have the potential of being more relevant or more easily integrated into the 
“loan application process” of the institution.  The underlying assumption is that the loan 
officer will assess the income level of the potential borrower before the loan is sanctioned, 
and as such the information would be easily collected as part of the loan appraisal process – 
presumably for a specific loan use in her or his microenterprise.82  The reasoning however, is 
not valid for those MFIs that rely on other group members to decide who gets the loan 
without the previous assessment of the loan officer or those that do not provide loans for a 
particular (business) use but rather allow clients to use their loans as a household lump-sum 
for whatever purpose and establish as the only requirement for sanctioning the loan that the 
household has sufficient and appropriate cash-flow to meet the repayment obligations.  
 
Furthermore, even if thorough cash-flow analyses were to be standard routine among MFIs, 
the fact that loan officers collect this information during the loan application is quite likely to 
produce information that is not completely reliable: the client is likely to provide responses 
that will increase her or his perceived likelihood to receive the loan, regardless of the validity 
or reliability of the answer.  Welch (2002) herself also identified this as a shortcoming 
because: 
? the quality of the expenditure data is uncertain (clients and loan officers tend to focus 
on income rather than on expenditure);  
? clients tend to inflate household income and/or underreport expenses; and  
? loan officers have an incentive to omit sources of income that they are unsure about. 
 
                                                 
82  See for example Welch (2002) or Sinha et al. (2003) 
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 Another factor identified by Welch (2002) is that ACCION data does not include subsistence 
consumption as income, as the LSMS data does (2002: 9).  This is a key concern of the 
ACCION’s tool:  it was designed for measuring income in urban settings and thus does not 
include detailed questions on home-produced and home-consumed food.  As Zeller notes, 
especially in rural areas the problem of consumption of one’s own production or Common 
Property Resources as well as the seasonality of income sources make the problem of relying 
on income information even more pronounced (2004: 13 and 25).  
 
 
Monetary Measurements (Expenditures): FINCA-FCAP tool 
 
In 1997, FINCA started a poverty-focused learning process surveying three of its country 
programs; in 1999 it surveyed another three countries and, in 2002, seven countries relying 
on research interns to conduct field surveys.  Over time the variables, questions and sample 
design improved and currently the questionnaire is performed with the of aid hand-held 
PDAs (palm pilots) that has shortened interview time to 10-minute sessions and instantly 
downloads the data collected into the country database.  In the summer of 2003, FINCA 
conducted a client assessment of 11 programs and announced the creation of their poverty 
assessment instrument: ‘a tool with sufficient simplicity, flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and 
analytical power to both meet FINCA’s poverty assessment needs while providing field staff 
with excellent market intelligence for designing more effective financial products and 
services.’  The name of the tool was the FINCA Client Assessment Tool (FCAT).   
 
The FCAT survey attempts to measure poverty by calculating a monetary-metric poverty 
indicator: the household’s Daily Per Capita Expenditures (DPCE).  In simple terms, FINCA’s 
FCAT tool contrasts DPCE with national poverty lines expressed in local currency.  A 
FINCA client household living on less than USD 1/day DPCE is considered severely or 
absolutely poor.  A FINCA client household living on a DPCE between USD 1-2/day is 
considered moderately poor.  And a FINCA client household living on a DPCE above than 
USD 2/day is considered above the poverty line (i.e. non-poor).  The DPCE section of 
FINCA’s FCAT is available in the first section of Annex 4. 
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 One of the main lessons that FINCA has explicitly highlighted about its poverty research 
efforts is that estimates of household expenditures are considerably more accurate than 
estimates of household income.  According to FINCA, this is especially true for female 
respondents because these women often do not know what their husbands or other adult male 
family members earn.  What these women do know is how much they themselves earn plus 
what men give them for family necessities, making the estimate much more accurate.  DPCE 
is calculated by applying questions on the number of household’s members and estimations 
of sub-categories of monthly household expenditures such as expenditures in food, education, 
health, housing, utilities, transport, fuel, clothing, etc.  This monthly household expenses are 
divided by 30 and by the number of household members in order to obtain the daily amounts 
in local currency DPCE.  Finally, in order to assess poverty, the methodology compares the 
DPCE value with the national poverty level expressed in local currency to determine the 
percentage of respondents that fall into the three poverty categories.83 
 
In addition, FCAT also monitors client self-scoring of their status with regard to 6 social 
metrics in order to assess program impact.  These 6 areas are: food security, healthcare, 
housing, education, empowerment, and social capital.  These additional social metrics of the 
tool are also available in the last section of Annex 4. 
 
 
Non-Monetary Measurements: Housing Indexes or Land Ownership  
 
Within the microfinance industry, there are also examples as well of non-monetary one-
dimensional measures of poverty.  For instance, the Housing Index has been used by many 
MFIs (particularly in South and Southeast Asia).  Housing Indexes use external housing 
conditions as a proxy for poverty, and can be very effective in conditions where there is a 
consistent relationship between poverty and housing conditions.  Its advantage is that the list 
                                                 
83 In the 2003 research project three poverty lines were applied:  the US dollar equivalent (employing each 
country’s local currency exchange rate prevailing at the time of the survey), the international dollar, adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP) between different currencies and the World Bank or national government’s 
estimate of each country’s national poverty line in local currency.   FINCA found that expressing income and 
expenditure categories in international dollars adjusted for PPP inflated their value, resulting in unrealistically 
low poverty criteria that were inaccurate on a country-specific basis.  Thus, FINCA prefers to compare DPCE 
with the national poverty level expressed in local currency to determine the percentage of respondents that fall 
into the three poverty categories. 
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 of indicators needed (such as the quality of the roof or walls of the house) can be obtained 
very quickly by visual inspection.  For instance the roof conditions in Asia are a good 
indicator of poverty: a temporary, flimsy roof (e.g., straw, leaves, plastic sheets, or 
cardboard) nearly always indicates a "very poor" household.  "Poor" households tend to 
replace their roof with at least a semi-permanent one that keeps out the rain and wind and 
does not require constant repairs, e.g. galvanized sheets in the Philippines, or locally 
manufactured, second-hand tiles in South India (Simanowitz et al., 2000).  Examples of well-
known housing indexes include CASHPOR,84 Amanh Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) and ASA.  
Examples of adaptations of the CASHPOR House Index in two countries as diverse as South 
India and China are available in Annex 5.  
 
While the main advantages of this method are the time and cost requirements, a major 
disadvantage is that it neglects other dimensions of poverty by focusing only on one 
dimension (i.e. housing).  Generalizing the indicator across rural and urban areas and across 
countries can prove difficult and may not be applicable when housing is homogeneous in the 
community, or when housing is not an important poverty dimension, such as in a region with 
a good climate.  Hashemi and Foose report that housing indexes are excellent predictors of 
poverty in rural South Asia but that they are not applicable in urban areas or in many 
countries (2007:7).85   
 
Other indicators such as land ownership work well as proxy indicators in specific contexts, 
but present the same disadvantage: they cannot be generalized as valid across regions.  For 
instance, land ownership is a good indicator in rural Bangladesh but not for parts of Africa 
and Latin America (CGAP, 2000).  Also, Ramamurthy et al. (2001) report that the main issue 
for the poor in Cambodia is not landlessness per se, but rather ‘near landlessness.’86  The 
majority of landless households do not obtain their main source of income from agriculture 
and thus, it is possible to find both relatively prosperous households and also impoverished 
households.  On the other hand, those who own less than 0.5 hectare of agricultural land 
cannot subsist and yet in surveys they affirm that they ‘depend on agriculture for their living.’  
Although the land is not enough for subsistence farming they work their land and thus have 
                                                 
84 CASHPOR stands for Credit and Savings for the Hard-Core Poor of Asia-Pacific. 
85 Also, dwellers often live in brick and concrete houses but in far worse conditions than rural families in 
thatched or tin houses CGAP (2000) or where the poor have benefited from housing programs as in some 
Scheduled Caste villages in southern India (Simanowitz, 2000) 
86 Near landlessness is defined when a household owns less than 0.5 hectare of agricultural land because this is 
not enough for subsistence.   
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 less time to work in additional activities to generate income.  Thus, these near-landless 
households might be more vulnerable than landless households. 
 
 
Multidimensional Measures of Poverty 
 
But poverty is much more than lacking money.  When people are asked to define and 
characterize their situations, they mention many interacting factors that reinforce one another 
(Narayan, et al., 1999 and 2000a), among them: inadequate shelter or other assets (including 
productive inputs); poor health; low levels of education; stress and insecurity; violence and 
criminality; lack of voice; humiliation and shame in their interactions with government, 
traders, moneylenders or landlords; racism or social exclusion.  
 
The problems of focusing on only one dimension of poverty have been documented 
extensively; countries with comparable levels of growth of GDP per capita do not achieve 
comparable levels of development in education, health care, equality in economic 
participation, or high employment.  In fact, there is little controversy among the literature 
about the need of defining well-being and poverty as a multidimensional concept.87  
However, if poverty is defined as a multidimensional phenomenon, simple solutions cease to 
exist and the debate becomes how to “operationalize” this multidimensionality, i.e. how to 
measure it.88  
 
Among the authors that have reshaped the way we think about poverty, beyond the traditional 
one-dimensional monetary notion of well-being, the work of Amartya Sen must be 
highlighted.  If conceptualizations of human well-being are increasingly multidimensional, 
this trend stems from his seminal capabilities theory.  Sen (1981, 1984, 1987) argued that 
well-being comes from a “capability to function in society” setting a broad set of conditions 
                                                 
87 See Kolm (1977), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Maasoumi (1986), and Tsui (1995), cited in 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003).   
88 Lister 2004; Pelletiere 2006; Ravallion 1996; Sen 2000; Sengupta 2005; Waglé 2002, cited in Waglé, 
(forthcoming).  Waglé also states that attempts to measure wellbeing or poverty applying multidimensional 
frameworks have remained either narrowly conceived or highly disaggregated, including: Adelman and Morris 
(1967, 1973), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), Chakravarty (1983), Deutsch and Silber (2005), Dewilde 
(2004), Moisio (2004), Morris (1979), Tsui (1999, 2002), and Whelan et al. (2002). 
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 that constitute well-being.  These may include being fed, healthy, clothed, and educated but 
shifted the focus from the ‘means’ (such as having income to buy food) to the ‘ends’ (such as 
being well nourished).  According to Sen, individuals have entitlements that are created 
through endowment (assets owned) and exchange (trade and production by the individual).  
Many of these entitlements take place in the ‘subsistence’ or ‘non-monetary/non-marketed’ 
economy. Entitlements are exchanged for capabilities – a set of opportunities – to achieve the 
set of conditions of well-being (Sumner: 2007).  Sen (1999) investigates five distinct types of 
freedom that help to advance the general capability of a person:  political freedoms; economic 
facilities; social opportunities; transparency guarantees and protective security.89  The crux of 
Sen’s argument is that freedoms are both the primary ends and the principal means of 
development and that all of these freedoms are linked so that knowledge of what kinds of 
freedom strengthen one another is crucial so that individuals can shape their own destiny.  As 
Bryant (2004) points out, Sen’s concept of capabilities turned towards positive values and 
freedoms—what is possible for people, and thus, can also be seen as the other (positive) side 
of the coin of the 1970s and 1980s dependency school.90   
 
Intimately linked with Sen’s work is the concept of participatory development.  The objective 
of participatory development approaches is to hear the voices of the poor, incorporate their 
views and bring them into the decision making process.  As such, Participatory Wealth 
Ranking (PWR) tools will be described in the detail in following section. 
 
 
Operationalizing Multidimensional Measures of Poverty  
 
The operationalization of multidimensional measures of poverty has relied on two main tools: 
participatory approaches and indicator-based methodologies. 
 
                                                 
89 For instance, political freedoms may take the form of free speech and elections; economic facilities may 
involve participating in production and trade; social opportunities may take the form of education and health 
facilities; transparency guarantees may minimize corruption and protective security may take the form of famine 
relief or unemployment benefits. 
90 Sen's work stresses that individuals need not be seen as passive recipients of developing programs.  This is 
precisely because “capabilities” focuses on people solving their own problems and shaping their own destiny, 
much in the vein of the “agent-oriented” view (1999: II). 
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 Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR) 
 
The common characteristic of participatory wealth ranking tools is that participants jointly 
identify the indicators and their weights (i.e. which of the indicators is more important) 
arriving at a classification of different participants (or groups of participants) into different 
poverty groups.  The facilitator only guides the process and documents the results.  The 
evolution of participatory methods, the principles and techniques have been described by 
Chambers (1992), Estrella and Gaventa (1998), Mayoux (2001) and Norton et al. (2001) 
among others.  
 
According to Chambers, Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA) are “ a growing family of 
approaches and methods to enable local (rural or urban) people to express, enhance, share and 
analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan to act” (1994a: 1253).  
 
Henry et al. make a distinction between rapid appraisals and participatory appraisals.  Both 
use inputs from the community and similar techniques (e.g. wealth ranking) but their ultimate 
goal is different.  The ultimate goal of the participatory appraisal is empowerment of the 
target group (which requires extensive participation of the community and assumes an open 
research and an open development agenda) while rapid appraisals are meant to provide data 




Indicator-based Methodologies  
 
Indicator-based methodologies rely on identifying a range of indicators that reflect 
powerfully on the different dimensions of poverty and for which credible information can be 
quickly and inexpensively obtained.  One of the most well-known applications of 
multidimensional indicator-based methodologies is the Human Development Index (HDI).  
The HDI can be considered a practical application of Sen’s work on well-being,91 and is 
                                                 
91 Albeit HDI do not incorporate all the capabilities and excludes endowments (Sumner, 2007:7). 
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 computed as the weighted average of educational attainment, life expectancy at birth, and per 
capita income.92   
 
The HDI does provide further evidence that income levels and human development are not 
directly correlated, for instance:  the HDI of Cambodia and Botswana in 2006 are very 
similar but the GPD per capita in Botswana is four times higher than the income in Cambodia 
while life expectancy is much lower in Botswana (HDR, 2006: 285).93 
 
 
The MFI Experience in Multidimensional Measures of Poverty 
 
The main multidimensional tools applied by MFIs can also be divided between participatory 
tools and indicator-based methodology tools.  Each of them will be reviewed in turn in the 





Participatory approaches to poverty assessment have been used extensively by MFIs in the 
past, albeit mostly concentrating on targeting as opposed to ex-post assessments.94  In fact, 
Concern-TPT (the precursor of AMK) applied a participatory wealth ranking tool combined 
with a participatory mapping exercise until 2002.  The origin of the methodology was 
intrinsically linked at the “targeting” requirement of the program.  Up to October 2002, the 
targeting policy of Concern-TPT stated that” “70 percent of the total members belonged to 
the poor and poorest categories” and aimed at reaching “90 percent of the poorest in each 
rural village” where it operated.  
                                                 
92 In the case of OECD countries, it also includes a fourth dimension: social exclusion (Waglé, Forthcoming: 1). 
93 Life expectancy: Botswana: 34.9 and Cambodia: 56.5.  GDP per capita (PPP USD): Botswana: 9,945 and 
Cambodia: 2,423. 
94 For instance, the Trickle-Up Program applies participatory methods to define their multidimensional poverty 
indicator. MicroSave-Africa has most recently applied participatory methodologies for MFIs.  MicroSave was 
created by SUM/UNDP Africa and DFID to promote savings services for poor.  Its regional center in Kampala 
conducts action research, develops curricula and provides technical assistance to MFIs.  Further information is 
available in www.microsave.org.   
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 As documented in Torres (2003), participatory approaches were applied to identify the poor 
and very poor families in the villages in order to target these families.  The key informants 
were the villagers themselves and the process was facilitated by the credit officers.   
 
The specific well-being grouping tool basically functioned as follows:  The villagers 
classified themselves according to poverty indicators that they themselves had set.  The 
exercise produced a list of all the households in the village classified into four categories: 
‘rich,’ ‘medium,’ ‘poor’ and ‘poorest.’  Two groups of villagers were formed and each of 
them was asked to compile the list of all the households in the village and then classify each 
of them into one of the four categories.  Both groups would be combined for the final count.  
If both groups had agreed on the classification of household X, household X would be 
classified and recorded as such.  In case of discrepancy between the two groups of villagers 
in the classification of one particular household, further discussion would be fostered among 
all participants until an agreement and a definite classification could be reached.  The credit 
officer recorded the list of all the households in the village and the decisions reached by the 
villagers regarding their grouping into the four categories described above. 
 
Once the list of all households and their corresponding classification had been completed the 
village was also mapped.  The map indicated the locations of the households as classified in 
the wealth ranking activity as well as other basic structures such as the school, a well, public 
houses, pagoda (religious house), etc.  The combined group of participants drew a map on the 
ground with sticks, seed or stones and agreed on where households and other basic structures 
should be placed in the map.  Thus, the map constituted a representation of the spatial 
distribution and location of resources, social groups, facilities, etc.   
 
The facilitator (in this case the credit officer) replicated the drawing on the ground in a sheet 
of paper that would be kept in the office along with the list of the households and their 
appropriate poverty classification.  These wealth ranking exercises were undertaken before 
the formation of the groups in a new village and were to be repeated every 3 years.  Updates 
of the wealth ranking figures were undertaken every time a new member joined the Village 
Bank and these updates were documented by the staff (Torres, 2003: 71-73). 
 
One of the most well known examples of MFIs that have applied participatory methodologies 
is Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) in South Africa.  The main two differences of the SEF 
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 approach and the approach Concern-TPT applied is that in SEF the participatory mapping 
exercise took place before generating the list of households and that SEF enforced a rule of 
triangulation (i.e. at least three parties) in order to assure consistency of the ratings.  
Concretely, SEF’s participatory wealth ranking takes place as follows: in the first step the 
community maps the village in a participatory exercise and a household list is generated from 
the exercise.  Groups of five to three members are grouped into “reference groups” who are 
in charge of identifying each household into at least four categories of wealth.  The results of 
the exercise are triangulated by using at least three reference groups in order to achieve 
consistency in the results of ranking and each household is assigned a score of wealth.   
 
According to Henry et al. (2003), rapid appraisals and participatory appraisals (including 
participatory wealth ranking) methods can be well suited for targeting and for the 
participatory design of development projects and services, but also have disadvantages for the 
purpose of poverty assessments.  First, the results are difficult to verify since they stem from 
the subjective rating of the community members.  Second, the method may be consistent in 
finding the poorest third in one village, but it may not be consistent in finding in which 
communities reside the poorest third of an entire region.  Precisely because each village sets 
its own parameters of poverty, the wealth ranking tools do not allow for comparison among 
villages, i.e. a “poor” household in village X might be classified as “very poor” in village Y 
or as “medium” in village Z.95   
 
Thirdly, good results in the exercise require skillful and experienced facilitators or otherwise, 
there is the risk of potential implementation problems.  The skills requirements for facilitators 
in participatory methods seem higher than the requirements of quantitative survey 
enumerators because the risks of respondent and sampling biases are also higher. 
 
Mayoux (2003) and Simanowitz et al. (2000) further argue that while participatory wealth 
ranking uses the community's own definitions and perceptions of poverty and employs 
rigorous crosschecking methods to ensure consistency and accuracy of results, wealth ranking 
relies on detailed knowledge of a community of itself, and is unlikely to work in contexts 
                                                 
95 According to Simanowitz, the practical experience with participatory wealth ranking shows that there is 
greater similarity among communities in the poverty indicators and cut-off criteria.  On the other hand, the study 
of Elbers et at (2003) found large differences in the poverty ranking even among neighboring communities and 
this differences are explained by the geographic characteristics of communities, even after controlling for 
demographic and economic conditions (Zeller, 2004).   
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 where the community is weak, or where there are high levels of conflict or mistrust/suspicion.  
Cambodia is rebuilding itself from prolonged armed conflict and distrust is still prevalent, 
thus it seems not to be the right candidate for this tool.   
 
In addition, Torres (2003) further identified problems with the implementation of the wealth 
ranking methodology in the Concern-TPT program.  These implementation problems were 
linked to data discrepancy, lack of triangulation processes for cross-checking and lack of 
mechanisms to assess the skills of field staff (2003:91).   
 
Therefore participatory tools within the context of Cambodia (and AMK) have the following 
disadvantages.  Firstly, it is not possible to compare the results regionally, nationally or 
internationally.  Secondly, the tool is particularly not appropriate in Cambodia’s post-conflict 
context.  Thirdly, the skills of the facilitators have been proven insufficient to guarantee 
correct implementation problems.  Thus, the participatory tool will be excluded as a potential 





The indicator-based methodologies will first review the “net worth” or “check list” tools, 
secondly the CGAP/IFPRI Poverty Assessment Tool and thirdly the CGAP/Grameen/Ford 
Progress Out of Poverty Index.   
 
Probably the more well-known examples of an indicator-based methodology applied by MFIs 
are the CASHPOR “net worth” tests or the “check list” tools applied by the Grameen Bank 
and the Grameen Bank replicators,96 which apply a simplified household poverty surveys 
with a small list of indicators that when combined give a reliable assessment of the poverty 
level of an individual household.  This indicator-based methodology attempts to solve the 
problems of the Housing Index (i.e. limited to externally visible characteristics and inability 
to consider other aspects besides housing) by introducing the ‘net-worth test’ that is used in 
                                                 
96 MFIs that use the check list tool include: the Kabalikat para sa Maunlad na Buhay Inc. Means Test (KMBI, 
Philippines); Rhunu UNESCO (Sri Lanka); Family Development Fund (FDF, Egypt); International Rescue 
Committee SEAD Program (IRC, Ivory Coast); and Lift Above Poverty Organization (LAPO, Nigeria). 
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 borderline cases because it adds extra cost to the tool.  The method usually involves three 
steps: (1) Identifying high-density poverty areas (2) using the house (or compound) as a crude 
indicator to eliminate the obvious non-poor households and (3) conducting a more detailed 
household interview (named “net-worth” test) to determine program eligibility amongst the 
remaining households.  Specifically, the staff walk systematically through the villages 
selected as containing many poor and look at each house and compound, eliminating those 
that are large, in good condition, and made from expensive materials.  The houses that may or 
may not contain a poor or poorest household are scored based on a locally relevant set of 
points. Two cut-offs are established: (i) between the poor and non-poor and (ii) of those 
identified as poor, between poorest and moderately poor.  Cut-off points guide eligibility (e.g. 
3 or less: “likely to be very poor”; 4 to 6: “poor”; greater than 6: “unlikely to be poor”).  All 
houses that scored 3 or less are marked on a simple map of the village as "eligible looking 
houses."  Once the list and map of eligible-looking houses has been completed for the village, 
the field staff will go to the houses on the list to verify the eligibility of the households 
through a short, 10 to 15 minute net-worth interview that focuses on the value of their 
productive assets (e.g. agricultural land owned and/or operated, farm equipment and 
machinery, large farm animals, transport vehicles, and stocks of goods for sale, etc.).  
According to Zeller, the “net worth” is thus the difference between value of assets owned and 
the debt of the household (2004:27).  According to the Net Worth proponents, there is a 
regular and independent process of random checking the quality of the output from the staff 
that assures both accuracy and transparency.  On average, it takes field staff five minutes to 
index a house and determine eligibility scores and about 10 to 15 minutes per household to 
perform the net-worth interview.   
 
In the “check list tool” or “net worth” test, the indicators depend on the local characteristics 
of poverty but can be divided into four main areas: income and expenditure; economic status 
(proxies of income levels such as household assets, productive assets, housing); social 
indicators (such as education or households headed by women); and indicators of wider 
poverty factors (such as water, health or education).  According to Simanowitz et al. (2000), 
developing and implementing effective and rigorous “check-list” tools requires considerable 
time and resources, but when combined with another tool (such as the House Index) they can 
be very effective and accurate.  According to Zeller, the advantage of the “net worth” test 
compared to the housing index is that assets other than housing are included, as well as debt; 
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 the disadvantage is that the questions used to estimate the current value of assets and debts 
may be difficult for respondents (2004: 27-28). 
 
Another indicator-based methodology is the complete FINCA-FCAT tool that is available in 
Annex 4.  Note that the FCAT section of Daily Per Capita Expenditures (DPCE) was 
explored in page 78 but that the complete tool also covers six additional social metrics (food 
security, healthcare, housing, education, empowerment, and social capital).   
 
 
CGAP-IFPRI Poverty Assessment Tool: Relative Poverty-PCA 
 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) developed the GGAP/IFPRI Poverty Assessment Tool with the 
aim of constructing a multidimensional poverty index that allows for comparisons between 
MFIs and across countries.  The tool was primarily designed for donors and investors who 
require a standardized and rigorous tool that can be applicable globally in order to make 
investment decisions.  In order to ensure a holistic understanding of the institution, CGAP 
recommends the use of the poverty assessment tool in conjunction with the other appraisal 
tools, such as the CGAP Appraisal Format (which covers the MFI’s performance in 
governance; management and leadership; mission and plans; systems; operations; human 
resource management; products; portfolio quality and financial analysis). 
 
The CGAP/IPRI tool presents a set of indicators that reflect the multidimensionality of 
poverty and involves a survey of 200 randomly selected new clients and 300 randomly 
selected non-clients from the same geographical area with the household as the basic 
sampling unit.97  Concretely, the survey collects information on the following dimensions: 
demographic structure and economic activities; footwear and clothing expenditure; food 
security and vulnerability (frequency of meals, consumption of luxury and inferior food, 
hunger episodes);98 housing indicators (ownership status, room size, building materials, 
access to electricity, drinking water and sanitation, cooking fuel); land ownership; and 
ownership of assets (livestock, productive assets and consumption assets).  The tool takes 
                                                 
97 The choice of new clients is precisely to eliminate any impact from being in the program. 
98 Examples of inferior foods include cassava in Kenya, coarse bread and chili in India and tortillas in 
Nicaragua. 
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 about four months to complete and costs about USD 10,000.99  When the data is compiled, a 
single index of poverty is created that assigns a score to each household, representing the 
household’s poverty status in relation to all other households in the sample.  The CGAP/IPRI 
tool applies Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as the statistical technique used to identify 
the components of the poverty score.  Thus, the poverty index allows for a comparison of 
poverty levels of clients and non-clients in a specific region.  In order to allow for national 
and international comparisons, two additional inputs are added: (a) a national evaluation 
panel of experts who rate the MFI’s operational area against national average and (b) the 
Human Development Index (HDI) to rank the poverty level of the country against all other 




CGAP-Grameen-Ford Progress Out Of Poverty Index  
 
The Progress Out Of Poverty Index is a composite, verifiable, non-financial indicator 
developed by CGAP, Grameen Foundation and Ford Foundation.  The indicators are specific 
to each country and must be simultaneously “simple and low cost” and “sufficiently robust 
and globally applicable” (Hashemi and Foose, 2007: 7).  In each country, a “poverty score 
card” is created sing techniques similar to those employed in credit scoring drawing from 
information from the LSMS or national-level household surveys.  The index uses a small set 
of simple, easily observable indicators and indicators are selected based on the degree in 
which they predict the household poverty level.  Thus the Progress Out Of Poverty Index 
provides an accurate estimate of the probability that a client is poor. 100  The methodology 
was developed by Mark Schreiner and scores typically include family size, the number of 
children attending school, the type of housing, or what the family typically eats.  As the name 
suggest, the index also serves as a baseline, so that repeated application will allow MFIs to 
track client movement across poverty lines over time.  Grameen Foundation further states that 
the index is both a management and a measurement tool, allowing MFIs to better determine 
                                                 
99 The costs in four MFIs were it was tested ranged from USD 4,000 to USD 16,000. 
100  Scores are sums of indicator points and range from zero (most likely poor) to 100 (least likely poor).  Scores 
are not poverty likelihoods (that is, estimated probabilities of being poor) but are associated with poverty 
likelihoods through a “poverty likelihood table.”  Scorecards are accurate: with 90 percent confidence, they 
estimate a group’s overall poverty rate within about 1 or 2 percentage points. For individuals, they typically 
estimate poverty likelihoods within 5–14 percentage points (Schreiner, 2006). 
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 the needs of their clients, the most effective programs; how quickly clients leave poverty, and 
what helps them to move out of poverty faster. 
 
According to Grameen Foundation, the Progress Out Of Poverty Index is practical and 
reliable: the tool consists only of 10 indicators, is simple to collect, easy to verify and 
difficult to manipulate.  Biggar states that initial field testing has shown that loan officers can 
indeed streamline the data collection and save time (2006:32).  Hashemi further states that 
tests show that a single scorecard works with high accuracy in both rural and urban areas of a 
given country. (2007:7) 
 
According to Hashemi and Foose, Scorecards for each country differ on the questions asked 
and on the specific numeric score assigned for each of the questions asked but would remain 
a statistically rigorous and user-friendly proxy for the same common global indicator: 
percentage of clients below the national poverty line or living on less than USD 1-2 per day 
[ppp] (2007:7).  The Progress out of Poverty Index has been created or piloted for over 20 
countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa.101  Please refer to Annex 6 for examples of the 
Poverty Score Card or the Progress Out of Poverty Index for the Philippines, Mexico and 
South Africa.   
 
However, indicator-based methodologies also have disadvantages.  The main disadvantages 
of “check lists” or “net worth” tests is that the indicators and weights assigned to each of the 
indicators are somewhat arbitrarily chosen and that does not allow for comparisons across 
countries.  The main disadvantage of the CGAP-IFPRI Poverty Assessment Tool is that is a 
relative score and as such, not directly comparable across countries.  The 
CGAP/Grameen/Ford tool is promising but the tool is too recent to be able to evaluate the 
implementation results.  In addition, there are no current plans to create a scorecard for 
Cambodia and the creation of the scorecard by an individual MFI is too expensive and 
unfeasible given the lack of access to the national equivalent to the LSMS (the Cambodia 
                                                 
101 These include: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, El Salvador, South Africa and 
Vietnam (CGAP, 2007).  Other countries recently added include: Argentina; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; 
Colombia; Dominican Republic; The Gambia; Mali; and United States of America (further information 
available at: www.microfinance.com/#Poverty_Scoring)  
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 Socio-Economic Survey (CSEC)).  Another potential drawback of the CGAP/Grameen/Ford 
tool is that it becomes totally dependent on an external source for updating the information.  
Even if CGAP/Grameen/Ford were to create a score card for every single country, the issue 
remains on who will be in charge of updating this scorecard and if the potential changes in 
the scorecard will allow for the assessment of changes over time.  A quick glance at the three 
examples of scorecards publicly available at the time of writing this dissertation (for the 
Philippines, Mexico and South Africa) seems to highlight the need for frequent updates for 
the scorecard.  This is because some of the indicators included are likely to be irrelevant 
indicators of poverty in a relative short time.  Examples include the question of whether the 
house has bough fabric softener in the last month for the case of Mexico, the question of how 
many TV a household owns in the Philippines or the questions of whether the household 
owns a VCR, a microwave, a washing machine or a landline phone in South Africa.  Because 
the scorecards are constructed only with 5 to 10 indicators, it is likely that changes in the 
poverty explanatory power of even one of these indicators would affect the overall score 
dramatically.  Given the dynamism of the developing world, particularly in the use of new 
technology the issue of updating the score is indeed relevant.102   
 
 
Subjective Measures of Welfare 
 
Recent literature is looking at a new concept that takes a new approach for measuring 
wellbeing.  Subjective measures of welfare aim to quantify poverty and welfare through 
instruments that rely on respondents’ subjective assessments. 103  As Ravallion and Lokshin 
state “it is a paradox that when economists analyze the welfare impacts of policies, they 
typically assume that people are the best judges of their own welfare, yet they resist directly 
asking people themselves whether they are better off.”  In addition, “conventional 
assessments of whether one person is better off than another may disagree with peoples’ own 
assessments” (1999: 2 and 24, respectively).   
 
                                                 
102 For instance, in Cambodia, it is far easier and cheaper to have access to a mobile phone than to a land line 
and it is difficult to even find VCRs in stores when most people (even in rural areas) can afford a DVD player.  
The speed for changes tends to be different between the developed and the developing world.  
103 This section has relied on a summary of the literature on the topic by Carletto and Zezza.  More extensive 
reviews on subjective measures of welfare can be found in Oswald (1997), Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), and 
Frey and Stutzer (2002).   
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 Indeed, data on subjective well-being has been applied by economists to examine both macro 
and micro-oriented questions and it is becoming a fashionable topic.  In their recent article, 
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) report that, according to a tabulation of EconLit, from 2001 to 
2005 there were more than 100 papers written analyzing data on self-reported life satisfaction 
or happiness compared with the merely 4 papers written from 1991 to 1995.   
 
However, how to measure subjective welfare is not an undisputed terrain.  Back in 1965, 
Cantril proposed the idea of a ladder on which respondents were asked to rank themselves in 
terms of happiness or satisfaction with life.  But as Ravallion and Lokshin (1999) point out, 
being poor is not the same as being unhappy.  Since then, the idea of the ladder has been 
modified to a narrower definition of economic welfare, asking people to put themselves on a 
poverty scale, also known as the Economic Ladder Question (ELQ).104  Van Praag (1968) 
introduced the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ), asking respondents what income they 
would consider “very bad” to “very good.”  Kapteyn (1994) introduced the Minimum Income 
Question, (MIQ) asking respondents what income they consider the minimum necessary “to 
make ends meet.”  However the MIQ question has been criticized (Ravallion and Lokshin, 
2000; Deaton and Zaidi, 2002) because in developing countries, the concept of income vary 
greatly across respondents, as well as from the definition of income often applied by 
economists.  Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) adapted Kapteyn’s approach to developing 
countries by asking questions on “the perceived adequacy of (food or total) household 
consumption,”  defining the subjective poverty line (SPL) as “the level of total spending 
above which respondents say (on average) that their expenditures are adequate for their 
needs.” 
 
Precisely because of the novelty of the new approach, attempts to measure subjective 
wellbeing have been compared with standard ‘objective’ measures:  Pradhan and Ravallion 
(1998) study in Jamaica and Nepal shows that the aggregate poverty rates based on subjective 
poverty lines come close to those based on “objective” poverty lines, but that there are 
notable differences in the demographic or geographic profiles of poverty.  Lokshin, Umapathi 
and Paternostro (2004) study in Madagascar applying categorical consumption adequacy 
                                                 
104 The question reads as follows: please imagine a 9-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the 
poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are you today? (Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 1999:9). 
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 questions show overall strong correlation between subjective welfare and household income 
but the measures appear to differ substantially the demographic dimension and the spatial 
poverty profile.  Carletto and Zezza (2004) study in Albania also found that subjective and 
objective measures of poverty are clearly correlated and yield very similar poverty 
headcounts, but that the actual overlap between the two definitions in terms of those who are 
identified as poor was not as strong.   
 
Carletto and Zezza (2004) study also confirms that subjective welfare includes idiosyncratic 
dimensions of poverty not fully captured by traditional moneymetric measures.  However, the 
authors also affirm that irrespectively of the particular subjective definition or measure 
chosen, the literature consistently suggests that self-reported measures of welfare regularly 
deviate from objective measures of welfare.105  They list the following possible reasons for 
the discrepancy:   
? People may not equate their welfare or poverty with income or expenditure alone; 
? Relative income explanation (Easterlin, 1974): it is relative rather than absolute 
income that matters in explaining self-reported levels of welfare.  Quantitative 
measures of poverty are in most cases based on absolute poverty lines, but the way 
people ‘feel’ about their welfare status depends –according to this interpretation- on 
how the distribution of the income around them. 
? Negative implications of unemployment and poor health on people’s perception of 
own welfare.  Psychology and socio-economic literature documents that being 
unemployed may cause depression and anxiety, and carry a social stigma in many 
societies.  At equal income levels, being unemployed or in ill health reduces the 
subjective assessment of one’s welfare, even when this is defined in purely economic 
terms (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000).  In addition, people may be concerned that a 
situation of high unemployment may adversely affect them in the future.  Empirical 
results from 12 European countries show that a 1 percent point increase in local 
unemployment levels has a negative impact on people’s satisfaction (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002). 
                                                 
105 This statement holds whether subjective welfare is defined broadly (e.g. “happiness”) or narrowly, (e.g. 
“poverty” or “financial situation”) and whether objective measures are based on GDP or poverty defined on the 
basis of income or expenditure data. 
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 ? Demographic characteristics (household size, marital status) have also been 
investigated and found to be significant (Diener et al., 1999; Lanjouw and Ravallion, 
1995).  
? Difficulty in disentangle the various effects of personality traits in the econometric 
analysis.  Personality traits influence the way people respond to subjective questions 
but they also influence their own socioeconomic characteristics such as household 
size or employment or income.106 
 
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) in a recent paper, argue that it is important to distinguish 
between “utility” as an economic concept with the perceptions of an individual’s experiences 
or feelings.  In fact, individuals interpret categories differently (for instance, in a scale 1 to 
10, my answer of 4 may be equivalent to your answer of 6).  This fact makes comparisons 
across countries difficult, along with cultural or language differences in answering standard 
satisfaction.  In order to solve this problem the authors propose the U- index, defined as a 
misery index that measures the proportion of time that people spend in an unpleasant state.  
The U-index (for “unpleasant” or “undesirable” is an ordinal measure at the level of feelings.  
Other studies have proven that the effects of context107, weather,108 mood 109or an earlier 
question in a survey110 affect the reliability of the standard life satisfaction and happiness 
questions.   
 
No MFI to date has applied or adapted the subjective poverty approach in order to assess the 
poverty of their clients. 
 
                                                 
106 For instance, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) in Russia’s longitudinal dataset found that the proportion of 
women and children in the household and marital status helped explain self-rated welfare.  However, household 
size became insignificant.  The authors assess that this result is because the longitudinal dataset allowed them to 
control for personality traits. 
107 Marcel Fafchamps and Forhad Shilpi (2004) in their study in Nepal, showing that isolation (measured by 
distance to markets and proximity to large urban centers) significantly reduce subjective assessments of income 
and consumption adequacy.  
108 Life satisfaction is reported higher on nicer days; although if individuals are first asked explicitly about the 
weather, the weather does not influence their reported life satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore, 1983).  
109 Schwarz (1987) invited subjects to the lab to fill out a questionnaire on life satisfaction.  However, before 
they answered the questionnaire, however, he asked them to photocopy a sheet of paper for him. A dime was 
placed on the copy machine for a randomly chosen half of the sample. Reported satisfaction with life was raised 
substantially by the discovery of the coin on the copy machine—clearly not an income effect 
110 On the other hand, Krueger and Schkade (2007) found that both overall life satisfaction measures (i.e. 
subjective well being) and affective experience measures derived from the daily recall method on different days 
two weeks apart show similar reliability.   
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 Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty  
 
If there was little consensus in how to operationalize poverty measures, there seems to be 
even less agreement in how to operationalize the concept of vulnerability.  Morduch (1994) 
proposes to measure poverty in terms of both the means and the variance of consumption 
over time, or to measure poverty in terms of certainty-equivalent consumption; but measuring 
vulnerability is “difficult to make precise and operational” (2004:224).   
 
Some of the proxies applied in order to measure vulnerability to poverty include: movements 
in and out of poverty; entry and exit probability; length and frequency of poverty spells; or 
income variability and mobility (Coudouel et al. 2002:54-58); the distance between mean per 
capita expenditure and the poverty line; or the consumption volatility observed from panel 
data (Conway and Turk, 2001).111  A notable exception to the lack of empirical evidence on 
how to operationalize the concept of vulnerability to poverty is the “asset vulnerability 
framework” developed by Caroline Moser. 
 
The “asset vulnerability framework” tries to identify what the poor have, rather than what 
they lack and in so doing focuses on their assets and was tested by Moser (1998) in four 
urban communities.  The framework goes beyond a ‘static’ measuring of the poor, towards 
classifying the capabilities of poor populations to use their resources to reduce their 
vulnerability.  The results of the study illustrate that the poor are managers of complex asset 
portfolios and how asset management affects asset accumulation (and poverty) and 
vulnerability.  The framework identifies five categories of assets that the urban poor manage: 
labor; human capital; productive assets (focusing on housing within the urban settings of her 
research cases); household relations; and social capital.112  The framework intended to 
facilitate interventions promoting opportunities (and removing obstacles) to ensure that the 
                                                 
111 Also, note that there is no clear empirical evidence of how to measure vulnerability as distinct from the 
concept of vulnerability to poverty. 
112 Management of labor as an asset identifies multiples earners with high income levels as the optimum 
strategy.  Management of human capital involves better educated household heads faring well.  Management of 
productive assets (such as housing in the urban setting) identifies home owners as having considerable 
advantages.  Management of household relations identifies stable, nuclear or small, extended households with 
low levels of intrahousehold conflict doing best.  Finally social capital identifies active reciprocal support 
networks within communities (particularly between women) and participation in community activities as 
facilitating trust and collaboration.  Note that social capital is discussed in terms of Putnam's work which 
focuses on the stocks of 'reciprocal networks of trust and norms embedded in the social organization of 
communities.' 
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 urban poor use their assets productively.  The research identified asset portfolio management 
strategies across communities in very different global context and the complexity of 
determining strategy sequencing.113  Finally, it also provided generalized checklists of 
potential solutions derived from the four research communities, each designed to consolidate 
a different asset. 
 
While it seems undisputed that there is a role for microfinance in reducing vulnerability to 
poverty and that research is needed to achieve financial product innovations that allow the 
poor to manage risk better, there is very little empirical data of measuring vulnerability in 
microfinance.  Most existing tools incorporate some indicators that could measure 
vulnerability to poverty, not all of them necessarily identify them as a “vulnerability” 
indicator per se.  No MFI to date has applied or adapted a vulnerability framework in order to 
assess the poverty of their clients, at least not exclusively.  Given the practical difficulties, 
often the linkage of vulnerability and microfinance is seen through asset accumulation: 
microfinance allows households to build assets and protect themselves from both sudden 
unexpected shocks and other more predictable demands for lump-sums of money.  
 
Cohen and Sebstad (2000) conclusions paper of the AIMS study suggest that microfinance 
plays an important role in decreasing vulnerability.  Indeed, recent research argues that the 
lack of insurance markets and imperfect credit markets in developing countries forces 
households to accumulate assets precisely for income –smoothing purposes.  This behavior is 
relevant for microfinance because, as Kochar (2002) details, it would favor investments in 
assets that are relatively “liquid” but have low yields, such as animals, food stock or cash 
instead of high yielding “illiquid” assets such as the physical capital required to increase crop 
incomes.  When liquidity is chosen over return of an asset, households will experience lower 
lifetime wealth and thus higher poverty.  The author provides empirical evidence on the 
effects of adult male illnesses on savings decisions and composition of assets portfolios in 
rural Pakistani households.  Her conclusions show that indeed anticipated ill health of adult 
males is a major determinant of poverty because it significantly influences the amount and 
type of assets the household saves, reducing their productive assets (2002: 266-267).  Also, 
the ability of poor household to deal with their vulnerability depend on the recurrence of the 
                                                 
113 This is because of simultaneous strategies and of the interrelationship between the consolidation of different 
assets. 
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 shocks, Sharma and Buchenrieder (2002) report on the 1994 study by Alderman in Pakistan 
using IFPRI data where the author found that if a household has a negative income shock 
following a positive shock, it will not reduce its consumption but increase debt.  However, if 
a household has two negative shocks in a row it will reduce consumption and not only will 
not increase debt but sell off physical assets (2002:232).   
 
 
Reasons behind the Choice of Poverty Measurement Tools 
 
The literature on targets and indicators talks about ‘SMART’ targets, which are specific, 
measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound.114  However, indicators should also be 
cost-effective (or economic), relevant (or appropriate), simple, and updated frequently, say 
yearly: EASY as well as SMART (Maxwell, 1999).  In fact, the best indicator would be the 
one that minimizes costs and effort for a certain level of accuracy.  Applying the term coined 
by Robert Chambers (1997) to highlight the importance of knowing what is not worth 
knowing, the best indicator must achieve “optimal ignorance’ so that it needs the minimum 
amount of information in order to achieve the minimum level of accuracy desired.  Zeller 
(2004) adds that in addition of being visible and obtainable at low cost, indicators should be 
verifiable by other investigators.  This involves that an MFI itself applies poverty assessment 
tools, these should be externally verifiable.  In addition, a tool that allows for national and 
regional comparisons and that could also be used as baseline data would be also preferred. 
 
Table III-2 below summarizes existing poverty assessment tools applied by MFIs, 
highlighting their main positive and negative features.   
 
                                                 
114 The same acronym is also used for stretching, measurable, agreed, recorded, and time-limited (Maxwell, 
1999). 
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 Table III-2: Summary of MFI Poverty Assessment Tools Reviewed  
(Positive and Negative features highlighted) 




ACCION Income Tool  
? Absolute measure ? comparable  
? One-dimensional 
? Focus on income (over expenditure) 
? Uncertain quality of data (as it is collected as 
part of application process) 
? Self-consumption not included 
 
DPCE section of FINCA-FCAT tool 
? Absolute measure ? comparable 
? Based on expenditure 
? Self-consumption not included 
 
CGAP/Grameen/Ford Progress Out of 
Poverty Index (PPI) 
? Multidimensional measure of poverty 
? Absolute measure ? comparable 
? Too recent to evaluate 
? Scorecard not available for Cambodia and not 
possible to create by an independent MFI 
(benchmark national survey not available and 
not clear on costs of creating the scorecard) 





? Easy and fast  
? One-dimensional 
? Relative measure ? Not easily comparable 
(it is one-dimensional but non-monetary) 
? Not applicable in all contexts (cannot be 
generalized) 
Participatory Wealth Ranking  
? Multidimensional measure of poverty 
? Participants define poverty 
? Subjective rating ? difficult to verify 
? Relative measure ? not comparable (not 
even for comparisons across different 
villages) 
? Unlikely to work well in post-conflict Cambodia 
? Experienced facilitators needed (minimalist 
MFI staff not likely to have the necessary 
skills)  
 
NET WORTH / CHECK LISTS or Complete 
FINCA-FCAT tool (not only DPCE)  
? Multidimensional measure of poverty 
? Indicators and weights assigned to each of the 
indicators are arbitrary  
? Relative measures ? not comparable 
 
CGAP/IFPRI Poverty Assessment Tool  
? Multidimensional measure of poverty 
? Robust methodology 
? Relative measure ? not comparable  
 
Analysis by author 
 
The conclusion of this review is that the goal of achieving a multidimensional poverty tool 
that provide an absolute measure of poverty is not achievable, far less for a microfinance 
institution attempting to be sustainable.  Attempting to measure the multidimensionality of 
poverty is complex and it is likely confined to a relative poverty indicator that cannot be 
compared nationally or internationally.  On the other hand, absolute poverty tools which 
allow for comparisons are one-dimensional tools that represent only one aspect of poverty or 
vulnerability to poverty.  However, given the intrinsic nature of microfinance services, if a 
one-dimensional poverty tool was to be chosen, a monetary tool would be preferred over a 
non-monetary one-dimensional tool.  The review also suggested that participatory tools were 
not the best options for the case of evaluating poverty levels of MFI clients since the 
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 methodology does not allow comparing the poverty level among different villages or working 
areas of the MFI. 
 
Therefore, given the needs of covering multidimensional aspects of poverty and providing an 
absolute measure within the Cambodian context but the impossibility of doing so within one 
single tool, this dissertation will apply two different measuring tools:  
 
(i) a household food expenditure tool labeled “AMK Daily Food Expenditure Per 
Capita” that is loosely based on expenditures tools tested by FINCA and IRIS, and  
(ii) an adaptation to rural Cambodia of the CGAP-IPRI poverty assessment tool based 
on PCA, which will be labeled “ AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score” 
 
The AMK Daily Food Expenditure Per Capita tool is variation of the FINCA-FCAP 
expenditures tool with some elements of the composite table on expenditure applied by IRIS 
but adapted to rural Cambodia and focusing only on food expenditure per household, and 
thus excluding other non-food items such as utilities, transport, fuel and other non-food 
goods.  As Zeller and Sharma (1998) show in many countries the poor spend as much as 91 
percent of their income in food.  AMK’s tool includes not only the cash expenses in food 
items but also quantify the consumption from household’s own production (including rice 
and other crops, vegetables or animals) and from other food items gathered, collected or 
fished.  This one-dimensional indicator has been selected to assess poverty of clients because 
it is an absolute measurement of poverty in monetary terms that can be compared with the 
food poverty line and thus allows for comparisons not only among different provinces within 
Cambodia but also with other countries in the region or the world.  The specific methodology 
applied for AMK Daily Food Expenditure Per Capita tool will be discussed in the Third 
Section: Empirical Study.  
 
The AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score is an adaptation for the specific context of rural Cambodia 
of the IFPRI/CGAP tool and has been selected because it is a multidimensional measure of 
poverty covering expenditures, physical and human assets as well as vulnerability and food 
security.  However, while the AMK wellbeing score represent a more complete picture of 
poverty and vulnerability to poverty, it is a relative poverty score measuring whether a 
household is worse off or better off compared to other households sampled and thus does not 
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 allow for national or international comparisons.  The underlying hypothesis is that while it is 
not possible to create a universal poverty or vulnerability score system, it is possible to create 
one for household in rural Cambodia.  The specific methodology applied for AMK-PCA 
Wellbeing Score tool will be explored in the Third Section: Empirical Study, but it is 
important to first address some specific issues identified by the authors of the PCA 
methodology who state: 
(i) that the tool is not meant to be undertaken directly by MFI staff.   
(ii) that the tool is not meant to be used as guide for future program development and 
(iii) that the tool is not meant to be used to assess the impact of microfinance services in 
the lives of clients. 
 
Each of these topics will be refuted in turn.   
 
Regarding the warning that the tool is not meant to be undertaken directly by MFI staff, the 
authors state that tool was intended to “assess the poverty levels of MFI clients compared to 
non-clients within the operational area” and could be used “to verify the extent to which an 
existing strategy results in poor clients joining the MFI” but was “not meant for direct use by 
an MFI” (2000:1-3).  Not only is the required level of specialized knowledge unlikely to be 
found among MFI staff, but direct field testing by an MFI could greatly bias household 
responses” (Henry et al., 2003: 2).  This empirical study has been implemented directly by 
the research department of AMK, headed by the author during the last 4 years, as part of the 
on-going effort of collecting, storing and analyzing information about breadth and depth of 
outreach.  As was discussed in Section II (Chapter VI), this research department is separated 
from the regular operations, precisely in order to minimize staff biases as well as to protect 
client confidentiality.  PCA methodology is indeed more statistically complex than other 
tools, but this dissertation is the positive proof that it is possible for MFIs to undertake the 
task on its own.  PCA analysis may be complex but it has been proven as a methodologically 
sound approach.  The necessary requirement may not be statistical sagacity but rather an 
honest desire to achieve the right tool for facilitating decision-making. 
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 Regarding that the tool not being “specifically intended to guide MFIs in applying 
assessments results to their future program development” (Henry et al., 2003:3).  Henry et al. 
also state that “any decision on how to use assessment results is left solely to the MFI and the 
donor” (2003:3).  In fact, the data presented in this dissertation, and the corresponding 
research undertaken to date have focused on improving the quality of information on the 
poverty levels of clients and thus indeed geared towards improving decision-making.  The 
aim of creating an internal research department within AMK was indeed, to inform decisions 
on a regular basis.  Concretely, the main goals of the AMK in-house market and social 
research, as stated in its creation in 2003, were:  
(i)  to inform management decisions on new product design, on improving delivery 
procedures or other informational needs;  
(ii)  to complement financial information with social indicators in assessing 
institutional performance; and  
(iii)  to inform shareholders, possible investors and donors about identified 
transformation effects on clients. 
 
The results of the AMK-PCA wellbeing score are indeed used for management and strategic 
decisions.  This is because it is believed that accurate, timely and reliable information on the 
outreach performance of AMK can indeed guide its strategic planning.  Gathering 
information through the right tools allows AMK management team to better understand its 
clientele and thus, apply useful (i.e. simple and reliable) information to their decision –
making processes.   
 
Finally, in relation to the tool not being meant to be used to assess the impact of microfinance 
services in the lives of clients, specifically the authors warned about using the tool as “means 
to target new clients nor to assess the impact of microfinance services on the lives of existing 
clients” (Henry et al., 2003:1).  AMK-PCA wellbeing score will not used as a means to target 
new clients but it will be used as a means to assess the impact (or transformation effects) of 
microfinance services on the lives of existing clients.  It is expected that the comparison of 
the levels in the wellbeing score between the clients and nonclients (i.e. the control group) 
over time will allow to assess if access to financial services (in this case microloans) allows 
households to overcome poverty or face internal and external crisis with better (and different) 
means, lowering their vulnerability to poverty.  Of course the wellbeing score system can be 
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 revisited in the future if it is estimated that the conditions have changed in rural areas.  As 
Hulme argued in his paper on theory, experience and better practice on impact methodologies 
(2000) the central issue in impact assessment design is how to combine different 
methodological approaches so that it achieves a fit between its objectives, the institution 
context and financial and human resources constraints.  It is believed that this internal 
assessment of depth of poverty as well as the future assessment of impact (or transformation 
effects on clients) provides an adequate level of scientific ‘robustness’ but is beneficial for 





 SUMMARY OF THE FIRST SECTION (THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK) 
 
From this First Section, what interests us most for this dissertation is whether the poor are 
being reached by microfinance programs and how to best measure their participation.  While 
Chapter I showed that the poor were excluded from the subsidized direct credit approach, 
Chapter II showed that the poor are being reached by MFIs.  On the theoretical ground, 
microfinance (or more specifically microlending) defines a credit contract that reaches the 
poor by excluding the wealthy and better-off either directly by not allowing them to be 
eligible for the program or indirectly, by using a combination of the following mechanisms: 
(a) charging market-related interest rates that will discourage elite to attempt to capture the 
loans; (b) providing loans so small that only the poor will want them; and (c) adopting 
requirements that will force the rich to auto-exclude themselves, such as compulsory 
attendance at weekly meetings or contributions of physical labor.  Secondly, on the ground of 
empirical evidence, Chapter II provided further evidence that microlending programs are 
reaching the poor and that their clients are clustered around the poverty line. 
 
Once we have assessed that the poor are being reached by microfinance, Chapter III 
explored the theoretical framework of how to best measure poverty and vulnerability to 
poverty.  The conceptual framework first reviewed the one-dimensional measures of poverty, 
both for monetary and non-monetary tools and provided three examples of this type of 
poverty assessment tools applied by MFIs: ACCION-Income Tool, the expenditures section of 
the FINCA-FCAT tool and the Housing Indexes.  The main advantage of the one-dimensional 
tools is that they are absolute measures of poverty and thus are easily comparable.  The main 
disadvantage, as the name says, is that they focus on a single dimension of poverty and thus, 
they cannot possible portray a full picture of the household status.  The main conclusions of 
the experience in measuring poverty in microfinance clients, is that if a one-dimensional 
measure were to be chosen, a monetary tool would be preferred over a non-monetary one:  
this is because while they both share the main disadvantage, at least with monetary tools it is 
easier to compare the result with national and international data.  Also, if one-dimensional 
monetary measure were to be chosen, a tool based on expenditure instead of income would 
be chosen, preferably if the information could be collected outside of the application process 
of the loan to reduce potential biases.  In the case of (rural) Cambodia, any expenditure 
measuring tool would necessarily need to include the assessment of self-production. 
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 The second section of Chapter III reviewed multidimensional tools, which were divided into 
participatory and indicator-based methodologies and presented the MFI experience to date 
in each category.  The main advantage of multidimensional tools is that they can portray all 
the relevant dimensions of poverty.  The main disadvantage is that they do so at the expense 
of loosing all the comparability in the results because they are often relative measuring tools.  
In the case of poverty assessment for microfinance clients, participatory methods have been 
excluded because, while they allow people themselves to define poverty and vulnerability, 
they offer the least versatile comparability of all the tools reviewed:  they poverty levels in 
one village or MFI working area cannot be accurately compared with the poverty level of the 
neighboring village or MFI working area.  The conclusion of the review of the indicator-
based methodologies is that those that offer a statistically robust method of selecting 
indicators or weights would be preferred over other methodologies that assign weights or 
indicators arbitrarily.  Finally, those methodologies that have been tested and can provide a 
record of results and costs in different contexts would also be preferred. 
 
The bibliography review completes with the recent debate on subjective measures of welfare 
and the how to best measure vulnerability to poverty, both of which have not been tested 
within microfinance.  
 
The conclusion of this literature review is to apply two different tools in order to assess 
poverty in microfinance clients: the relative poverty tool based on Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) and the absolute poverty tool based on food expenditure per capita.  The 
Third Section of this dissertation will show the results for the case of AMK, a microfinance 
institution operating in Cambodia.  But first, the Second Section will provide a general 
overview of Cambodia, the historical context and the current economic and sociopolitical 
environment, the financial sector and microfinance in the country as well as an overview of 
AMK and Concern Worldwide, its shareholder.  
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 SECTION 2 – NATIONAL, SECTORAL and INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
The Second Section discusses the environment of operations of AMK with the objective to 
provide a concise overview of the state of rural finance and the microfinance sector in 
Cambodia. 
 
Chapter IV provides an overview of the historical context and the current economic and 
political environment in Cambodia, including its poverty profile.  The last section of the 
chapter summarizes the main characteristics of the current Cambodian financial sector.  
 
Chapter V delves into the size and nature of demand for rural finance and then describes the 
formal and informal finance sectors; the regulatory framework for MFIs and analyzes the 
main microfinance providers in Cambodia and their evolution over the last seven years from 
2000 to 2006, both inclusive. 
 
Chapter VI provides an overview of AMK, from its origins as a microfinance program of 
Concern Worldwide to its current status as an independent local MFI.  The chapter provides 
a summary of Concern Worldwide and of AMK as institutions.  The last section of the chapter 





 Chapter IV - CAMBODIA: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE 
CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
This chapter provides a brief historical, political and economic overview of Cambodia and a 
poverty profile of a country where 35 percent of the total population lives below the poverty 
line and where 91 percent of the poor live in rural areas. 
 
 
Historical, Sociopolitical and Economic Overview  
 
Cambodia is a post-conflict country, rebuilding itself from the devastation of social, human, 
and economic resources and re-establishing the foundations for growth and development.115   
 
The history of Cambodia can be traced into seven main political periods: The Khmer Empire 
(9th to 14th centuries); The French Protectorate (1863-1953); Cambodian Independent Rule 
(1953-1975); Khmer Rouge (1975-1979); People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1985); The 
State of Cambodia (1985-1993) and the Royal Government of Cambodia (1993 to present). 
 
Modern Cambodia traces its origins back to the 3rd century CE116 as the state of Funan, which 
absorbed considerable cultural influence from India.  In the 6th century, Funan was succeeded 
by Chenla whose rulers can be identified as Khmer (Cambodian) predecessors of the later 
rulers of Angkor.  The period of the great Cambodian empire lasted from the 9th century until 
1431 when the Cambodian King left Angkor.  During the height of the empire, its rulers built 
magnificent temples and extended their power over much of the territory of modern Thailand, 
Vietnam and Laos.  Not being a commercial power, the empire declined slowly as the Thai 
challenged the authority of the ruler at Angkor in the 13th century; albeit Angkor was only 
abandoned in the 15th century.  The first recorded visit to Cambodia by a European is dated 
1555: Father da Cruz, a Portuguese priest.  Portuguese and Spanish missionaries returned to 
Cambodia in the 1580s, 1593-1599; and Portuguese and Spanish buccaneers (led by Blas 
Ruiz and Diego Veloso) played an active role in Cambodia’s royal politics.  Cambodia was 
                                                 
115 The historical and political review draws on Shawcross (1991); Thion (1993); Kamm (1998); Chandler 
(1999); and Osborne (2000 and 2002). 
116 CE stands for "Common Era" and replaces AD ("Anno Domini"). 
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 still an important regional power in the mid-17th century, but from that time onwards until the 
early 19th century, it almost ceased to exist as Thai and Vietnamese power grew stronger.   
 
By the time France established a protectorate over it, in 1863, Cambodia was a small 
impoverished kingdom.  Cambodia became part of French Indochina in 1887 and France 
gradually assumed more control over the kingdom’s affairs but leaving the king (and his 
symbolic importance for the Cambodian population) in place.  By the beginning of the 
Second World War, the French in Cambodia had stirred modest economic development 
(notably rubber plantations and exports of rice) but had placed little effort on expanding 
education.  For instance, by the end of 1930s, fewer than 12 Cambodians had completed a 
full high school education.   
 
The French placed Norodom Sihanouk on the throne in 1941 with the expectation that he 
would be a cooperative figure.  However, by the beginning of the 1950s Sihanouk had 
become the leader of the Cambodian push for independence.  Following the Japanese 
occupation in World War II, Cambodia became independent within the French Union in 1949 
and fully independent from France in 1953.   
 
Sihanouk became the dominant figure in Cambodia until the late 1960s; even abdicating from 
the throne in 1955 to become a full-time politician.  By the late 1960s, the country was in 
economic decline, with little place for disagreement with Sihanouk’s politics from left-wing 
supporters.  Ironically, Sihanouk’s removal from power came not from the communist wing 
but from his own right-wing supporters who became alienated by his dealing with the North 
Vietnamese communists and toppled him in a coup d’état.  Through this coup d’état, 
Cambodia became involved in the Vietnam war (as the US tried to buy time for the 
withdrawal of its forces from Vietnam) and eventually a full-scale civil war broke as left-
wing groups started their resistance with the ultimate objective to gain power.  Cambodia’s 
civil war lasted until 1975 with the victory of Pol Pot regime. 
 
In 1969, the United States begun secret bombings of the sanctuaries installed by the 
Vietnamese communists along the Cambodian side of the border between the two 
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 countries.117  In 1970 (during the Lon Nol regime) both the Vietnamese (North and South) 
and the US troops increased their fighting into Cambodian territory.  The bombings and the 
US-backed coup of Lon Nol encouraged the growth of the Khmer Rouge.  By October 1970 
the Khmer Rouge forces had occupied half of the Cambodian territory; in 1971 Lon Nol 
declared a state of emergency and by 1972 all legitimate political opposition was eliminated.  
The United States and North Vietnam violated the agreement they had signed in 1973 to end 
military action in Cambodia and fighting continued within Cambodian territory.  When the 
United States congress ordered a halt to the bombing in Cambodia (August 1973), Lon Nol’s 
army was left to fight the Khmer Rouge by itself.  From 1973 to 1975, the Khmer Rouge 
dominated most of the countryside and in April 1975 they completed their victory by 
capturing Phnom Penh.   
 
From 1975 to 1979 the Khmer Rouge regime and its leader Pol Pot ruled Cambodia with the 
aim of turning the country into large self-sufficient agricultural communes.  The Khmer 
Rouge regime drove the population out of the cities and towns, abolished money, markets and 
prohibited all private property, western medicine, education and religious practice.  Its four 
years of rule resulted in the death of at least hundreds of thousands (estimates range as high 
as two million) of Cambodians by arbitrary execution (estimated at five hundred thousand), 
torture, starvation, exhaustion from overwork and denial of medical care.  During that time, 
the renamed Democratic Kampuchea remained almost completely closed to foreign visitors 
and it took a long while until the outside world came to learn of the atrocities of the Khmer 
Rouge regime led by Pol Pot. 
 
In 1978 the Vietnamese started the invasion of Cambodia and captured Phnom Penh in 1979, 
but Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge forces escaped to the Thai border -where they established 
themselves with Chinese and Thai support under the benevolent eyes of the United States and 
the West in general.  The Vietnamese installed a communist puppet regime of Khmer Rouge 
defectors and named the country the People’s Republic of Kampuchea.  In addition to the 
Khmer Rouge, two additional resistance forces settled along the Thai border: The Khmer 
People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and National United Front for an Independent, 
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC, for its French acronym).  These 
                                                 
117 See Shawcross (1991) for a detailed account of the Nixon administration decisions regarding Cambodia in 
the 1970s. 
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 three groups organized the displaced Cambodia population into camps along the Thai 
border.118  
 
Ironically, while the Vietnamese invasion stopped the Pol Pot tyranny, it also transformed the 
country in yet another key element of the Cold War tyranny:  neither China nor the then 
member of ASEAN119 accepted the regime installed by the invasion.  In fact, it was not until 
the Cold War ended (following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s) that 
a solution for Cambodia could be sought.  By 1985 Vietnam started withdrawing and in 1989 
the last Vietnamese troops left Cambodia while the country was renamed State of Cambodia.   
 
In October 1991 seventeen nations and all four Cambodian factions signed in Paris an 
“Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.”  The UN-
sponsored settlement provided for an end to the fighting, disarmament of all the factions 
(Phnom Penh government, the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese forces) and the 
creation of a “neutral political environment conductive to free and fair elections.”  The 
United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) was established with civilian and military 
components to implement the agreement and to organize free elections.  A constitutional 
monarchy was established in Cambodia in 1993 with King Norodom Sihanouk as the head of 
state.  Cambodia’s first national elections were held in 1993, and subsequent elections were 
held in July 1998 and July 2003.   
 
FUNCINPEC party won the UN-supervised 1993 elections with 45 percent of the vote,120 but 
the elections resulted in a coalition government of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, the 
previously ruling party) and FUNCINPEC (with two simultaneous Prime Ministers).  This 
coalition ruled until 1997 when the CPP leader (Hun Sen) staged a coup d’état against all his 
opponents, allegedly pre-empting FUNCINPEC’s planned coup.121  The national elections in 
1998 eventually brought in another coalition government between the CPP and 
                                                 
118 The division of the Cambodian population between those living in the border camps and those living inside 
the People’s Republic of Kampuchea set the conditions of how multilateral organizations and NGOs provided 
emergency aid during the following decade.  
119 The members of ASEAN were then: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
120 See Frieson (1996) for an analysis of the positive and negative impacts of UNTAC on the political patronage 
system and how it influenced that 90 percent of Cambodian electorate turned “to vote in what was perhaps the 
most democratic election in Southeast Asian history” (1996:225).  Frieson defines patronage as a social and 
economic system of relationships between patrons and clients (1996: 240-241). 
121 Unauthorized imports of weapons for FUNCINCEP units were intercepted and attempts to negotiate with 
would-be Khmer Rouge defectors became known. 
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 FUNCINPEC, with Hun Sen as Prime Minister.  In February 2002, the first ever-local level 
elections (commune/sangkat councils) gave a new victory to the CPP.  The last national 
elections were held in July 2003; however none of the parties won the two-thirds majority 
required to govern alone and the new coalition government was not formed until July 2004 
due to differences among political parties.  The coalition remained of the same two parties 
(CPP and FUNCINPEC), with Hun Sen as the Prime Minister.  Hun Sen has been 
Cambodia’s Prime Minister (sole Prime Minister, coequal Prime Minister or second Prime 
Minister) uninterruptedly for over 22 years, from 1985.122  The next national elections are 
scheduled for July 2008.   
 
In addition to the elections, the three most important political developments of the early 21st 
century include:  Cambodia's entry into the World Trade Organization (ratified by parliament 
in August 2004); the abdication of King Norodom Sihanouk in October 2004 and the 
selection of his son Prince Norodom Sihamoni as his successor; and the creation of a special 
tribunal to trial senior Khmer Rouge officials on charges of genocide (agreed between the UN 
and Cambodia in March 2003, with a funding arrangement in April 2005 and the first 
indictment by prosecutors in July 2007, who charged Kang Kech Iev with crimes against 
humanity).   
 
According to the World Bank report on Poverty Assessment (2006, drawing on Hughes 
(2003)) Cambodia has been undergoing a threefold transition from the late 1980s: from war 
to peace; from a one-party to a multi-party politics; and thirdly, from economic dirigisme and 
isolation to markets and integration.  During the last fifteen years Cambodia has rebuilt itself 
from decades of social, human, and economic devastation and the original reforms aimed at 
restoring social and economic infrastructure and soldier demobilization have slowly given 
room to reforms for reducing poverty.  The overarching goal of the three governments since 
1993 has been securing peace (alongside with political stability and cooperative international 
relations) and as such, a deliberate focus on reducing poverty or on more pro-poor policies to 
sustain or increase the rates of poverty reduction of the last decade becomes the main 
challenge of the coming years (2006:16).  
 
                                                 
122 Albeit the count should start in 1993 if the term Prime Minister only refers to an election result. 
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 According to the last population census in 1998, the population of Cambodia was 11.4 
million people, comprising 2,188,663 households with an average household size of 5.2.  
Most recent estimates set Cambodia’s population at 14.4 million people in 2006, with 85 
percent living in rural areas and 15 percent in urban areas and an overall population density is 
82 people per square kilometer (although there are wide variations among provinces).  The 
population is growing at 2 percent per year, and about 38 percent of the population is under 
15 years old and 60 percent are under 25 years old (Cambodia Inter-Censal Population 
Survey 2004).  Poverty is much higher in rural areas than in Phnom Penh and other urban 
areas and income inequalities between urban and rural areas continue to be high.  Over ninety 
percent of the Cambodian poor live in rural areas, where they rely heavily on weather-
dependent agricultural employment.  Currently, the 181,035 Km2 of Cambodia are divided 
into 24 provinces (20 provinces and 4 municipalities), 185 districts, 1,628 communes and 






Cambodia enjoys relatively favorable geographic conditions for development.  Soils are not 
particularly good and the hydrological regime is complex, but it has a deep water port, plenty 
of flat cultivable terrain, productive freshwater fisheries and a considerable stock of timber.  
It has great potential for tourism and most importantly, it is located in a fast growing region 
with land borders that allow it access to markets in Thailand and Vietnam.  Thus, Cambodia’s 
contemporary poverty is due primarily to the almost three decades of conflict (WB: 2006:1). 
 
With the exception of the years following the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), Cambodia 
has enjoyed sustained economic growth since 1993, averaging over 9 percent since 2000 and 
accelerating in recent years (10.75 percent in 2006).  However, growth has been narrowly 
based on the urban-centered garment and tourism industries (mainly in the capital Phnom 
Penh and its peripherals, and the tourist towns of Siem Reap-Angkor and Sihanoukville) and 
                                                 
123 Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter draws mostly from the following sources: IMF (2007a, 2007b, 
2006a, 2006b), the Economist Intelligence Unit (2002); UNCTAD (2006); UNDP (2007/08 and website), 
UNFPA (2005 and website); UNICEF (2002 and website); World Bank (2006a, 2007, website); World 
Development Indicators website; and the CIDA website on Cambodia. 
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 the rural-based and agricultural sector has only started making a sustained contribution in 
recent years (agriculture grew at only 3.3 percent per year on average during 1993-2004).   
 
Regarding economic activities, as of 2005, Cambodia’s agricultural sector (inclusive of crops, 
livestock, forestry and fishery) employs about 59 percent of the workforce and over 63 
percent of the poor gain their livelihoods from agriculture.  Paddy rice is by far the most 
common crop: about 2.16 million hectares or about 90 percent of the total cropped area of 
2.42 million ha is planted for rice (CEA: 2006:37).  Despite this, agriculture accounts for only 
34 percent of the total economy.  The services sector accounts for 39 percent and the 
industrial sector for 27 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employ only 27 
percent and 13 percent of the labor force respectively.  Annual per capita income in 2006 was 
approximately USD 480 (GNI per capita, Atlas method)  
 
Economic growth has been supported by continued expansion of exports, especially of 
garments, which constituted over 90 percent of total exports of merchandise (EIC: 2007: 6), 
construction and tourism, low inflation and stable exchange rates.  Tourism has substantial 
development potential, but the risks in the export industry are high.  In 2004, the garment 
industry contributed 15 percent to GDP and employed 325,000 workers but the sector is 
highly concentrated with virtually all outputs exported to the European Union and the United 
States (70 percent and 22 percent of garment exports respectively, EIC: 2007:6).  According 
to UNCTAC (2007), Chinese investment in garment manufacturing amounted to 40 per cent 
of total foreign direct investment in Cambodia and exports of garments accounted for 64 per 
cent of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2004 (a sharp rise from 3 per cent in 
1995).  While prospects for the garment industry looked bleak at the end of 2004 when the 
United States favorable quotas system ended, new quotas by the US and the European Union 
by mid-2005 have propitiated further growth.  However, the recent accession of Vietnam to 
the WTO and the prospect of safeguards measures on China being lifted have been identified 
as potential threats for its future competitiveness.  In fact, while the garment industry 
accounts for 72 per cent of manufacturing value added, it has not been accompanied by a 
corresponding development of the companies’ technological capabilities: skill intensity levels 
are extremely low for wages not that much lower than those found in China.   
 
In addition to the garment industry, recent exploration suggests that Cambodia could have 
significant offshore oil and gas resources in its territorial waters (provisional estimates 
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 account for 400-500 million barrels of oil and 2-3 trillion cubic feet of gas).  As stated by the 
IMF, extractive industries based on oil production could significantly increase national 
income and provide vital financing but there is still considerable uncertainty over its scale 
and timing.  In addition, the are potential policy challenges: the “oil curse” of absorbing large 
increases in money and fiscal revenues with weak institutions and capacity as well as the risk 
of high inflation (particularly because of the dollarization of the economy and the immature 
banking system).  Reaping the benefits while avoiding economic problems would depend, in 
particular, on sound fiscal policies (2007b:3-12). 
 
The informal sector, small enterprise, trade and services activities have also expanded 
significantly and are employing part of the labor force that other sectors cannot absorb.  
Development of the private sector is constrained by limited and high-cost infrastructure, 
uncertain access to land, limited access to credit, a weak and unpredictable regulatory 
framework, and a corrupt and unreliable judicial system.  The Royal Government of 
Cambodia (RGC) continues its efforts to encourage private initiative and create basic 
infrastructure (roads, energy, water resources, potable drinking water, etc.).  Progress has 
been made on structural reforms in the fiscal and financial sectors, but legal and judicial 
reform progress has been much slower: the draft anti-corruption law was halted pending 
review of the penal code, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism 
Laws passed but drafts of the Insolvency Law and the Law on the Status of Judges and 
Prosecutors are still being debated at Ministry level (IMF:2007a: 9).  Other long -awaited 
laws include the Law Establishing Commercial Courts; Secured Transaction Law; 
Commercial Contract Law and the Civil Code, and the Criminal Code (EIC, 2007: 53). 
 
Fiscal performance, domestic revenues and public expenditure management have improved, 
but the ratio fiscal revenue to GDP remains quite low (about 12 percent).  In 2005, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and official aid amounted almost USD 538 Public debt 
(which is almost entirely external124) amounted to 33 percent of GDP at end-2006 but is 
considered “sustainable, although with a moderate risk of distress” by the IMF (2007a: 12).  
Defense and security expenditures have been progressively reduced in recent years to boost 
the health and education sectors, although the geographic coverage of the latter two sectors 
has been regarded as insufficient.   
                                                 
124 In addition to debt to multilateral sources (such as the ADB, IMF and WB), there is also a substantial 
percentage of debt owed to the Russian Federation and United States (EIC, 2007:24). 
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 According to the World Bank, in order to accelerate poverty reduction there is a need for 
more pro-poor and rural-focused sources of growth.  But in order to unleash the potential in 
agriculture and agribusiness sectors, critical constraints must be eased.  In the agricultural 
sector, the primary binding constraint is insecure property rights.  The lack of secure land 
tenure inhibits investment because expected private return are not guaranteed to be 
appropriable.  The second-order constraints are weak infrastructure (especially irrigation) 125 
and low human capital (which reduce returns to investment for society as a whole).  In the 
agri-business sector,126 the primary binding constraint is weak governance.  Excessive 
unofficial fees either prevent profitability or render private returns too uncertain, and because 
unofficial fees tend to rise exponentially with the scale of the operation, they inhibit 
expansion and growth.  Access to credit and the cost of credit are second-order binding 
constraints (WB, 2006a:55).  Also, according to EIC, the proliferation of land grabbing and 
land concentration threatens the livelihood of the poor and the country’s stability and viable 
land redistribution have to be in place to cope with the population explosion (2007: 69). 
 
In April 2007, Cambodia was rated by Standard and Poor’s.  The country received a long-
term foreign currency rating of B+ (stable) and a local currency rating of B.  The rating is 
four notches below investment grade and puts Cambodia on par with Pakistan and Mongolia, 
above Papua New Guinea and Fiji but below all other South East Asian nations.  Moody’s 
also assigned its first-ever sovereign rating to Cambodia: the long-run foreign currency rating 
and the local currency government bonds were placed at B2 (also stable), which is five 
notches below investment grade.  Standard and Poor’s advised that a rating upgrade would 
require Cambodia to reduce barriers to investment and improve the government’s revenue-
raising measures.  Potential reasons for a rating downgrade include fiscal slippage, reduced 
donor support because of a departure from current prudent macroeconomic policies or a 
change in debt management strategy (Dean, 2007: 7). 
 
                                                 
125 In Cambodia only 7 percent of arable land is irrigated, well below the 20-30 percent range in most 
neighboring countries (WB, 2006a:60). 
126 Agribusiness in Cambodia consists of tens of thousands of micro-enterprises, a few hundred SMEs and only 
a handful of companies with more than 100 employees.  Only about 1-1.5 percent of the labor force is engaged 
in agribusiness, with the average microenterprise consisting of 2-3 workers.  Among SMEs, rice milling is the 
most common activity (WB, 2006a:64). 
117 
 Vulnerability also remains.  According to the IMF, if recent land price hikes and real estate 
speculation were to reverse, the growing confidence in the banking system could erode.127  
Given the dollar denomination of almost all loans and deposits, currency mismatches are not 
a major concern but many banks are exposed to a single sector and, in some cases, a few 
large customers (IMF, 2007a:15).  In fact, the rapid growth in foreign currency deposits is 
concentrated in a few banks catering for particular segments of the market and credit is 
similarly concentrated and almost entirely collateralized against the booming real estate 
market.  Credit seems to be also financing real estate and construction investment.  According 
to the NBC, the non-performing loans remain below 10 percent, but there are some concerns 
as to the quality of asset classification (2007a:15).   
 
At the first Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum128 in June 2007 under the theme 
"Progress in Implementing the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010" aid pledges 
by the international donor community totaled USD 689 million in aid and loans for Cambodia 
in 2007129 (Xinhua, 2007). 
 
 
Poverty Profile  
 
Despite significant progress on many fronts, Cambodia still faces formidable challenges.  
Overall poverty has declined markedly –from 45-50 percent (47 percent is the point estimate) 
in 1993 to 35 percent in 2004- but with a rise in inequality and poverty remains 
“uncomfortably high in rural areas” (IMF 2007a: 1).  Poor governance has been repeatedly 
pointed as one of the main weakness:  corruption is endemic and human rights problems 
continue.  Land grabbing and illegal logging with damaging economic, social and 
environmental effects are widely reported (IMF, 2007a: 4).   
 
                                                 
127 The fiscal impact would be limited because the state is not involved in the banking sector but the NBC’s 
international reserves would be at risk (2007a:11) 
128 The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) is the new format for the previous Consultative 
Group meetings.  The meetings are co-chaired by the World Bank and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
(RGC) and include development partners.  They provide a joint overview of the developments in the country as 
a whole touching all sectors and for pledging and commitment of development aid. 
129 Cambodia received USD 594 million of international aid in 2006 and USD 610 million in 2005.  Note that 
international aid levels have remained high throughout the decade, for instance Cambodia received USD 556 
million in 2001 and USD 548 million in 2000. 
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 According to the diary estimated of poverty using CSES 2004, income inequalities both 
between urban and rural areas continues to be high.  Poverty in Cambodia is overwhelmingly 
a rural phenomenon.  Of the country’s total number of poor more than 91 percent live in rural 
areas compared with 9 percent living in Phnom Penh and other urban areas (of which, 8 
percent in other urban areas and barely 1 percent in Phnom Penh) (RGC,2006:xi).130 
 
 
Measuring poverty in Cambodia 
 
The World Bank estimates the international (dollar-a-day) poverty line in 2004 at R 1,382 per 
capita per day (or USD 0.34 in 2004 current prices).131  The same report advocates for the use 
of the national poverty line instead of the dollar-a-day international poverty line.  While the 
international poverty line is invaluable for rough comparisons between countries and over 
time, “for the purposes of national level analysis it is preferable to use a national poverty line 
constructed following accepted international principles and with reference to a country-
specific consumption bundle” (World Bank, 2006a:38).132   
 
Monetary values of the poverty lines vary from time to time and region to region depending 
on economic situation, i.e. the values of poverty lines in rural areas are generally lower than 
in urban areas reflecting different level of cost of living.  The Cambodian food poverty line 
allows a person to consume a food basket that provides at least 2,100 calories of energy per 
day, based on the quantities of foods consumed by persons in the third quintile of the per 
capita consumption distribution (WB, 2006a:20).  The overall Cambodian poverty line also 
includes a small allowance for non-food items such as shelter and clothing.  Generally, two 
poverty lines can be drawn: the Food Poverty Line (FPL) and the Overall Poverty Line 
                                                 
130 These figures are based on the recall estimates, when based on diary estimates: 93.4 percent live in rural 
areas (i.e. 4.4 million) while only 6.6 percent live in Phnom Penh and other urban areas (barely 15,000 in 
Phnom Penh and 0.3 million in other urban areas) (RGC,2006:vii).  Estimates based on recall data are preferred 
because they have been used to construct the Cambodian poverty line. 
131 Absolute poverty line is defined as USD 1 a day at 1985 international prices (equivalent to USD 1.08 at 1993 
international prices), adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).  This absolute poverty line of USD 1 a day 
ppp is used to compare poverty across countries.   
132 Comparisons across countries are problematic because of the consumption of non-market goods.  The local 
market value of all consumption in kind (including consumption from own production which is particularly 
important in developing rural economies) and the imputed profit from production of non-market goods should 
be included in the measure of total consumption or income.  (This is not always done; most of the surveys 
undertaken after the 1980s include valuations for consumption or income from own production but valuation 
methods are not homogeneous e.g. price in the nearest market, average farm gate selling price, etc.) 
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 (OPL). The FPL does not provide allowance for non-food consumption.  Because of the lack 
of inflation figures for rural areas and baseline inflation data for 1993, the World Bank 
updated the food poverty line to 2004 applying the average annual rates of inflation in food 
prices in rural areas, i.e. using food price inflation in Phnom Penh (weighted by the reference 
1993/94 food bundle) and household survey data to estimate regional differences in food 
prices.  At the same time, the 1993/94 baseline food prices are median values calculated from 
household responses on the value and quantity of foods consumed.133   
 
Table IV-1 below shows the monetary values of the national poverty lines for different 
regions in Cambodia, with the overall Cambodian poverty line for rural areas set at R 1,753 
and the Cambodian food poverty line for rural areas set at R 1,389 in 2004.   
 








Total Cambodian Poverty Line 
2004134  
 Riel (per capita per day) 
Riel (per capita 
per day) 
Riel (per capita 
per day) 
Current USD (per 
capita per day) 
Phnom Penh 1,782 569 2,351 USD 0.59 
Other Urban 1,568 384 1,952 USD 0.49 
Rural 1,389 364 1,753 USD 0.44 




Poverty Trends: The Evolution of Poverty in Cambodia 
 
It is difficult to assess the evolution of poverty and poverty trends in Cambodia.  This is 
because the socio-economic surveys conducted in Cambodia are not entirely comparable for 
many reasons.  The Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) is the equivalent of the 
LSMS and becomes the main source for poverty reports in the country.  Five surveys have 
                                                 
133 Concretely, updating the food poverty line to 2004 involved three steps.  First, CSES 2004 data on village 
food prices were used to estimate the percentage increase in the cost of the reference food bundle in each region 
using quantity weights of the 1993/94 reference food bundle (which is composed by 155 food items and was 
used to build the poverty line).  Second, the consumer price index data on Phnom Penh food prices were used to 
obtain a second estimate of the percentage increase in the cost for the reference food bundle in Phnom Penh 
(using the same quantity weights from the reference food bundle rather than the CPI weights).  Third, estimates 
obtained in the first step for all regions were adjusted using the ratio of the CPI price estimates to village price 
estimates for Phnom Penh.  Further information is available in Knowles 2005 (RGC, 2006: 34-35).  
134 Poverty Lines in 1994/94 and 2004 have been based on recall estimates (and not on diary estimates, which 
are only available for 2004 CSES) 
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 been conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of the Ministry of Planning:  
these took place in 1993/94, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2004.  The latest one was actually 
conducted between November 2003 and January 2005 covering a sample of 15,000 
households, but is commonly referred as the CSES of 2004.  Data from the surveys is not 
directly comparable because of the following reasons:   
- The 1993/94 CSES covered only 59 percent of the villages and 65 percent of rural 
households on the country due to security problems at that time.  (These excluded 
areas were the remote areas where the Khmer Rouge were still active and/or forested 
highlands along the south-western, eastern and northern borders of the country, where 
fewer people lived but where poverty was presumably higher (WB, 2006a: 29)).   
- In subsequent surveys, the coverage progressively increased.   
- The 2003/04 CSES is first survey based on a sampling frame that covers the entry 
country drawing from the first population census conducted in 1998.   
 
The estimates of poverty are not directly comparable because in different surveys the 
sampling frame was expanded over successive years and the design of the survey and the 
timing of implementation also changed.135  In addition, the 1993/94 CSES only collected 
consumption data through recall method (and not diary estimates)136.  Thus, poverty trends 
                                                 
135 The 1996 survey presented seriously underestimated household consumption because food consumption data 
was collected as a single category “total consumed during last week.”  The 1997 survey took place only on one 
round coinciding with the 1997 political crisis and there are good reasons to believe that households were 
cutting back on consumption in anticipation of a political turmoil.  The consumption data of the survey 1999 is 
not reliable because of the irreconcilable differences in estimates from the two rounds (the standards of training 
and supervision of the first round were inadequate resulting in under-recorded consumption and exaggerated 
poverty while results from the second round show much higher consumption and much lower poverty estimates) 
(WB, 2006a: 19).  
For instance, statistical estimates of the poverty headcount indices by region for 1993/94, 1997 and 1999 
available before the poverty assessment of 2006 provided the following irreconcilable figures: 
 1993/94 1997 (Adjusted) 1999 (Round 2) 1999 (Both Rounds) 
 OPL FPL OPL FPL OPL FPL OPL FPL 
Phnom Penh 11.4 6.2 11.1 3.4 9.7 3.3 14.6 5.2 
Other Urban 36.6 19.6 29.9 15.4 25.2 13.7 42.4 28.4 
Rural Areas 43.1 21.9 40.1 20.0 40.1 12.1 56.1 31.5 
Cambodia 39.0 20.0 36.1 17.9 35.9 11.5 51.1 28.9 
Note: OPL: Overall Poverty Line and FPL:  Food Poverty Line 
Source: A Poverty Profile of Cambodia 1999 and A Poverty Profile of Cambodia 1997 (MOP) 
136 The main differences in 2004 CSES between diary and recall estimates are the following:   
(i) diary estimates are based on the food basket and non-food allowance of the second quintile in the 
distribution of household consumption per capita while the recall estimates are based on the consumption 
of the third quintile; 
(ii) diary estimates use adult equivalent scale to make households comparable across differences in size and 
composition while recall estimates are based on per capita terms; 
(iii) diary estimates adopt comprehensive price indexes at the household level for food based on unit values 
instead of using village prices as in recall estimates; 
(iv) diary estimates use house rents which are adjusted for quality differences through hedonic regressions; 
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 can only be properly assessed between 1993/94 CSES and 2003/04 CSES in those areas that 
are comparable, i.e. from the same geographical areas that were included in both (RGC, 
2006: vi-vii).137   
 
The World Bank Poverty Assessment in 2006 attempted to fill in these gaps.  The main 
conclusion of the report is that poverty in Cambodia has dropped from 39 percent to 28 
percent in 10 years in accessible rural areas, that is in the geographically comparable 
sampling frame.  The report also (re)estimated the all-Cambodia poverty headcount in 
Cambodia as a whole in 1993/94 at 47 percent (back-projected).  This figure was compared 
with the 35 percent (measured) poverty headcount in 2004 to assess that indeed poverty had 
fell in Cambodia in the 1993/94 to 2003/04 decade.  However, given the imprecision of the 
estimate, the report states that it is safer to state that the all-Cambodia poverty rate in1993/94 
was somewhere between 45-50 percent and thus, poverty in Cambodia fell by between 10 to 
15 percent between 1994 and 2004.  (WB, 2006a:17). 
 
However, while poverty reduction has been experienced across the population, the rates of 
improvement have not been uniform.  The standards of living of the rural population grew at 
the lowest rate and inequality has increased most notably within the rural population.  (WB, 
2006a:17).  In fact, according to the World Bank’s Sharing Growth: Equity and Development 
Report (2007) the Gini coefficient138 rose from 0.35 in 1993/94 to 0.40 in 2004 within the 
geographical comparable sample.  The Gini coefficient for the whole national population in 
2004 was 0.42.  In 2004, the living standards of the poorest fifth of the population were only 
8 percent higher than they were a decade earlier while the living standards of the richest fifth 
rose five times as fast, at 45 percent.  Similarly, rural living standards rose more slowly than 
those in Phnom Penh and other urban centers (2007: iii).  While the quality of the data from 
the CSES 1997 if often questioned (see footnote 135), the report assets that rural inequality 
widened considerably from 1993/94 to 1997 while from 1997 to 2004 inequality remained 
unchanged. 139  However, in urban areas, inequality remained stable throughout (WB, 2007: 
                                                                                                                                                        
(v) diary estimates adopt ‘use value’ based on depreciation of durables in possession of households instead of 
value of purchased durables in the last 12 months as in recall estimates (RGC, 2006:vii). 
137 In fact, until 2004 it was not even possible to compare data between 1993/94 CSES and 2003/04 CSES 
within the same geographical sampling areas because the description of the sampling framework from 1993/94 
had been lost.  In 2004, it was rediscovered, allowing for trends to be estimated from 1993/94 to 2004. 
138 In this common measure of inequality zero indicates prefect equality and one perfect inequality. 
139 Except for the richest 7 percent of the population, the entire rural population experienced only sluggish 
growth in consumption.  Even households at the 75th percentile only gained 20 percent while those at the 93 rd 
percentile grew a mere percent.  By contrast the richest end of the distribution growth was 40 percent. (WB, 
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 iv-v).  Rising rural inequality was mainly the result of rising inequality within the richest 
quartile (WB, 2007: 24).  Inequality within rural populations seems to reflect the interaction 
of three main factors: geography, household’s capital endowments and local governance.  
Geographic factors imply that the incidence of poverty is higher and mean consumption 
levels are lower in remote villages with difficult road access/connectivity.  Differential initial 
stock of physical capital (land and other productive assets) and human capital (education and 
health status) have promoted the disparity among rural households (WB, 2007: vi).  For 
instance, land ownership is highly concentrated:  in 1989 land was privatized and distributed 
based on the size of the household, resulting in a highly equal distribution and effectively 
zero landlessness.  By 2004, 5.7 percent of the rural population was both landless and poor, 
and Cambodian land distribution is among the most unequal in Asia.140  Similarly, wealthier 
rural households have found it easier to navigate unaccountable local governance structures, 
through social connections or simply greater capacity to pay bribes (WB, 2007: vii). 
 
In the UNDP Global Human Development Report 2007/08, Cambodia ranks 131st out of 177 
countries in the Human Development Index (HDI),141 the third lowest value in South East 
Asia142 after Timor-Leste and Myanmar.  The HDI value (which refers to the year 2005) is 
0.598.  This results from life expectancy at birth of 58 years; an adult literacy rate of 73.6; a 
combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio of 60 percent; and a GDP per 
capita (ppp) of USD 2,727.  This level of HDI ranks Cambodia in the 47th place from the 
bottom while still remains as one of the 50 least developed countries designated by the 
United Nations.  Likewise, Cambodia's Human Poverty Index (HPI)143 is 38.6 and reflects 
the high level of mortality and child malnutrition as well as the poor availability of pub
services in the country and ranks 85th among 108 developing countries for which the index 
has been calculated.  Women continue to face additional constraints, as shown by with a 
lic 
                                                                                                                                                        
2007:21).  Between 1993 and 1997 only the top three percent of the rural population enjoyed growth in real per 
capita consumption exceeding 20 percent (WB, 2007:23), 
140 The gini coefficient of land ownership is 0.65 in Cambodia; 0.55 in India; 0.51 in Malaysia; 0.49 in 
Indonesia and 0.41 in Thailand (WB, 2007:x).  Note that a value of zero indicates prefect equality and a value of 
one indicates perfect inequality. 
141 HDI: Composite measure of longevity, educational attainment, and standard of living. 
142 Southeast Asian countries are: Brunei; Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia; Myanmar; Philippines; 
Singapore; Thailand; Timor-Lesté; Vietnam.  All of them are members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), except Timor-Lesté, which is a candidate. 
143 HPI measures deprivation in three essential elements of human life: longevity, knowledge and a decent 
standard of living. 
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 Gender-related Development Index (GDI)144 score of 0.594, representing rank 114 for the 
157 countries with GDI values. 
 
At the end of 2005, Cambodia had the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in South East Asia: 
1.6 percent of the adult population (15 to 49 years).  Programs promoting 100% condom use 
have enjoyed some success with reduced HIV prevalence amongst brothel-based sex workers 
(from 43 percent to 29 percent between 1998 and 2002).  Because of the traditional tolerance 
of prostitution, promotion of condom use in commercial and causal sex has been effective but 
it is harder to promote condom use by married couples.  Husband to wife and mother to child 
HIV transmission are becoming increasingly common in Cambodia (WB, 2006:42).  In June 
2007, the Government of Cambodia announced a decline in the HIV prevalence in Cambodia 
with an official prevalence rate of 0.9 percent.145  However, this figure is higher than the 
estimate of the 2005 Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey (CDHS 2005) which is a 
household survey and thus likely to exclude people from various population groups at higher 
risk of HIV infection (RCG-MoH: 2007).  HIV/AIDS still poses a major threat to Cambodian 
development. 
 
Finally, food security is threatened by low agricultural yields and the limited access to land 
(especially for the poorest) and Cambodia is regularly hit by floods, droughts and other 
natural disasters.146   
 
Regarding gender issues, the literature has often stressed the “relative equality” in the 
relations between men and women in Cambodian society and women enjoy a higher status 
and greater independence than women in India or China.147  However, gender inequalities 
continue in certain aspects of social, economic and political life (WB, 2006a: 42).  In 
addition, over two decades of war and civil strife have placed extraordinary strains on the 
                                                 
144 GDI is similar to the HDI but additionally takes into account the degree of gender inequality in life 
expectancy, educational attainment, and standard of living. 
145.  There were two sources of HIV prevalence data: the HIV Sentinel Surveillance (HSS) from 1996 through 
2006 and the Cambodia Demographic & Health Survey (CDHS) 2005.  The HIV prevalence in the general 
population aged 15-49 years in 2006 was higher in urban areas than in rural areas.  (The last official HIV 
prevalence estimate was 1.2% in 2003.) 
146 The agriculture sector had negative growth due to severe floods in 2000 and to severe drought in 2004 and 
2005 (WB, 2006a:58).  The weather conditions in 2006 were considered as favorable as those in 2005. 
Cultivated areas kept increasing even though some places were flooded by the rains. As a result, during 2006, 
paddy value added increased slightly by about 1 percent compared with a 43.6 percent increase in 2005, and that 
of other crops also continued to grow, at a slower rate of about 5.7 percent compared with 15.9 percent in 2005 
(EIC, 2007: 4). 
147 Most notably Ledgerwood, 1992, 1996 and 2005. 
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 status of women in Cambodia and nowadays they have a heavier workload than in the past.  
For instance, the current women’s “triple burden” (reproductive, productive and community 
roles) now also includes non-traditional work such as ploughing and climbing sugar palm 
trees or as migrants for paid-employment.  Also, the conflict legacy of an unbalanced adult 
sex ratio (with more adult women than men because more men died during the wars) has 
been also identified as one of the factors behind the high rates of violence, including domestic 
violence, rape and marital rape.  Women’s representation in legislative and executive bodies, 
local governments, management, and professional occupations remains very low.   
 
The analysis of consumption poverty data of 2004 CSES does not show female-headed 
households to be any poorer that those headed by men, but other studies have shown that 
certain types of female-headed households suffer particular economic disadvantages (WB, 
2006a:42).  In fact, the CDRI participatory study found that most female-headed households 
were poor or destitute and there were also more likely to move into poverty than other 
households, particularly those headed by widows or divorced women with small children 
(FitzGerald, 2007: 130-132).  
 
Another key finding of CDRI’s participatory study is the relationship between livelihood 
strategies and participation in education.  While income is the major factor in school retention 
(with middle and rich income families more likely to keep both boys and girls in school), 
families of all income levels will be more inclined to pull their daughters rather than their 
sons from school in order to help with domestic work and earn an income148 (FitzGerald, 
2007: 143-144). 
 
Finally, women continue to be concentrated in low-wage, low- income economic sectors and 
are paid less than men for the same work.  The growth of the garment industry has benefited 
mainly women (who comprise over 90 percent of the workforce in this sector) but remains a 
small percentage of the overall workforce.  Also, garment workers transfer a large percentage 
of their earnings to their families, even at the cost of their own current consumption (WB, 
2006a:42). 
 
                                                 
148 Exceptions are noted in fishing villages where boy’s labor is seen as more valuable and girls are able to stay 
in school. 
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 In 2007, CDRI produced a report on trends in community well-being and household mobility 
in nine Cambodian villages commissioned by the World Bank entitled “Moving Out of 
Poverty?” (FitzGerald and So et al.).  The longitudinal study applied both qualitative and 
quantitative methods for identifying upward or downward poverty mobility.  Conducted in 
2004/05, it revisited nine rural villages where CDRI had previously conducted research.149  
The Moving Out of Poverty Study provides a local perspective on national poverty studies by 
validating national trends with local data, explaining national trends from the perspective of 
the poor and providing insights that are not captured by national studies.  For instance, the 
report shows similar rate of growth, but a slower rate of poverty reduction and higher poverty 
rates than provincial averages reported in national studies.  This suggests that when measures 
other than consumption are taken into account, rural inequality is increasing while static 
consumption inequality may be explained by “flattening” at the top and bottom end of the 
distribution.  Furthermore, this study provides additional insights into the drivers of rising 
inequality, including the role of local corruption and impunity in contributing to some 
household mobility.  The study also shows that the changing nature of social capital, 
including the erosion of traditional mutual assistance and the increasing importance of 
patronage networks, plays a significant role in determining households’ opportunities and the 
support they receive (FitzGerald and So et al., 2007:193).  The key findings of the report can 
be divided into two main categories: village and households findings (FitzGerald and So et 
al., 2007:192): 
 
? At a village level, community well-being and prosperity are largely determined by 
two factors: the location and the accessibility of the village (including its proximity to 
rural centers and markets and year-round road access) and its geographical 
endowment (including soil quality, availability of arable land and irrigation).  
Demographic change (population growth, new marriages and under-employed male 
youth population) is impacting all villages and putting pressure on natural resources, 
affecting more radically those CPR-reliant villages where resources and opportunities 
are more limited.   
 
                                                 
149 The nine villages represent all four of Cambodian main rural agro-ecological regions (the Tonle Sap plains, 
the Mekong plains, plateau/mountain region and the coast) and produced 890 panel households, which were 
supplemented with qualitative information from 477 participants of these nine villages. 
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 ? At the household level, the study found that location, assets and risk-spreading 
investments enable the comfortably rich to stay well off since they have multiple 
earners and sources of income, as well as assets and savings that act as insurance 
against shocks and crisis and allow investment in new opportunities.  Migration is an 
increasingly important source of income for study households, contributing to upward 
mobility, in particular for better-off households and in villages close to the border.  
However, most migrating jobs are seasonal and short-term and local employment 
opportunities are also seasonal and agricultural, usually poorly paid or involving “in 
advance” cash for labor.  Illness is the most frequent household shock or crisis and 
lack of affordable health care plays a direct role in driving households into poverty.  
Households moving upward are more likely than others to take risks, invest in health 
and education and have members migrating for work.  Households that have moved 
downward have typically experienced shocks, life-cycle events, debt and / or 
destructive behaviors that drive them into poverty, but lack the assets, savings or 
income sources to cope with these events.  Chronically poor households are trapped in 
poverty due to lack of (or limited) assets, old age, sick or disabled household heads, 
fewer earners and more dependents and reliance on only a few income sources, 
including CPR.   
 
Murshid and Phim (2007) also provide a good summary in their review of Poverty and 
Vulnerability in Cambodia.  The experience of people who have moved out of poverty seems 
to suggest some basic characteristics and processes.  These include access to initial capital, 
avoiding borrowing and indebtedness, absence of any major economic or health shock, 
frequently engaged in money-lending along with a shop or trading activity, diversification of 
earnings away from rice cultivation into something more productive (animal raising, small 
business, food processing, etc.) and strong support from extended family.  There is generally 
very little help and assistance available from social networks, local government or 
community based institutions.  Initial capital comes from family support or hard work such as 




 Nature of Poverty in Cambodia 
 
The nature of poverty in Cambodia is displayed by presenting a brief summary of the 
Cambodian poverty profile; the special concentration of poverty among the provinces; a 
succinct summary of vulnerability in Cambodia that stresses the voices of the poor and 
destitute; and the priority poverty issues recognized by the Royal Government of Cambodia, 
the donors and the NGO community.  
 
 
Cambodian poverty profile  
 
It is widely recognized that most of the poor in Cambodia are living in the rural areas where 
they rely mostly on weather-dependent agricultural employment.  While the poverty 
headcount for 2004 was estimated at 35 percent, poverty was considerably higher in rural 
areas (39 percent) than in urban areas (5 percent in Phnom Penh and 25 percent in other 
urban areas).   
 
Based on the WB (2006a) and RGC (2006) reports, some important characteristics of the 
poor, as identified by the recall estimates of the 2004 CSES include the following:150 
? Poverty in Cambodia is overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon: approximately 91 
percent of the poor live in rural areas (and poverty is lowest in Phnom Penh). 
? The poorest 20 percent of all households spent 70 percent of their total 
consumption on food (while the richest 20 percent spent only 47 percent).151 
? Poverty is highest among households with heads engaged in agricultural activities 
or employed as domestic workers (48 percent and 13 percent respectively of the 
total poor), who also experience the worst poverty severity.  The highest incidence 
of poverty and the largest number of the poor belong to households headed by 
persons aged 30 to 50 years old. 
                                                 
150 Note that the poverty profile based on the 2004 CSES provided information based on diary estimates as well 
as on recall estimates.  Because the study of poverty trends and headcount has been based on the recall 
estimates, only information based on the recall estimates have been provided above (unless otherwise indicated). 
151 Diary estimates highlight that the differences in calorie consumption among the five population quintiles are 
considerable and range from 1,476 calories per adult equivalent per day in the poorest quintile to 4,006 calories 
in the riches quintile (RGC, 2006: 21).  Note that the poverty line is set applying a 2,100 calories per day 
benchmark and that consuming below 1,500 calories per day is considered a clear health risk. 
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 ? Poor households tend to have larger dependency ratios (i.e. large households with 
many children and elderly).  Poverty incidence significantly rises for household 
sizes larger than 5 persons (which accounts for half of the population). 
? Poor households tend to lack human capital; they tend to be uneducated, unskilled 
and unhealthy.  The probability of being in poverty drops significantly for 
household heads with some years of schooling.  Poor households suffer acutely 
from health problems and often incur unaffordable health care costs. 
? The poor and the extreme poor (the bottom quintile below the poverty line) are 
found in highest concentration in remote rural areas with limited access to 
economic and social infrastructure such as roads, irrigation facilities, markets or 
basic services (energy sources, water and sanitation, school and healthcare 
facilities).  In fact, the poor have virtually no access to modern energy sources or 
water and sanitation:  97 percent of the poor rely heavily on firewood for fuel and 
kerosene for lighting, only 2 percent of poor households had access to piped water 
or public tap and only 3.5 percent had access to decent sanitation.   
? The poorest often lack access to land for cultivation while those who owned land 
have little security of land tenure.  About 15 percent of the poorest quintile and 13 
percent of the next poorest quintile living in rural areas are landless.  Also, only 
15 percent of the extreme poor hold a land title compared with 29 percent of the 
richest quintile group. 
 
There is not much difference in the poverty rates in terms of marital status, ethnicity or 
reported disability of household heads.  Both female and male headed households experience 
similar rates of consumption poverty.  Pothy et al (2007) in their gender analysis of food 
security statistics, report that in rural areas, the monetary value of food consumption in a 
female-headed household was R 1,330 per person/day while in a male-headed household it 
was Riel 1,242 per person/day.    
 
 
Spatial concentration of poverty in Cambodia 
 
The poverty maps developed by the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the World Food 
Program (WFP) in 2002 reflect that poverty concentrates generally in the rural areas, but not 
in all, with about 27 percent of the total communes in rural areas make up the majority of the 
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 poor:  104 communes in rural areas constitute more than 75 percent of the poor, while 394 
others constitute 50-75 percent of the poor.  The WFP’s estimation of poverty rates at the 
commune level in Cambodia are based on the census of 1998 and found that the provinces 
with high incidence of poverty (i.e. above the national average) include: Oddar Meanchey, 
Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kampong Chhnang, Pursat, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, and 
Krong Kep.152  Please refer to the poverty map in Annex 8 for further information. 
 
The 2004 CSES provided an update of poverty incidence and severity for agro-climatic 
regions and at the provincial level (even if not available at the commune level).  Phnom Penh 
shows the lowest poverty rate at 4.6 percent.  The Mountains/Plateau is the poorest zone with 
a poverty rate of more than 52 percent.  The Tonle Sap region has a poverty rate of 43 percent 
compared with 32 percent in the Plains and 27 percent in the Coastal zone.  However, due to 
the population density in these regions, the Plains zone has the largest share of the poor 
(40%), followed by Tonle Sap (37%), Plateau/Mountains (16%) and the Costal Zone (6%).  
The Mountain/Plateau and Tonle Sap regions show both highest poverty headcount as well as 
the highest poverty severity (about twice the national average).  Poverty is higher in rural 
areas than in urban areas in all geographical zones (RGC, 2006: 54).   
 
In terms of provinces, the poverty rate is highest in Kampong Spue (57%) followed by 
Kampong Thom (52%) and Siem Reap (52%).  Poverty gap and poverty severity indexes also 
follow similar trends, indicating that poverty in these provinces is deeper and more severe.  
On the other hand, the lowest poverty incidence is in Phnom Penh (5%), Kandal (22%) and 
Kampong Som/Kep/Kok Kong (23%) (RGC, 2006: 55-56).   
 
The spatial concentration of poverty in Cambodia summarized in the Table IV-2. 
 
                                                 
152 Oddar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap are former conflict zones (the conflict lasted longer 
there than in most other parts of the country), where many of the population were returnees, and land was 
heavily contaminated with landmines.  Many parts of Kampong Chhnang and Pursat were also affected by 
landmines.  In Prey Veng and Svay Rieng there are small agricultural landholdings and no access to natural 
resources year round.  Other facts common for all of these poor provinces are that, while the majority of the 
people live on farming, most of their agricultural land is not fertile and they are frequently struck by natural 
disasters (in particular drought and flood). 
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 Table IV-2: Poverty Estimates by Region in Cambodia, 2004 
Region Poverty Headcount(*) Index (%) % of all poor 
Poverty 
Gap (*) 
By Type of Area Total   Total   Gap (%) 
Phnom Penh 4.6%   1.1%   1.23 
Other Urban areas 24.7%   7.8%   6.55 
Rural areas 39.2%   91.1%   10.17 
Cambodia 34.7%   100%   9.02 
Geographical Zone / Province Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Gap (%) 
Phnom Penh Zone 4.6.% 8.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.9% 1.23 
Phnom Penh 4.6.%      1.23 
Plains Zone 32.1%  [33%] 32.9% 13.7% 39.7% 42.3% 8.9% 
7.45 
[8] 
Kampong Cham [37%]      [9.28] 
Kandal [22%]      [4.81] 
Prey Veng [37%]      [8.09] 
Svay Rieng [36%]      [8.35] 
Takeo [28%]      [6.31] 
Tonle Sap Zone 42.8% [43%] 45.4% 28.2% 37% 36.2% 46.3% 
12.15
[12] 
Banteay Meanchey [37%]      [9.82] 
Battambang [34%]      [7.94] 
Kampong Thom [52%]      [15.55] 
Siem Reap [52%]      [17.31] 
Kampong Chhnang / Pursat [40%]      [10.35] 
Costal Zone 26.8% [29%] 30.1% 20.4% 6.1% 5.0% 19.7% 
5.68
[6] 
Kampot [30%]      6.60 
Sihanoukville/Kep/KohKong [23%]      4.60 
Plateau / Mountains Zone 52.0% [52%] 56.3% 32.6% 16.0% 15.4% 23.2% 
15.21
[15] 
Kampong Speu  [57%]      16.98 
Other provinces: Kratie, 
Mondolkiri, Preah Vihear, 
Ratanakiry, Stung Treng, 
Oddar Mean Chey and Pailin. 
[46%]      13.20 
Total Cambodia 34.7 [35%] 37.8% 17.6% 100% 100% 100% 
9.02  
[9] 
Source: RGC 2006: 46, 53, 55 based on Knowles, 2005, CSES 2004 
Notes (*): 
- Headcount poverty (incidence of poverty): percentage of population with per capita consumption below the 
poverty line. 
- Poverty gap (depth of poverty): total household consumption that would be required for redistribution with 
perfect targeting to eliminate poverty.  It is measured as the average difference over the total population 
between a person’s per capita consumption and the poverty line, assigning zero values to all people above the 
poverty line.  
- [Straight brackets]: Indicates estimates over the full 15-month 2003/2005 CSES sample instead of only the 12 




 Vulnerably in Cambodia  
 
The literature often highlights that households in Cambodia face a variety of risks that can 
push a relatively wealthy household into poverty and poor households into destitution.  These 
risks can be further divided into covariant risks and idiosyncratic risks.153  Covariant risks are 
shocks that affect many households at once such as floods, droughts, typhoid disease or the 
avian flu.  Idiosyncratic shocks affect only individual households and include: illness (which 
is a major factor in land loss); crop failure or illness or death of livestock; theft or violence 
(including domestic violence); and life cycle events such as wedding, deaths or births.154  
According to the 2006 Poverty Assessment, floods in 2000 affected some 3.4 million people 
causing crop failures and extensive damage to houses, livestock and property, damaged 
public goods in the form of infrastructure and spread illness.  Droughts in 2002 and 2004 also 
affected millions of people (WB, 2006a:53).  According to the same report, vulnerability to 
these shocks is exacerbated by:  
(i) the limited asset bases and savings of poor households; 
(ii) the underdevelopment of financial markets for savings, borrowings and insurance; 
(iii) the lack of livelihood/income diversification in many rural households; 
(iv) heavy reliance on CPRs as part of normal livelihood strategies or as safety nets; 
(v) lack of rule of law and lack of guaranteed access to justice in conflicts between the 
poor and wealthier and more powerful actors (WB, 2006:53). 
 
In 2007, CDRI published “We Are Living with Worry All the Time,” a qualitative 
participatory poverty assessment that took place in the Tonle Sap (the lake area), covering 24 
villages in the surrounding 6 provinces and edited by Ballard.  The specific methodology 
included various Participatory Rural Assessments (PRA) tools in Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs) and individual and key informant interviews.  The study aimed at listening to the 
voices of the poor and destitute, with particular attention to women, and to provide 
information on rural livelihood strategies, natural resource use and management, gender and 
local governance.  The conclusions are that the situation of the poor and destitute are 
                                                 
153 Idiosyncratic risks (i.e. non-contagious illness) affect individuals or households in an unrelated manner, 
while covariant risks (i.e. natural disasters) can be correlated among individuals or households. 
154 Households respond to these crises with both mitigation and coping strategies.  Mitigation strategies are 
measures undertaken before a shock occurs to lessen the potential impact of a shock. Coping strategies include 
both the common and more extreme ways in which individuals and households deal with minor shocks and 
more devastating crises. They range from turning to relatives for help and selling assets to prostitution and 
begging. Many of the negative coping strategies have longer-term consequences and can oftentimes lead to even 
greater exposure to risk and diminished ability to manage risks (WB, 2006: 27). 
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 becoming increasingly difficult as a results of a combination of factors, including debt, 
illness, shocks such as flooding and drought and a lack of institutional safety nets and 
protection.  Many of poor and the destitute in the region are increasingly dependent on land 
and water based natural resources to sustain their livelihoods.  However, farming productivity 
has been eroded because of droughts and flooding along with poor soils and lack of water 
management, while access to forest and fisheries is increasingly subject to the pressures of a 
growing population and to conflict with local elites and powerful actors from outside the 
village.  As a result, the poor sell their labor locally or migrate elsewhere within the country 
or across the borders in search of employment opportunities (Ballard, 2007: 10).  The poor 
and destitute are also especially vulnerable to various forms of domestic and public violence, 
lack access to important infrastructure (such as clean drinking water) and are routinely 
excluded from education and health care services because they are not able to pay for such 
services or because they lack information on their rights to obtain them.  Corruption at the 
local level is endemic, and prevents the poor and the destitute from obtaining social services 
and erodes their capacity to improve their livelihoods (Ballard, 2007:1).  The study also 
concluded that there is a chronic need in rural areas for consumption credit or credit to cope 
with sudden, unforeseen adversity, such as food shortages, illness, accident or death (Ballard, 
2007:15).  While the majority of rural households face similar high risk profiles, the 
distinguishing feature is that the richer households are able to cope with shocks without 
resorting to selling key productive assets or other measures that increase vulnerability.  The 
voices of the poor and destitute are characterized by resignation to hardship and vulnerability.  
They live with the risk of routine shocks without safety nets, which impacts their mental 
wellbeing (reflected in reportedly higher incidence of violence and alcohol abuse than better-
off households), and many are constantly worried about illnesses or their inability to pay 
debts that pull their family deeper into poverty (Lim, 2007:103). 
 
 
Priority poverty issues for the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), donors and NGOs  
 
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) acknowledges the multidimensional nature of 
poverty.  Reducing poverty is the stated overarching development objective of the RGC.  
Cambodia’s poverty reduction strategy has been laid out in the National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) 2006–2010, which was finalized in January 2006 (and approved 
by the National Assembly in May 2006).  The NSDP is a single, overarching document 
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 containing the RGC's priority goals, long-term targets and strategies to reduce poverty and to 
achieve the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDG)155 and other socio-
economic development goals.  It replaces the second Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(SEDP-II) 2001–2005 and the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) 2003–2005. 
 
According to the NSDP, achievement of poverty reduction and CMDGs critically depends on 
achievement of significant and steady progress in several socio-economic spheres, such as: 
robust and equitable macro-economic growth; strong check on inflation; significant increases 
in agricultural production and productivity; protection and enhancement of the environment; 
strengthening and improvement of infrastructure; robust industrial growth, creation of 
employment and incomes; reforms in public administration and the judiciary; fast growth in 
private sector investments; unhindered growth in trade; and, growth in the services sector 
including tourism.  The vision of the Rectangular Strategy is operationalized through the 
NSDP's goals and targets.156  The key elements of the Rectangular Strategy include good 
governance; enhancement of the agricultural sector; further rehabilitation and construction of 
physical infrastructure; private sector development and employment creation and capacity 
building and human resources development (IMF, 2006a).  Please refer to Annex 9 for a 
graphic summary of the key elements of the strategy.  According to the IMF (2007a), 
progress will have to be accelerated if Cambodia is to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals: despite progress in some areas, some of the goals appear beyond reach.  Please see 
Annex 10 for a table with the Millennium Development Goals, indicators, progress and the 
targets for Cambodia.   
 
According to the World Bank and the IMF joint staff advisory note to the Executive Boards 
of the two institutions, the NSDP constitutes a significant step forward in terms of 
government ownership, up to date diagnostics and results framework (although ownership is 
felt unevenly across ministries and weakly at sub-national levels); it outlines links between 
goals, strategy and patterns of public expenditure, but is more indicative than specific when it 
comes to spending priorities.  In addition, sustained effort is required to roll the NSDP out to 
                                                 
155 The Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs) were first formulated in 2003 and updated in 
2005.  The Millennium Development Goals are an ambitious agenda for reducing poverty and improving lives 
that world leaders agreed on at the United Nations Millennium Summit celebrated in September 2000. 
156 The RGC Rectangular Strategy (2004) replaces the RGC Triangle Strategy (1998).  The three building blocks 
of the triangle strategy were: (1) building peace, restoring stability and maintaining security for the nation and 
people; (2) Cambodia's integration into the region and normalization of our relationships with the international 
community; and (3) promoting development. 
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 Ministries in a manner which adds value to sector strategies that are at very different stages of 
development.  The conclusion of the joint advisory note was that the NSDP could be 
strengthened as poverty reduction strategy by: (i) elaborating more detailed prioritization of 
policies and expenditures; (ii) making full use of the Technical Working Groups to strengthen 
the links between the NSDP, sector strategies, and the Public Financial Management reform 
process (especially regarding the agriculture strategy); and (iii) taking measures to broaden 
awareness and ownership of the plan within the Government and in the country at large (IMF, 
2006b:13). 
 
On the other hand, NGOs operating in Cambodia identified three main priority areas for 
reducing poverty in the NGO Statement to the 2007 Cambodia Development Cooperation 
Forum: (a) land, agriculture and natural resources management; (b) human development; and 
(c) good governance.  Reforms in land, agriculture and natural resource management would 
include reducing those practices that are particularly harmful to poor and vulnerable groups 
such as land alienation, forced resettlements, and reduced access to land and natural 
resources.  The human development agenda concentrated in education, health, gender 
relations and the good governance issues include the NGOs’ concerns about the draft Anti-
Corruption Law, freedom of information, management of future oil revenues, and legal and 
judicial reform (NGO Forum, 2007b).  In support to this statement, NGOs produced 23 
position papers on Cambodia’s development in 2006 covering all areas where they are active 
in Cambodia.  The position papers aimed at providing feedback on the progress made on the 
implementation of the NSDP and its monitoring indicators during 2006 and served as the 
background document to for the NGO Statement to the Cambodia Development Cooperation 
Forum (NGO Forum, 2007a).157  
 
 
                                                 
157 The position papers cover the following detailed topics: governance (combating corruption; legal and judicial 
framework; decentralization and deconcentration reforms); implementation of the rectangular strategy (election 
reform and democracy, harmonization); agricultural sector (agriculture development, irrigation, water 
management; fisheries; hydropower developments; forests, plantations and concessions; land reform; mines; 
community finance); physical infrastructure (petroleum); private sector development and employment (trade; 
employment and Working Conditions); capacity building and human resource development (education; health; 
gender equality; disability; youth and child rights; costs, resources and programming; and NSDP monitoring and 
evaluation). 
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 Cambodian Financial System and the Formal Financial Sector  
 
Cambodia became independent in 1953; in 1963 banking and foreign trade were nationalized 
and from 1975-79 banks and markets were abolished in order to create the Khmer Rouge 
dream of an agrarian moneyless society.  Following the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, the 
Cambodian government established a mono-banking system in 1980 with the National Bank 
of Cambodia (NBC), a state-owned bank whose role included central, commercial and 
development banking activities.  In 1989, as a market-based system emerged, commercial 
functions were separated from the NBC and private commercial banks were established as 
limited liability companies, usually in joint venture with the NBC.  In 1996, the NBC was 
established as the central bank of Cambodia and it gradually divested its interests in all 
commercial banks (except the Foreign Trade Bank, which was directly managed by the NBC 
until the year 2000) (IMF, 2003:34-35).  The subsequent reform process resulted in the 
closure of 15 banks and a tightening of prudential regulations.   
 
According to the ADB’s Financial Sector Blueprint (2001), Cambodia’s financial sector is at 
a rudimentary stage, with limited financial intermediation, poor asset quality and high 
operating costs; this has led to low public confidence and limited deposit mobilization.  
Cambodia lacks a recognized interbank or money market, capital market or credit bureau for 
exchanging information among financial institutions.  Lending against collateral is highly 
risky because Cambodia lacks the necessary legal infrastructure for secured transactions.  The 
general public does not have access to credit cards, and credit card transactions are limited to 
some commercial banks and a few hotels, restaurants and high-end retail business.   
 
In their latest assessment, the IMF concluded that the banking sector remains small, 
concentrated and highly dollarized.  In fact, about 95 percent of the deposits and loans are 
denominated in US dollars and only a few banks take riel deposits.  This high degree of 
dollarization poses a significant challenge for bank supervision since the lender-of-last-resort 
function of the NBC becomes severely impaired.  Simultaneously, this extraordinarily high 
level of dollarization entails that there is little problem of currency mismatches in the overall 
banking system (IMF, 2007b: 28-29).  The broader economy remains cash-based, with 
transactions in local currency occurring almost completely outside the formal banking 
system, except for some licensed MFIs and money changers (the last ones not supervised by 
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 NBC) (IMF 2007b:24).  As an indicative example, the highest value note denominated in 
Cambodian KHR is 50,000 (USD 12.50) but they are seldom used; the highest denomination 
commonly used by rural populations is KHR 10,000 (USD 2.50). 
 
As a result, the bulk of money in the economy is held outside the banking system and there is 
little information on the amount of dollars held outside the banking system.158   
 
On the other hand, money demand is rising: broad money grew by around 40 percent in 2006, 
mainly reflecting increases in bank deposits, almost entirely in dollars.  Credit to the private 
sector (also in dollars) grew even more rapidly but the level remains very low at only 12 
percent of GDP.  These trends continued in early 2007 (IMF 2007a:6).159   
 
According to the ADB’s Financial Sector Blueprint (2001), the lack of rule of law in 
Cambodia has not only impeded the development of the private sector but has also hindered 
the development of a formal, contract-based credit culture.  Cambodia still lacks a reliable 
court system, adequate enforcement mechanisms and effective measures against corruption.  
Cambodia has yet to create or is only in the early stages of strengthening the framework of 
laws regarding contracts, bankruptcy, collateral, loan recovery, accounting, insurance, 
negotiable instruments or secured transactions (ADB, 2001:5).   
 
In order to conduct reforms with line with the priorities set by the Financial Sector Blueprint 
2001-2010, the Council of Ministers approved a new Financial Sector Development Strategy 
2006-2015 on February 2007 (EIC:2007).  The strategy was developed along five main areas 
of focus: (a) foundations of financial sector development; (b) banking and microfinance; (c) 
non-Bank Finance (insurance); (d) financial markets; and (e) general and cross-sectoral issues 
(liberalization and competition; innovation and regulatory structure).  The overall objective of 
the strategy is “to support the development of a sound market-based financial system to 
support resource mobilization, effective financial resource allocation, and broadbased 
sustainable economic growth,” in other words, the objective is to build confidence in 
Cambodia’s financial system, thereby encouraging formalization of finance and supporting 
                                                 
158 De Zamaroczy and Sa (2004) estimated that $2.9 billion were in circulation in 2001 – this reflected the 
effects of UNTAC, international aid flows, return of Cambodians abroad and large scale investment in the 
garment industry (IMF, 2007b:24). 
159 Cambodia still has one of the lowest rates of banking intermediation in the world;  in 2001, the ADB reported 
that bank loans and deposits accounted for 8 and 12 percent of GDP, respectively (ADB, 2001: 4). 
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 more effective financial resource allocation in order to support economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  In effect, the new Financial Sector Development Strategy updates and revises the 
Vision and Financial Sector Development Plan for 2001-2010 to address priorities and 
sequencing for the period of 2006-2015.  Based on the above objective, vision and guiding 
principles, the key priorities for financial sector development include:  
(1) improving enforcement of contracts and mechanisms for resolution of commercial 
disputes;  
(2) improving fiscal, macroeconomic and monetary policy implementation;  
(3) developing a safe and efficient payment and settlement system;  
(4) improving financial sector supervision to appropriately address risks while at the 
same time providing incentives for financial development and innovation; and  
(5) supporting human capital development and financial education across the full 
spectrum of Cambodia’s population (RGC, 2007).   
 
Please refer to Annex 11 for a summary to main focus in each of these areas.   
 
Regarding rural finance, the core reform of the Blueprint was focused on strengthening the 
supervisory role of the NBC on MFIs.  According to EIC, despite the steady progress in the 
field of supervision, progress remains slow in the promotion of deposits, regulation of leasing 
and insurance, the transformation of merged/restructured banks into licensed MFIs, as well as 
deepening the linkages between MFIs and commercial banks (EIC, 2007:39).   
 
As of May 2007, the formal financial system consisted of 15 fully licensed commercial 
banks, 5 specialized banks, 2 representative offices, 17 licensed microfinance institutions and 
NGOs and money changers.160  Of these 15 commercial banks, 3 are branches of foreign 
banks and of the remaining 12 private banks only 6 are majority Cambodian owned and 2 are 
subsidiaries of foreign banks.  (Two more foreign-owned banks are expected to begin 
operations in the second half of 2007.)  Of the 5 specialized banks, only one is state owned: 
the Rural Development Bank.  Until recently the banking market was dominated by two 
Cambodian banks that held almost half of all deposits: Canadia Bank and the Foreign Trade 
                                                 
160 To put this figure in perspective, the following data can prove useful:  In 1998 there were 31 commercial 
banks.  As a result of the 1999 Financial Institutions Law, 29 banks were examined through a re-licensing 
process; 11 were closed after they were declared non-viable; 14 were considered potentially viable if 
restructured; and 4 were considered viable as-is (The Economist Intelligence Unit, quoted in O’Driscoll et al., 
2002). 
138 
 Bank (then state owned). 161  However, in late-2005, the Foreign Trade Bank was bought by a 
consortium led by the market-leading Canadia Bank and ANZ Royal (Australian/Cambodian 
owned).  As ANZ entered the market, it introduced more modern banking services and 
increased the competitive pressure.162  As a result, the concentration of deposits in Canadia 
and Foreign Trade Bank (now with the same owner) has decreased markedly, and the rapid 
growth in deposits flowed disproportionately to ANZ Royal, ACLEDA (the bank with the 
largest rural presence) and Cambodian Public Bank (a subsidiary of a major Malaysian bank).  
All other banks remain small and generally associated with specific sectors or nationalities.   
 
The Cambodia’s Financial Sector Blueprint had warned that the volume of “non-performing 
loans in the banking system is substantial and growing” (ADB, 2001: 5) and the NBC warned 
about the non-performing loans in their 2006 annual report (2007:5).163  Please refer to 
Annex 12 for the profile of the commercial banking system and to Annex 13 for a summary 
of the banking system as of May 2007. 
 
The formal banking sector does not serve the rural populations, except for ACLEDA Bank.  
First, less than 4.5 percent of the total credit offered by both commercial and specialized 
banks is used for agriculture (and the bank with the highest volume was ACLEDA) (NBC, 
2007: Table 15).164  Secondly, formal banking institutions are mostly concentrated in Phnom 
Penh and the tourist destinations of Siem Reap and Sihanoukville (and to a much lesser 
extent, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Pailin, Kampot, the city of Poipet and Banteay Mean 
Chey – please refer to Annex 13 for details).  ACLEDA is the only exception to this rule 
within the formal sector because it transformed from an NGO operating in microfinance into 
a specialized bank and eventually into a commercial bank.  Currently, ACLEDA provides 
both commercial banking and rural financial services and has the largest network all over the 
country: over 30 branches in the cities and in remoter areas in the countryside. 
 
                                                 
161 The NBC reported that 49 percent of all deposits and 61 percent of all loans were concentrated in 3 banks: 
Canadia Bank, Foreign Trade Bank and Cambodia Public Bank (NBC, 2007: 6)  
162 For instance, during 2006, 69 ATMs were introduced in Cambodia, bringing the total figure from 17 to 86 
(NBC, 2996:1)  
163 For instance, the ratios of nonperforming loans over loans were: 68 percent for the Singapore Banking 
Corporation; 24 percent for Canadia Bank and 21 percent for the Foreign Trade Bank among the commercial 
banks and 26 percent for Peng Heng among the specialized banks (NBC, 2007: Table 13). 
164 The ADB previously reported that less than 6 percent of total banking sector advances are for agriculture or 
related activities and these are primarily short-term dollar-denominated loans (2001: 8).  Another figure 
estimates that commercial banks disbursed around USD 9 million for agriculture, representing 3.7 percent of the 
total disbursement loans as of December 2001 (Son Koun Thor, 2002).   
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 There is little information to identify why the commercial and specialized banks (excluding 
ACLEDA Bank) are reluctant to lend in rural areas.  Plausible hypotheses include the higher 
costs associated with lending in rural areas, few perceived opportunities and the inability to 
effectively assess credit risks.  In this last regard, Harner (2003) researched 12 banks in order 
to identify the barriers to providing medium and long-term lending for locally-owned 
SMEs.165  According to the study, banks in Cambodia generally prefer to finance working 
capital (short-term) rather than fixed capital financing (medium and long term) and to finance 
individuals (rather than corporations) that have immovable assets as collateral, such as land 
and buildings in Phnom Penh or other major cities (rather than movable assets such as 
equipment and machinery).  The main barriers to SME lending by banks can be grouped in 
three main categories: an inadequate legal and judicial system, weakness of the credit market 
(supply side) and weakness of the SMEs (demand side).  The banks’ perception of the legal 
and judicial system is that the existing laws166 (as well as the current court system) are 
inadequate to protect the banks’ interests.  The weakness of the credit market refers to both 
the shortage of specialized lenders and lending officers in commercial banks as well as the 
fact that bank staff do not have the skills (or the incentives) to adequately analyze and 
manage risks of long-term lending.  In turn, this lack of adequate analysis leads staff to 
compensate by charging higher interest rates than appropriate to the actual level of risk of the 
operation.  On the supply side, SME borrowers often lack the expertise to convince banks 
that they are good clients; for example, SMEs rarely maintain minimally acceptable financial 
records and often perceive bank procedures to be too complicated (Harner 2003 and MPDF 
2003).  Other important issues highlighted by the Harner study are that SMEs are unable to 
approach banks outside the major cities and that some SMEs prefer to use the informal credit 
market.  In relation to rural finance, the lack of medium and long-term lending affects not 
only middle range farmers but also rural populations in general, who lack long-term credit for 
any kind of capital-intensive input or asset. 
 
High risks and operating costs are associated with high interest rate spreads and the 
prevalence of short-term lending.  The spread between loan and deposit interest rates was 
estimated at about 13 percent, as loan interest is around 20 percent per annum or more.  
                                                 
165 The 12 banks interviewed were: ACLEDA Bank Ltd; Advanced Bank of Asia Ltd.; Cambodian Commercial 
Bank; Cambodian Public Bank; Canadia Bank Ltd.; Foreign Trade Bank of Cambodia Ltd.; Maybank; Mekong 
Bank; Peng Heng SME Bank Ltd.; Rural Development Bank; Singapore Banking Corporation; Union 
Commercial Bank Plc. (Harner, 2003). 
166 This includes the 2001 land law, the 1988 contract law and the lack of company and bankruptcy laws. 
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 Typical loan maturity is 3-6 months.  Because long-term finance is unavailable the common 
practice is to roll over short-term loans, increasing the overall risk (ADB, 2001: 6).   
 
Despite high demand, there is an almost total absence of medium and long term financing for 
SMEs.  This is not because lending to SMEs is unprofitable; in fact, the profitability spread 
for lending to SMEs is higher than the profitability spread for general lending.  Compared to 
international standards, Cambodia’s banks have low loan portfolios (in addition to low bank 
intermediation) and a large amount of the banks’ funds are deposited with the NBC (Harner, 
2003:4).  
 
Therefore, within the formal sector, the Rural Development Bank (RDB), the Association of 
Cambodia Local Economic Development Agencies (ACLEDA Bank) and the microfinance 
institutions are the most relevant institutions regarding rural finance.  ACLEDA Bank and the 
Cambodian microfinance institutions will be reviewed in detail in Chapter V. 
 
The Rural Development Bank (RDB) is currently the only state owned bank remaining within 
the formal sector.167  The RDB was established by the government (with foreign assistance) 
in 1998 and became a wholesale bank for channeling funds from the international donor 
community to Cambodian Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in 2000.  The RDB is under the 
financial control of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and it is supervised by the NBC.  
The RDB principal activities are “providing financial resources to commercial and 
specialized banks, and MFIs involved in the provisions of credit and savings services for 
rural households and small businesses” (RDB, 2007:18).  Concretely, the RDB mission is 
detailed as:  
(i) financing and refinancing Licensed Financial Institutions, Small and Medium 
Enterprises, Community Based Associations, and Micro Entrepreneurs which 
support rural economic activities;  
(ii) supporting long and medium term investment project for small and medium rural 
and urban enterprises;  
(iii) negotiating soft loans with donors that will permit the bank to widen its activities; 
(iv) take public deposits;  
                                                 
167 Note that its banking license became due in June 2007.  
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 (v) cooperating with financial institutions which extend credit to farmers and to 
projects for agriculture, rural development and rural enterprises;  
(vi) providing technical training for Licensing Financial Institutions, Small and 
Medium Enterprises, Community Based Associations; and  
(vii)  monitor institutions which obtained subordinated debt from the Government  
 
Interestingly, compared with its mission as of 2003, its responsibilities have been minimized 
as a wholesaler, there is a focus on soft loans from donors and instead of encouraging the 
mobilization of deposits by the public they now list as their mission to take public 
deposits.168  The RDB obtains its on-lending funds from the following main source
Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IF
Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Groupe de recherche et d'échanges 




                                                
169  The conditions for on-lending depend on the source of the funds; for 
example while the ADB’s funds are restricted to licensed financial institutions, IFAD’s funds 
are open to registered -but not necessarily licensed- microfinance operators and the RDB’s 
own funding is open to registered and non-registered microfinance operators, NGOs and 
associations.   
 
The RDB had loans outstanding from ADB fund (which is restricted to licensed banking 
institutions) for USD 2.2 million  The original fund was USD 20.7 million, but the slow 
disbursement figures led to the cancellation of USD 14.8 million in December 2002.  The 
cancellation reflected the weak capacity of both the RDB and the MFIs (IMF, 2003: 41).  
According to the ADB’s Performance Audit Report on the Agricultural Sector Program, this 
slow loan disbursement was caused by a number of factors, among them that there were only 
three eligible clients and that the RDB’s loans were not necessarily attractive to eligible 
 
168 Its responsibilities as 2003 included:  
(i) financing and refinancing MFIs and commercial banks in support of the rural economy;  
(ii) negotiating with donors for funding;  
(iii) encouraging the mobilization of deposits by the public;  
(iv) cooperating with financial institutions in providing agricultural credit;  
(v) conducting wholesale banking activities; and  
(vi) training staff of MFIs funded by donors or government (Conroy, 2003).   
169 Funds from IFAD are linked to Support to the Seila Programs in four provinces (Pursat, Battambang, 
Banteay Mean Chey and Siem Riep).  Funds from AFD are linked to the family rubber plantation (in fact the 
AFD grant is being implemented on behalf of RDB by GRET).  GRET-KOSAN funds are to be on-lent to Peng 
Heng SME Bank, which will, in turn, re- lend to selected private investors in a rural water supply project in 
Takeo province.  Funds from the MEF is for provincial rice miller associations.  Funds from the ADB are linked 
to the Rural Credit and Savings Project (RDB, 2007). 
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 borrowers (ADB, 2003:8).  Regarding the number of potential clients, the RDB could only 
lend to banks and licensed MFIs and its wholesaler function was made available before 
enough institutions could make use of it.170  Secondly, while the RDB lent at concessional 
rates, the loans were not necessarily attractive to eligible borrowers that have access to 
concessional funds from other external sources.171  In addition to the price, other terms and 
conditions attached to loan contracts might have made them equally unattractive to potential 
borrowers (CSD, 2002:80).   
 
The total outstanding loans of the RDB as of December 2006 was USD 12.5 million, of 
which less than 7 percent was denominated in riel and 93 percent in US dollars.  The RDB 
has provided funds to banks, microfinance operators (licensed, registered or neither) and 
associations and is also the counterpart of some development projects.  Of the sixteen 
licensed microfinance operators, the RDB has a current outstanding balance with eleven of 
them but this group only includes four of the main microfinance operators (which will be 
discussed in Chapter V) and for small amounts: Cambodia Entrepreneur Building (CEB) 
(USD 513,000); Hattha Kaksekar (USD 500,000); Thaneakea Phum Cambodia (USD 
293,000); Amret Co Ltd (USD 246,000).172  The RDB has also provided loans to some 
smaller (not licensed) registered microfinance operators or NGOs, some associations, and a 
specialized bank (Peng Heng Bank).  As of the end of December 2006, about 59 percent of 
the portfolio was linked to licensed or registered microfinance operators or NGOs. 
 
                                                 
170 As of December 2002, Cambodia had only three licensed MFIs (EMT [currently AMRET], Hattha Kaksekar 
and Tong Fang Microfinance, the last one being very small) and four specialized banks of which only one 
handled microcredit (ACLEDA).  Given the limit per institution of USD 1 million set by the ADB fund, the 
maximum amount that could have been lent as of December 2002 was USD 3-4 million.   
171 The actual concessional rates are difficult to report.  According to the RDB, their minimum interest rate for 
loans from the ADB was 5.47 percent for US dollar lending and 6.47 percent for riel lending in 2003.  For loans 
from the IFAD fund their minimum interest rate was 7 percent per annum for US dollar loans and 11-12 percent 
per annum for riel loans.  For loans from the RDB’s own fund the loans were between 8-10 percent for US 
dollar lending and 12-15 percent for riel lending.  However, according to the ADB report, the RDB charges an 
annual interest rate of 12 percent on US dollar loans, including 4 percent for its services, without the capacity to 
deliver services or training (ADB, 2003:8).  Also, according to an appraisal by the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor (CGAP), EMT’s (currently AMRET’s) cost of funds from the RDB riel loans was 15 percent per 
annum (Reille et al., 2002: 34).  
172 The licensed MFIs, ordered by the size of the loan outstanding with the RDB are:  Intean Poalroath 
Rongroeurng (USD 1,400,000); Seilanithih (USD 676,000); Cambodia Business Integrated in Rural 
Development (CBIRD) (USD 601,000); Cambodia Entrepreneur Building (CEB) (USD 513,000); Hattha 
Kaksekar (USD 500,000); Farmer Union Development Fund (FUDF) (USD 394,000); Cambodia Health 
Committee (CHC) Ltd (USD 350,000); Thaneakea Phum Cambodia (USD 293,000); Amret Co Ltd (USD 
246,000); Maxima MFI (USD 230,000); Pisit Akphiwat Sethakeh Co. Ltd (USD 50,000).  ACLEDA bank and 
Tong Fang MFI had outstanding loan in 2005 but not in 2006. 
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 In summary, given limited supply of rural finance from commercial and specialized banks, 
the main providers of microfinance and rural finance in Cambodia are the microfinance 
institutions and the rural services of ACLEDA Bank (excluding its commercial banking arm).  
Chapter V will discuss how the services have concentrated mainly in credit and will review 
each of these providers (albeit covering only the microbusiness portfolio of ACLEDA Bank) 
as well as the regulatory framework in which they operate.   
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 Chapter V – RURAL FINANCE AND MICROFINANCE IN CAMBODIA 
 
This chapter provides a general overview of how microfinance and the rural finance sector 
have evolved in Cambodia in the last five years.  The first part of the chapter reviews the size 
and nature of demand for rural finance while the second section of the chapter concentrates 
on the supply of rural finance, describing the regulatory framework and its implications as 
well as analyzing the main microfinance providers in Cambodia.  The final section of the 
chapter further analyzes the evolution of the market from 2000 to 2007 through a detailed 
seven-year comparison of the institutions reporting the Cambodia’s central bank. 
 
 
Demand for Rural Finance: Size and Nature of Demand (mainly credit)   
 
Along with the lack of infrastructure and underdeveloped markets, the lack of access to 
reliable financial services has been identified as a major constraint to the reduction of rural 
poverty in Cambodia, especially regarding households’ incomes from agriculture (McKenny 
and Tola, 2002; FAO, 1999).  However, demand for rural credit far exceeds supply and 
reliable savings facilities are generally not available in rural areas or to the poor.  The 
following sections will provide an estimation of the size of the market and describe what is 
known about the nature of demand. 
 
 
Size of the Market  
 
On the demand side, there is no reliable data about the aggregate demand for microfinance or 
microcredit in Cambodia (MPDF, 2005:3).  Different sources have estimated that Cambodia 
needs to loan the rural poor between USD 40 million and USD 125 million but the figures for 
the demand of microcredit differ widely. 173  On the supply side, the aggregate outstanding 
                                                 
173 The government estimated the total need for microcredit at around USD 125 million (IMF, 2003: 41). 
Economist Sok Hach estimated the figure to be between USD 70 million and USD 100 million (quoted in Kay 
Kimsong 2002: 14).  ACLEDA Bank estimated the demand for microcredit at USD 100 million (In Channy, 
2002: 2).  Within the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS), the government estimated the shortage of 
credit capital to be between USD 60-90 million (CSD, 2002: 79).  The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
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 microcredit was USD 208.74 million and mobilized savings were USD 4.31 million.  These 
are the official figures as of May 2007 of the 17 licensed MFIs and the 26 registered NGOs 
reporting to the NBC (USD 114.42 million) plus the “micro” and “small” business loan 
portfolio of ACLEDA estimated at USD 93.4 million.174  The deposits portfolio of ACLEDA 
Bank has been excluded in this analysis since it is not possible to identify the exact 
percentage linked exclusively with rural finance (as opposed to institutional depositors or 
urban individuals with large depositors).  However, a discussion of the percentage of 
households not currently covered by rural finance might prove more useful in estimating the 
potential demand for financial services in rural areas.   
 
Recent estimates set Cambodia’s population in 2006 at 14.4 million people, corresponding 
roughly to 2,750, 000 households.175  As of December 2006, the number of borrowers of 
microcredit served by microfinance operators reporting to the NBC (plus the corresponding 
rural finance figure of ACLEDA) was 671,219.  If we assume that each of these borrowers 
represents a household and that each household borrows only from one institution,176 current 
microcredit reaches less than 25 percent of total Cambodian households.  Because over 90 
percent of the Cambodian poor live in rural areas, it is useful to calculate credit service 
coverage exclusively for rural households.  Given that 81 percent of the population is rural, 
the number of rural households can be estimated at 2,227,500.  Even if we further assume 
that all existing borrowers are from rural areas, thus the percentage of rural households with 
access to formal and semi-formal microfinance services becomes 30 percent.  Therefore, 
although we do not know how many rural households currently need access to credit or other 
financial services, we can estimate that at least 70 percent of Cambodian rural households are 
not served by formal or semiformal microfinance operators at affordable terms and must rely 
solely on informal financial sources such as friends, relatives, neighbors, moneylenders and 
middlemen to cover their financial needs.   
                                                                                                                                                        
estimated total rural finance demand at USD 120-130 million per annum, of which only one third (i.e. USD 40-
43 million) is for microcredit ranging in loan size from USD 50 to USD 300 (ADB, 2001: 8).   
174 ACLEDA’s loan figures for the “micro and small business portfolio” were reported directly to the author by 
the Credit Management Unit by personal communication (October 2007). 
175 This is an approximate figure:  applying the average household size of 5.2 identified in the population census 
of 1998 to this recent estimate of population, the current number of households in Cambodia is 2,769,231 and 
applying the 5.1 average household size identified by Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey (CIPS) of 
2004, the approximate number of households in Cambodia would be 2,823,529.  Note that the results of the 
CIPS 2004 are the most recently available but may not be as accurate as the ones from the Census 1998: while 
the Census 1998 covered over 2 million households in more than 13,000 villages the CIPS 2004 barely covered 
21,000 households in 700 villages. 
176 However, anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise. 
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 There are few studies that look at the sources of credit and fewer still that attempt to establish 
the average size of the debt per household or the uses (stated or real) of credit, including 
credit used specifically for agricultural purposes.  The different methodologies and 
questionnaire design impede an accurate picture at the household level, but a review of 
existing data allows two main conclusions:  
(i) rural households currently have outstanding debt: 24-60 percent of rural 
households have debts and that each household owes, on average, USD 64-150. 
(ii) rural populations rely on the informal and semi-formal sectors for providing credit 
and it is not possible to accurately measure the relative importance of semiformal 
versus informal finance sector for rural households.  
 
Regarding debt prevalence and average debt per household, Helmers (2003) compares the 
results from five sub-national sample surveys and provides additional information from a (re) 
analysis of a national survey (CSES 1999/Gibson).177  The summary table of debt prevalence 
among households from the five sub-national quantitative studies indicates that 40-60 percent 
of households have current cash debts ranging from KHR 245,000- 315,000 (USD 64-84).  
Rice debt is incurred by 13-49 percent of households, each owing between 150 and 373 kg 
(2003: 71-72).178  On the other hand, the analysis of a national level study (CSES 
1999/Gibson) indicates that the prevalence of loans in households is much lower: around 24 
percent on average, but with a higher average loan debt of KHR 550,000 (USD 150).179  
According to a rice study by the Ministry of Commerce (2001), 43.8 percent of the 
respondents had borrowed money often or sometimes and each respondent had on average 
KHR 375,000 (USD 96) of outstanding loans, with most borrowers (67 percent) owing 
around KHR 300,000 (USD 77).180  According to the Cambodian Poverty Profile, 43 percent 
of households have one or more loans outstanding, owing on average KHR 224,000, but there 
                                                 
177 The five sub-national quantitative studies reviewed and the number of provinces and households covered are:  
Ahmed et al. (1998) surveying 8 provinces and 5,117 households; Kenefick (1998) in 13 provinces and 1,200 
households; Kenefick (2000) in 12 provinces and 1,298 households; Helmers & Wallgren (2001) in 4 provinces 
and 1,104 households; Sophal & Acharya (2002) in 7 provinces and 1,005 households (Helmers 2003:6 and 
Helmers 2003b:72). 
178 The figures of the cash debts are based only on the most recent studies.  The amount of rice debt is based on 
4 surveys and, in the case of Sophal & Acharya (2002) it includes not only rice debt but any in-kind debt.  The 
figure of the kilograms of rice owed is based on the information from 2 of the surveys.  
179 The average loan size is smallest for the poorest quintile (Riel 180,000 or USD 45) and largest for the 
wealthiest quintile (Riel 2.1 million or USD 550).  Also, the average annual interest rate on outstanding loans is 
31.4 percent, but the interest rate is highest for poorer borrowers than for the wealthiest quintile borrowers (39.0 
percent vs. 26.2 percent) (Gibson, 2003:33).  Little further definitive information can be inferred regarding 
wealth quintiles and geographic zones. 
180 Ministry of Commerce (2001).  The survey had 845 respondents.  
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 are sharp difference by the level of poverty of the households:  50 percent of the poorest 
quintile have loans outstanding, owing KHR 233,400 on average, while 31 percent f the 
richest quintile households have outstanding loans owing KHR 846,600 on average (RGC-
MoP, 2006: 79) 
 
Regarding sources of credit, Benkirane (2003) in her survey of 558 people in 5 villages found 
that 38 percent of households had loans from family members, 32 percent from microfinance 
providers, 16 percent from suppliers or middlemen and 14 percent from moneylenders.  
Sophal and Acharya’s (2002) survey of 1,005 households in 6 villages reported that 44.5 
percent of households obtain their loans from relatives and friends, 33.1 percent from 
moneylenders, 15.7 percent from microfinance providers and about 7 percent from other 
sources.  Noteworthy is that while relatives and friends provide the larger number of loans, 
the size of each loan is smaller.181  According to the Ministry of Commerce rice study (2001), 
19.9 percent of respondents rely on microfinance operators.  When asked to enumerate all the 
available lenders, microfinance providers were the most mentioned (34.6%), followed closely 
by relatives and friends (31.5%), middlemen (13.8%), moneylenders / pawnbrokers (10.8%) 
and rice millers (2.1%).   
 
The most recent qualitative study in the Tonle Sap concluded that while all forms of informal 
credit are present in all areas, the predominant informal credit sources depend on the specific 
evolution of the area from the subsistence economy of the 1980s to early 1990s: those 
geographic areas with natural resources and livelihood opportunities have stimulated the 
growth of moneylenders and traders.  In poorer areas, most arrangements are cash-kind/labor 
or kind-kind/labor (with cash-labor forms dominating the market and implicit interest rates 
charged through low wages that are below market prices).182  Also, the rich and medium 
households tend to be lenders to the poor and destitute.  When rich and medium households 
do borrow they usually borrow from formal sources or traders.  On the other hand, poor and 
                                                 
181 The average loan size from relative and friends ranged from Riel 232,000 to Riel 275,000 (USD 59-70).  The 
largest average loan size is from ACLEDA and ranges from Riel 506,000 to Riel 864,000 (USD 130-221).  The 
general average loan size is Riel 277,000 to Riel 354,000 (USD 71-91) (2002:47 and 107). 
182 In Cash-kind loans money is borrowed with the promise of repayment in kind or in labor (e.g. rice producers 
or artisans taking cash loans from a trader with the promise of selling the entire or some of the production to this 
trader at a lower price or providing labor as repayment or fishermen taking cash loans from a trader with the 
promise of selling the entire catch to this trader at a lower-than-market price).  (The opposite are kind-cash 
loans, where loans in rice, agricultural inputs such fertilizer or services such as health are repaid in cash in 
amounts that involve an implicit rate of interest).  In kind-kind loans consumption loans in rice are repaid by 
labor or labor is exchanged for labor or draught power (Murshid, 2007: 221). 
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 destitute households also borrow from traders but depend heavily on rich and medium 
households for pre-paid wages and loans requiring daily repayment.  Women are not 
discriminated in the Tonle Sap rural credit market, where they play a key role in negotiating 
terms and credit amounts and are almost always co-signatories to credit contracts.  Finally, 
the study concluded that while credit rarely plays a role in moving people out of poverty, it 
can accelerate the process of downward mobility.  The author further suggests that for the 
poor and destitute, informal credit provides immediate (even if temporary) relief but also an 
illusory opportunity because the opportunity to regain equilibrium or overcome a particular 
shock is rarely realized (Murshid, 2007: 243). 
 
 
Nature of Demand for Rural Finance (mainly credit) 
 
Despite not being able to accurately estimate the relative weight of informal finance sector as 
credit providers for rural populations, their importance cannot be underestimated.  Rural 
Cambodians depend on these informal sources of credit not only for productive investment 
(notably in rice production) but also for consumption and other seasonal or occasional needs 
such as educational costs or ceremonies (weddings, funerals).183  Additionally they borrow in 
cases of emergencies (such as sickness or accidents) because health costs are often 
prohibitively expensive for rural Cambodians. 
                                                 
183 The available studies have provided different figures: 
- According to Benkirane’s survey, the principal uses of credit were: agriculture (28%), livestock (27.6%), 
consumption and cash flow (27.5%), other investments (8.4%) and others (8.4%) (2003:25).   
- The 2001 rice study by the Ministry of Commerce enumerated the following reasons for borrowing: 32.4% 
borrowed for agricultural inputs; 21.1% for health/illness reasons; 13.8% for food; 8.8% for educational costs; 
7.5% for daily necessities; 4.4% for investment in agriculture (other than inputs) and 4.4% for wedding and 
funerals (2001: 3.7.3-1).   
- Bousso et al. in their survey of 523 households in eight villages found that between 24% to 65% of the total 
amount was used for agriculture (including investments in purchasing equipment, livestock and fertilizer as well 
as direct use of cash flows for agricultural purposes) and 16% for boosting working capital for trading 
(1997:43).   
- Aafjes’ (1996) results from her survey of 142 villages in 3 provinces found credit for agricultural purposes as 
the main use of credit (12-20% of the total number of loans were used for purchasing fertilizer, 14-23% for 
animals, 0-6% for agricultural equipment, 0-3% for pesticides, 2-3% for seeds) while the rest was used for other 
business or consumption expenses.  
- Cater’s (1996) survey of 283 households in Kompong Thom province found that 46% of rural households 
required credit for farm tools and inputs, 10% for piglets and 54% for other business investments, consumption 
or other non-agricultural purposes.   
- Gibson (2003), in his analysis of the CSES 1999 finds that the share of loans that are primarily for agricultural 
purposes is 14% on average, which seems low compared with other studies (Helmers 2003:44-45).  Interestingly 
enough this figure changes very little according to the level of wealth (ranging from 12 to 15% across the 5 
quintiles). 
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 Most of the few studies that look into uses of credit usually focus on “agricultural” use (and 
more often than not this is tacitly linked to rice production) and explore little of other income-
generating options or consumption options, which leaves the analysis incomplete and, in 
effect, misleading.   
 
According to Helmers’ report “there seems to be a research gap about how often rural 
households need to borrow, how much, from whom can they borrow and at what costs as well 
as the strategies rural household use when credit is not available for consumption and 
emergency needs” (2003: 70).  Indeed, the fact that there is little information about the 
sources and uses of financial services by rural households is just another symptom of the lack 
of systematic and accurate information about both the sources and the uses of income (i.e. 
livelihood strategies) in rural households.  Likewise, most of the findings from Helmers’ 
summary of sources of income and livelihood strategies of Cambodian rural households are 
of direct relevance for rural finance, among them that:  
(a) there is a lack of research on the broad range of issues related to Cambodian rural 
livelihoods, income sources and livelihood strategies;  
(b) national level studies do not appropriately cover the different sources of income 
for rural households and yet their results are repeatedly utilized in secondary 
studies / analyses concerning policy issues at the national level; and  
(c) there is a high prevalence of shocks (crises) in rural households that cause major 
income loss or increased expenditures and that the rural households’ responses or 
coping strategies contain inherent risks themselves (2003: 3-4).   
 
Regarding the first two points, it is commonly accepted that Cambodian rural households 
typically depend on a diverse range of income sources composed of a combination of 
agricultural, livestock, fisheries/aquatic resources, forestry and other income generation 
activities such as wage labor, small business, and rental of assets or remittances.  However, 
there is limited research available about the economic role of each of these specific sources of 
income among rural households and, more importantly the economic role of rice production 
has probably been overemphasized, non-rice crops (including field crops, vegetables and 
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 agricultural tree crops) under-estimated and forestry and fisheries under-enumerated and 
undervalued (Helmers, 2003: 3-7).184 
 
The issues raised by Helmers are of crucial importance for rural finance because of two main 
reasons:  
(i) if sources of income have been under-represented in previous studies, there is 
little information that can be useful from these studies for microfinance providers 
and  
(ii) detailed, systematic and accurate information about sources of income and the 
coping strategies of rural households are critical for increasing access to rural 
finance: microfinance operators must know the cash flow patterns of rural 
households in order to design adequate financial products to fit rural households’ 
needs.   
 
The relevant question for rural finance is not whether credit has been used for agricultural 
purposes, or more generally, if the credit has been used for productive purposes versus 
consumption purposes.  Money is fungible and loans are simply lump-sums used to fulfill the 
financial needs of households at a particular point in time.  Generally, attempts to investigate 
exactly where the money is being invested are likely not to be cost-efficient.  In fact, it does 
not really matter whether a particular lump-sum has been used for purchasing fertilizer or for 
paying the school fees or for covering health costs.  From the point of view of the 
microfinance providers and, more broadly, for expanding access to rural finance the crucial 
issues are (i) whether the household can generate enough income at the right time to be able 
to service its debt, and (ii) whether the patterns of rural households regarding sources of 
income and uses of income (i.e. livelihood strategies) are well known.  Microfinance 
operators need to understand the first point in order to screen effectively for credit risk but 
will need to understand the second one in order to design products that fit the client’s needs. 
 
                                                 
184 For instance, the CSES 1999/Gibson results estimate that, on average, non-rice crops contribute 7 percent of 
total household income and livestock incomes 17 percent. Additional (limited) findings indicate that, on 
average, wage labor contributes 10-30 percent and small business 14-30 percent of total household incomes (and 
that 30 percent or more of rural households engage in wage labor and that 25 percent or more of rural 
households engage in small business as important sources of income) (Helmers, 2003: 3-7).   
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 In order to fill in this gap, AMK’s research efforts include establishing a profile of client 
households and the villages where they liver.  Chapter VI provides a succinct analysis of rural 
households and village profiles. 
 
There is no further information on the demand of other non-credit services.  In particular, the 
demand for savings has not been quantified but is estimated by the ADB to be “significant 
and largely unmet because of (i) the absence of secure and reliable savings facilities; (ii) the 
lack of appropriate products; (iii) the high cost of service delivery; (iv) inaccessibility; and 
(v) the relative inexperience of microfinance operators in managing savings” (ADB, 2001: 
9).185   
 
 
Supply of Rural Finance  
 
Microfinance services can be provided by formal institutions, semi-formal institutions and 
informal providers.  Within the Cambodian context, formal finance providers are those 
institutions subject not only to general laws but also to specific banking regulation and 
supervision, while semi-formal providers are registered entities subject to general laws but 
only to some form of supervision or reporting requirements.  As was reviewed in the 
Cambodian Financial System of Chapter IV, within the formal sector, the current sources of 
rural finance in Cambodia are the microfinance operators and the rural finance division of the 
operations of ACLEDA Bank.  The informal sector providers are non-registered groups and 
individuals for which neither special banking law nor general commercial law apply; this 
includes friends, relatives, neighbors, moneylenders and middlemen as well as self-help 
groups and rotating savings and credit associations.  In turn, moneylenders can include 
wealthy village chiefs, local authority members or other patrons while the term middlemen 
usually refers to traders in inputs or agricultural trade.  Because of the intrinsic nature of the 
informal sector, little accurate information is available.  While there is some information 
regarding supply chain linkages from middlemen or traders in studies of specific industries 
(such as rice millers, fisheries or resin),186 previous attempts to profile components of the 
informal sector (such as moneylenders) have rendered fragmented results.  Relatives and 
                                                 
185 In 1997 the general rate of domestic savings was only 5 percent of GDP, the lowest in South East Asia.  In 
2000, domestic savings were reported at 9 percent of GDP. 
186 See for example ACI (2002), Tola and McKenney (2003) or Chea and McKenney (2003b). 
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 close friends usually charge no interest, but moneylenders and middlemen charge high 
interest rates of around or above 10 percent per month.187  The informal sector can provide 
credit in cash and in kind while microfinance operators tend to concentrate on credit in cash.  
Local variations of RoSCAS or ASCAS188 (known in Cambodia as “tong tines” or 
“tontines”) are popular in Cambodia and found usually among salaried workers (often am
civil servants) and among large merchants operating in the main markets of the provincial 
capitals, but are rare in remote rural se
ong 
ttings.   
                                                
 
In order to provide a complete overview of the current state of the rural finance sector in 
Cambodia and the general financial sector context, this section on the supply of rural finance 
has been subdivided in three parts.  The first part provides the main characteristics and 
history of ACLEDA Bank, the only commercial bank that serves rural populations (albeit not 
exclusively).  The second part analyzes Cambodia’s regulatory framework for microfinance 
operators and it implications for the supply of rural finance.  Finally, the third section 
concentrates on the main Cambodian providers of microfinance services: the micro-and-small 
business loan portfolio of ACLEDA Bank and the eight main microfinance institutions.   
 
 
ACLEDA Bank  
 
The Association of Cambodia Local Economic Development Agencies Bank (ACLEDA 
Bank) started its operations as an NGO, became a specialized bank and only became a full 
commercial bank in December 2003.  The evolution and performance of ACLEDA Bank is 
well known within the industry and it is often regarded as one of the main success stories 
worldwide in microfinance and rural finance.  Clark (2006) documents the history of the bank 
 
187 ADB (CAM 30237-01) documents the interest rate of moneylenders at 10 percent per month.  Sophal and 
Acharya report moneylenders charging from 6-9 percent per month (2002:47).  Sedara, Sophal and Achraya 
report that if the borrowers have family or good relations with the lenders the interest rate might only be 5 
percent per month without requesting collateral while poorer households without that network may pay higher 
interest rates of 10-15 percent per month in addition to providing collateral (2002:18).  The author can confirm 
that moneylenders charge as little as 5 percent and as much as 15 percent per month. 
188 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCAs) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ASCAs) explicitly pool savings and tie loans to deposits.  Members are usually familiar with each other and 
contribute a certain sum every day, week or month.  The total sum of the savings is distributed to each member 
in turns and the RoSCA/ASCA will dissolve or start a new cycle once all the members have had their turn.  
Members define the sequence of their turn by consensus, lot, or bidding.  In Cambodia, tongtines commonly use 
monthly bidding, conducted by secret ballot with a discount offered by the highest bidder who pays the bid as a 
reduction in the contribution/installments of the other participants (WB, 2006: 30). 
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 from its inception to its success as a commercial bank.  ACLEDA was established in January 
1993 as a national NGO for micro and small enterprise development and credit, with the aim 
of raising the standard of living of the poor by promoting economic activities ranging from 
self-employment and small to medium size business.  The expansion of its network and its 
sustainability led to the transformation of ACLEDA NGO into ACLEDA Bank Ltd.  The 
transformation started in 1998.  ACLEDA Bank received a specialized bank license in 
October 2000 and its full commercial banking license on December 2003, officially changing 
its brand name to ACLEDA Bank Plc. since January 2004.  On December 2004 and May 
2007, ACLEDA Bank Plc. was rated by Moody's Investors Service obtaining a D for its Bank 
Financial Strength Rating in both occasions.  ACLEDA Bank’s shareholders are ACLEDA 
NGO, ACLEDA Staff Association, IFC (International Finance Corporation-a division of the 
World Bank), DEG (a part of KfW -Group, Germany), FMO, and Stichting Triodos Doen 
together with Triodos Custody B.V. as custodian of Triodos Fair Share Fund (The 
Netherlands).  As of December 2006, ACLEDA Bank Plc. is 51 percent owned by Cambodia 
interests (including its staff) and the remaining 49 percent taken up in equal parts by foreign 
investors.189   
 
Currently, ACLEDA Bank covers every province in the country (24 provinces/towns).and 
offers credit services; savings services; transfers; cash management services for 
manufacturers and distributors and trade finance.  Credit services include microbusiness 
loans; small business loans; medium size business loans; personal/retail loans; overdrafts; 
revolving credit lines; credit lines; and housing loans.190  Savings services include savings 
and demand deposit; current account; fixed deposit; corporate deposit; trust account for real 
estate; euro flex account and trust services.  Transfers include local fund transfers and both 
SWIFT and Western Union international transfers.  Cash management services for 
manufacturers and distributors include payments, standing orders, direct debits, supplier 
                                                 
189 ACLEDA NGO remains the main shareholder with 37.70 percent of the shares.  The other shareholders are 
ACLEDA Staff Association (13.30%) and four foreign investors each holding 12.25 percent of the shares (IFC, 
DEG-KfW-Group, FMO and Triodos-Doen Foundation Bank).  The last one is divided between Triodon Doen 
(7.95%) and Triodos-Fair Share Fund (4.30%).  In 2004 the Bank increased its capital from USD 4,000,000 to 
USD 13,000,000, represented by 13,000,000 ordinary shares, each having an issue price of USD 1 (2002: USD 
10).  On November 30, 2006, ACLEDA Bank raised its issued and paid-up capital from USD 13,000,000 to 
USD 30,000,000 (each share with 1 vote and participating equally in dividends and other distributions) 
(ACLEDA Bank website). 
190 Note that personal and housing loans are only available for personal banking while the other loans are 
available for business banking. 
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 payments, cash consolidation accounts, payroll and overdrafts.  Finally trade finance includes 
documentary collection and credit and bank guarantee.   
 
Regarding lending products, ACLEDA Bank provides microbusiness loans to both 
individuals and groups. For individual loans, the borrower can choose the loan amount in 
Cambodian riel, Thai baht, or US dollars up to KHR 6,000,000, THB 60,000, or USD 1,500.  
For group loan borrowers, each member of the group can borrow up to KHR 1,500,000 or 
THB 15,000 (this is equivalent to USD 375 but note that group clients cannot receive loans 
denominated in US dollars).  All other loans are exclusively for individuals and require 
collateral.  Small business loans range from USD 1,500 to USD 10,000 (or the equivalent in 
KHR or THB).  Medium business loans go up to USD 100,000 (or the equivalent in KHR or 
THB).  Personal loans can go up to USD 30,000.  Annual interest rates depend on the 
currency and the loan size.  ACLEDA Bank reduced the interest rates of most loans in late 
2007 as follows: 
 
Table V-1: Comparison of Interest Rates– ACLEDA Bank, 2006 and 2007 








Khmer Riel  
and  
Thai Baht 
Up to KHR 1,500,000 
Up to THB 15,000 3.00% 3.25%-3.50% 39% to 42% 
KHR 1,500,000 - 5,000,000  
THB 15,000 - 50,000   3.00% 3.00% 36% 
KHR 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 
THB 50,000-60,000  3.00% 2.00%-3.00% 24%-36% 
Greater than KHR 6,000,000 
Greater than THB 60,000 2.75% 2.00%-3.00% 24%-36% 
US Dollar 
Up to USD 1,500 3.00% 3.00% 36% 
USD 1,500 – USD 10,000 2.00% 2.00% 24% 
USD 10,000 – USD 30,000 1.80% 1.20-2.00% 14.4-24% 
Greater than USD 30,000 * 1.50% 1.20-2.00% 14.4-24% 
* For maximum loan period of 3 months, the interest rate is 1% per month  




The evolution of ACLEDA as rural finance provider has mirrored its evolution from a solely 
microfinance provider to a full commercial bank while maintaining its main target in clients 
with micro and small loan needs.  Table V-2 shows that between 2000 and 2006, more than 
95 percent of all ACLEDA clients with active loans remained those clients with either micro 
or small loans (although the share of clients with microloans is slowly decreasing in favor of 
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 clients with small loans).  On the other hand, Table V-3 shows that the share of micro and 
small loans in the total loan portfolio of ACLEDA has indeed decreased from 93 percent in 
2000 to 53 percent in 2006, as a reflection of the new loan products created in a commercial 
bank business model. 
 






Small Loans Total Clients 
% Clients 
Micro / Total 
Clients 
% Clients 
Micro +Small / 
Total Clients 
December 2000 49,232  11,474.00 60,860 81% 100% 
December 2001 65,777  15,492.00 81,453 81% 100% 
December 2002 65,414  16,897.00 82,982 79% 99% 
December 2003 77,407  20,372.00 98,906 78% 99% 
December 2004 91,566  27,311.00 122,173 75% 97% 
December 2005 98,570  36,645.00 140,920 70% 96% 
December 2006 126,289  25,289.00 159,930 79% 95% 
Compiled from data supplied by email from Mr. Uch Sokhan (AVP & AMgt of Credit Management Unit, ACLEDA 
Bank Plc.) on 15/10/2007 
 
 





















Clients Micro + 
Small / Total 
Portfolio 
Outstanding 
December 2000 17,444  42,874.33 65,085.91 27% 93% 
December 2001 21,309  54,481.03 81,717.16 26% 93% 
December 2002 25,235  65,236.51 108,262.67 23% 84% 
December 2003 33,855  85,992.18 161,316.94 21% 74% 
December 2004 47,331  129,495.46 265,706.41 18% 67% 
December 2005 59,538  189,302.35 411,178.65 14% 61% 
December 2006 133,832  209,611.94 642,888.21 21% 53% 
Compiled from data supplied by email from Mr. Uch Sokhan (AVP & AMgt of Credit Management Unit, ACLEDA 
Bank Plc.) on 15/10/2007 
 
As of the end of December 2006, 81 percent of ACLEDA Bank’s loans were denominated in 
US dollars, 15 percent in Riel and 4 percent in Thai baht.  Amounts in US dollars are only 
provided for individual loans while the loans in riel or Thai baht currencies may be either 
group or individual loans.  In addition, given the dollarized economy in Cambodia, higher 
amounts are likely to be denominated in US dollars rather than in Riel.  Thus, we can 
estimate that individual loans compose at least 81 percent of the portfolio and group loans 
156 
 less than 19 percent.191  Regarding the quality of ACLEDA Bank’s loan portfolio, the non-
performing loans at the end of December 2006 represented about 0.10 percent (USD 
153,928) of the total loan portfolio while the non-performing loans at the end of December 
2005 were about 0.16 percent (USD 159, 720) of the total loan portfolio.  
 
 





The “Law on Banking and Financial Institutions” was enacted in November 1999 and the 
government decree (prakas) for implementation was enacted in early 2000.193  This legal 
framework recognizes three categories of banking institutions: commercial banks, specialized 
banks and MFIs.   
 
? Commercial banks require a minimum registered capital of USD 13 million and can 
carry out all banking activities.   
? Specialized banks require a minimum registered capital of KHR 10 billion (USD 2.5 
million) and can carry out a limited number of banking activities as specified in the 
terms of their license.   
? Microfinance institutions require a minimum registered capital of KHR 250 million 
(USD 62,500). 
 
According to the prakas B7.02-49 on the Registration and Licensing of Microfinance 
Institutions, microfinance is defined as: “the delivery of financial services such as loans and 
deposits, to the poor and low-income households, and to micro-enterprises.”   
                                                 
191 Torres estimated that of total loans disbursed in 2002 and 2003, at least 65 percent were individual loans and 
less than 35 percent group loans.  The corresponding figures for 2001 were: at least 72 percent of the portfolio 
as individual loans and less than 28 percent as group loans (2004:13).  While the number of loans disbursed 
provides more accurate information than the percentage of loans outstanding, this dissertation has used the 
percentage of portfolio outstanding in order to compare more easily the figures with other MFIs. 
192 This section is based on NBC (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2006a, 2006b), Nayar & Ramm (2002), Kim Vada 
(2002) and the corresponding prakas.  Throughout this section, the exchange rate applied to provide proxies in 
USD has been: 1USD = KHR 4,000. 
193 Prakas No. B 7-00-06. 
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 Registration or licensing of microfinance providers is compulsory when microfinance 
operators meet one or more of the following conditions:  
 
Table V-4: Registration and / or Licensing Requirements by the NBC 
Activity Registration by NBC Licensing by NB 
Credit  Loan portfolio outstanding ≥ KHR 100 million (~USD 25,000) 
Loan portfolio outstanding 
≥ KHR 1,000 million (~USD 250,000) 
or ≥ 1,000 borrowers 
Savings 
Voluntary savings mobilized: 
≥ KHR 1 million (~USD 250) 
or ≥ 100 depositors 
Voluntary savings mobilized 
≥ KHR 100 million (~USD 25,000) 
or ≥ 1,000 depositors 
Sources: Prakas No. B 7-00-06 of 11 January 2000, amended by Prakas 7.02-49 of 25 February 2002 
 
Microfinance operations above the thresholds detailed above had (by law) to register or apply 
to the NBC for an operating license by 31 December 2002 (this deadline was later extended 
to July 2003 (Green 2003:5)); and if they chose not to register or apply for a license they had 
to downscale their operations and operate as a registered operator.  On the other hand, if 
registration is denied or cancelled by the NBC, operators are to cease all microfinance 
activities within 3 months.  Registered and licensed operators must report quarterly to the 
NBC; 194 in addition, licensed MFIs because they are Limited Liability Companies must pay 
taxes.  Disciplinary measures, including fines, were stipulated for non-compliance.  The 
regulation for licensed MFIs is very similar to commercial banks, except that the capital 
requirements are substantially lower.  On the other hand, the regulation for registered 
microfinance operators is lighter and in particular reports sent to the NBC are simplified.  
Reporting requirements are monthly for licensed MFIs and quarterly for registered 
microfinance operators.  The reports include asset and liability statement, profit and loss 
statement, statement of deposit and loan classified by currency and type; loan classification 
and branch network.  The smallest microfinance operators can operate freely with no 
requirement to be regulated and supervised.  As a result, within the Cambodian financial 
environment, the term Licensed MFI is applied specifically to those MFIs that are subject to 
the corresponding banking regulation and supervision from the Central Bank.  Annex 14 
provides the detailed description of the legal status of all current microfinance operators.195   
                                                 
194 The reporting requirements for Registered NGOs and Licensed MFIs are regulated by prakas B 7-02-47 of 25 
February 2002. 
195 Note that, compared with the figures from 2002, four previously registered organizations seem to have 
collapsed or reduce their portfolio in order to avoid the supervision of the Central Bank: Buddhism for 
Development (BFD); SAMAKITHOR; ARUNREAH and Help the Widow Organization (HTW).  
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 Often, credit operations of NGOs (i.e. the registered microfinance operators and those smaller 
providers not subject to regulation by the central bank) are integrated with other programs 
such as health, education and community development.  Many of the credit schemes are 
based on solidarity groups and after a few loan cycles, many groups disband either because of 
lack of interest of because members become dissatisfied with the quality of the service (NBC, 
2006:8).  Many of these smaller credit and savings schemes are not viable due to the lack of 
voluntary savings, their dependence on grants or funds with very limited duration, lack of 
professional management as well as lack of appropriate legal structure and external 
supervision.  On the other hand, the largest licensed MFIs are the direct result of the 
transformations from programs of international or local NGOs into local MFIs and focus 
exclusively on financial services with a professional approach.196  Other smaller licensed 
MFIs seem smaller local companies with marginal presence in rural areas. 
 
Regarding licensing requirements and key prudential regulations for MFIs, note that while 
regulation allowed for the legal incorporation of the MFI as a Limited Liability Company or 
cooperative, all the currently licensed MFIs have become Limited Liability Companies and 
not cooperatives, forced by the fact that a law on cooperatives does not yet exist in 
Cambodia.  Regarding key prudential regulations for MFIs, note that the provisioning 
regulation classified loans as ‘substandard,’ ‘doubtful,’ and ‘loss’ according to Table V-5 
below.  Please see Annex 15 for further information and a summary table on the licensing 
requirements and key prudential regulation for MFIs. 
 
Table V-5: Provisioning Regulation by the NBC 




 Standard   Loans with payments of principal and interest on time None 
 Substandard   Loans between 30-59 days past due 10% 
 Doubtful  (a) loans with original maturity <1 year that are 60-89 days past due 
(b) loans with original maturity >1 year that are 60-179 days past due 
30% 
 Loss  (a) loans with original maturity <1 year that are past due for >90 days 
(b) loans with original maturity >1 year that are past due for >180 days 
100 % 
(Prakas B 7-00-51, amended by prakas 7-020145) 
 
                                                 
196 The precursor of CREDIT (World Relief-CREDIT) initially also offered health education, but now solely 
provide microfinance services. 
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 All microfinance operators, whether licensed or registered, are excluded from a range of 
financial sector activities including leasing, derivatives, gold and commodities dealing, the 





Thus, through the regulatory framework, the NBC in effect enforced two main alternatives 
for microfinance operators in Cambodia: licensing for the ‘medium-sized’ microfinance 
providers or registration for the ‘small’ microfinance providers.   
 
As it is commonly noted within the industry, the new regulatory environment forced the 
microfinance operators to decide whether they wanted to professionalize and upgrade their 
management and governance systems to meet the MFI licensing and prudential regulation.  In 
this regard, it is important to highlight that all of the current main players were in operation 
before the 1999 regulation and that all of them opted for licensing.  Currently, registration of 
all rural finance operators is not yet completed (EIC, 2007: 38-39).   
 
Please refer to Annex 16 for the list of all licensed and registered microfinance operators 
reporting to the NBC and their corresponding clients and portfolio outstanding as of May 
2007.  Note that 13 registered NGOs show portfolios exceeding the threshold for licensing 
required by the NBC: Aid Farmers Association (AFA); Buddhism for Development 
Association and Supporting Environment (BDASE); Cambodia Mutual; Cambodia Credit to 
Abolish Poverty Organization (CCAPO); Cambodian Community Savings Federation 
(CCSF); Centre International du Credi Mutuel (CICM); Cambodia Rural Economic 
Development Organization (CREDO);  Khmer Rural Development Association (KRDA); 
Ministry of Rural Development Credit Scheme (MRD Credit Scheme); Northwest 
Development Association (NWDA); Rural Development Association (RDA); Social 
Development in Rural (SDR) and; Women's Saving and Development Cooperative (WSDC).  
(At the end of 2001, there were 32 microfinance providers with portfolios exceeding the 
threshold for licensing with the NBC.) 
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 As a general statement, the main microfinance providers have regarded the regulation as a 
positive step to guarantee the protection of depositors and to enable their growth.  For 
instance, an FAO/APRACA workshop in Bangkok in February 2002 entitled “From 
NGO/Project to MFI” concluded that Cambodia had the most favorable regulatory 
framework for developing the microfinance sector and attracting foreign investment among 
the 12 South Asian and Southeast Asian countries covered by the workshop.197 
 
 
Rural Finance and Microfinance Providers in Cambodia 
 
While formal financial institutions in Cambodia must bear high operating costs, the operating 
expenses are even higher for rural finance and microfinance operators serving poor people in 
Cambodia.  These higher costs are due to a number of factors, including poor infrastructure in 
rural areas, the lack of a rural banking system, high costs of communications, and high credit 
and security risks.  The rural finance and microfinance sector also suffer the consequences of 
the inadequate legal and judicial system.  Additionally, clients face a lack of market 
opportunities, which means that people only want very small loans.198  For example, during 
2002, AMRET (formerly EMT – one of the leading Cambodian MFIs), charged an annual 
interest rate of 48 percent which breaks down to 31 percent of operating costs, 15 percent of 
cost of funds and 2 percent of costs of business expansion.199  In 2005, ACLEDA reported 
the figures of four of the five factors affecting their interest rates:  the cost of funds was 10
percent, inflation ranged from 4-5 percent per annum, operational costs were 14 percent and 
the loan provision rate (the provisioning for the risk of default) was 5 percent.  To these 
figures, ACLEDA adds the profit margin to calculate the interest rate.  However, interest 
rates have declined in Cambodia from 5-6 percent per month in the early 1990s, 3-5 percent 
from 1998 to 2005 and to 2.5-3 percent in 2006 (NBC, 2006:10 and Kimsong, 2006:1). 
.5 
                                                
 
 
197 The workshop was attended by 32 senior and middle-level officers of policy making and regulatory bodies, 
wholesale financing institutions, microfinance institutions, NGO microfinance providers and government 
agencies from the twelve countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
198 See Williams et al. (2001:58).  Providing small loans to many people is more expensive than providing larger 
loans to few people. 
199 The Second Commission of the Senate (2002): Minutes of Forum Discussion on Micro Credit in Cambodia, 
quoted in Kang Chandararot (2002: 2). 
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 Currently there are at least 100 licensed, registered and unregistered microfinance operators 
within the formal and semiformal sector there are serving the rural populations in 
Cambodia.200  Annex 16 provides the complete table of all microfinance operators reporting 
to the NBC.  These include one commercial bank (ACLEDA Bank, with part of its portfolio 
targeting microentrepreneurs through microbusiness and small loans), 17 Licensed MFIs, 25 
Registered NGOs and around 60 unregistered small lender bodies operating in Cambodia 
without any accreditation.   
 
Of these operators only nine serve more than 10,000 borrowers and report loan outstanding in 
excess of KHR 10,000 Million (USD 2.5 million).  These are: one commercial bank 
(ACLEDA Bank-Microbusiness) and eight licensed MFIs:  AMRET, PRASAC, AMK; TPC; 
VISON FUND; CEB; HATTHA KAKSEKAR and CREDIT.  These become the top-nine 
microfinance operators and will be analyzed in the next section.   
 
The remaining nine MFIs that have become licensed but that show figures on loan 
outstanding similar to other registered MFIs are a mixed bag:  two of the eleven remaining 
MFIs became licensed even when did not reach the threshold of number of 1,000 borrowers 
or KHR 1,000 million loan outstanding required for licensing: Tong Fang Microfinance, 
which became licensed in 2002 and Pisith Akphiwat Sethakech (PAS) which became licensed 
in 2005.  Currently both of them remain below the threshold in both number of borrowers and 
portfolio outstanding.  The other seven MFIs (while above the previously mentioned 
threshold) all have smaller balances, often closer to the sizes of the bigger registered NGOs, 
particularly regarding the number of clients served.  Most of the remaining MFIs are new 
entrants in the pool of licensed MFIs but one of them (Seilanithih) was among the main top 
MFIs back in the first years of the century but has since slipped down the chart.   
 
In 2004, the Cambodia Microfinance Association (CMA) was created with the objective of 
providing a common voice from the industry and support microfinance development a well as 
share information among members.  The 14 members of CMA include all the licensed MFIs 
that constitute the top-nine microfinance providers (AMK, AMRET; CEB; CREDIT; Hattha 
Kaksekar; PRASAC; TPC; and VisionFund) plus 6 additional licensed MFIs:  CBIRD; CHC; 
EAP; Intean Poalroath Rongroeurng; MAXIMA; and SEILANITHIH. 
                                                 
200 According to the summary of the banking system in Cambodia as of May 2007 (Annex 13), there are at least 
102 operators.  
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 The four privately owned specialized banks (Peng Heng SME, Cambodia Agriculture 
Industry Specialized Bank (CAISB); First Investment Specialized Bank and ANCO 
Specialized Band are not classified as rural finance operators.  Peng Heng SME, CAISB and 
the RDB (the fifth specialized bank, but state owned) reported briefly to the NBC network 
information of microfinance providers from 2002 to 2004 but their portfolio information was 
omitted as of December 2005.  In addition, information from the RDB was rarely comparable 
since, as a wholesaler, they reported loan outstanding that had been on-lent to other 
microfinance operators reporting to the NBC, in effect double-counting in estimating the size 
of the credit market.  
 
As a general review, microfinance operators in Cambodia use a variation of commonly 
known methodologies including solidarity groups, village banks, individual loans, mobile 
banking and branch office services.  According to different sources, between 75 and 100 
percent of microcredit clients are women and range from USD 50 to USD 500 for microloans 
and USD 500 to USD10,000 for small and medium loans and are distributed in Cambodian 
riels, US dollars or Thai baht (in the provinces near the Thai border).  Loans are provided 
from 6 to 24 months and with interest rates of 2 to 3 percent per month, calculated on 
declining balance (Bun, 2007).  However, a microfinance operator my charge different 
interest rate depending on the type or denomination of the product.  For instance, PRASAC 
charges 24 percent to 42 percent per annum for individual loans but 36 percent to 42 percent 
per annum for group loans.  Similarly, AMRET charges 3 percent to 3.5 percent per month 




 Main Rural Finance and Microfinance Providers: The Top Nine   
 
The nine main players in the microfinance market in Cambodia ranked by the size of their 
loan outstanding portfolio as of May 2007 are the following:  
 
1. ACLEDA Bank Plc (previously know as ACLEDA Bank Ltd and also as 
Association of Cambodia Local Economic Development Agencies (ACLEDA); 
2. PRASAC (previously known as Prasac Credit Association (PCA)); 
3. AMRET (previously known as Ennatien Moulethan Tchonnbat (EMT)); 
4. CEB (Cambodia Enterprise Building, previously known as Cambodia Community 
Building (CCB) program);  
5. TPC (previously Catholic Relief Services (CRS)- Thaneakea Phum Cambodia 
(TPC) program); 
6. VisionFund (previously known as World Vision Cambodia or MED Programme); 
7. Hattha Kaksekar (also known as Hattha or HKL); 
8. AMK (Angkor Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea), previously known as Concern-
TPT program); 
9. CREDIT (previously known as World Relief-Cambodia Rural Economic 
Development Initiatives for Transformation (CREDIT). 
 
Annex 17 provides a detailed list with their full legal name, the current acronyms used and 
their previous names or acronyms. 
 
Note that in this section the information on ACLEDA has been restricted only to the portfolio 
of microbusiness loans (to both individuals and groups) and small loans to individuals.  As 
was detailed starting in page 153, microbusiness loans have a maximum loan ceiling of USD 
1,500 for individuals and USD 375 for group clients, while small business loans have a 
maximum loan ceiling of USD 10,000.  For the purposes of estimating the supply of rural 
finance, the balance of ACLEDA will be only recorded for the loan portfolio equivalent to 
“microbusiness” and “small loans.”  This is consistent with the maximum loan ceiling of the 
other main MFIs.  The loan ceiling for the largest loan in Hattha Kaksekar, PRASAC, and 
CREDIT is also USD10,000 while for AMRET, TPC, CEB and VisionFund is USD 5,000.  
AMK seems to serve a lower market segment, with a maximum loan ceiling of USD 500.   
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Thus, for the purposes of estimating the supply of rural finance, and applying only the loan 
portfolio equivalent to “microloans” and “small loans” for the case of ACLEDA, the top nine 
players serve 94 percent of the clients and capture 93 percent of all outstanding loans in the 
market.  Details are shown in Table V-6 below. 
 
Table V-6: Major Operators in Rural Microfinance (as of May 2007) 
NAME 
  LOAN OUTSTANDING DEPOSIT BALANCES 


















ACLEDA Bank - Micro + 
Small Portfolio CB 384,547.10 $94.32 45% 159,659 24% $591       
PRASAC (ex-PCA) L 100,462.13 $24.64 12% 86,682 13% $284 789.28 $0.19 3,081 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) L 95,472.90 $23.42 11% 160,767 24% $146 2,551.46 $0.63 131 
CEB L 58,963.27 $14.46 7% 17,014 3% $850 2,668.04 $0.65 13,767 
TPC L 36,940.55 $9.06 4% 62,806 9% $144 518.52 $0.13 40,845 
VISION FUND L 32,233.63 $7.91 4% 42,285 6% $187 330.10 $0.08 9 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR L 30,012.42 $7.36 4% 13,445 2% $548 1,328.78 $0.33 15,984 
AMK L 28,343.15 $6.95 3% 82,764 12% $84 268.14 $0.07 7,149 
CREDIT L 26,781.00 $6.57 3% 12,683 2% $518 4,457.00 $1.09 13,056 
Total Main MFOs   793,756.15 $194.69 93% 638,105 94%   12,911.32 $3.17 94,022 
Remaining (9) Licensed MFIs3 L 36,437.15 $8.94 0% 18,401 3%   2,003.88 $0.49 9,490 
Other (25) registered NGOs R 20,857.08 $5.12 2% 22,794 3%   2,598.11 $0.64 39,661 
Total Other Microfinance 
Operators 57,294.23 $14.05 7% 41,195 6%   4,601.99 $1.13 49,151 
TOTAL Regulated Microfinance 
Operators (reported NBC) 466,503.28 $11.68   35,477     17,513.31 $4.30 143,173 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators (reported 
NBC + ACLEDA) 
851,050.38 $208.74   679,300        
Compiled from data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
1  LS = Legal Status: Commercial Bank (CB), L (Licensed MFI), R (Registered Microfinance Operator).  
2 1 USD = KHR 4,077 (as of May 2007). 
3  Remaining 9 licensed MFIs = TFMF, Seilanithih, FUDF, CBIRD, MAXIMA, IPRR, CHC, PAS and EAP. 
 
 
Table V-6 ranks providers by the size of the loan outstanding.  When the ranking is 
performed in terms of loan clients served the order changes to the following: AMRET; 
ACLEDA; PRASAC; AMK; TPC; Vision Fund; CEB; Hattha Kaksekar and CREDIT. 
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 Please note that there is no current sector-wide information available on the quality of the 
portfolio of the operators in rural finance; the NBC has not reported on non-performing loans 
on either licensed MFIs or other registered microfinance operators.   
 
Additionally, the figure of the deposit balances may include the amounts of voluntary and 
mandatory savings and further disaggregation of deposits between mandatory and voluntary 
savings is not available for all the existing operators.201  Further, deposit information has not 
been collected from ACLEDA, because although it is possible to identify voluntary deposits 
in ACLEDA, it is not possible to identify how many of these are small scale savers.202  
 
As the summary shows, the main nine microfinance operators dominate the market, holding 
93 percent of all outstanding loans and serving 94 percent of the total borrowers.  However, 
the three largest operators capture about 68 percent of all outstanding loans and serve around 
60 percent of the market’s clients.  (It should be noted that these figures are only a rough 
estimate of the size of the market since a particular borrower might be a client of more than 
one institution.)  ACLEDA Bank is the market leader, holding 45 percent of the total 
microfinance sector market share in terms of loans outstanding.   
 
Table V-6 also highlights that, microfinance operators to date have not been particularly 
successful in mobilizing deposits and that the savings needs of rural populations are largely 
underserved.  In fact, given the lack of savings options for the rural sector the microfinance 
sector in Cambodia can be more accurately described as a microcredit sector.  The lack of 
confidence of the public in urban and rural areas in financial institutions is often mentioned 
as one of the main factors as well as the high costs of serving rural populations.  Even though 
the difficulties in mobilizing deposits within Cambodia are not restricted to rural areas and 
                                                 
201 Torres (2004) provided an incomplete summary of voluntary and compulsory deposits for specialized banks, 
MFIs and registered microfinance operators as of September 2003.  The report is incomplete because 
information was not available for all microfinance operators.  In addition, deposit balances did not match the 
reported figures of the “Network Information” compiled at the time EMT (currently AMRET) for EMT, 
Seilanithih, PRASAC, Maxima and ADDKN.  In the case of PRASAC, deposits were nil in the “Network 
Information report” and Riel 24.84 million of voluntary savings according to the (incomplete) NBC report 
(2004:40). 
202 As of December 2006 ACLEDA had 141, 368 depositors.  In deposit terms, 70 percent of the USD 123, 
149,783 of deposits from customers belonged to individuals and 30 percent to enterprises and their savings can 
be held in current accounts, savings accounts, fixed deposits and margin deposits (i.e. the aggregate balance of 
required non-interest bearing cash deposits from customers for letters of credit and guarantees outstanding at 
year-end).  However, it cannot be inferred that the deposit balance in individual accounts are “microsavers” or 
that their savings are small scale savings.  Also note that of these four types of deposits, only savings accounts 
and fixed deposits bear interest. 
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 few savings are kept within the formal sector, the costs of deposit mobilization in rural areas 
and from the poor segments of the population cannot be understated.   
 
What is noteworthy is that, despite the great difference in outstanding portfolio held by 
ACLEDA Bank versus AMRET, the difference is not so great when it comes to the number 
of borrowers they serve.  This is because of the difference in the average loan size a borrower 
holds from each of these institutions.  The loan size is often used as a proxy for the level of 
wealth of the borrower; this is based on the assumption that only the poor will be interested in 
a small loan.  Thus if the average loan size is small, that would imply that a larger percentage 
of the MFIs’ clients are poor.  In the Cambodian case, table V-6 shows that the average size 
of an ACLEDA Bank loan is USD 591 while the average size of an AMRET loan is USD 
146.  These figures seem to indicate that ACLEDA Bank targets (or reaches) wealthier 
individuals than does AMRET.  A review of the range of loan sizes of each institution 
confirms this impression:  while ACLEDA Bank‘s maximum loan sizes range between KHR 
1,500,000 (USD 375) for group loans and USD 1,500 for individual loans in the most modest 
of its lending products (and up to USD 10,000 for small business loans; see previous section 
on ACLEDA Bank), AMRET’s maximum group loan size cannot exceed KHR 600,000 
(USD 150).  AMRET’s individual loans -which require physical collateral- have maximum 
loan sizes of USD 5,000 but terms up to 24 months.203  While it is difficult to compare 
heterogeneous institutions (some concentrating on group loan products and others offering 
different types of products aimed at diverse types of clients) it is fair to tentatively say that 
the microfinance operators that target (or reach) wealthier clients are CEB, ACLEDA Bank, 
Hattha Kaksekar and CREDIT.  Following the same logic, microfinance operators that tend 
to target (or reach) poorer populations are AMK, TPC, AMRET and VisionFund and, to a 
lesser extent, PRASAC.  (Note that both lists follow the order of their respective average loan 
sizes.)  Although the size of the loan alone does not provide all the information needed to 
categorize the clientele, much less give an indication of how effective and sustainable is a 
microfinance operator, it allows for some gross estimations of the objectives and goals of 
these institutions.   
 
In 2002, Kim Vada, the Deputy Director Bank Supervision Department of the NBC, stated 
that some MFIs were gradually moving up market and getting into individual loans that may 
                                                 
203 Neither ACLEDA nor AMRET have minimum loan sizes.  AMRET’s loan ceiling for the first cycle of group 
loans is Riel 100,000. 
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 amount to as much as USD 10,000 (2002:3).  This impression has been corroborated by the 
Cambodia Performance trends analysis (2003 to 2007) which shows outstanding loan 
balances more than doubling since 2003, with portfolio growth more rapid than growth in 
borrowers and many MFIs targeting higher income market segments.  In fact, according to 
the report, the microfinance sector in Cambodia appears to be splitting into two groups: those 
MFIs maintaining a focus on small-balance loans and outreach, and other MFIs working with 
a mixed product offering of micro- and SME-loans (MIX, 2007:2).  Figure V-1 below shows 
the increasing differences between these two groups.204 
 
Figure V-1: Market Split between SME and Microloans 
 
Source: MIX (2007:2) based on MIX Market Data 2003-2006, unadjusted 
 
In order to further refine this analysis, Table V-7 below compares the main microfinance 
operators’ mission, target group and methodology of these top nine microfinance operators in 
2003 and in 2007.  The definitions of the mission statement and the target group are an 
indication of the professionalism of the management and governance structure of an 
institution: a better definition evidences a more professional (senior) management and board 
of directors.  The information regarding the professionalism of MFIs is important:  
unfortunately, there is a long history of organizations with very good intentions but very 
limited technical knowledge that can actually harm the poor either in the short term (by 
further indebting individuals that can literally not afford it) and or in the long term (by 
subsidizing interest rates and distorting the market, thereby reducing the chances that other 
                                                 
204 The MFIs used in the MIX Market study were: ACLEDA, AMK, AMRET, CEB, CHC-Limited, CREDIT, 
HKL, IPR, Maxima, PRASAC, Seilanithih, TPC and VFC. 
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 more sustainable MFIs will start programs in the area).  Also, a more professional 
management and board may also provide an (albeit imperfect) indication of the likelihood of 
the operator’s success and survival in the long term.  Because of the many variations among 
the microfinance operators in terms of their credit delivery methodologies, this last column 
only differentiates between individual and group loans.  Finally, in 2007 a line has been 
added specifying the denomination of loan products because, given Cambodia’s dollarized 
economy, loans denominated in USD are more likely to correspond to larger loan sizes than 
those loans provided in KHR or THB. 
 
 
Table V-7: Comparison - Mission, Target Group and Loan Products of Main MFIs 
(ordered by decreasing order of portfolio size as of 2007) 
 2003 2007 
ACLEDA 




+ small loans 
portfolio] 
Mission: “To be the best quality service and 
the most trusted bank in Cambodia with 
financial strength, sustainable profits, 
progressive growth and the best governance.” 
Group reached: Microentrepreneurs. 
Loan products: Group and individual loans 
(mostly individual)  [Microbusiness and small 
loans represented about 74 % of the total 
portfolio)] 
 
Mission: “To provide micro, small and medium 
entrepreneurs with the wherewithal to manage 
their financial resources efficiently and by doing 
so to improve the quality of their lives” 
Group reached: Microentrepreneurs. 
Loan products: Group and individual loans 
(mostly individual) [Microbusiness and small 
loans represented about 53% of the total 
portfolio]. 
Maximum loan sizes (and denominations): 
Small Loans: USD 10,000 (KHR, THB, USD) 
Microloans: Individual loans: USD 1,500 (KHR,
THB, USD); Group loans: USD 375 (KHR, THB).
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR and THB: Maximum 3%, minimum 2.75% 




Mission: To create sustainable access to 
financial services for rural communities and 
microenterprises. 
Target group: rural communities and 
microentrepreneurs.  
Loan products: Group loans (54% of portfolio) 
and individual loans  (46% of portfolio) 
Mission: To contribute to sustainable rural 
economic development in order to improve the 
living standards of the rural people through 
creation of sustainable access to financial 
services for rural communities and micro-
enterprises. 
Target group: rural communities for group 
loans and microentrepreneurs and small 
enterprises for individual loans. 
Loan products: Individual loans (89% of 
portfolio) and group loans (11% of portfolio). 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (53% of 
loan portfolio) and USD (47% of portfolio). 
Maximum loan sizes (max. terms): 
Individual loans: USD 10,000 (24 months) 
Group loans: USD 125 (12 months). 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR: Maximum 3.5%, minimum 3%. 
USD: Maximum 3%, minimum 2%. 
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  2003 2007 
AMRET   
(ex-EMT) 
Mission: To provide financial services that are 
suitable for the needs of most of the rural 
population while ensuring EMT's long term 
sustainability.   
Target group: Rural populations. 
Loan products: : Group loans (94% of 
portfolio) and individual loans (6% of portfolio) 
Mission: To provide financial services that are 
suitable for the needs of most of the rural 
population while ensuring AMRET's long term 
sustainability.  
Target group: Rural populations. 
Loan products: Group loans (70% of portfolio) 
and individual loans (30% of portfolio). 
Denomination of loan products: KRH and 
USD (“mostly in KHR”). 
Maximum loan sizes (max. term): 
Individual loans: USD 5,000 (24 months) 
Group loans: USD 150 (12 months). 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR: Maximum 3.5%, minimum 2.5% (Phnom Penh)







Mission: To empower entrepreneurial poor 
women in urban and rural areas to develop 
income-generating activities and 
microenterprises through access to 
microfinance services, including credit and 
savings at reasonable rates. 
Target group: Entrepreneurial poor women in 
urban and rural areas.  
Loan products: Individual loans (a greater 
percentage of the portfolio; more often in USD 
than in KHR), Group loans (a smaller 
percentage of the total portfolio) 
Mission: To empower entrepreneurial poor, 
especially women, in urban and rural areas to 
develop income-generating activities and 
microenterprises through access to 
microfinancing services, including credit and 
savings at reasonable rates. 
Target group: Entrepreneurial poor in urban 
and rural areas (particularly women). 
Loan products: Individual loans (99.8% of the 
portfolio) and group loans (1.2% of the total 
portfolio). 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (8% of 
loan portfolio) and USD (92% of portfolio). 
Maximum loan sizes: 
Individual loans: USD 5,000 
Group loans: USD 500. 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR: Maximum 3.5%, minimum 3% 








Mission: TPC is a microfinance institution with 
a social vision and a business orientation that 
provides poor rural women with the economic 
opportunities to transform the quality of their 
lives and their communities through the 
provision of effective and sustainable client 
empowering financial services. 
Target Group: Poor rural women. 
Loan products: Group loans only 
Mission: TPC is a microfinance institution with 
a social vision and a business orientation that 
provides poor rural women with the economic 
opportunities to transform the quality of their 
lives and their communities through the 
provision of effective and sustainable client 
empowering financial services. 
Target Group: Poor rural women. 
Loan products: Group loans (91% of portfolio) 
and individual loans  (9% of portfolio) 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (79% of 
loan portfolio), THB (20% of portfolio) and USD 
(<1% of portfolio).  
Maximum loan sizes (max. terms): 
Individual loans: USD 5,000 (12 months) 
Group loans: USD 750 (12 months) 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR and THB:  3% 
USD: Maximum 2.5%, minimum 2%. 
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  2003 2007 
VisionFund 
Cambodia 







Mission: To transform poor 
microentrepreneurs’ lives, build community and 
promote economic justice through affordable, 
accessible and sustainable microfinance 
services. 
Target Group: Poorest microentrepreneurs in 
the villages where World Vision has areas of 
operation. 
Loan products: Group loans (only): Most of 
the loans were from “village banks” but new 
“solidarity” loans were being introduced for the 
clients who graduate from the village bank 
loans. 
Mission: VisionFund Cambodia is a Christian 
company that provides financial services to 
help the poor liberate themselves from poverty 
Target Group: Entrepreneurial poor 
Loan products: Group loans (92% of portfolio; 
of those about half belong to “solidarity groups” 
and half to “community banks”)) and individual 
loans (8% of the total portfolio). 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (58% of 
loan portfolio) and USD (42% of portfolio). 
Maximum loan sizes(max. term): 
Individual loans: USD 5,000 (24 months) 
Group loans: USD 1,000 (18 months). 
Monthly interest rates:  
KHR: Maximum 3.5%, minimum 3% 
USD: Maximum 3.5%, minimum 2%. 
Hattha 
Kaksekar  
Mission: To promote income in agricultural, 
business and manufacturing enterprises within 
rural areas of Cambodia by curtailing the high 
interest rates on loans found in rural areas and 
supporting savings; and specifically targeting 
women and poor families in order to help them 
achieve a higher income.  We intend to fulfill 
our mission through cost-efficient credit and 
savings methodologies, sound customer 
service and profitability to ensure growth and 
sustainability. 
Target group: Microentrepreneurs (preference 
for women microentrepreneurs) in urban and 
rural areas. 
Loan products Individual loans (nearly100%: 
as Hattha no longer provided group loans). 
 
Mission:  To improve income in agricultural, 
commercial and manufacturing enterprises in 
rural areas of Cambodia by providing loans at 
reasonable interest rates and encouraging 
savings and specifically targeting women and 
poor families in order to help them achieve a 
higher income.  
Target group: Microentrepreneurs (preference 
for women microentrepreneurs) in urban and 
rural areas. 
Loan products: Group loans (0.2% of portfolio) 
and individual loans (99.8% of portfolio). 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (5% of 
loan portfolio), THB (6% of portfolio) and USD 
(89% of portfolio). 
Maximum loan sizes (max. term): 
Individual loans: USD 10,000 (24 months) 
Group loans: USD 400 (12 months). 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR and THB: Maximum 3.5%, minimum 3% 





Mission: To help large numbers of poor people 
in rural Cambodia to increase their livelihood 
options through the sustainable delivery of 
appropriate and viable microfinance services to 
the economically active poor. 
Target Group: The economically active poor. 
Loan products: : Group loans (only)   
Mission: To help large numbers of poor people 
in rural Cambodia to increase their livelihood 
options through the sustainable delivery of 
appropriate and viable microfinance services to 
the economically active poor. 
Target Group: The economically active poor. 
Loan products: Group loans (84% of portfolio) 
and individual loans (16% of portfolio). 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (75% of 
loan portfolio), THB (24% of portfolio) and USD 
(<1% of portfolio). 
Maximum loan sizes (max. term): 
Individual loans: USD 500 (18 months) 
Group loans: USD 150 (24 months). 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR and THB: Maximum 3%, minimum 2.5%. 
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Mission: Micro-entrepreneurs and farmers will 
have access to a full range of financial services 
at an affordable rate.  
Target: Microentrepreneurs and farmers both 
urban and rural (Customers are defined as 
“poor Cambodian women and their families, 
especially the unemployed and households 
with irregular income, both urban and rural”). 
Loan products: Group loans (80% of portfolio; 
of those 60% belong to “solidarity groups” and 
20% to “community banks”)) and individual 
loans (20% of the total portfolio). 
 
Mission: To provide inclusive financial services 
tailored to the clients' needs through excellent 
service, and positive relationships while 
maintaining organizational sustainability.  
Target:  Cambodia's poor entrepreneurs. 
Loan products: Individual loans (95% of 
portfolio) and group loans (5% of the total 
portfolio)205 
Denomination of loan products: KRH (29% of 
loan portfolio) and USD (71% of portfolio). 
Maximum loan sizes: 
Individual loans: USD 10,000 
Group loans: USD 500. 
Monthly interest rates: 
KHR: Maximum 3.2%, minimum 2.5% 
USD: Maximum 3%, minimum 2%. 
Compiled by author.  Sources: Documentation, annual reports, brochures and personal communications 
 
The summary table (Table V-7) shows that most of the top nine players have well-focused 
mission statements and clearly defined target groups.  The information provided above is also 
rather consistent with the deductions explored earlier regarding loan sizes.   
 
Those microfinance operators with bigger average loan sizes tend to have an emphasis on 
individual loans, while those that have smaller loan sizes tend to have an emphasis on group 
loans.  Not coincidentally, the microfinance operators that target (or reach) entrepreneurs or 
microentrepreneurs tend to focus methodologically on individual loans and, given the 
Cambodian dollarized economy, provide their loans mostly in US dollars rather than in KHR.  
On the other hand, while group loans tend to be associated with reaching rural households 
rather than microenterprises per se (e.g. defining the target group as rural populations, poor 
rural women or the economically active poor), it is important to note that this is a false 
dichotomy: rural households often run micro-enterprises, in the form of farm and / or non-
farm activities.  It is the scale of the enterprise and the existence of physical collateral that 
highlights the distinction: the bigger the microenterprise and the assets of the household, the 
more likely it is that the borrower will require larger loan sizes and thus, and will also require 
individual loans denominated in US dollars rather than in KHR.  Microfinance and rural 
finance providers concentrate on the needs of both households and microenterprises or 
microentrepreneurs.  However, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have been included 
only as part of the background on the Cambodian financial sector.  Within the Cambodian 
                                                 
205 The figure quoted in the Financial Statement is the opposite (95 percent group and 5 percent individual).  
This is a mistake confirmed by personal communication with CREDIT’s Finance Manager (Mr. Vibol HIM). 
172 
 173 
context, the average farmer is a subsistence farmer while the middle range farmer (who is 
likely to require agricultural machinery or capital-intensive inputs) is grouped under SMEs.  
Thus, the average farmer is covered by this rural finance review and the medium range 
farmer is not. 
 
Interestingly, only three institutions had the same mission statement in 2003 and in 2007:  
AMRET, TPC and AMK and these three are precisely the main institutions identified in 
previous pages (see Figure V-1: Market Split between SME and Microloans) as the ones that 
tend to target (or reach) poorer population based on the analysis of their loan size. 
 
Having seen why the main microfinance providers are operating (their mission), who they 
target and how these clients are targeted or reached, the next relevant question is where they 
operate.  Most microfinance providers are concentrated in the three economic centers of 
Cambodia:  
(i) Phnom Penh and surrounding provinces (particularly Kandal),  
(ii) the Sihanoukville area, and  
(iii) the Tonle Sap lake area (particularly Battambang and Siem Reap).   
 
Please refer to Annex 18 for a table of the provinces, districts, communes and villages 
covered by the top nine microfinance operators (as of June 2007). 
 
An analysis of the geographic coverage of the top nine microfinance operators shows that the 
north (Oddar Mean Chey and Preah Vihear), northeast (Kracheh, Mondolkiri, Ratanakiri and 
Stung Treng), and the province of Koh Kong remain underserved.  Figure V-2 in the 
following page shows the map of Cambodia and highlights the geographic concentration of 











 A review of the poverty maps developed by MOP/WFP in 2002 identifying the specific 
communes in rural areas with higher poverty concentrations (Annex 18) shows that all the 
provinces with a high incidence of poverty are served by three or more of the main microfinance 
operators except the province of Oddar Meanchey and the municipality of Krong Kep.206  
However, this comparison does not allow for matching the specific distribution by district or by 
commune. 
 
The concentration of microfinance providers in the south and central provinces of Cambodia and 
in villages with easy access to provincial towns has often been linked with poor security and 
poor infrastructure in other areas of the country (Uniconsult, 1999).  Indeed, the main reason for 
the limited operators in the provinces in the north, northeast and Koh Kong seems to lie in the 
higher costs of operating there (poor infrastructure, high costs of communications, high security 
risks, etc.).  However, Torres (2004) identified an additional cost component that could further 
explain why these provinces have been underserved: low population densities.  The review of the 
population densities (according to the Population Census of 1998) reveal that most of the areas 
underserved by microfinance operators match exactly those areas with lower population 
densities.  Concretely, sorting all the provinces of Cambodia by population density in ascending 
order it becomes evident that the seven least populated provinces (i.e. those with population 
densities below 25 inhabitants per Km2) are precisely the ones that are more underserved by the 
main microfinance operators (2004: 23).207  Please see Annex 19 for the list of all the provinces 
and their corresponding population densities in ascending order.  However, as is the case with 
the poverty maps, this population density ranking does not allow for matching the specific 
distribution by district or by commune.  
 
                                                 
206 The provinces with the highest incidence of poverty are: Oddar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, 
Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, and Krong Kep.  The 2004 CSES provided an update of 
provincial poverty rates is highest in Kampong Speu (57%), Kampong Thom and Siem Riep (52% each), followed 
by Kampong Cham, Prey Veng Banteay Meanchey (37% each); Svay Rieng (36%); Battambang (34%); Kampot 
(30%) and Takeo (28%).  On the other hand, the lowest poverty incidence is in Phnom Penh (5%), Kandal (22%) 
and Kampong Som/Kep/Kok Kong (23%) (RGC, 2006: 55-56).  Note that information is not directly comparable 
since Kampong Chhnang / Pursat are combined in the 2004 CSES sample to produce a poverty rate of 40% and 
Kratie, Mondolkiri, Preah Vihear, Ratanakiry, Stung Treng, Oddar Mean Chey and Pailin are also combined within 
the sample to produce a poverty headcount of 46%. 
207 The exceptions are the three cities/municipalities of Krong Pailin, Krong Kep and Krong Preah Sihanouk, which 
have higher population densities but are also underserved by microfinance operators (two or less than two operators 
in each).  
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 However, from 2003 to 2007 there has been a great expansion in terms if geographical coverage, 
but it has not been uniform among different operators.  Expansion can happen inside current 
provinces of operations or can happen in new provinces.  Table V-8 shows the changes in 
provincial coverage between 2003 and 2007, highlighting these differences:  AMK, ACLEDA, 
PRASAC, AMRET and CEB have undergone the most dramatic provincial expansion, followed 
by Hattha Kaksekar, while Vision Fund expanded at a slower rate, TPC remained stationary, and 
CREDIT actually reduced one area of operations (Takeo province). 
 
Table V-8: Changes in Provincial Coverage from 2003 to 2007 
(ordered by decreasing coverage as of June 2007) 
 2003 2007 
ACLEDA Bank 14 All 24 provinces 
AMK  3 15 
PRASAC 6 13 
AMRET 6 13 
CEB  5 11 
TPC 9 9 
VisionFund  7 8 
Hattha Kaksekar 4 8 
CREDIT 7 6 





In addition to credit and (to a much lesser extent) savings services, there is a health insurance 
scheme called “SKY”, a Khmer acronym of "Sokapheap Krousat Yeugn" or “Health for Our 
Families.”  The scheme was launched in 1998 by GRET (the French NGO that set up the 
microfinance project that eventually became AMRET) as an experimental rural health insurance 
program.  The key objectives of SKY Health Insurance are: (1) secure the incomes of 
Cambodian households by limiting the economic consequences of large health expenditures 
(illness, accidents) and (2) facilitate and encourage these households' access to appropriate 
quality health care.  In 2000, the SKY project received CGAP’s PRO-Poor Innovation Award 
that acknowledges innovations in financial services for the poorest populations. 
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 The evolution of the project can be divided in the experimentation process from 1997 to 2001, 
the second phase from 2002 to 2005, and the consolidation phase from mid-2005 onwards.  The 
project started in Kandal province in 1998, extending to Takeo in 2001, to Phnom Penh in the 
end of 2005 and to Kampong Thom and the beginning of 2007.  As of December 2006, the 
project insured 1,780 households (or 8,826 persons) charging a premium per year per capita of 
USD 4.54.  The payment of the premium is on a monthly basis and it is based on family size 
(average family size in their areas of operation; 5.01) and registration is open throughout the 
year.  The health insurance is a private scheme that follows a community based and voluntary 
membership's approach.  The scheme requires that all family members are insured and covers 
both primary health care and hospital care (with a mandatory referral mechanism).  While SKY 
works in partnership with public health facilities and with the Ministry of Health and health 
authorities at the provincial level, it is private and independent from health authorities or health 
providers.   
 
The scheme is currently supported by AFD, GTZ and ILO under Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Cambodian Ministry of Health.  The main challenge of the non-profit SKY for the 
coming years is to continue geographical expansion and to reach financial viability.  In 2008, 
SKY plans to expand to the whole Takeo, Kampot and Siem Reap provinces and diversity its 
targeted population to include other groups such as garment workers or students.208 
 
 
                                                 
208 The main design features of the SKY have been identified as: follows a community based and voluntary 
membership approach; covers the whole members of the family (family membership required); has a clear social 
mission and must be affordable for all rural households including large and poor families; follows a pragmatic 
membership’s approach, taking into account rural households situation and enabling them to join the scheme easily; 
incites to stable / long term memberships (waiting periods, dropouts penalties, …) in order to limit anti-selection and 
enhance outreach of coverage for households; is designed in consultation with the direct beneficiaries in the villages; 
covers both primary health care and hospital care with mandatory referral mechanism; works in partnership with 
public health facilities through capitation payment mechanism and close monitoring (to enhance quality assurance 
and costs containment); is transparent / health insurance scheme's financial statements are shown in villages Health 
Insurance Consultative Committee (including elected insured representatives); works in partnership with Health 
authorities (MoH central and provincial level) to fit into national health policy and guidelines (GRET, 2007b:6-7). 
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 Evolution of Microfinance in Cambodia from 2000 to 2006  
 
Cambodia has been one of the most rapidly developing microfinance sectors in the world over 
the past few years.   
 
The Cambodian Performance Trend 2003-2007 report compared Cambodia to other countries 
around the globe at similar stages of development: Bolivia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The three 
are small countries with dense, competitive microfinance sectors and Bosnia further shares with 
Cambodia a history as post-conflict countries that benefited from substantial donor support at the 
early stages of the sector, have similar legal frameworks for microfinance and have seen rapid 
growth and increasing commercialization over time.  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia also 
exhibit a growing split between microfinance and SME providers.  Bolivia has the largest 
number of MFIs, while Bosnia and Cambodia have a similar number.  The comparison shows 
that Cambodian MFIs reach a slightly higher portion of the population: they are ahead of Bolivia 
in total outreach but lag behind Bosnia (which has a much smaller low-income population 
overall).  Yield levels are the highest in Cambodia (but have also seen the most rapid decrease, 
corresponding with the increase in loan balances).  Financial expenses are similar (set at 4 – 6 
percent), and they have been increasing as local and commercial financing replaces donor funds.  
Bolivia is by far the most leveraged (although many institutions can mobilize savings) and loan 
balances are the lowest in Cambodia, both in absolute and relative terms (MIX, 2007:4).  See 
Annex 20 for additional benchmarks for the comparison of microfinance markets among these 
three countries. 
 
A seven-year comparison of the market between the years 2000 and 2006 provides some relevant 
information: Tables V-6 to V-10 show the evolution of the microfinance and rural finance 
market for the regulated rural credit providers that report to NBC, plus the micro and small 
portfolio of ACLEDA Bank, at the end of the last seven years. 
 
Tables V-9 to V-11 show that while the size of the total loan outstanding portfolio of regulated 
rural credit providers increased by 560 percent, the total number of borrowers increased only by 
68 percent and the average loan size increased from USD 75 to USD 284.  In terms of the top-
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 nine market leaders, the same tables show that the size of the total loan outstanding portfolio of 
the top-nine credit providers increased by 581 percent while the total number of borrowers 
increased only by 137 percent and that the average loan size increased from USD 103 to USD 
284.  These figures suggest that microentrepreneurs (and small enterprises) have benefited more 
than rural households from the increase in loans available to rural areas.   
 
Table V-9: Evolution of Loan Portfolio Outstanding (as of 31 December each year) 
 LOAN OUTSTANDING – AMOUNTS (Million Riels) Variation 
2000-06  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA Bank 60,317.90  75,790.29  90,471.18  119,847.56 176,826.86 248,840.22  343,444.09 469% 
PRASAC (ex-PCA) 13,026.65 13,600.00 25,241.00 26,546.00 33,992.50 45,844.43* 89,416.25 586% 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) 10,724.66 12,500.00 16,446.20 22,237.22 31,245.76 46,504.64 71,166.90 564% 
CEB (ex-CCB) 2,022.91 2,800.00 5,582.00 7,702.09 14,925.92 25,859.94 50,059.12 2375% 
TPC (ex-CRS-TPC) 5,121.04 3,000.00 4,092.00 8,736.97 14,228.57 18,201.62 29,185.90 470% 
VISION FUND (ex-World Vision) 2,171.92 2,171.92 1,095.00 2,040.00 6,299.52 14,169.00 24,321.82 1020% 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR 4,484.07 5,900.00 5,566.75 5,660.10 9,553.23 15,095.68 24,142.23 438% 
AMK (ex-CONCERN TPT) 836.65 1,900.00 2,436.00 3,272.00 4,850.56 10,174.86 21,407.78 2459% 
CREDIT (ex-World Relief - Credit) -  2,750.00 2,504.00 3,274.00 6,383.00 10,631.00 18,747.00 582% 
Total top Microfinan Operators 98,705.80 120,412.21 153,434.13 199,315.94 298,305.92 435,321.39 671,891.09 581% 
Other Licensed MFIs (At the 
moment of analysis)**     171.76 218.70 4,704.99 18,091.12 28,622.91   
Other registered NGOs/operators 9,965.23 10,928.25 9,384.32 11,060.37 8,990.74 9,544.75 16,952.04   
Total Other Microfinance 
Operators 9,965.23 10,928.25 9,556.08 11,279.07 13,695.73 27,635.87 45,574.95 357% 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators (MFIs 
reporting NBC + ACLEDA) 
[exc.RDB, Peng Heng, CAISB]*** 
108,671.03 131,340.46 162,990.21 210,595.01 312,001.65 462,957.26 717,466.04 560% 
Compiled by author from data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
*The PRASAC figure in 2005 (45,844) has been corrected from 33,992 originally reported in the in NBC data. 
**Other licensed MFIs refers to the remaining 9 licensed MFIs (TFMF, Seilanithih, FUDF, CBIRD, MAXIMA, IPRR, 
CHC, PAS, EAP) and refers to their status at the moment of the analysis. 
***Grand TOTAL Regulated Microfinance Operators (reporting to NBC) excludes the specialized banks (Peng Heng, 





 Table V-10: Evolution of Number of Borrowers (as of 31 December each year) 
 NUMBER Of BORROWERS Variation 
2000-06  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA Bank 60,706  81,269 82,311 97,779 118,877 135,215  151,578 150% 
PRASAC (ex-PCA) 34,882  36,431 63,113 58,147 73,002 82,545* 94,264 170% 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) 73,352  85,497 84,781 92,223 105,284 121,699  141,957 94% 
CEB (ex-CCB) 5,250  7,265 6,014 7,063 8,493 11,119  15,112 188% 
TPC (ex-CRS-TPC) 31,589  31,589 22,148 31,668 37,674 43,196  55,870 77% 
VISION FUND (ex-World Vision) 17,303  17,303 8,863 12,577 20,189 25,347  35,289 104% 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR 5,794  8,922 6,648 5,372 6,620 8,475  11,490 98% 
AMK (ex-CONCERN TPT) 17,303  17,303 10,929 16,061 20,502 36,266  67,586 291% 
CREDIT (ex-World Relief - Credit)    n/a 7,532 8,097 10,922 11,481  10,834 44% 
Total top Microfinan Operators 246,179  285,579 292,339 328,987 401,563 475,343  583,980 137% 
Other Licensed MFIs**     497 611 11,765 16,459  17,726   
Other registered NGOs/operators 124,298  128,823 34,434 32,707 26,998 20,918  20,881   
Total Other Microfinan Operat. 124,298.00 128,823.00 34,931.00 33,318.00 38,763.00 37,377.00 38,607.00 -69% 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators *** 370,477.00 414,402.00 327,270.00 362,305.00 440,326.00 512,720.00 622,587.00 68% 
Compiled by author from data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
*The PRASAC figure in 2005 (82,545) has been corrected from 73,002 originally reported in the in NBC data. 
 
Table V-11: Evolution of Average Loan Sizes (as of 31 December each year) 
 AVERAGE LOAN SIZE (US Dollar) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA Bank $255 $239 $280 $308 $369 $448 $558 
PRASAC (ex-PCA) $96 $96 $102 $115 $116 $135 $234 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) $37 $37 $49 $61 $74 $93 $124 
CEB (ex-CCB) $99 $99 $236 $274 $436 $566 $817 
TPC (ex-CRS-TPC) $42 $24 $47 $69 $94 $102 $129 
VISION FUND (ex-World Vision) $32 $32 $31 $41 $77 $136 $170 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR $198 $170 $213 $265 $358 $433 $518 
AMK (ex-CONCERN TPT) $12 $28 $57 $51 $59 $68 $78 
CREDIT (ex-World Relief - Credit) n/a n/a $85 $102 $145 $225 $427 
Total top Microfinan Operators $103  $108 $134 $152 $184  $223 $284 
Other Licensed MFIs* n/a n/a $88 $90 $99  $267 $398 
Other registered NGOs/operators $21  $22 $69 $85 $83  $111 $200 
Total Other Microfinan Operat. $21  $22 $70 $85 $88  $180 $291 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators ** $75  $81 $127 $146 $176  $220 $284 
* Note: NBC exchange rate at the 
moment of the analysis, 1USD= 3,900 3,900 3,930 3,976 4,027 4,112 4,057 
Compiled by author from data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
For Both Tables:  
*Other licensed MFIs refers to the remaining 9 licensed MFIs (TFMF, Seilanithih, FUDF, CBIRD, MAXIMA, IPRR, CHC, PAS, EAP) 
and refers to their status at the moment of the analysis 
** Grand TOTAL Regulated Microfinance Operators refers to all MFIs and NGOs reporting to the NBC plus the micro and small loan 
outstanding balance of ACLEDA.  The figure does exclude the specialized banks (Peng Heng, CAISB, and RDB), which were only 
reporting to the NBC in 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
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 The analysis of the evolution of loan sizes of the top-nine microfinance operators, further 
confirms the two sub-groups highlighted in the previous section as of May 2007.  The 
microfinance operators identified as the group targeting (or reaching) wealthier clients (i.e. CEB, 
ACLEDA Bank, Hattha Kaksekar and CREDIT) have been at the top of the scale during in the 
last 3 years.  However, CEB, ACLEDA and Hattha Kaksekar have been consistently at the top of 
the scale since 2000 while CREDIT was actually reaching poorer clients in 2002 and 2003 and 
gradually started shifting towards higher loan sizes in 2004.  It is noteworthy that during the last 
3 years, CEB has surpassed ACLEDA on the largest average loan size and that Hattha Kaksekar 
has been at par with ACLEDA.  As was also seen in the previous section, these group of 
operators reaching up-market seem to have focused on individual loans (rather than group loans) 
and in conducting transactions at their premises (rather than in the clients’ villages) in order to 
lower costs and reach acceptable sustainability levels quicker.   
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On the other hand, the microfinance operators that tended to target (or reach) poorer populations 
(AMK, TPC, AMRET and VisionFund and PRASAC) have remained at the lowest segments of 
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 the ranking scale in terms of average loan sizes.  However, AMK, AMRET and TPC seem to 
focus more consistently on maintaining lower loan sizes while PRASAC and to lower extent 
Vision Fund seem to be moving slightly up-market (in relative terms).  Note that changes are 
slow and tenuous, and thus, likely due to the introduction of new individual products rather than 
to a change on policy focus.  
 
Figure V-4 shows the evolution of the average loan size by type of provider.  As expected, the 
top-nine microfinance operators drive the whole market, which has seen a steady increase in the 
average loan size from 2000 to 2006.  What is interesting is the evolution of the other non-top 
providers:  During the last two years, other (non-top-nine) licensed MFIs provided larger loan 
sizes than registered NGOs and, more importantly, above the level of the overall market 
behavior.  This seems to indicate that new entrants into the formal banking system tend to focus 
more on microentrepreneurs and small enterprises, with larger average loan sizes that on smaller 
livelihood loans for rural households.   
 























 Figure V-5 shows the evolution in market share (but excluding ACLEDA micro and small loan 
portfolio) and Table V-12 shows the growth rates for all main operators during the period as well 
as their average rate of growth per year.  The market leader in terms portfolio has always been 
ACLEDA (with 48 to 58 percent of the market share), with PRASAC and AMRET oscillating 
between second and third place.  The most rapidly growing MFI in term of portfolio ranking has 
been CEB (from 2 percent of the market share in 2000 to 7 percent in 2006 and 73 percent of 
average growth per year in the seven years).  AMK and Vision Fund have not changed much in 
the ranking position within the industry but have also grown at an average rate of 76 percent and 
74 percent per year respectively during the period.  CREDIT grew at an average of 52 percent 
per year and the other MFIs grew between 32 to 43 percent on average per year.  The top-nine 
aggregated and the total rural finance providers grew at 38 percent per year on average.   
 
Figure V-5: Evolution of Market Share of Loan Portfolio 






























 Table V-12: Evolution of Growth Rates: Loan Portfolio Outstanding 











2000 to 2006 
Yearly 
Average 
ACLEDA 26% 19% 32% 48% 41% 38% 34% 
PRASAC 4% 86% 5% 28% 35% 95% 42% 
AMRET  17% 32% 35% 41% 49% 53% 38% 
CEB 38% 99% 38% 94% 73% 94% 73% 
TPC -41% 36% 114% 63% 28% 60% 43% 
VISION FUND 0% -50% 86% 209% 125% 72% 74% 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR 32% -6% 2% 69% 58% 60% 36% 
AMK 127% 28% 34% 48% 110% 110% 76% 
CREDIT  -9% 31% 95% 67% 76% 52% 
Total top-nine 22% 27% 30% 50% 46% 54% 38% 
Other MF operators 10% -13% 18% 21% 102% 65% 34% 
Grand TOTAL 21% 24% 29% 48% 48% 55% 38% 
Analysis by author with data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
Figure V-6 shows the evolution of market shares regarding number of borrowers reached and 
Table V-13 provides the growth rates in number of borrowers for all main operators during the 
period.   



























In terms of number of borrowers served the market leaders have been AMRET and ACLEDA, 
with PRASAC always remaining in the 3rd ranked position.  In relative terms, AMK is the fastest 
growing MFI in terms of outreach: from 5 percent of the market in 2000 to 11 percent in 2006 - 
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 becoming the 4th MFI in terms of borrowers and growing at the highest rate per year on average, 
(34 percent).  The top-nine aggregated grew at 16 percent per year on average while the total 
rural finance providers grew at only 10 percent per year on average, with other microfinance 
operators showing a negative average growth rates per annum. 
 
Table V-13: Evolution of Growth Rates: Number of Borrowers 











2000 to 2006 
Yearly 
Average 
ACLEDA 34% 1% 19% 22% 14% 12% 17% 
PRASAC 4% 73% -8% 26% 13% 14% 20% 
AMRET  17% -1% 9% 14% 16% 17% 12% 
CEB 38% -17% 17% 20% 31% 36% 21% 
TPC 0% -30% 43% 19% 15% 29% 13% 
VISION FUND 0% -49% 42% 61% 26% 39% 20% 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR 54% -25% -19% 23% 28% 36% 16% 
AMK 0% -37% 47% 28% 77% 86% 34% 
CREDIT   8% 35% 5% -6% 10% 
Total top-nine 16% 2% 13% 22% 18% 23% 16% 
Other MF operators 4% -73% -5% 16% -4% 3% -10% 
Grand TOTAL 12% -21% 11% 22% 16% 21% 10% 
Analysis by author with data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
Interestingly, many providers show negative growth rates in the periods of 2001 to 2002 and 
2002 to 2003 (even to a higher degree than the negative growth rates in portfolio outstanding).  
This is likely linked to the effect of the NBC’s licensing processes, as most top-nine MFIs 
received their first licenses from the central bank from 2001 to 2003. 
 
Annex 21 shows the ranking positions and market shares for the top-nine performers in terms of 
loan outstanding and number of borrowers. 
 
Tables V-14 and table V-15 further confirm that the Cambodian microfinance sector can be more 
accurately described as a microcredit sector.  ACLEDA is the market leader in deposits.  
However, as it was discussed previously, it is not possible to identify how many of the voluntary 
depositors in ACLEDA are small scale savers.  The remaining microfinance operators have 
struggled throughout the period with investments and disinvestments in savings balances, likely 
the result of launching new products or canceling compulsory savings in order to start voluntary 
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 ones, or simply as the variations in savings linked to loan products (compulsory loan-linked 
savings).  When ACLEDA is excluded in the analysis, the size of the total deposit balances of 
regulated rural credit providers increased by 123 percent but the total number of borrowers 
decreased by 32 percent.  In terms of the top-nine market leaders, the same tables show that the 
size of the total deposit balances increased by 173 percent while the total number of borrowers 
also decreased by 4 percent.   
 
Table V-14: Evolution of Deposit Balance (as of 31 December each year) 
 
 DEPOSIT BALANCE – AMOUNTS (Million Riels) Variation 
2000-06  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA Bank 0.00 7,595.21 22,317.41 52,326.88 127,219.26 254,675.04  498,186.50 6,459% 
PRASAC (ex-PCA) 915.44 915.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 976.67 7% 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) 54.50 200.00 261.64 459.00 724.44 794.49 1,337.71 2,355% 
CEB (ex-CCB) 383.02 293.00 413.00 908.00 730.34 823.78 2,193.29 473% 
TPC (ex-CRS-TPC) 1,553.74 1,100.00 625.00 1,158.00 1,627.66 2,077.58 561.03 -64% 
VISION FUND (ex-World Vision) 41.19 41.19   0.00 24.19 2.49   -100% 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR 199.22 300.00 302.77 248.00 392.34 700.36 1,043.35 424% 
AMK (ex-CONCERN TPT) 0.00 406.00 244.00 0.00 14.11 46.99 172.46 -58% 
CREDIT (ex-World Relief - Credit) - - 472.00 426.00 755.00 1,454.00 2,317.00 391% 
Total top Microfinan Operators 3,147.12 10,850.84 24,635.82 55,525.88 131,487.34 260,574.73 506,788.01 16,003% 
Total top-8 (excluding ACLEDA) 3,147.12 3,255.63 2,318.41 3,199.00 4,268.08 5,899.69 8,601.51 173% 
Other Licensed MFIs*     0.00 0.00 793.37 1,206.62 1,650.78   
Other registered NGOs/operators 2,210.73 2,925.64 1,119.27 4,575.92 877.60 1,128.42 1,702.64   
Total Other Microfinan Operat. 2,210.73 2,925.64 1,119.27 4,575.92 1,670.97 2,335.04 3,353.42 52% 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators ** 5,357.85 13,776.48 25,755.09 60,101.80 133,158.31 262,909.77 510,141.43 9,421% 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators 
(excluding ACLEDA) 
5,357.85 6,181.27 3,437.68 7,774.92 5,939.05 8,234.73 11,954.93 123% 
 Compiled by author from data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
*Other licensed MFIs refers to the remaining 9 licensed MFIs (TFMF, Seilanithih, FUDF, CBIRD, MAXIMA, IPRR, CHC, PAS, EAP) 
and refers to their status at the moment of the analysis 
** Grand TOTAL Regulated Microfinance Operators refers to all MFIs and NGOs reporting to the NBC plus the micro and small loan 
outstanding balance of ACLEDA.  The figure does exclude the specialized banks (Peng Heng, CAISB, and RDB), which were only 





 Table V-15: Evolution of Number of Savers (as of 31 December each year) 
 NUMBER Of SAVERS Variation 
2000-06  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA Bank -   3,836 19,070 35,054 57,091 92,413  141,368 3,585% 
PRASAC (ex-PCA) 43,729 43,729 -   -   0 0 2,937 -93% 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) 41 5,817 45 87 93 102 91 122% 
CEB (ex-CCB) 5,250 5,250 6,014 7,063 8,493 11,119 13,222 152% 
TPC (ex-CRS-TPC) 21,448 21,448 25,382 45,762 64,326 83,906 43,949 105% 
VISION FUND (ex-World Vision) 17,303 786   0 389 63   -100% 
HATTHA KAKSEKAR 6,526 6,526 7,932 7,495 8,131 9,902 14,209 118% 
AMK (ex-CONCERN TPT) 0 8,076 15,840 0 709 2,179 5,110 -37% 
CREDIT (ex-World Relief - Credit) - - 7,532 4,016 10,922 11,481 11,024 46% 
Total top Microfinan Operators 94,297 95,468 81,815 99,477 150,154 211,165 231,910 146% 
Total top-8 (excl. ACLEDA) 94,297 91,632 62,745 64,423 93,063 118,752 90,542 -4% 
Other Licensed MFIs*     0 0 11,097 8,214 8,932   
Other registered NGOs/operators 71,698 56,024 25,305 24,023 18,795 12,429 13,843   
Total Other Microfinan Operat. 71,698 56,024 25,305 24,023 29,892 20,643 22,775 -68% 
Grand TOTAL Regulated 
Microfinance Operators ** 165,995 151,492 107,120 123,500 180,046 231,808 254,685 53% 
Grand TOTAL Regulated MF 
Operators (exc. ACLEDA) 165,995 147,656 88,050 88,446 122,955 139,395 113,317 -32% 
Compiled and produced from data supplied by the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, May 2007  
and from ACLEDA Credit Management Unit, October 2007 (personal communication). 
 
*Other licensed MFIs refers to the remaining 9 licensed MFIs (TFMF, Seilanithih, FUDF, CBIRD, MAXIMA, IPRR, CHC, PAS, EAP) 
and refers to their status at the moment of the analysis 
** Grand TOTAL Regulated Microfinance Operators refers to all MFIs and NGOs reporting to the NBC plus the micro and small loan 
outstanding balance of ACLEDA.  The figure does exclude the specialized banks (Peng Heng, CAISB, and RDB), which were only 
reporting to the NBC in 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
 
Therefore the main three conclusions of the evolution of microfinance market in Cambodia from 
2000 to 2006 are the following: 
 
? Microentrepreneurs (and small enterprises) seem to have benefited more than rural 
households from the increase in loans available to rural areas.  In addition, new entrants into 
the formal banking system tend to focus more on microentrepreneurs and small enterprises 
(with larger average loan sizes that on smaller livelihood loans for rural households). 
? Confirmation of a two sub-groups in microfinance operators.  The MFIs that target (or reach) 
wealthier clients within the microfinance and rural finance market are: CEB, ACLEDA 
Bank, Hattha Kaksekar and CREDIT.  On the other hands, the MFIs that target (or reach) 
poorer populations are mainly AMK, TPC and AMRET, followed by VisionFund and 
PRASAC.   





 Chapter VI  - CONCERN WORLDWIDE AND ANGKOR 
MIKROHERANHVATHO KAMPUCHEA (AMK) 
 
This chapter covers the main features of Concern Worldwide (an international NGO), Concern’s 
operations in Cambodia and its connection to the current microfinance institution: AMK.  The 
section concentrates in describing in depth AMK: its history, objectives and aims, structure, 
areas of operation and methodology.  Finally, the last section of the chapter also provides a 
profile of AMK’s clients and the villages where they live. 
 
 
Concern Worldwide and Concern Worldwide Cambodia  
 
Concern Worldwide is a non-denominational voluntary organization.  Concern Worldwide was 
born in 1968 as a humanitarian response to the famine in Biafra, which resulted from the 
Nigerian civil war.  On March 19, 1968, a group of concerned individuals who called themselves 
"Africa Concern" joined together to launch a 'Send One Ship' Appeal (SOS).209  In 1972 Africa 
Concern began to work in Bangladesh and became simply, Concern.  Later it added the word 
‘worldwide’ to reflect the organization’s increased global presence.   
 
Currently Concern operates in about 28 countries mostly in Africa and Asia and works in both 
emergency and long-term development programs with a focus on five key areas: education; 
emergencies; health; HIV and AIDS and livelihoods.  The organization headquarters are in 
Dublin, Republic of Ireland but it has offices in Belfast, London, Glasgow and an affiliate 
organization in New York (Concern US) (Farmar, 2002 and www.concern.ie). 
 
Concern’s mission is to enable absolutely poor people to achieve major improvements in their 
lifestyles which are sustainable without ongoing support from Concern. To this end, Concern 
works with the poor themselves and with local and international partners who share its vision to 
                                                 
209 The goal of the appeal was to send one ship, loaded with relief supplies, from the people of Ireland to those 
suffering in Biafra.  Donations in cash and kind poured in and within twelve weeks $350,000 had been raised.  Other 
ships loaded with supplies soon followed. 
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 create just and peaceful societies where the poor can exercise their fundamental rights.  Thus, 
Concern bases its work on the principle that development is a process which occurs in people, 
proceeds at their pace and is achieved, not given. The intent is that Concern's overseas projects 
will benefit a range of social groups within the category of the absolute poor. These target groups 
will include people reduced to extreme poverty by exceptional natural or man-induced events, 
poor ethnic groups, poor regions, poor strata of society and other identifiable groups such as 
refugees and displaced people, low-resource farmers and the landless, the urban poor, and 
socially disadvantaged women and children. The highest aspiration of Concern is that its work 
will no longer be necessary.  Most recently, Concern has started a partnership with the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) regarding nutrition and hunger.  Concern 
will celebrate the 40th anniversary of its foundation in 2008. 
 
Concern has been working in Cambodia since 1989 (following some years in the Thai border 
camps).  Initial programs focused on repatriation of refugees from camps in Thailand and 
rehabilitation of rural infrastructure.  In recent years, Concern has moved from directly 
implementing programmes on education, forestry and livelihoods to working exclusively through 
about 17 local partner organizations. 
 
Up to 2003, Concern also facilitated the creation of rice and buffalo banks and offered small 
loans to poor villages as part of its directly implemented programmes.  These savings and loans 
activities were the precursor of AMK: activities started in 1993 but became an independent 
program directly implemented by Concern Worldwide Cambodia (and separated from the 
community development work) by 1999.  The program worked in three provinces identified as 
poorest in Cambodia at the time: Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat.   
 
When the national savings and credit program officially started in 1999, it was decided to 
develop the programme into an independent Cambodian MFI.  The following section documents 




 Angkor Mikroheranhvatho Kampuchea (AMK)  
 
 
History   
 
210Angkor Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea) Co. Ltd (AMK)  grew out of Concern’s Worldwide’s 
savings and credit activities in Cambodia, which started on a small scale in 1993.   
 
From 1997 to 1999, savings and credit activities were separated from the community 
development work and became one of the programs directly implemented by Concern 
Worldwide Cambodia.  Using a modified village bank approach, the National Savings and Credit 
Program started its operations in 1999 in three provinces identified as poorest in Cambodia 
(Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat).  In January 2001, the program name was 
changed to Thaneakea Ponleu Thmey (The Bank of the New Shining Light, TPT).   
 
The vision of Concern -TPT was of a “Cambodia where there is peace and freedom and where 
people no longer live in poverty.”  Accordingly, Concern-TPT’s mission stated that “we are a 
microfinance service provider committed to reducing poverty in a lasting way by providing 
sustainable and appropriate services targeting the poorest.  To achieve this, we will establish an 
independent MFI.”  Concern-TPT’s goals were twofold: “to assist poor families to increase their 
income through productive economic activities” and “to establish an operationally and 
financially sustainable microfinance institution that offers microfinance services appropriate to 
the poor.”  In January 2002, Concern-TPT was registered as a “Rural Credit Operator” with the 
National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) and in October of the same year, TPT changed its target 
group to the Economically Active Poor (EAP), defined as “those poor with at least one economic 
activity or business (that enables them to repay the loan).”  In contrast, the poorest or the 
destitute were defined as those who “either lack productive assets or who are not capable of 
carrying out income-generating activities.” 
                                                 
210 Unless otherwise indicated, the information about the AMK Co. Ltd. and Concern-TPT program draws from the 
respective Manual of Operations, internal documentation, AMK’s Institutional Overview, interviews, field notes and 
AMK website. 
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 This change in the target group merits further explanation.  Originally, the programme was 
designed to meet the needs of low-income families in rural areas and aimed at reaching 90 
percent of the poorest in each village where it operated.  The objective was that 70 percent of 
total members belonged to the poor and poorest categories with the poor being defined by TPT’s 
wealth ranking procedures.  However, in practice, the majority of TPT clients belonged to the 
“economically active poor” rather than the poorest of the poor.  At the same time, the Post 
Conflict Microfinance Research (Williams et at., 2001) suggested that people who took loans 
from TPT were suffering greater hardship after the floods in Pursat.  This confirmed both 
international and local staff’s experience that the destitute with no economic activity could not be 
helped by loan programs and that they required welfare or a grants system.  Henceforth, the 
target group became “100 percent of total members are Economically Active Poor (EAP) people 
or individuals.”211  There are no requirements for gender but women are encouraged to 
participate and currently represent 84 percent of AMK’s client base.   
 
The process of developing the Concern-TPT program into an independent Cambodian 
Microfinance Institution (MFI) started in 2002, following the new Cambodian microfinance 
regulation that stipulated the creation of a separate company and obtaining an MFI license once 
the outstanding loan portfolio exceeded KHR 1,000 million (equivalent to approx. USD 
250,000).  The bulk of this transformation process took place during the second part of 2002 and 
2003.  The name was changed to Angkor Mikroheranhvatho Kampuchea (AMK), the new 
institution was registered as a Limited Liability Company with the Ministry of Commerce and 
the physical separation of all assets and liabilities from Concern was completed.  On the 
operational front of this transformation process, AMK Co. Ltd redefined its focus, constituted 
and strengthened its Board of Directors, recruited new staff members, and began the task of 
upgrading systems and policies in line with the needs of a financial institution.  By mid 2004, 
AMK obtained its license as an MFI from the Cambodian central bank.   
 
                                                 
211 For the sake of international comparison, it was also established that the “poor” were those individuals trying to 
live on less than USD 1 a day, and most definitely below USD 2 a day.  Note that the term “poor” in this context 
includes both the EAP and the destitute.  Note that following this change in the targeting definition, the clients’ loan 
eligibility criteria included that: the individual was willing to be part of a solidarity group, belonged to the 
economically active poor people; and was not highly indebted. 
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 From 2004 to 2007, AMK expanded both its financial products and its geographical coverage 
from the original 3 provinces of operation to a total coverage of 15 provinces.  AMK received 
the CGAP Financial Transparency Award in 2005 and 2006 becoming the only Cambodian MFI 
and one of three MFI’s globally to receive the award for the second year in a row.  The 
highlights of this evolution are summarized in Table VI-1 below 
 
Table VI-1: Highlights of the Evolution of AMK Co. Ltd.  
Year Main Highlights 
1993-98   Concern Cambodia pilots models of savings and credit activities, separates savings and credit from 
community development work, and decides to be a direct implementor of savings and credit. 
1999 Official start of the “National Savings & Credit Programme;” 
Decision to develop the programme into an independent Cambodian MFI. 
2001 Renamed the programme “Thaneakea Ponleu Thmey” (The Bank of the New Shining Light, TPT). 
2002   
 
Jan 02: TPT is registered as a “Rural Credit Operator” with the central bank;  
Oct 02: Change in the target group to the Economically Active Poor (EAP); Appointment of two 
shareholders in order to register as a company with the Ministry of Commerce. 
2003  Apr 03: Redefinition of the mission statement;  
20 May 03: Angkor Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea) Co. Ltd (Angkor Microfinance Kampuchea, 
AMK) is registered as a Limited Liability Company with the Ministry of Commerce;   
1 Jul 03: Physical separation of all assets and liabilities completed; signature of Framework Agreement 
between AMK Ltd and Concern Worldwide Ltd;  
Nov 03: Board of Directors ratifies new guiding principles. 
2004 Introduction of repayment in installments for group loans and pilot of individual loans (Jan 04) and 
voluntary savings product (Sept 04).  
May 04:Granted the MFI license by the National Bank of Cambodia (the central bank) 
2005 Expanded to two new provinces: Battambang and Siem Reap.   
Interest rate in group loans with repayments in installments reduced from 3% to 2.8% (Jan 05) and 
introduction of two new loan products Emergency Loans and Credit Lines for group clients (Sept 05);  
Establishment of the Social Performance Committee. 
2006 Expanded operations to four new provinces: Kampong Cham; Kampong Chhnang; Kampong Thom; and 
Oddar Meanchey; 
Awarded the CGAP Global Financial Transparency Award (for 2005);  
Selected to participate in Imp-Act Consortium Global Action Research Programme and became a member 
of the Social Performance Task Force. 
2007 Expanded operations to six new provinces: Kandal; Kratie; Preah Vihear; Prey Veng; Svay Rieng; Takeo;
Awarded CGAP Financial Transparency Award (for 2006). 
Source: AMK Annual Reports 2004, 2005, 2006 
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 AMK Vision, Mission and Guiding Principles 
 
The long-term vision of AMK is of a Cambodian society ‘where citizens have equal and 
sufficient economic and social opportunities to improve their standards of living, and where they 
can contribute productively towards the overall development of the country’.   
 
AMK’s priority is to balance operational and financial sustainability with social objectives and 
thus, AMK’s mission statement has been defined as:  ‘to help large numbers of poor people in 
rural Cambodia to increase their livelihood options through the sustainable delivery of 
appropriate and viable microfinance services to the economically active poor’.   
 
AMK’s guiding principles reflect the overall operating framework of the institution and are the 
following: 
 
? provide microfinance services to poor people in Cambodia that are grounded in sound 
financial discipline at all levels. 
? be committed to openness and transparency in all areas of management and operations. 
? be committed to developing processes/services and to adopting behaviors and standards 
that ensure client protection. 
? be a learning organization where appropriate exchange and sharing of information will 
contribute to staff development, training and in policy & systems improvements. 
 
As an extension of its guiding principles, during 2005 AMK adopted a Code of Practice for 
Client Protection to formally ensure fair and equal treatment of clients.  This code is monitored 
through both the internal audit and social research findings. The code of practice refers to the 
following five aspects:  
 
? Minimizing the exclusion of the poor who meet AMK’s other criteria for selection. 
? Minimizing the exposure of (poor) clients to financial products that may prove harmful if 
they promote over-indebtedness. 
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 ? Providing complete information to clients about policies and procedures, and ensuring 
complete transparency in transactions. 
? Facilitating/Promoting complete freedom of choice to clients. 
? Ensuring appropriate and respectful behavior towards clients of staff and management. 
 
 
Ownership, Governance and Management Structure  
 
The current shareholders of AMK are Concern Worldwide and Concern Worldwide UK, which 
hold 99.9 and 0.1 percent of the share capital respectively.  AMK’s governing body is the Board 
of Directors.  AMK’s shareholders appoint the Directors; in turn, the Board of Directors appoints 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).   
 
The Board of Directors is responsible for governing AMK and liaising with potential investors, 
as well as overall monitoring and guidance through the board meetings.  The eleven-member 
Board is composed of an ex-senior partner with Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), a leading 
Cambodian lawyer, one member from Concern Worldwide Cambodia Program Management; 
four members from Senior Management of Concern Worldwide in Dublin, the Head of 
Community Development Finance at ANZ Banking Group, the CEO and Chairperson of DEPFA 
Bank (Ireland) plc, as well as the former and the new CEO of AMK Co. Ltd. 
 
The Board of Directors has two advisory committees: the Audit and Finance Committee and the 
Social Performance Committee.  The Audit and Finance Committee advises the Board on 
AMK’s external audit performance as well as the internal audit function.  The Social 
Performance Committee advises the Board on AMK’s social performance in terms of poverty 
outreach, product suitability, client protection and transparency, and overall social responsibility.  
Both committees have external experts as members in addition to Directors.  It is the 
combination of both committees that provides the Board of Directors and all stakeholders with 
information on the achievement of AMK’s mission and the double bottom line of balancing 
social mission with financial self-sufficiency requirements.  
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 The CEO heads the management team, which includes six departments and brings together 
professionals from microfinance and related backgrounds.  A simplified structure of AMK is 
shown in Figure VI-1 below: 
 
Figure VI-1: AMK Organizational Structure 
Shareholders 




































Source: AMK Annual Report 2006 
 
It is noteworthy that AMK includes an in-house and ongoing research function (undertaken by 
the Training, Research and Marketing (TRAM) department), which is separated from the regular 
operations in order to minimize staff biases and protect client confidentiality. The research 
function includes social and market research and systematically collects, stores, and analyzes 
information on clients.  Market research aims at informing management decisions on new 
product design and on improving delivery procedures while the main aim of social research is to 
provide social performance information in terms of depth of poverty outreach and 
appropriateness of financial products.  The starting point is a household survey that captures 
demographic information; household cash-flow patterns (sources of income and expenditure); 
consumption (as a proxy for income); variations in assets (physical, human and social capital); 
and other vulnerability factors including food security, coping strategies and indebtedness.  To 
date, AMK’s research database stores information about over 1,000 old and new clients as well 
as a control group of non-clients.  Current outputs include client profiles, satisfaction and exiting 
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 client reports as well as a wellbeing score that summarizes the poverty profile into a single 
poverty/wellbeing household index.   
 
In 2005, AMK was selected as one of the seven MFIs around the world to participate in the Imp-
Act Consortium Global Action-Research Learning Programme on Social Performance 
Management (SPM), a two-year project which seeks to gather evidence of effective SPM and 
understand its organizational value.  The programme aims at examining the Social Performance 
experience of those MFIs pioneering on this topic and also include CRECER and PROMUJER in 
Bolivia; FONKOZE in Haiti; NWTF in The Philippines; PRIZMA in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and 
SEF in South Africa.  Two workshops have taken place so far, a preliminary case study for AMK 
has been finalized (including a short summary) and a final one is foreseen for 2009.   
 
Further information on the Social Performance of AMK and the balance between Social and 
Financial Performance can be found in AMK (2007b), Chetan (2007) and Torres et al. (2007). 
 
 
Areas of Operation   
 
AMK has expanded greatly in terms of geographical coverage from 2003 to 2007.  Up to 2004, 
AMK only covered three provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat.  In 2005, 
AMK expanded to Battambang and Siem Reap covering a total of five provinces.  In 2006 AMK 
expanded to Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Thom and Oddar Meanchey 
covering a total of nine provinces.  My mid 2007, AMK had expanded to Kandal, Kratie, Preh 
Vihear, Preh Veng, Svay Rieng and Takeo and covered a total of fifteen provinces.   
 
On 30 June 2007, AMK had nearly 90,000 clients in its fifteen provinces of operation in a total 
of 67 districts, 427 communes and 2,198 villages.  Table VI-2 below shows AMK’s geographical 
coverage among the fifteen provinces.  Additionally, Figure VII-2 compares AMK’s 
geographical coverage with the incidence of poverty at provincial level.   
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 Table VI-2: AMK’s Geographical Coverage  
Province District Commune Village 
Banteay Meanchey 8 59 283 
Battambang 6 34 193 
Kampong Cham 7 38 198 
Kampong Chhnang 5 31 140 
Kampong Speu 7 53 388 
Kampong Thom 5 31 167 
Kandal 3 10 26 
Kratie 1 10 34 
Oddar Meanchey 4 17 91 
Preh Vihear 4 18 51 
Preh Veng 2 15 49 
Pursat 5 44 221 
Siem Reap 7 49 279 
Svay Rieng 1 9 41 
Takeo 2 9 37 
Total Coverage 67 427 2,198 
Source: AMK Annual Report 2006 
 
Figure VI-2: AMK Geographical Coverage and Poverty Incidence by Province 
 Analysis by author. Sources: AMK Annual Report (2006), RGC (2006: 46, 53, 55) 
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In Figure VII-2 the poverty incidence is disaggregated by color: provinces in green have less 
than 25 percent of their population below the poverty line, provinces in blue have an incidence of 
poverty between 25 to 35 percent; provinces in grey have a poverty incidence of 35 to 45 percent 
and provinces in red have the highest poverty incidence (more than 45%).  Thus, Figure VII-2 
shows that AMK works preferentially in those areas with higher incidence of poverty than the 
national average of 35 percent.   
 
Also, an analysis of the evolution of AMK’s geographical coverage against poverty incidence by 
province corroborates that AMK indeed works in and expands to areas with higher incidence of 
poverty.  This evolution of the AMK geographical coverage from 2004 to 2006 and the 
provincial distribution of poverty in Cambodia is available in Annex 22. 
 
 
Methodology   
 
Up to 2003, AMK operated solely through a solidarity group methodology and an end-of-term 
repayment product.  End-of-term loans sustain high demand due to flexible repayment terms and 
remains AMK’s main loan product, but they also carry the highest covariance risk212 and have 
the slowest signal time in cases of delinquency.  In order to reduce this risk and respond to other 
client types, AMK developed other credit products: for those households whose livelihoods 
depend on small scale manufacturing, service or trading activities, AMK is introducing fixed 
installment options for loan repayment.  For those households with irregular cash-flows but good 
repayment history, AMK introduced a credit line option.  AMK currently offers five different 
credit products and two types of savings products.  Each of these will be described in detail in 
the following pages. 
 
                                                 
212 i.e. the risk increases because the group is homogeneous (rural households) and they all invest in the same activity (farm 
production). 
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 Credit Products 
 
Currently, AMK offers five different credit products: three group-guaranteed loans without any 
physical collateral requirement, one emergency loan (without collateral, restricted to clients who 
have completed one year/cycle with AMK) and a small business loan delivered through an 
individual loan methodology that requires physical collateral and personal guarantees.213  The 
group loans have three distinct repayment modalities: end-of-term, installments and credit-line, 
while the individual loan can only be repaid in installments.   
 
AMK’s most traditional product is the solidarity-group loan product, which offers flexible 
repayment terms where clients can borrow and repay at any point during the cycle.  AMK’s end-
of-term repayment product is delivered to members through a solidarity-group lending 
methodology.  The village solidarity groups are called Village Banks (VBs) and constitute the 
group loan delivery mechanism.214  The potential clients self-select themselves into solidarity 
groups of 4 to 6 members and these, in turn, are organized into Village Banks of 4 to 12 groups 
(20 to 60 clients).215  Each group nominates a group leader who is in charge of ensuring member 
attendance to meetings, troubleshooting and liaison with the Village Bank President, AMK’s 
Credit Officer and other members. 
 
A Village Bank President is the management representative of the Village Bank, is elected 
through secret ballot by all members of the Village Bank and is paid an incentive depending 
upon the Village Banks’ performance.216  Village Bank Presidents are responsible for helping 
Credit Officers in organizing collection and repayment meetings; informing Credit Officers in 
advance in cases of potential non-payment and following-up with delinquent clients; solving 
                                                 
213 In addition to these 5 main loan products, there is a staff loan for full time staff.  However, this product is part of the staff incentive 
package and will never exceed 2-3 percent of AMK’s total loan portfolio.  Thus, it will not be discussed in this section. 
214 Please note in the Cambodian context, “Village Bank” refers more to a “Village Association” or a “Village-level client group” than 
to the “Village Banks” as the delivery methodology developed by FINCA.  The main difference is that AMK does not provide any 
revolving fund for establishing the VBs.  
215 Being part of a self-selected solidarity group entails that three to five other villagers trust the loan applicant to let him/her join their 
solidarity group.  This has important implications for the risks and the costs incurred by the lender in providing financial services. 
216 VBPs receive a monthly incentive up to 3 percent of interest collection and 0.5 percent of principal collection only if collections 
are 100 percent.  The VBP’s qualifying criteria is: partially/fully literate; should not be a Village Chief/Deputy Village Chief or a direct 
relative; not involved in any money-lending activity; permanent resident; know AMK policies and procedures; and give at least one 
day per month to support AMK. 
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 membership related problems; and ensuring that all clients have been enrolled according to 
group and Village Bank formation criteria.   
In order to be part of a group, the potential client currently needs to fulfill four main conditions: 
(i) must be willing to be part of a solidarity group and offer moral guarantee for each other; (ii) 
should have at least one economic activity in the household; (iii) no two members in one group 
can be from the same family or household; (iv) cannot have existing (outstanding) loans from 
other microfinance institutions, programs, banks or moneylenders.  All loans are guaranteed by 
the respective group members and appraised and approved by AMK’s Credit Officer (CO) and 
the Village Bank President (VBP) before the disbursements take place in the presence of the 
group members and AMK’s Area/Branch Managers.   
 
Group loan: End of Term (or EoT-VB) 
The End Of Term Loan for Village Bank members (EoT-VB) is delivered through VBs and 
granted for any purpose as long as the household has a lumpy cash-flow pattern from its 
livelihood activities that allows it to repay the loan.  The maximum term is 12 months and the 
interest rate is of 3 percent per month on outstanding balances.  Interest is paid monthly and the 
capital can be repaid at any time during the loan cycle, usually at the end.  There is no penalty or 
fee for partial or full pre-payment of the loan principal.217  The maximum loan amount of the 
first loan is R 200,000 (~USD 50), and one subsequent increment of R 100,000 (USD 25).  From 
their third loan (or 2 years, whichever is later), they can apply for the maximum ceiling, which is 
equivalent to USD 125.218  All loans are subject to a flat processing fee of 0.5 percent of the loan 
amount that is deducted from the loan.  Payments start one month after the loan is disbursed and 
take place only during the monthly VB meeting.  In case of late repayment, there is a penalty of 
12 percent per annum (or 1 percent per month) on the principal balance. 
 
                                                 
217 In case of pre-payment, the client is allowed to receive another loan within the original 12 months term but (1) the size of the new 
loan cannot exceed the size of the original loan, (2) the repayment date of the new loan will be no later than the original end-of-cycle 
date and, (3) the group is required to fill out a new group guarantee form for this new loan.   
218 The maximum amount of the first loan will increase to R300,000 (~USD 75) in late 2007. 
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 Group loan: Installments (or Installments-VB) 
The Installment loan for VB members (Installment-VB) shares exactly the same characteristics 
as the EoT-VB loan except the interest rate and the repayment modality: instead of paying 
interest monthly and the principal at the end of the term, I-VB loans require a monthly payment 
of fixed principal and declining interest amounts, with a monthly interest rate of 2.8 percent.  
The maximum loan size (at any cycle) is R 600,000 (USD 125).  Additionally, the maximum 
loan term remains at 12 months but the term must be clearly decided with the client before 
sanctioning the loan.  Therefore, the only distinction between this product and the EoT-VB loan 
is the client’s household cash-flow pattern: households that have a regular cash inflow that is 
sufficient to meet repayment obligations are encouraged to borrow in installments.  This product 
was introduced in 2004 and the interest rate was reduced to 2.8 percent per month in 2005. 
 
Group loan: Credit Line (or Credit Line-VB) 
Credit Line-VB is restricted to VB members who have finished their second loan cycle with 
AMK.  As with other group loans, no physical collateral or guarantors are required.  Clients can 
borrow and repay a number of times in any single cycle upto an approved borrowing ceiling.  
Clients must borrow any amount equal or less than their approved ceiling for the first time within 
the first 90 days from her or his individual approval date.  After that, they have complete 
freedom of when and how much to borrow or to payback; the only condition is that the principal 
balance must be zero on the final payment day or before.  The maximum ceiling of the loan is R 
500,000 (USD 125) with term of at least 13 months but less than 24 months.  The interest is 3 
percent per month and the amount to be paid as interest will vary according to how much 
outstanding principal is left at a particular date.  All loans are subject to a flat processing fee of 
0.5 percent of the agreed loan ceiling, payable in the first disbursement.  There are no fees or 
further requirements, except in the case of late repayment, where the penalty of 12 percent per 
annum (or 1 percent per month) will be charged on the principal balance.  The VB-Credit Line 
was introduced in 2005 and is fast becoming the most popular product.   
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 Individual loan: Installments (or Installment-I) 
The individual loan targets the (underserved) lowest segment of rural entrepreneurs, who would 
want to borrow up to a maximum loan ceiling of USD 500.219  The installment loan for 
Individual clients (Installment-I) is delivered to rural/semi-rural individual entrepreneurs 
(individual clients located in rural markets).  The maximum term is 18 months and the interest 
rate is of 3 percent per month for the first two cycles (or two years) and 2.5 percent per month 
thereafter.  Repayment will be in monthly installments with fixed principal and declining interest 
and there is no penalty for complete or partial pre-payment of the loan principal.  The maximum 
loan amount of the first loan is equivalent to USD 375 and a maximum ceiling equivalent to 
USD 500.  There are two up-front fees: a flat processing fee of 0.5 percent and a savings deposit 
of 2 percent of the loan amount.  The compulsory loan-linked savings act as a security for loans 
losses but are fully refundable on loan completion with an annual interest of 12 percent on 
minimum monthly balances.  In case of late repayment, there is an additional penalty of 1 
percent per month on the principal overdue.  In addition, Installment-I loans require physical 
collateral and two personal guarantors – from November 2007 only one guarantor will be 
required.  Also, the process of identifying individual clients is significantly different from that of 
VB clients: a greater degree of scrutiny and control is undertaken to ensure that client 
identification is appropriate.   
 
Emergency Loan 
In addition, AMK also offers an emergency loan that is restricted for those clients that have 
completed one cycle with AMK, whether they are group or individual clients.  The product is 
designed to help our clients to cover medical expenses in case of sudden illness or accident 
problems as well as to cover funeral expenses in case of death in the family of the client.  The 
client can request the emergency loan to the Credit Officer in the village or the office staff at the 
branch and disbursement will take place within 4 working hours of receiving the request.  The 
maximum loan amount is KHR 400,000 or THB 4,000 (USD 100) and the maximum term is 10 
months.   No physical collateral is required but clients must present one personal guarantor (who 
can be a family member).  Clients will pay 2.5 percent monthly interest on the outstanding loan 
and the principal on or before the end-of term.  There are no fees for this loan, except a 1 percent 
                                                 
219 Most other MFIs/banks concentrate on higher value individual clients and lend higher amounts (around $500 and over, and 
reaching up to US10,000). 
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 late repayment fee.  Family members are eligible to apply for an emergency loan on behalf of the 
client. 
 
Table VI-3 provides a summary of the main features of all AMK’s products. 
 
Table VI-3: Summary of Distinctive Features of AMK’s Credit Products 
 End Of Term - Village Bank 
Installment - 
Village Bank 
Credit Line - 
Village Bank 
Installment - 


















Individual or group 
clients who have 
completed one 
cycle 
Loan Guarantee Social guarantee – No need for physical collateral or guarantors 
Physical collateral 










Maximum loan ceiling: USD 125 
Maximum first 
loan: USD 375 
Maximum loan 
ceiling: USD 500 
Maximum loan: 
USD 100 
Denominations KHR and THB (in Banteay Meanchey) 
Disbursement 
Deadline 1 to 2 weeks 
4 working hours 
from time of 
request
















interest on the 
outstanding loan; 
principal on or 





From the 3rd loan/ 
2 years: 2.5% 
interest. 
2.5% monthly 
interest on the 
outstanding loan; 
principal on or 





fee Additional 1% per month 









interest of 12% on 
loan completion. 
None 
Source: AMK Annual Report 2006 
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 Savings Products  
 
Up to May 2003, TPT/Concern encouraged members to save small amounts at the village level.  
These savings were a compulsory precondition for providing loans but were not handled directly 
by the Concern-TPT programme.  The Village Banks themselves were responsible for its 
performance and maintenance.  Regular savings were required before providing a loan in order 
to screen out those members that were not diligent in their regular savings payment (i.e. savings 
was a test of their commitment and diligence).  These savings were circulated as internal loans 
among the group members.  AMK’s role was restricted to supervising the record management; 
providing each Village Bank with a cash safe and stationary to record savings collections and on-
lending; and paying the incentives of the Village Bank Savings Secretary (who was appointed 
specifically for savings management).  The compulsory savings at the Village Bank level were 
suspended in May 2003 and stopped completely from August 2003.  This decision was due to the 
limitations of compulsory savings.  On one hand, the internal fund administered by the Village 
Banks was prone to nepotism if the patron-client relations prevalent in rural Cambodia were 
replicated in the figure of the Village Bank President or Savings Secretary.  At the same time, 
AMK’s Credit Officers lacked verifiable information about the real performance of the savings 
fund because Credit Officers did not control its management.  On the other hand, it was very 
costly for AMK to facilitate savings (providing a safe, stationary, incentives to the Village Bank 
Savings Secretary, and significant Credit Officers’ time for recording functions).  Compulsory 
savings were refunded to the members once they completed their full loan cycles.  
 
Currently, AMK offers two types of savings products: a loan-linked savings product for 
Installment-I loans and a general voluntary savings product.   
 
Loan-Linked Savings Product 
The loan-linked savings are compulsory for Individual-Installment loan clients and thus 
withdrawals are not permitted until the loan and interest is fully paid.  However, on complete 
payment of outstanding loan and interest balances, the client has the option of withdrawing the 
savings with interest accrued (currently set at 12 percent per annum) or to shift the balance to 
higher interest earning voluntary savings. 
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General Voluntary Savings Product 
The savings account allows complete freedom for deposit and withdrawal amounts and earns 1.5 
percent interest per month (18 percent per annum) on minimum monthly balances.  Interests are 
accrued every 6 months, in June and December.220  Accounts can be opened with a deposit of 
KHR 500 (USD 0.125, which is also minimum savings balance to be maintained in the account), 
and the minimum denomination for transactions is KHR 100 or multiples of KHR 100.  At the 
time of enrolment, each individual is provided with a savings passbook free of cost where all 
transactions must be recorded by the CO/Teller.  Transactions for deposits and withdrawals take 
place at the village (on the day of the monthly VB meeting or individual meeting/visit) or at the 
branch office on all working days from 8 am to 12 pm.   
 
Table VI-4 provides a summary of the main features of all AMK’s savings products. 
 
Table VI-4: Summary of Distinctive Features of AMK’s Savings Products 
   SAVINGS ACCOUNT 
Minimum 
transactions 
Minimum denomination: R100 and multiples 
Minimum deposit to open account: R500 (USD 0.125) 
Transactions venue Village (during monthly meetings or collection visits) and at the branch office (Monday to Friday, 8am-12 pm). 
Savings account 
passbook Records all deposit and withdrawal information and only the client can use it.  
Savings account 
interest 
18% annual interest on minimum monthly balances over R500.  Interests accrued every 6 
months: in June and December. 
Fees 
None, except R200 if clients (more than 6 months old) choose to request a withdrawal 
delivered to her village in non-monthly meeting day. 
There are no fees for minimum or maximum transactions, but for those exceeding USD 200, 
clients must call the branch office 24 hours (1 working day) in advance. 
Dormant accounts An account will become dormant (cease to earn further interest) after 12 consecutive months of no transactions and will be liquidated after 24 consecutive months without activity.  
Source: AMK Annual Report 2006 
 
Finally, the pre-loan training provided by AMK to potential clients is limited to the AMK’s 
policies; origin and areas of operations; terms and conditions of microfinance products (such as 
repayment requirements, fees, penalties and disqualification for non-payment, loan sizes, 
analysis of cash-flow, and moral guarantees -or physical guarantees and loan-linked savings-); 
and the roles and responsibilities of the clients, group leaders and the Village Bank President. 
                                                 
220 Interest rates, terms, and timing of interest accrual are due to change in late 2007. 
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 AMK Financial and Operational Highlights 
 
By end of 2006, AMK had a loan portfolio of USD 5.3 million serving 67,000 borrowers and a 
ration of Portfolio at Risk (PAR) of less than 0.1 percent.   
 
Changes from 2003 to 2006 in the institutions have been quite dramatic: from covering 18,000 
clients in 3 provinces to 67,000 clients in 9 provinces and from 68 to 188 staff members.  By 
2006, the Return on Assets (ROA) increased to over 8 percent and most importantly the 
Financial Self Sufficiency (FSS) rose to almost 100 percent.  This is a remarkable achievement 
for a little over three full years of operations, particularly because this financial self-sufficiency 
has been achieved with a methodology that has not changed its focus on the very poor (AMK, 
2007:7).  
 
Table VI-5 briefly summarizes the main operational and financial performance and its evolution 
from its creation in December 2003 to December 2006. 
 
Table VI-5: AMK Highlights 
 Dec 03 Dec 04 Dec 05 Dec 06 
Number of branches 3 3 5 9 
Number of villages 497 610 912 1,586 
Total staff 68 91 108 188 
Number of active borrowers 18,422 20,464 36,221 67,006 
Women Borrowers (%) 80 85 86 85 
Number of voluntary savers 0 182 765 1,460 
Loan portfolio (USD, K) 843 1,202 2,474 5,277 
Group loans (%)  100 93 91 85 
Individual loans (%) 0 7 9 15 
Voluntary savings balance (USD, K) 0 1 5 8 
PAR30days 2.51% 0.71% 0.05% 0.09% 
Avg loan disbursed (USD) 50 80 76 86 
Avg outstanding loan per borrower (USD) 46 59 68 79 
Number active loans below USD 300 (%) 100 100 99 99 
Avg voluntary savings per saver (USD) n/a 6 6 6 
Loan outstanding/Avg.Loan Officer (USD,K) 32 32 50 74 
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS)  71.6% 93.0% 103.4% 121.5% 
Return On Assets (ROA) -10.7% -2.0% 0.5% 8.3% 
Source: AMK Annual Report 2006 
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 This evolution of main ratios from 2003 to 2006 shows the profile of a successful microfinance 
institution, with increasingly positive ratios of profitability (RoA and OSS).  The numbers of 
borrowers nearly quadrupled while maintaining the same percentage of women borrowers (about 
85 percent) and very slow changes in the average loan outstanding per borrower and average 
loan disbursed (the average outstanding loan per borrower increased only from USD 46 to USD 
79 well below market changes).  More importantly, the percentage of loans below USD 300 
remains very high at 99 percent.  The staff has grown from 68 to 188 to match the demands of 
geographic expansion to other provinces (as well as new districts or communes within already 
operating provinces) but productivity of staff has also been increasing (with the amount of loan 
outstanding per average loan officer moving from USD 32,000 to nearly USD 74,000).    
 
Also, because the number of clients in AMK has increased so dramatically and because there are 
more poor people in the areas where AMK work (see Figure VI-2 in page 198), the number of 
poor people reached over the years is likely to have increased considerably.  However, this type 
of data does not allow assessing the evolution of AMK’s depth of outreach; the data may provide 
indications on the potential depth of outreach but the depth of poverty outreach can only be 




AMK Research Summaries: Village and Rural Household Profiles 
 
A review of the existing literature on the nature of demand for rural credit (see page 149 
onwards), identified that the sources of income had been underrepresented in national level 
studies (concentrating on rice production and under-reporting income sources linked to livestock, 
fisheries/aquatic resources, forestry, wage labor, small business, rental of assets or remittances) 
and that there is a lack of research on a broad range of issues regarding Cambodian livelihood 
strategies, such as the high prevalence of crisis and their corresponding coping mechanisms.  In 
order to fill in this gap, this section provides a succinct summary of the profile of villages where 
AMK operates and the client households it serves.   
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 Generally, AMK clients are mostly located in remote rural areas which usually possess poor 
infrastructure facilities and utilities.  Most of AMK clients are involved in rice production and 
farming (i.e. subsistence agriculture such as paddy, vegetable and fruit production).  Other 
crucial sources of income and employment are livestock rearing, small-scale fishing, temporary 
labor, and small trading.  Due to bad road conditions and distances from the villages to the 
districts and commune markets, clients often sell their products to both individual consumers 
within the villages and to middlemen, who transport the products to other markets. 
 
Khlok et al. (2007) produced the latest AMK Client Household profile based on the sample of 
300 cash-flow survey interviews.  The report provides a summary of the main characteristics of 
the communities/villages where fieldwork took place as well as the profile of the average AMK’s 
group client household.  Each of these will be detailed in turn. 
 
Based on the report, the main characteristics of the villages served by AMK are summarized in 
the following bullet points (Khlok et al., 2007:8-9): 
 
? Location and general demographics: In 76 percent of the villages the roads were in 
good condition while bad and excellent roads were 12 percent each.  The average 
number of households in a village is 217 (minimum 51 and maximum 934) and the 
average size is 4.8 persons per household.  Both farm and non-farm activities are the 
main economic activities of the households.  In more than 75 percent of villages (19 
out of 25 villages surveyed) people migrate more than 3 months a year, either 
domestically or internationally.   
? There are microfinance providers operating in 80 percent of all villages surveyed.  
In addition, 4 villages (16 percent) had more than 10 clients using the services of 
informal credit/finance activities such as money lenders or in-kind traders.  
? Basic infrastructure: Villages seem poor in terms of healthcare or secondary school 
facilities.  Markets in the villages are usually small and traditional (selling meat, fish 
and vegetables and open only in the morning or the evening).  There are only 4 
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 villages (16 percent) with a market or bazaar and most villagers buy fertilizers or 
pesticides from outside their villages (usually in the commune or district market).  In 
18 villages (72 percent) there are services available for livestock or agricultural 
activities.  The details of the distance to infrastructure are available in Annex 23.  
Only 6 villages (24 percent) have access to electricity while other villages rely on 
kerosene or battery lamps.  There is only 1 village with access to piped drinking 
water; other villages rely on rain water, well, pond or river water.  It is interesting to 
note that all villages surveyed have access to network coverage for mobile phone.  
During the past 24 months, 11 villages (44 percent) benefited from food for work 
programs, 10 villages (40 percent) from relief assistance and 11 villages (44 percent) 
have self help groups of any kind.  
? Incidence of natural/non-natural disasters: None of the villages surveyed lost 
crops due to natural disasters (flood, drought, etc.) every year but they commonly 
happened once in 2 to 10 years, with 52 percent incidence of floods and 48 percent 
incidence of droughts.  However, most damage from most natural disasters has been 
assessed as manageable.  Non-natural disasters also affected 9 out of 25 villages (36 
percent) such as land grabbing or no further access to CPR, but in 89 percent of the 
cases this was assessed as manageable. 
 
Based on the same report, the following paragraphs provide the main highlights of the household 
profile following the six main categories of analysis (Khlok et al., 2007: 2-3). 
 
? Demographics:  Most of AMK clients in the sample are married women.  Their average 
age is 41 years, 62 percent are literate and only 10 percent could attend secondary school.  
The average household size is 5.4 members; a little over half of these are adults and 3.4 
are income earners.  Of the children living in AMK client households, about 51 percent 
are in school, 22 percent are not in school and 27 percent are not yet of school age.  There 
is no gender difference in the children currently in school, but the drop-out rate for girls 
is higher than boys (27 percent vs. 18 percent), which is consistent with the Cambodia 
Inter-Censal Population Survey 2004.  AMK clients and AMK heads of household are, 
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 on average, under-educated with their average years of schooling lower than the figures 
found in the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (2004).  Also, women had access to 
fewer years of formal education than men.  
? Cash inflow sources: Rural households depend on a mixed array of diverse and 
complementary activities.  Nearly every household is involved in farm and non-farm as 
well as other economic activities.  Farming activities such as crops, livestock and CPR 
are one of the main cash earners for most households, particularly rice farming.  Non-
farm activities are often ranked as the first main cash inflow source, particularly casual 
labor, salaried employment, petty trade and food processing.  Other economic activities 
include mainly loans and remittances.  Salaried employment, although not as common as 
casual labor, is one of the most important cash earners for those households. 
? Cash outflow sources:  Food is one of the main expenses and often the first ranked 
expense, indicating the relative poverty of the households.  Main outflows include 
expenses on basic needs (especially food and schooling), investments in farm and non-
farm activities, ceremonies, loan payments, health-related expenses and expenditures on 
household materials and assets.  Interestingly, investments on farm-activities are rarely 
the first main expense in the household, with non-farm activities more likely to be ranked 
first in the yearly household expenses.  Households often mention expenses in loan 
payments, ceremonies, clothing, health, schooling, but comparatively they represent only 
a small share of the household yearly outflows.   
? Cash-flow patterns:  There are seasonality patterns of inflows and outflows in rural 
households.  The months with higher cash inflows are December to March and the 
months with lowest cash inflows are August and September.  Crops contribute to the high 
cash income pattern during the harvest season (December and January).  Livestock sales 
increase in March and CPRs collection are mainly in February and March.  Non-farm 
activities such as casual or salaried labor, manufacturing, services and petty trade present 
rather large and constant income flows for the whole year.  Cash outflows in the 
household show similar patterns as cash inflows.  Food is the most important outflow and 
accounts for the largest cash expense in the households.  The main seasonal variation is 
linked to ceremonies such as wedding, traditional and religious rituals (especially from 
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 December to May) and investments in crop production (from May to July).  Non-farm 
investments and expenditures on health and schooling are important and happen 
throughout the year. Expenses on livestock inputs or CPRs and loan servicing are 
constant throughout the year and comparable in size with investments in crop production. 
? Assets:  About 94 percent of the households own cultivable land, with over half reporting 
only one plot.  However, land is not evenly distributed among households, with 62 
percent owning land less than 1.74 Ha, the average land area.  A little over half of the 
households could produce enough rice to be self-sufficient.  Regarding other assets, 58 
percent own cows, 42 percent own pigs and 9 percent own buffaloes and all of the 
households own at least one asset of relatively modest value (worth less than USD 100).  
About half of AMK client households live in ‘permanent houses’ and most houses are in 
good condition and built on stilts, with a zinc/tin roof and either wood or thatch walls, but 
about 92 percent lack toilet facilities.  Only 45 percent of the households could afford 
health care without having to borrow money or sell assets and only 14 percent expect all 
of their school-age children to complete secondary school.  Generally, AMK clients have 
good relationship with others in their communities. 
? Vulnerability: Compared to last year, half of the households thought their economic 
situation stayed the same, 34 percent thought it improved and 13 percent thought it 
worsened.  When the household yearly income decreased, this was due mainly to 
sickness in the household (32 percent), poor agricultural season (27 percent) or natural 
disasters (29 percent).  It is noted that household diets did not worsen proportionally with 
income decrease, with only 9 percent stating that their diets worsened compared with 13 
percent whose economic situation worsened.  In addition, 29 percent of the households 
surveyed went through a difficult situation in the last 12 months.  The crises include 
family matters (19 percent), business trouble (10 percent) and external shocks (5 percent).  
To cope with these crises, the households applied different coping strategies: 14 percent 
of the households increased their economic activities; 13 percent spent past savings; 12 
percent borrowed money or gold; and another 6 percent had to reduce consumption or 
sell assets.  Nearly all of the households reported some or a lot of difficulty in paying 
large expenses, and only 5 percent could afford large expenses with no difficulty.  
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 SUMMARY OF THE SECOND SECTION (NATIONAL, SECTORAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT) 
 
Poverty in Cambodia is widespread and there is little infrastructure in rural areas. The need to 
create economic opportunities in the rural sector in a country where more than 84 percent of the 
population is rural and where more than 90 percent of the poor live in rural areas, it is 
undeniable.  However, it should be stressed that microfinance is not a panacea:  access to 
financial services (and more concretely to credit) does not create economic opportunities but 
rather it helps people to take greater advantage of existing economic opportunities.   
 
Despite significant progress on many fronts, Cambodia still faces formidable challenges.  
Cambodia’s financial sector is at a rudimentary state.  Rural households are still underserved by 
rural finance: an analysis of household coverage indicates that demand exceeds supply.  In 
addition, there is regional disparity in access to microfinance services in rural areas, especially 
in the north and north-east of the country and the province of Koh Kong.  Rural households 
currently have outstanding debts but there is little reliable information on the sources of credit, 
average debt sizes and the uses of credit (whether stated or real).  Information on cash flows, 
livelihoods strategies and demand for other financial products besides credit is also limited or 
simply lacking.  Within the formal financial sector, commercial banks do not serve rural 
populations, with the only very notable exception of ACLEDA Bank, which previously was a 
microfinance operator.   
 
In addition to ACLEDA Bank, licensed and registered microfinance operators as well as the 
informal financial sector are the providers of financial services to poor rural households, albeit 
offering mainly rural credit.  In fact, the Cambodian microfinance sector can be more accurately 
described as a microcredit sector: savings needs are also largely underserved, and except for a 
single health insurance project, microfinance providers do not provide other financial services 
(besides credit and savings). 
 
The top-nine microfinance operators are ACLEDA Bank – Micro and Small Loan portfolio; 
PRASAC; AMRET; CEB; TPC; VISIONFUND; Hattha Kaksekar; AMK; and CREDIT.  
213 
 214 
Together these top-nine microfinance operators capture 93 percent of all outstanding loans and 
serve 94 percent of the clients.  The analysis of the evolution of all microfinance providers 
reporting to the NBC, from 2000 to 2006 concludes that the Cambodian microfinance sector 
appears to be splitting into two groups: those MFIs maintaining a focus on small-balance loans 
and outreach, and other MFIs working with a mixed product offering of micro- and SME-loans.  
The first group is composed mainly by AMK, TPC and AMRET and, to a lesser extent, by 
VisionFund and PRASAC.  The second group is composed by CEB, ACLEDA Bank, Hattha 
Kaksekar and CREDIT.  In addition, the analysis further suggests that microentrepreneurs (and 
small enterprises) have benefited more than rural households from the increase in loans 
available to rural areas and that new entrants into the formal banking system also tend to focus 
more on microentrepreneurs and small enterprises.  Finally, while licensed microfinance 
operators appear to be increasingly professionalized, further information is necessary on 
marginal licensed MFIs and other (registered or non-registered) microfinance operators to 
assess the likelihood of their long-term financial success.   
 
Regarding specifically AMK, its evolution from a program of an international NGO (Concern 
Worldwide) into a Cambodian independent microfinance institution can be described as a 
success.  The geographic expansion of operations along with the characteristics of AMK’s 
products and services and their corresponding methodologies seem to serve the population its 
mission statement calls for.  In addition, the current institutional structures set in place provide a 
balance between social and financial performance, with a pioneering parallel system of social 
and audit committees reporting to the Board of Directors as well as a market and social 
research function at the management level.  AMK remains as one of the sub-group of 
microfinance operators that reach poorer populations and has maintained low average loan 
sizes compared to other top-nine operators (and the lowest during the last 3 year).  In relative 
terms, AMK is the fastest growing microfinance operator in terms of outreach: moving from 5 
percent of the market in 2000 to 11 percent in 2006.  Currently it is the fourth microfinance 
institution in terms of borrowers and it is growing at the highest rate per year (34 percent on 
average).   
SECTION 3 – EMPIRICAL STUDY: Measuring Poverty and 
Vulnerability among AMK Clients 
 
The Third Section covers the Empirical Study of this dissertation and it is composed by chapters 
VII and VIII.   
 
Chapter VII provides information on the methodology applied to the two poverty measures used 
in this study.  The first section covers information on the sample size, representativeness and 
selection issues as well as the design of the survey tool.  The second section first describes the 
methodology applied to the wellbeing score, which is based in Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) followed by the methodology applied to the daily food expenditure measure per capita.   
 
Chapter VIII goes on the summarize the results of analyzing the relative measurement of the 
wellbeing score as well as the absolute measure of the daily per capita expenditure in food items.  
The chapter also details what each of the two types of measures show and what can be implied 
or ascertain from these findings.  The last section compares the finding of both type of poverty 






 Chapter VII  - METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter VII studies the main methodological questions of the empirical study and is divided in 
three main areas: (a) the size of the sample, representativeness and selection issues (b) the 
survey tool, and (c) the different methodologies for analysis applied to the study. 
 
The methodological approach involved a review of related literature in order to merge the best 
approaches and adapted them to the Cambodian context.  Particularly, the questionnaire design 
has drawn from particular questions (and underlying hypotheses) found in the following four 
programs or projects and have been adapted to the specific context of rural Cambodia:  
 
(1) The results from the USAID’s Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) 
project, which aimed to improve the understanding of the impacts of microenterprise 
programs on microentrepreneurs, their households and enterprises and to strengthen the 
ability of USAID and its partners to measure the results of microenterprise programs.  
(2) The multicountry research program of the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI)/Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) on measuring relative poverty.  
The project was financed by CGAP and the methodology for the tool developed by 
IFPRI.  The objective was to design and test a simple, low-cost operational tool to 
measure the poverty level of MFI clients relative to non-clients.221   
(3) The Imp-Act global action-research program, supported by the Ford Foundation and 
aimed at developing impact assessment systems based on the priorities of microfinance 
operators and their stakeholders; to broaden the scope of impact assessment to include 
wider poverty impacts; and to influence thinking and practice relating to the role of 
microfinance in poverty reduction. 
(4) The USAID’s Accelerated Microenterprise Advancement Project-Poverty Assessment 
Tools (AMAP-PAT) implemented by the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland.  The 
                                                 
221 The tool was tested in four case-countries microfinance institutions: SHARE in India, Kenya Women Finance 
Trust in Kenya, ACODEP in Nicaragua and Desjardins in Madagascar. 
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 IRIS-AMAP/ PAT project, aimed at designing at least two low-cost tools for poverty 
assessment in order to prove fulfillment of the new USAID mandate that “half of all 
USAID microenterprise funds benefit the very poor.”  The project defines the very poor 
as “those living on less than USD 1 a day, or those living in the bottom 50 percent below 
their country's poverty line.”   
 
In addition, some survey questions and techniques have been adapted from FINCA’s 
methodologies (Hatch, 2007), particularly the FINCA Client Assessment Tool (FCAT) tool that 
was reviewed in Chapter III and that is detailed in Annex 4. 
 
The methodology applied for defining AMK wellbeing score relies significantly on the 
IFPRI/CGAP initiative and it is based on the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) tool.  More 
specifically, the empirical study follows the methodology proposed by Henry, Carla; Sharma, 
M.; Lapenu, C.; Zeller, M. (2003) Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool. CGAP Technical 
Tool Series No.5.  The handbook explains in detail the process for conducting a comparative 
poverty assessment between MFI clients and nonclients and it is often referred throughout the 
text as the IFPRI/CGAP manual. 
 
As it was described in Chapter III, poverty refers not only to lack of adequate income but also to 
the limited capacity to take advantage of economic (livelihoods) opportunities and to the 
vulnerability of households to variations in their income or cash-flow patterns.  
Methodologically, this study addresses the multidimensionality of poverty by applying PCA as 
the statistical tool to define AMK’s wellbeing/poverty score.  Likewise, the household survey 
tool covers multiple dimensions: cash-flow patterns (including income and consumption 
patterns); average food consumption (as a proxy for income); variations in asset holding for both 
physical assets (whether productive or not) and intangible assets such as human capital 
(education and health) or social capital; and households vulnerability status (that is, how well 
placed they are to cope with internal and external shocks). 
 
In addition, the study had to face the selection bias problem when choosing the control group.  
Selection bias refers to choosing respondents that are significantly different from the intended 
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 general sample, producing a profile that is not representative of the general population.  Selection 
bias can happen either because the researcher chooses a particular subgroup of the population or 
because the respondents put themselves into these groups (i.e. self-selection bias), usually 
because they aspire to belong to those groups even if they are not currently part of them.  The 
first part of the problem has been minimized since the control group was defined as nonclients 
chosen randomly in the villages where clients were interviewed.  On the other hand, the self-
selection problem cannot be completely addressed.  Applying new clients as the control group 
would reduce the self-selection biases since new clients share the same intrinsic characteristics of 
the client population.  However, new clients are not an adequate comparison group for 
longitudinal impact studies and were discarded as the control group.  Indeed, the relative and 
multidimensional poverty measurement detailed in this section has been created along side a 
general framework for a future longitudinal impact study.  While the impact study will not be 
part of this dissertation, it is envisioned that the transformation effects on clients will be assessed 
by comparing the AMK-PCA wellbeing score of clients and nonclients (the control group) over 
time.  It is precisely the definition of the AMK-PCA wellbeing score that will be detailed in this 
chapter.222  Table VII-1 below offers a summary of the methodology applied to the study: 
 
Table VII-1: Methodology 
Methodology Quantitative = Questionnaire. 
Type of questionnaire Mostly closed questions, but also occasional open ended questions. 
Type of questions Dichotomous (Yes/No, Men/Women, etc); categorical;  multiple response options; etc. 
Answers: Type of data  
Ordinal (measurement scale that specifies ordered relationships of objects or events 
such as low/medium/high). 
 
Nominal (measurement scale that specifies categories but with no intrinsic order such as 
men/women or single/married/divorced/widow(er)). 
 
Ratio data (measurement scale in which responses correspond to absolute values, 
including the absolute value of zero). 
Analysis Types 
Simplification of the client profile information into a single Wellbeing Score.  
 
Daily Food Expenditure Per Capita (for rural households). 
Analysis Tools 
Wellbeing Scoring: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Tercile Analysis.  
 
Daily Food Expenditure Per Capita: Benchmark with Cambodian Food Poverty Line.  
 
Comparing the results of both poverty measures.  
                                                 
222 A framework for a future longitudinal Impact Study has been created alongside these poverty measurements.  
The transformation effects on clients will be assessed comparing the AMK-PCA wellbeing score of clients and 
nonclients (the control group) over time. 
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 The client household profile information referred in the analysis types above, has been already 
summarized in the final section of Chapter VI, where the main results were presented applying 
simple descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Sample Size, Representativeness and Selection Issues 
 
This study has covered a total of 450 households: 360 are client households and 90 are nonclient 
households (which become the control group).  Fieldwork took place in the first part of the year 
2006 and covered the five provinces of operation of AMK at that time: Banteay Meanchey 
(BMC), Battambang (BTB), Kampong Speu (KSP), Pursat (PST) and Siem Reap (SRP). 
 
The sampling methodology used is a two-stage random selection process resulting in a self-
weighting sample.  In the first stage, 30 villages were randomly selected proportionate to the size 
of client population in all of AMK operational areas.  In the second stage, in each of the 30 
villages, 12 clients were randomly selected applying simple random sampling.223   
 
The 30 villages were chosen from the list of all AMK’s Village Banks with more than 14 active 
clients as of 31 December 2005.  This is because, due the characteristics of AMK group loans, it 
is possible to have less than 14 clients who are active in a given date in a VB.  The sampling 
requires an absolute minimum of 14 households for fieldwork (12 client households plus 2 
replacements).  However, using VBs with more than 14 clients does not affect the random 
selection proportionate to client population by province since the proportion of clients in each 
province remains exactly the same regardless of whether we count all clients, only group clients 
or only group clients in VBs with more than 14 active clients.  Table VII-2 shows that the 
percentages between total clients and total group clients in Village Banks with more than 14 
members remain constant.  
                                                 
223 The two-stage sampling methodology is described in detail in Henry et al. (2003).  The sample design benefited 
from the input and feedback of the members of AMK’s Social Performance Committee (SPC) and particularly from 
the inputs of Dr. Manfred Zeller. 
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 Table VII-2: Clients and Clients in Village Banks with more than 14 members 
 Total Clients 31/Dec/05 Total Group Clients 31/Dec/05 
Total Group Clients in VB 
> 14 members 
Banteay Meanchey (BMC) 11,192 31% 10,855 31% 10,746 31% 
Battambang (BTB) 3,081 9% 3,047 9% 3,036 9% 
Kampong Speu (KSP) 9,198 25% 8,662 25% 8,609 25% 
Pursat (PST) 8,382 23% 7,964 23% 7,814 23% 
Siem Reap (SRP) 4,367 12% 4,169 12% 4,127 12% 
Total 36,220 100% 34,697 100% 34,332 100% 
 
 
Table VII-3 below shows the results of the first stage (i.e. selecting 30 villages proportionate to 
the provincial distribution of AMK clients), with the distribution of the sample by province.  
First, AMK determined the minimum 27 villages proportional to provincial distribution of VBs 
by using only the integers and dropping the decimals in the distribution.  Secondly, the 
remaining 3 villages were chosen randomly among the total list of clients in all provinces, 
selecting 3 random numbers from the cumulated list of all clients in all provinces and picking the 
3 villages that contained each client.  Random numbers were selected within the boundaries of 
the cumulated list of clients (i.e. the sum of clients over the list) in order to avoid biases towards 
clients from smaller VBs; otherwise smaller and larger VBs would have had the same probability 
of being selected.  Therefore, in stage 1-a, 27 villages were selected proportional to the 
provincial distribution and in stage 1-b, 3 additional random villages were selected from the 
cumulated list of all clients in all provinces.   
 




(in VB > 14) 















Banteay Meanchey (BMC) 10,746 (31%) 9.4 9 1 10 
Battambang (BTB) 3,036 (9%) 2.7 2  2 
Kampong Speu (KSP) 8,609 (25%) 7.5 7  7 
Pursat (PST) 7,814 (23%) 6.8 6 1 7 
Siem Reap (SRP) 4,127 (12%) 3.6 3 1 4 
Total 34,332 (100%)  27 3 30 
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 In the second stage, in each village 12 clients were chosen using simple standard sampling, i.e. 
equal probability of being selected.  Table VII-4 below shows the summary of total sampled 
client households by province.  Note that the sampling accomplishes its objective with similar 
percentages between the number of existing group clients in Village Banks with more than 14 
members and the number of AMK client households interviewed.  Annex 24 provides further 
details on the villages selected and the districts and provinces they belong to as well as the 
specific names of each of the individuals interviewed.  
 




(in VB > 14) 
Household Sampling [Stage 2] 








Banteay Meanchey (BMC) 10,746 (31%) 10 120 (33%) 30 150 (33%) 
Battambang (BTB) 3,036 (9%) 2 24 (7%) 6 30 (7%) 
Kampong Speu (KSP) 8,609 (25%) 7 84 (23%) 21 105 (23%) 
Pursat (PST) 7,814 (23%) 7 84 (23%) 21 105 (23%) 
Siem Reap (SRP) 4,127 (12%) 4 48 (13%) 12 60 (13%) 
Total 34,332 (100%) 30 360 (100%) 90 450 (100%) 
 
The whole set of fieldwork took place between 26 March and 23 May 2006, with a break in 
April coinciding with the traditional Khmer New Year holiday.  This time period is right after 
the rice harvest and before the planting season which starts again in June/July.  These months 
were chosen because that is the time of the year in which rural households with (direct or 
indirect) farm-based livelihoods have more free time.  Originally, there was also a high seasonal 
concentration of new loans in the first half of the year but this pattern is reducing over time, 
particularly with the introduction of Village Bank-Credit Line loans discussed in Chapter VI, 
which are becoming increasingly popular among existing clients.  The fieldwork was undertaken 
entirely by Pech Sithon and Pum Sophy, then officers working for AMK’s Training, Research 
and Marketing (TRAM) Department and under the direct supervision of the author.   
 
In rural Cambodia, distances cannot be adequately assessed in Km because of the state of the 
road and it is commonly assessed in travel time.  Thus, travel time becomes a proxy for the 
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 remoteness of the villages covered.  On average, it took 56 minutes to travel from the branch 
office to the villages with small variations among provinces: villages were more remote in Siem 
Reap province (with an average of 106 minutes) and more easily approached in Battambang 
(with 43 minutes of travel time).  Average travel time was 52 minutes in Banteay Meanchey, 47 
minutes in Kampong Speu and 46 minutes in Pursat.  The distribution of time traveled to reach 
the villages is shown in the histogram in Figure VII-1 below, indicating that the sampled villages 
are usually remote and difficult to reach. 
 
  
Figure VII-1: Histogram of Minutes from Branch to Location (MFBL)  




















Once in the village, information on who of the pre-selected client sample is present at the village 
at the time of the interview was facilitated by AMK’s Village Bank President (VBP); this also 
identified the number of clients that had to be chosen from the replacement list.  The first 
interviewee was introduced by the VBP but subsequent households were introduced by the 
previous interviewee.  Note that while the VBPs helped identify nonclients’ dwellings, the 
selection was random and performed by the fieldwork team.  Finally, the interviewees were 
informed how the research department is different from the regular operations department and 
assured the interviewees that their information would be treated with complete confidentiality.   
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 Clients who were pre-selected in the sample list but quit between 31 December 2005 and the 
actual time of the survey were only interviewed if they stated their desire to borrow again within 
the next 6 months (i.e. if they were classified as “dormant” clients as opposed to “deserting” 
clients).  All other clients that exited AMK between 31 December and the time of the fieldwork 
were dropped from the list and the team choose another client from the replacement list.224 
 
All replacement client households were also selected from a specific list.  While it is common to 
prepare 2 replacements for each 12 clients, in this empirical study 13 randomly selected 
replacements have been included for each 12 randomly selected client households.  By 
establishing a longer list of potential replacements, random selection of clients can be assured.  
The average replacement rate was 33 percent.  This high replacement rate is mainly due to the 
nature of rural villages in Cambodia: often many households are absent at one particular time or 
season of the year; clients are busy in the fields, migrate temporarily or are attending a local 
celebration (wedding, funeral, etc) or share transport to attend the nearby market.  Annex 25 
studies in detail the incidence of replacements by village, province and enumerator in order to 
confirm the patterns outlined above. 
 
In each village, the same proportion of client-nonclient households was interviewed:  3 nonclient 
households for every 12 client households.  The nonclient households are not currently AMK 
clients and thus they may borrow from other MFIs or informal lenders.  Nonclient households 
were selected randomly within the village.  The specific procedure for the random walk was the 
following:  in each village one member of the team selected one nonclient households and the 
other team member selected two nonclient households.  The VBP provided the information of 
the location of nonclient dwellings but households were randomly selected making sure they 
were not close together.  Often, nonclients were interviewed after each team member finished 
with their allotted 6 client households, although sometimes nonclient households were 
interviewed while waiting on the allotted client to become available.  This is believed 
appropriate as villages in rural Cambodia have no spatial clustering of wealth.  
                                                 
224 The implementation of this rule remains difficult to verify.  From the 360 client households, 72 reported having 
their loan fully repaid at the time of the interview.  While it is likely that most of these 72 clients were indeed 
dormant this fact will not be confirmed for sure until the follow-up interview scheduled for 2008.  As a useful 
benchmark, note that based on AMK 2006 Exit Survey, 18 percent of exit clients can be classified as dormant, 
which is consistent with the figures provided above. 
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 The sample distribution in each of the provinces is shown in detail in Graphs VII-2 to VII-6 
below, with the districts not yet covered by AMK operations highlighted in grey. 
 
? As shown in Figure VII-2, in Banteay Meanchey province fieldwork took place in most 
districts except Malai, O'Chrov and Svay Chek.  Concretely, 4 villages in Mongkol Borei; 2 
in Phnum Srok; 1 in Preah Netr Preah; 1 in Serei Saophoan and 2 in Thma Puok.  Note that 
AMK works in all districts in Banteay Meanchey.   
 







 ? As shown in Figure VII-3, in Battambang province fieldwork took place in Moung Ruessei 
and Sangkae districts with 1 village in each.  At the time of the fieldwork, AMK only 
operated in one additional district within the province: Thma Koul. 
 






 ? As shown in Figure VII- 4, in Kampong Speu province fieldwork took place in Odongk and 
Samraong Tong districts (2 villages in each) and in 3 villages in Thpong district.  AMK was 
also operational in Phnum Srouch, Kong Pisei and Chbar Mon but Aoral and Basedth were 
not operating areas. 
 






 ? As shown in Figure VII- 5, in Pursat province fieldwork took place in Bakan and Phnum 
Kravanh districts (3 villages in each) and in 1 village in Kandieng district.  In addition, at the 
time of the fieldwork AMK was active in Krakor and Sampov Meas.  However, AMK does 
not operate in Veal Veng district and the southern part of the Phnum Kravanh district is 
forest area with little or no population. 
 







? Finally Figure VII- 6 shows that in Siem Reap province, fieldwork took place in 3 villages in 
Kralanh district and in one village in Puok.  In addition, at the time of the fieldwork, AMK 
was also active in Angkor Chum district.  
 





On the following page, Figure VII-7 shows the map of Cambodia providing the overall 
distribution of the sample throughout the country and mimicking the areas of operations within 
the province at the time of the fieldwork.  
 Figure VII-7: Geographical Distribution of the Total Sample  
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 Design of the Survey Tool  
 
The survey tool, also referred as the household cash-flow survey, can be found in Annex 26, 
including all codes and definitions applied (which are also specified at the end of the tool).225  
The household’s cash-flow survey covers the following main areas:  
 
(a) General demographics and household information, such as the family size, income 
earners, age or number of children.  This corresponds to Section A in the questionnaire. 
(b) Sources of income and expenses in the last year; seasonality of household inflows and 
outflows in the last 12 months (or cash-flow patterns); and an estimation of the 
household’s food expenditures.  Household inflows are covered in Section B; household 
outflows are covered in Section C; and the estimation of the households’ food 
expenditure is covered in Section D. 
(c) Asset holding levels: physical assets (including productive assets) and intangible assets 
such as human capital (education and health) and social capital (social relations).  
Physical assets are covered in Section E of the survey tool while intangible assets and 
social capital are covered in Question G.10 to G.12. 
(d) Other vulnerability information, such as variations in economic situation, food security, 
indebtedness, difficulty in coping with external or internal shocks as well as coping 
strategies.  Vulnerability information is generally found in Section G, except of loan and 
indebtedness information which is covered in Section F of the survey tool. 
 
Some key detailed explanations specific to the application of this tool and to the Cambodian 
context are provided below.  
 
                                                 
225 Codes apply for the following questions: A.4.2 and A.7 (Gender); A.6 (Position in the household); A.9 (civil 
status); A.12 (Highest class passed); B.5.1 (type of manufacturing activity); B.6.1 (type of service activity) and 
B.8.1 (other inflows including, rental or provas and sale and pawned items).   
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 ? The number of members in a particular household is defined as the “Group of individuals 
who live together under the same roof and regularly share meals and expenses together 
(household members share the same food at least once a day).”  Family members away from 
home are not included unless they are:  
− Migrant spouse or migrant children that contributes regularly/ substantially to the 
household expenses or  
− Children of head of household attending boarding school when the household fully 
supports them financially. 
 
Also in Section A, the expenditures in clothes and shoes for all members of the household 
during the last 12 months (Question A.14) include also second hand clothes and are probed 
by each member with time reference points: Khmer New Year, school, plowing /harvest or 
other celebrations.  The figure does not include gifts, or clothes passed by one member to 
another.  If sewn at home, it provides the value of all materials used: thread, fabrics, buttons, 
and needles. 
 
While the head of household and the AMK client are explicitly identified by questions 
(Question A. 6 and Question A.14 respectively), the first person in the demographics grid of 
Section A corresponds to the person interviewed within the household structure. 
 
? Secondly, the Khmer term “provas” (Question B.8.1) means “sharing” – whether 
“sharecropping or “sharelivestocking” and is considered a type of rental.  There are two main 
differences between traditional Khmer provas and common rental: 
− in provas the “rental” is post-paid (i.e. rice is given after harvest or the owner of the 
cow will get the first calf while the family caring after the cow will get the second 
calf) while other rental arrangements are usually pre-paid and  
− in case of a natural calamity, no full payment is expected (at least not in cash) while 
in the other common rental arrangements, the full amount will be paid regardless of 
natural calamities or other external forces. 
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 Also, pawning assets (Question B.8.1) is considered as a “type of sale” (basically, selling at a 
worse price but it is also cheaper to buy back), simply because most pawning cases 
encountered never quite claimed the asset back.  
 
? In Section E, household assets are defined as equipment and durable goods, i.e. goods that 
last for a long time (some of them could be passed to their children): cultivable land, 
livestock, house, gold/jewelry, TV or radio, motorcycle, etc. 
 
? Regarding education and the highest education level achieved by individuals (Questions G.10 
and A.12), in the Cambodian context, primary school refers to grades 1 to 6 and it is used as 
a proxy from 6 to 12 years old; lower secondary refers to grades 7 to 9 and it is used as a 
proxy from 13 to 15 years old and upper secondary refers to grades 10 to 12 and it is used as 
a proxy from 16 to 18 years old. 
 
? Finally, food security refers specifically to Question G.2 but it is also triangulated with 
Questions G.3, G.4, and G.5.  Note that meals refer to meal eaten and not cooked; e.g. a 
household might eat 3 times a day but cook only twice a day. 
 
This questionnaire has been revised in two occasions.  The first revision incorporated the 
learning from the results of the original test in 2004 with a sample of 114 households and the 
second revision entailed modified questions and pre-coded answers for the 522 sample of 2005.  
The survey tool also includes thorough inputs from the members of AMK’s Social Performance 
Committee at the end of 2005.  Concretely, as a result of the Committee feedback a grid of 
household demographic information was added in Section A; a modified version of the IRIS-
AMAP/ PAT expenditure composite survey combined with the original FINCA-tested questions 
for estimating the food expenditure per household was incorporated in Section D; and Section F 
added a pre-coded list of risks (and the corresponding coping mechanisms) previously tested by 
CDRI surveys.  
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 The questionnaire took on average about 40 minutes to complete (42 minutes for clients and 33 
for nonclients).226  The format of the questionnaire per se has remained very similar to the 
original formats of 2004 and 2005 and it is somewhat different from the commonly used survey 
formats since it responds to what was convenient to the research team.  For instance, all the 
coding has been included at the end of the tool instead of throughout the document because the 
team had already memorized the codes of all the answers.   
 
Questions that could potentially be perceived as discriminatory were purposely excluded, such as 
religious groups, the ethnic group227 or asking directly who the head of the household is; 
information about the household head is obtained when probing in the household composition in 
Section A without labeling it as such.  Additionally, it is fairly easy to identify the female headed 
households through a simple query.   
 
The survey tool included some self-assessment questions.  Self-assessments are often considered 
unreliable for use in comparison studies due to the subjective nature of the responses.  Specific 
self-assessment questions in the survey tool included: the expectations of how many children 
will graduate from school, the strategies used to pay for healthcare, and how many friends within 
the community would help them in case of an emergency.  These self-assessed questions are 
variations of previous questions developed by FINCA in their research efforts for measuring 
poverty (Hatch, 2002) and were included to test if they could also be valid for the Cambodian 
context.  In addition, the reviewers of poverty assessment tools under the IRIS-AMAP/ PAT 
project concurred that some of the FINCA’s approaches were “interesting” and recommended 
further field testing for some aspects (Zeller, 2004: 29).  The specific reasons for the inclusion of 
each question in the survey tool are detailed below:  
                                                 
226 On average, the original 2004 questionnaire took 72 minutes and the one in 2005 also took 40 minutes on 
average.  These time savings were due to the simplification of the questionnaire but most importantly to the 
Cambodian research team being solely responsible for the fieldwork, which dramatically reduced the translation 
time.   
227 Note that Cambodia is relatively ethnically homogenous.  Khmer ethnicity makes up some 96% of the population 
and the remaining 4% is divided among 2.2% Cham (or Khmer Islam); 0.2% Chinese; 0.4% Vietnamese and 0.1% 
highland tribal groups (Khmer Loeu, Chunchiet or highlanders encompassing a total of 17 different ethnic groups); 
finally other groups include Thai, Lao, and other.  Most of these small ethnic groups are geographically concentrated 
in specific areas of the country:  Chinese, Vietnamese and Thai mostly in Phnom Penh; Cham in Kompong Cham 
and neighboring provinces; and highlanders in Ratana Kiri, Mondol Kiri, Kratie and Stung Treng (World Bank 
2006: 43).  In the rural areas where the fieldwork took place nearly all would be classified as ethnically Khmer.   
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 (i) The perceived level of difficulty in affording large expenses has been included in the 
questionnaire (Question G.9) because vulnerability to shocks has been consistently 
recorded in country reports and analysis as a crucial catalyst of poverty and 
vulnerability to poverty in rural Cambodia, particularly medical emergencies and 
health expenses.228  
(ii) The tool included child-specific indicators even when not all households have 
children in order to test if the expectation of a household about how many of their 
children would complete secondary school (Question G.10) could be a good indicator 
of human capital.  Also, note that due to the history of Cambodia, general low levels 
of adult education further complicated measuring education as a human asset.  
(iii) Health-related information is often rejected because responses are deemed highly 
subjective and misleading, without specialized training of the interviewers by health 
specialists.  The tool collected information on the frequency of selling assets or 
borrowing money in order to afford healthcare expenses.  This question allowed 
assessing the incidence of health crisis in households without requiring specific health 
related training. 
(iv) Finally, indicators for social capital are often rejected due to the difficulty of 
measuring and identifying comparable indicators.  Notwithstanding, the tool used as 
an indicator of social capital the number of good friends or neighbors that the 
household has in the village or community were they live.  This type of question 
seemed propitiatory due the particular characteristics of rural households in remote 
Cambodia.  
 
The following paragraphs briefly review some other questions commonly found in surveys but 
that have been adapted for or excluded from the AMK survey tool and explain the reasons 
behind the specific adaptation or its exclusion.   
 
                                                 
228 For instance see Ballard, ed. (2007), WB (2006a, 2006b) or FitzGerald and So (2007) referenced extensively in 
the Cambodian Poverty Profile explored in Chapter IV.  
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 Firstly, own production that is consumed within the household, is commonly assessed by asking 
the value food that the household produces on its farm or garden, or gathers from the forest and 
then consumed.  In the case of AMK, the questionnaire divided this question into two separate 
entries: first it asks for the value of rice consumed229 and secondly it asks for the value of other 
food items that the household has produced in the farm or garden.  A third specific question 
covers the value of food consumed that has been gathered, collected or fished from the forest or 
river/pond/lake has been added since the use of Common Property Resources (CPR)230 is very 
relevant within the Cambodian rural context.  Also, the recall period in this type of questions are 
usually one week, but this becomes irrelevant in rural Cambodia (particularly for rice, which is 
the staple of Cambodian diet); therefore, the recall period applied to the survey tool for food 
produced and consumed within the households is 12 months.  
 
Secondly, the monetization of expenditures in non-food items have been excluded in the 
questionnaire in order to reduce the duration of the survey tool and because most nonfood items 
were not relevant for comparisons with national benchmarks or among different provinces.231  
For instance, the cash-flow survey does not ask the amount spent on other nonfood goods such as 
wood or charcoal for fire/cooking or utilities (such as electricity, phone, water and sanitation) or 
fuel (such as kerosene, paraffin, wood or gas for cooking).  In fact, over 93 percent of 
households use firewood/charcoal for cooking and 53 percent of household use kerosene for 
lighting (RGC-MoP, 2006: 71).  In rural Cambodia, common lighting sources also include 
batteries (car batteries) and there are nearly no toilet facilities to speak of.  Households in rural 
Cambodia do not display much in terms of furniture or appliances, except for the traditional 
bed/table furniture and common household appliances and kitchen items.  However, construction 
materials (pillars, wood logs, cement-bases for pillars) are bought throughout the year in small 
amounts and become a form of savings until households have accumulated all elements required 
                                                 
229 The amount of rice consumed by the households (Question E.2) was double checked at the time of the physical 
review of the questionnaires applying the following simple rule: amount consumed had to be over the estimation of 
minimum self-sufficiency requirement for rice which have been estimated at 10 tang (240 Kg) per adult per year and 
5 tang (120 Kg) per child per year (Conway, 1999: 137).  Please note that 1 tang = 2 tao = 24 Kg; 1 tao = 12 Kg. 
230 CPR refers to plants and animals collected from the field and forest, including fish and wood.  Other CPR 
include: bamboo, palm leaf, fruits, roots, wild vegetables, frogs, land crabs, birds, snakes, rats or rabbits, etc. 
231 In addition, note that there is no LSMS in Cambodia and the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSEC), which 
is the LSMS equivalent in the Cambodian context, uses a “diaries” methodology while AMK survey uses a “recall” 
methodology, which would further complicate the potential task of comparing results from both sources of data. 
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 for setting them up or assemble them.  While the survey tool does not asks for the specific 
amount spent, it does ask for an enumeration of all the main outflows in the household and 
identify the main 3 expenditures in the year (without attempting to monetize these items and 
without attempting to classify them as consumption or, productive / economic activity 
expenditure or both.  At the same time, the questionnaire does not analyze in detail the enterprise 
expenses because most livelihoods are based on subsistence and small family enterprises are 
rarely able to adequately separate enterprise budgets from household budgets.  The outflow 
section (Section C in the questionnaire) is not directly comparable with national surveys, but has 
been included in the survey tool because it is very useful information for client profiling and 
product design.  For instance, if paying back a loan is one of the main outflows in a household, 
this is crucial information for AMK and this data could not have been collected if the 
questionnaire only concentrated on consumption expenditures. 
 
Finally, regarding land ownership, people in Cambodia use simultaneously and indistinctively 
different measures of size (Squared meters, Are, Hectares and Rai)232 and different measures of 
value (Riel, Dollars, Chi and Damloeng)233  The value of cultivable land is provided by the 
interview and probed, if necessary, by asking “If you were to sell that land today, how much 
money would you receive for it?” or “If you want to buy land like yours today, how much money 
would it cost you?”  Regarding the values of land, it is not possible to have a reasonably accurate 
reference for land values as the land situation in Cambodia is very unorganized at the moment.  
Since it is not possible to verify to reject market prices provided by the respondents, the cash-
flow survey trusts the information provided without any further data triangulation. 
 
In addition to the household survey, a community survey was completed for all villages where 
fieldwork took place.  This information was provided by the Credit Officer and/or Area Manager 
in charge of the particular village.  The objective is to provide a general overview of the 
communities/villages where fieldwork took place and covered four main areas:  
                                                 
232 The equivalent measures are: 1 Ha = 10,000 m2 = 100 Ares = 6.25 Rai 
233 The equivalent measures are: 1 Chi = 3.75 gr. gold;  1 Damloeng = 10 Chi.  The conversions used in this 
dissertation are the following: For gold prices, the prices at the end of last quarter of 2005 were used (1 Chi = USD 
57 and thus, 1 Damloeng = USD 570).  For USD conversion, I used the average of exchange rate form March to 
May 2006 (the time of the fieldwork), which has been used throughout the dissertation.  The rate applied is 1 USD  
= R 4,906 (March 2006: 1USD = 4,095; April 2006: 1USD = 4,092; May 2006: 1USD = 4,102). 
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 ? Main demographics of the community (such as number of households; average household 
size; main economic activity; incidence of temporary migration, etc.);  
? Main credit providers (MFIs/MFOs/NGOs, informal sources);  
? Main infrastructure (hospitals; schools; and access to electricity, water or mobile network 
coverage);  
? Main incidence of natural or non-natural disasters (flood, drought, land grabbing, lack of 
access to Common Property Resources (CPR)234) 
 
This community survey is a modification of the tool applied by IRIS-AMAP/PAT project in 
Uganda but due to time constraints it was filled in once all other household cash-flow surveys 
where finished (May 2006) instead of coinciding with the village visit schedule from May to 
May.  Interviews took place in person, by phone or through AMK’s internal video/VoIP system.  
The Community Survey can be found in Annex 27.  The most interesting highlights have been 
highlighted in Chapter VI – AMK Client and Village Profile.235  
 
 
Benchmarking with National Level Data 
 
The analysis of the cash-flow survey tool provides a profile of the average AMK client 
household.  This profile was already summarized in the last section Chapter VI and does 
coincide in the basic features of all recent reports on rural livelihoods and poverty profiles.236   
 
                                                 
234 CPR definition discussed in footnote 230. 
235 Note that the highlights discussed in Chapter VI correspond to latest sampling available at the time of writing this 
dissertation (2007) instead of the sample applied for this dissertation, which took place in 2006.  Findings are 
expected to be very similar, as the findings from the Client Profile 2007 were indeed very similar to ones of the 
Client Profile produced in 2005. 
236 See for example Ballard, ed. (2007); FitzGerald and So (2007); WB (2006a, 2006b); and RGC-MoP (2006 – 
which have been referenced extensively in the Cambodian Poverty Profile discussed in Chapter IV. 
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 In addition, Table VII-5 below shows the comparison between the basic infrastructure available 
in AMK villages where sampling took place and those villages covered by the Cambodian Socio-
Economic Census (CSES 2003/04) as reported in the Cambodian Poverty Profile (RGS-MoP, 
2006).  Further, the national-level general data on villages is segmented by the level by 
consumption of the household, reporting the specific figures corresponding to the poorest and 
richest quintile.  Table VII-5 shows that the characteristics of the AMK sampled villages 
regarding location and access to basic infrastructure are very similar to the villages covered in 
the RGD-MoP Poverty Profile, further confirming the representativeness of the sample.  
However, sampled villages generally seem closer to the figures of the poorest consumption 
quintile than those of the richest quintile (except for access to primary and lower secondary 
schools).  This difference is likely due to the poorer infrastructure generally available in rural 
settings.  
 
Table VII-5: Comparison of Basic Infrastructure in Villages 
 AMK Villages  Sampled in 2006 (n=30) 
CSES03/04 Sample
RGC- Village Characteristics 
Poverty Profile 





Location     
Distance from Branch to Location  
[Distance to Province headquarters] 32 Km 36 Km 42 Km 25 Km 
Road Condition (Good)  
[Access to all weather roads] 77% 78% 71% 88% 
Access to Basic Infrastructure     
Villages with referral hospital  3% 3% 2% 4% 
Villages with primary school 83% 53% 49% 49% 
Villages with lower secondary school 17% 12% 8% 16% 
Villages with upper secondary school 3% 5% 3% 6% 
Villages with shop for pesticides, etc 10% 16% 11% 22% 
Villages with access to electricity 13% 30% 14% 58% 
Villages with access to piped water 0% 11% 2% 34% 
Distance to Basic Infrastructures (when not 
available in village)     
Distance to nearest referral hospital 16 Km 13 Km 16 Km 9 Km 
Distance to nearest primary school 2 Km 2 Km 2 Km 1 Km 
Distance to nearest lower secondary school 8 Km 12 Km 8 Km 16 Km 
Distance to nearest upper secondary school 15 Km 12 Km 17 Km 7 Km 
Distance to nearest shop for pesticide… 9 Km 8 Km 11 Km 5 Km 
Community Surveys 2006 and RGC-MoP (2006: 72-75). 
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 The basic demographics and household information of the sample also seem consistent with the 
national benchmarks regarding characteristics of households in rural Cambodia, as well as with 
the general population of AMK clients.  The following bullet points provide a brief overview: 
? Women constitute 88 percent of the AMK clients in the sample.  This is consistent with 
the gender disaggregation of AMK clients at the end of December 2005 which was 85 
percent women clients and 15 percent clients who are men. 
? Clients in the sample are on average 41 years old.  
? Only about 60 percent of the interviewees and 50 percent of AMK clients could read and 
write a letter, which is below the average adult literacy rate for rural women of the 
Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey 2004 (CIPS-2004) of 62 percent but in tune 
with the 54 percent rate from the 1998 census.  The mean of number of years of 
schooling was 2.46.  Note also that the percentage of literate adults reported in the CSEC 
03/04 is also consistent with AMK at 44 percent (RGC-MoP, 2006:77).   
? The average household size is 5.3 persons per household, slightly above the national rural 
household size of 5.0 according to the CIPS of 2004 and the figure of 5.1 from the 1998 
census but below the figure reported by the CSEC 03/04 of 5.8 (RGC-MoP, 2006:76).  
The household size for client households is 5.4 and for nonclient households 4.7.   
? In each household there is an average of 2.7 adults and 2.6 children.  
 
The complete figures for literacy rates and household size are displayed in Table VII-6 below 
 
Table VII-6: Comparison of Literacy and Average Household Size 
  Census 1998 CIPS 2004 CSES 03/04 
Literacy Rates    
Adult Literacy Rate 67% 74% 44% 
Women Adult Literacy Rate 57% 64%  
Adult Literacy Rate Rural Areas  65% 72%  
Women Adult Literacy Rate Rural Areas 54% 62%  
Average Household Size     
Household Size (Total)  5.2 5.1 5.8 
Household Size (Rural Areas) 5.1 5.0  
Sources: Census 1999, CIPS 2004 and RGC-MoP (2006, pp. 76-77) 
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 Note that the results of the CIPS 2004 may not be as accurate as the ones from the Census 1998: 
while the Census 1998 covered over 2 million households in more than 13,000 villages the CIPS 
2004 barely covered 21,000 households in 700 villages.   
 
Finally, Table VII-7 compares some very basic indicators from the AMK household sample and 
households interviewed for the CSES 2003/04 regarding dwelling and ownership of consumer 
durables.  As was the case with the comparison for villages these figures further confirm the 
representativeness of the sample with similar dwelling characteristics and ownership of assets, 
albeit the figures of AMK clients tend to be closer to those found in the poorest consumption 
quintile.  
 
Table VII-7: Comparison of Basic Dwelling and Ownership Indicators in Households 
 AMK Client Households [n=360]) 
CSES03/04 Total Sample
RGC- Household Characteristics 
Poverty Profile 





Dwelling     
Living area (m2) 46 m2 44 m2 33 m2 63 m2 
Thatch Roof 38% 20% 37% 5% 
Tiled Roof 11% 29% 20% 31% 
Walls of wood, logs or plywood 45% 46% 33% 53% 
No Toilet Facility 95% 73% 94% 35% 
Ownership Selected Consumer Durables      
Television 48% 50% 26% 79% 
Mobile phone 6% 14% 1% 48% 
Motorcycle 24% 32% 10% 62% 




 Methodology  
 
This section first explores the methodology applied to the AMK Wellbeing Score to later explore 
the methodology applied to the per capita Food Expenditure measure.  The AMK Wellbeing 
Score is a multidimensional and relative measure of poverty, while the Food Expenditure 
measure is a one-dimensional and absolute measure of poverty. 
 
 
Methodology applied to AMK Wellbeing Score:  Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique used to identify a relatively small 
number of components that represent relationships among a set of many interrelated variables.  
PCA provided the vehicle to address the multidimensionality of poverty for the purposes of this 
dissertation.  If poverty is multidimensional, operationalizing these dimensions entails that a set 
of multiple indicators have to be combined into a single index that summarizes the information 
in a logical way.  The method of PCA is used precisely to isolate and measure the poverty 
component embedded in various poverty indicators in order to create a household-specific 
poverty score or index.   
 
In simple terms, PCA is an indicator–based method that simplifies the multidimensionality of 
poverty to a single composite score.  PCA slices information contained in the set of indicators 
into several components and uses the co-movement amongst the indicators (which are likely to 
be related to each other) to isolate and quantify the underlying common components.  Thus, each 
component is constructed as a unique index based on the values of all the indicators. The main 
idea is to formulate a new variable, X*, which is the linear combination of the original indicators 
such that it accounts for the maximum of the total variance in the original indicators. That is, X* 
is computed as: 
 
X* = w1 X1 + w2 X2 + w3 X3,… 
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 where the weight (the ws) are specified such that X* accounts for the maximum variances in X1, 
X2 and X3…..(Henry et al., 2003, Basilevsky 1994; Sharma 1996).   
 
The objective of AMK’s Principal Component Analysis (AMK-PCA) is to address the 
multidimensionality of poverty by measuring the welfare of households as well as their 
vulnerability to poverty.  PCA was selected as the methodology to create a score because it 
selects those indicators that capture common characteristics of poverty rather than to describe the 
causes of poverty and computes a series of weights that mark each indicator’s relative 
contribution to the overall poverty component.  Using these weights, a household-specific 
“poverty score” can be computed based on each household’s indicator values.  The end result is a 
single index that assigns to each sample household a specific score representing that household’s 
wellbeing status in relation to all other households in the sample.  The underlying hypothesis is 
that while it is not possible to create a universal poverty score system, it is possible to create one 
for households in rural Cambodia.   
 
Annex 28 provides an overview of PCA theory, the mathematical summary and the detailed 
procedure.  However, the main properties of the index can be summarized as follows:  
 
(a)  Each component is constructed as a unique index based on the values of all the 
indicators and this index is standardized (i.e. it has a zero mean and a standard 
deviation equal to one);  
(b)  The first principal component accounts for the largest proportion of the total 
variability in the set of indicators used; the second component accounts for the next 
largest amount of variability not accounted by the first component, and so on for the 
higher order components; and  
(c)  Each component is unrelated to the other components; that is, each represents a 
unique underlying attribute.   
 
The construction of the AMK-PCA score has relied on the work produced by Henry et al. (2003) 
for the IFPRI/CGAP poverty score and has followed the same statistical methodology and filters 
in order to ensure that the resulting index does not represent a distorted measure of poverty.  
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 However, there are three fundamental differences between AMK-PCA score and the score 
developed by IFPRI/CGAP-PCA:   
 
1) the survey tool and indicators are different and have been adapted to the reality of rural 
Cambodia, as was discussed in detail in Chapter VII; 
2) the score has been relabeled a “wellbeing score” as opposed to a “poverty score” as a 
conscious effort on concentrating on what clients have as opposed on what they lack;237 
3) the AMK-PCA benchmark is food security instead of the per capita expenditure in 
clothing and footwear benchmark applied in the IFPRI/CGAP-PCA.   
 
Regarding the last point, the IFPRI/CGAP study used as benchmark expenditure in clothing and 
footwear because it can reflect the relative poverty or wealth of a household in many cultures.  
The empirical section of this dissertation actually tested both benchmarks: clothing and footwear 
and food security and decided that the score produced with food security portrays a more 
complete picture of how poverty and vulnerability affect rural households in Cambodia.  
Specifically, the indicators that define the score resulting using food security as a benchmark 
cover some key dimensions of poverty (such as education and health) that were not covered in 
the score built with clothing and footwear as a benchmark.  The statistical comparison of both 
scores will be explored at the end of this section.  In addition, household eating patterns offers 
clues on chronic hunger and are strong indicators of poverty and vulnerability: a household will 
only reduce the quantity or the quality of the food they eat when there is no other coping strategy 
available; in other words “going hungry for all or part of the day” is a decision of last resort.  
According to Henry et al. (2003:56) eating patterns can be affected by the poverty of a household 
in three main ways:   
? First, poorer households tend to consume food on a less regular basis and eat smaller 
quantities than wealthier households; depending on the context, some households skip 
meals or eat smaller quantities during particular seasons of the year or on a more regular 
basis;   
                                                 
237 Concentrating on what clients have, as opposed to on what they lack, has been inspired by the work of Caroline 
Moser on Asset Management, which was discussed on Chapter III – Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty.  
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 ? Second, poorer households tend to consume more of less costly foods and less of more 
costly foods;  
? Third, poorer households are often less able to purchase staple foods in larger quantities 
at better prices or less able to maintain a stock of these staples.   
 
In defining the household index, AMK-PCA wellbeing score followed four stages:   
? First, identifying the strongest individual indicators that distinguish relative levels of 
poverty/wellbeing for the surveyed households of nonclients (i.e. the control group).   
? Secondly, pooling together the explanatory power of the selected indicators into a single 
score using PCA, testing the absolute value of coefficients, sign of component 
coefficients and eigenvalues of the components.   
? Thirdly, testing the model applying the relative size of communalities and Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin test and fourthly, run the model for the total sample, i.e. both clients and 
nonclients.   
The following pages detail each of these stages and the corresponding criteria and cutoff values, 
as defined by the IFPRI/CGAP model.   
 
 
Step 1: Selecting a screened set of indicators that are significantly correlated with the poverty 
and vulnerability benchmark indicator using linear correlation coefficients 
 
In this first step, the objective is to identify the strongest individual indicators that distinguish 
relative levels of poverty for the surveyed households of nonclients. 
 
AMK-PCA chose those indicators that already show a strong correlation with the poverty 
benchmark indicator of “food security” applying the statistical procedure of the linear correlation 
coefficient, which measures the degree to which two variables are associated.  In addition to the 
ordinal and ratio scale indicator variables recommended by the IFPRI/CGAP manual, this 
dissertation used dummy variables (i.e. variables with possible answers yes or no) as part of the 
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 PCA model.  In fact, yes and no answers could also be interpreted as ratio measures of 0 or 1 or 
as an ordinal measure scale that assigns a higher order to 1 than to 0.238   
 
Following this statistical procedure, a coefficient value at or near 1 suggests a strong positive 
relationship between the two variables while a value at or near –1 indicates that the variables are 
inversely related.  Those indicators registering insignificant levels of association (based on 
probability theory p > 0.05, meaning less than a minimum 95 percent confidence interval) were 
excluded from the list while the indicators with the highest level of significance (i.e. based on 
probability theory, very strong levels of association are set at p< 0.01) were chosen and ranked 
according to their level of significance.  The full correlation matrices and the summary of the 
166 indicators with the highest levels of association can be found in Annex 29.   
 
Of these 166 indicators, 47 were chosen for step 1 of the process and are ranked in Table VII-8 
below on the basis of their correlation to the poverty benchmark indicator: food security.  Annex 
30 provides the detailed reasons for exclusion of the remaining 119 variables.  The set of 
indicators ranges from 40 to 50 variables, instead of the 20 variables originally suggested by the 
IFPRI/CGAP manual239 and may be grouped in three main categories (Assets, Expenditures and 
Vulnerability / Food Security), which will become the building blocks of the score: 
 
                                                 
238 The inclusion of dummy variables was a suggestion to the author by Dr. Zeller (one of the authors of the manual) 
in the Social Performance Meeting of December 2005. 
239 Increasing the number of variables from 20 to upto 40-50 was suggested to the author by Dr. Manfred Zeller (one 
of the authors of the manual and member of AMK Social Performance Committee) in the December 05 SPC 
Meeting. 
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 Table VII-8: Ranked 47 Indicators by Level of Association with “Food Security” Benchmark  
 





G.2. [Food security] . 1 450 
G.3 [HH Diet] 0 .712(**) 449 
CopingReduceSold 0 -.525(**) 450 
G.1. [HH Economic Situation] 0 .451(**) 450 
G.9. [HH Large Expenses – Ordinal] 0 .428(**) 450 
G.11. [HH Health Expenses – Ordinal] 0 -.422(**) 449 
CopingBorrowing 0 -.378(**) 450 
E.3.3. [Walls] 0 .377(**) 448 
D.7.1. [Savings] 0 .331(**) 450 
AssetOrdinal 0 .311(**) 450 
G.12. [HH Social Capital – Ordinal] 0 .293(**) 449 
E.6.1. [Moto] 0 .288(**) 450 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 0 .272(**) 450 
E.3.2. [Roof] 0 .254(**) 449 
C.7.2. [Outflow reinvest NonFarm] 0 .250(**) 450 
ClothingPC 0 .246(**) 447 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 0 .241(**) 449 
C.12.2.[Outflow buy gold] 0 .240(**) 450 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 0 .236(**) 450 
E.4.3. [TV] 0 .232(**) 450 
CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 0 .228(**) 450 
E.5.6. [Mobile] 0 .222(**) 450 
E.7. [Toilet] 0 .219(**) 448 
E.3.1.[Floor] 0 .216(**) 449 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 0 .212(**) 450 
AccRankFood 0 -.207(**) 450 
NUMADULTS 0 .202(**) 450 
C.11.2.[Buy other HH materials Durable Assets] 0 .190(**) 450 
D.6. [Buy clothes KNY] 0 .186(**) 448 
AccRankSalariedLabor 0 .185(**) 450 
AcdRankServiceLoans 0 -.180(**) 450 
FarmCash0or1 0 .178(**) 450 
C.10.2. [Buy land] 0 .178(**) 450 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 0 .171(**) 450 
AccRankCasualLabor 0 -.168(**) 450 
HHhClothing 0.001 .154(**) 448 
AccRankAssetBuilding 0.001 .153(**) 450 
4.a. [MFBL] 0.001 -.152(**) 450 
AccRankLoansReceived 0.001 -.149(**) 450 
D.2.3.  [Market value rice consumed] 0.002 .148(**) 449 
HHhHighEduc 0.002 .144(**) 448 
A.4.1. [Number Income Earners] 0.003 .142(**) 450 
HHhLiteracy 0.003 .138(**) 449 
AccRankRemittances 0.004 -.137(**) 450 
D.2.2. [Rice sold by HH] 0.004 .134(**) 450 
D.2.1. [Rice Yield] 0.007 .128(**) 450 
B.8.1.2.3. [Assets pawned for cash] 0.007 -.127(**) 450 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
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 Step 2:  Choosing the best explanatory variables to test a model and interpret the results 
 
The objective of stage 2 is to pool together the explanatory power of the selected indicators into 
a single score using PCA, by using as testing marks the absolute value of coefficients, sign of 
component coefficients and eigenvalues of the components. 
 
In AMK-PCA, the first component is the combination that accounts for the largest amount of 
variance in the sample. The second component accounts for the next-largest amount of variance 
and is uncorrelated with the first.  Successive components explain progressively smaller portions 
of total sample variance.  Because all components are uncorrelated with one another, only one 
can be considered to measure relative poverty.  Therefore, the most critical output for 
determining the composition of the poverty index is the component matrix.  The final AMK-
PCA score has been constructed with 22 indicators; whereby closely related variables were 
screened in order to add to the PCA model only the strongest.   
 
The details of this interactive process and all the previous AMK-PCA models tested in order to 
arrive to the best AMK-PCA model can be found in Annex 31.  Annex 31 covers test 1 to test 5 
of this interactive process: test 1 started with 47 variables of which 13 were excluded; test 2 
started with 34 variables of which 10 were excluded; test 3 started with 24 variables of which 
one was excluded; test 4 started with 23 variables of which one was excluded.  Annex 31 
provides the details for each of these five tests, spelling out the reasons for the exclusion of 
specific indicators in each of them. 
 
The CGAP/IFPRI-PCA methodology recommended that the number of variables in the index 
should be at least 10 indicators but less than 20.  However, the AMK-PCA wellbeing score has 
been constructed with 22 indicators.  While it is crucial to limit the number of variables in the 
score, the limit on 20 indicators is not a statistical requirement of PCA and using more than 20 
variables is indeed possible.  It is true that when there are many variables, indicators that are very 
close to each other may be selected and that the marginal gain in precision quickly drops with 
each additional indicator.  However, the IFPRI/CGAP manual used the maximum figure of 20 in 
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 order to promote a practical tool with fewer indicators and not because of statistical requirement 
of PCA.240  
 
The following pages define the final AMK-PCA model and details the steps followed to 
guarantee that it is correctly specified:  
 
1. Absolute value of the coefficients for each indicator is above 0.300 
The coefficient indicates the degree of correlation between the component and the 
indicator; thus a large absolute value indicates a high level of correlation.  In AMK-PCA, 
those indicators with coefficients above 0.300 were chosen. 
 
Table VII-9: Component Matrix 
 Component Loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Food Security [Q.G.2.]. .692 -.478 .079 -.021 .081 -.149 
NUMADULTS .545 .335 -.116 -.132 .432 -.177 
HHhLiteracy .335 .045 -.312 -.534 -.211 -.203 
ClothingPC .531 .287 .137 -.017 .217 .211 
AccRankCasualLabor -.484 -.192 .247 -.047 .592 -.214 
C.7.2. .407 -.388 -.388 .188 -.073 .347 
C.11.2. .406 -.251 -.031 .434 -.141 -.362 
AccRankFood -.390 .068 .111 -.487 .040 .485 
D.7.1. .541 -.452 .026 .056 -.294 .109 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly .656 .377 -.025 .324 .260 .125 
E.3.1. .518 .431 .433 -.050 -.211 -.010 
E.3.2. .690 .417 .342 -.199 -.108 -.093 
E.3.3. .712 .390 .276 .013 -.200 -.102 
E.4.3. .655 -.079 -.022 -.077 .166 -.083 
E.6.1. .661 .215 -.525 .148 .051 .081 
HHTotalLandAreainHa .477 .248 .037 -.222 .023 .146 
AssetOrdinal .755 .236 -.355 -.012 .179 .199 
G.3 .627 -.536 .246 .064 .222 -.016 
G.9. .676 -.207 -.027 -.172 -.143 -.242 
G.11. -.410 .528 .015 .438 .001 -.065 
G.12. .350 -.214 .430 .343 -.058 .417 
CopingReduceSold -.373 .636 -.136 .208 -.154 -.079 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  6 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
                                                 
240 This fact has been confirmed by Dr. Manfred Zeller in personal communication to the author (Jan 07). 
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 In AMK-PCA, all the selected 22 coefficients have values between 0.335 to 0.755 as can 
be seen in Table VII-9.  As was discussed before, the exclusion decisions for indicators 
that showed a high correlation in Table VII-8 but that are not included in the final AMK-
PCA (Table VII-9) are detailed in Annex 31. 
 
2. Correct sign of each component coefficient  
Positive coefficients indicate a direct relationship between the indicator and the relative 
poverty of the household.  Negative coefficients indicate an inverse relationship between 
the indicator and the relative poverty of the household.  Indicators were accepted if the 
component loading (i.e. the coefficients for each component) had the expected sign 
predicted by the theory.  Table VII-9 shows the six components calculated from the 
indicators.   
 
The answering options in the questionnaire have been ordered from “least” to “most.”  
For instance, the answering options for the benchmark variable Food Security are:  
(1) Often not enough to eat;  
(2) Sometimes not enough to eat;  
(3) Enough but not always what we want to eat;  
(4) Enough and the kinds of food we want to eat.   
 
Therefore the signs of the coefficients are generally positive because a high level of food 
security should contribute positively to the wellbeing of the household.   
 
In the AMK-PCA there are four variables that show a negative coefficient.  In the first 
three variables, the signs are expected according to theory because they indicate an 
inverse relationship with wellbeing:  a sign is expected to be negative if the variable 
measured contributes negatively to the wellbeing of the household.  In AMK’s case, 
negative contributions to wellbeing include the following:  
 
? households depend heavily on the income from temporary work (including 
migration); 
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 ? households where one of the main expenditures is in food items;  
? households that reduce food consumption or other non-food expenses or sell 
personal property in order to cope with crises or unexpected events;  
 
Finally, the variable “strategies in order to pay for healthcare” (question G.11. in the 
survey tool) lists as possible answering options the following:  
 
(1) We never borrow or sell assets;  
(2) We seldom (rarely) need to borrow or sell assets;  
(3) We often (frequently, regularly) need to borrow money /sell assets; 
(4) We always need to borrow money or sell assets (difficult).   
 
Thus, the negative coefficient is expected since the frequency of borrowing money or 
selling assets in order to pay for healthcare should contribute negatively to the wellbeing 
of the households. 
 
 
Eigenvalue of the component is at least 1  
The larger the Eigenvalue,241 the more that component is “explained” by the model’s 
indicators.  If the model has been carefully screened to include only indicators of poverty, 
the first component is likely to explain the variance associated with poverty.  As a rule, a 
minimum Eigenvalue of 1 is needed if the component is to be considered representative 
of a common underlying dimension. In Table VII-10, the first five components indicate 
that a common variance is being measured.  The first component explains 30.9 percent of 
total variance; the second 12.6 percent; the third 6.4 percent; the fourth 6.3 percent, the 
fifth 4.9 percent and the sixth 4.7 percent. 
 
                                                 
241 Eigenvalue is the variance of the principal components (PC or eigenvectors ); that is, var (PCi) and expresses the 
variance of PCi in the data being considered. 
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 Table VII-10: Total Variance Explained 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 







1 6.805 30.934 30.934 6.805 30.934 30.934 
2 2.768 12.583 43.517 2.768 12.583 43.517 
3 1.412 6.417 49.933 1.412 6.417 49.933 
4 1.380 6.273 56.207 1.380 6.273 56.207 
5 1.072 4.873 61.080 1.072 4.873 61.080 
6 1.036 4.707 65.787 1.036 4.707 65.787 
7 .946 4.302 70.089    
8 .832 3.783 73.872    
9 .772 3.509 77.381    
10 .741 3.369 80.751    
11 .699 3.178 83.929    
12 .588 2.671 86.600    
13 .508 2.309 88.908    
14 .431 1.957 90.865    
15 .409 1.861 92.726    
16 .348 1.584 94.310    
17 .318 1.444 95.754    
18 .260 1.182 96.936    
19 .198 .899 97.835    
20 .186 .846 98.681    
21 .171 .775 99.457    
22 .120 .543 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Step 3: Revise the test model until the results meet the performance requirements 
The test model was run and results interpreted until they met the performance requirements.  
Since the indicators chosen in steps 1 and 2 were those that correlated well with the benchmark 
indicator and had consistent signs in their contribution to the index, the first poverty component 
was expected to account for most movement in the indicators and is the “strongest” of all the 
components.  The performance requirements involved: 
 
a) Testing the relative size of communalities 
Communalities indicate how well the indicators combine to identify different 
components.  Thus, communalities represent the strength of the linear association among 
variables and components.  In statistical terms, communalities is the squared multiple 
correlation coefficient between a variable and all other variables and represent the same 
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 measure as R-squared in a regression analysis.  The values of communalities range 
between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating that a greater share of common variance 
is explained by the extracted components.  Some variables may contribute to the 
explanatory power of a poverty factor, but not account for variances captured by other 
common factors.  Communalities close to 0 (less than 0.1) signal that the variable in 
question may be a candidate for exclusion in subsequent runs.  However, a variable may 
have low communality coefficient but still be a relevant indicator for building the poverty 
component.  Table VII-11 below shows the results for the AMK-PCA model. 
 
Table VII-11: Communalities 
  Initial Extraction 
G.2. 1.000 .743 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .659 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .583 
ClothingPC 1.000 .475 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .731 
C.7.2. 1.000 .628 
C.11.2. 1.000 .568 
AccRankFood 1.000 .642 
D.7.1. 1.000 .599 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .762 
E.3.1. 1.000 .688 
E.3.2. 1.000 .826 
E.3.3. 1.000 .787 
E.4.3. 1.000 .476 
E.6.1. 1.000 .790 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .362 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .823 
G.3 1.000 .795 
G.9. 1.000 .609 
G.11. 1.000 .644 
G.12. 1.000 .649 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .635 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
In the AMK-PCA, all communalities were above 0.1 with values ranging from 0.362 to 




 b) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy  
The Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin (KMO) test is an index for comparing the magnitudes of 
observed correlation coefficients with the magnitudes of partial correlation coefficients.  
The smaller the value of the index, the less appropriate the model.  In general, scores 
above 0.60 are acceptable, above 0.70 are good, above 0.80 are commendable, and above 
0.90 are exceptional.  As Table VII-12 shows, the adequacy result of the AMK-PCA 
model is 0.818, a rather good result. 
 
Table VII-12: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Test Value 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .818 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
Approx. Chi-Square 877.764 
df 231 
Sig .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Therefore when the IFPRI/CGAP criteria were followed, 22 indicators were selected for 
contributing to the AMK-PCA poverty score.  The selection of these multidimensional indicators 
is further validated by the findings of the most recent qualitative study of rural households in 
Cambodia.  As discussed in Chapter IV, the quotes from the participatory studies generally 
portray the poor and the destitute as powerless in the face of circumstances beyond their control 
(Ballard et al., 2006: 69).  In addition, there is widespread consensus that housing conditions, the 
amount of land, the number of livestock and mode of transport are all useful indicators of 
wellbeing.  Generally speaking, the rich have more and the poor have less of each (Ballard et al., 
2006:68).  More information about this participatory report as well as other recent livelihoods or 
poverty profiles reports have been already discussed extensively in Chapter IV.  
 
These indicators combine different aspects and dimensions of poverty concerning expenditures, 
assets and vulnerability and can be grouped among these three main categories as follows 
(Figure VII-8):  
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- Total Land Area owned by the 
household [Computed as 
HHTotalLandAreaHa] 
 
- Floor, Wall and Roof materials for 
the house/dwelling [Questions E.3.1, 
E.3.2 and E.3.3]  
 
- Household owns a television, a 
motorcycle [Questions E.4.3 and E.6.1] 
and ownership of assets of 
modest, mid or high value 
[Computed as AssetOrdinal] 
EXPENDITURES: 
 
- Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC 
[Computed as Clothing PC] 
 
- Total Household Expense in Food [Computed as 
TotaHHFoodExpenseYearly] 
 
- Outflows of the Household include: 
inputs/reinvestment for nonfarm income 
activities [Question C11.2].and buying household 
materials/equipment and durable assets 
[Question C.7.2].   
 
- Main Household expenditures include food 
[Computed as AccRankFood] 
SOCIAL CAPITAL: 
 
- Number of good 











- Number of adults [~income earners] [Computed as NUMADULTS] 
 
- Health: Strategies in order to pay for healthcare [Question G11] 
 





VULNERABILITY & FOOD SECURITY: 
 
- Food Security [Question G.2]  
 
- Household diet in the last year [Question G.3]  
 
- Self-reported level of difficulty in affording large expenses - Ordinal [Question G.9] 
 
- Main income generating activities include casual labor (agricultural and non-agricultural) or 
temporary migration (domestic or international) [Computed as AccRankCasualLabor] 
 
- Savings and Reinvestment Behavior [Question D.7.1]  
 
- Coping strategies include reducing food consumption/eating worse foods/ eating fewer 
times a day, reducing other non-food expenses (school, clothes, etc) or selling personal 











Annex 32 provides detailed explanations about where to find the questions to each of these 
indicators within the cash-flow survey tool as well as the formula applied to the variables that are 
additional computations.  The statistical description of the chose 22 variables can be found in 




 Table VII-13: Description of the 22 variables of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score 
Indicator N Type Measure Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
G.2. [Food security] 450 Ordinal 1 4 3.02 .488 
NUMADULTS 450 Scale 0 7 2.70 1.157 
HHhLiteracy 449 Dummy 0 1 .61 .487 
ClothingPC 447 Scale .00 300,000 52,564.8435 47,664.5 
AccRankCasualLabor 450 Dummy 0 1 .50 .501 
C.7.2. [Outflow reinvest NonFarm] 450 Dummy 0 1 .52 .500 
C.11.2.[Buy other HH materials 
Durable Assets] 450 Dummy 0 1 .39 .488 
AccRankFood 450 Dummy 0 1 .94 .234 
D.7.1. [Savings] 450 Dummy 0 1 .77 .422 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly  449 Scale 169,000 15,960,000 2,450,589 1,673,069.5 
E.3.1.[Floor] 449 Ordinal 1 3 1.88 .609 
E.3.2. [Roof] 449 Ordinal 1 3 1.77 .659 
E.3.3. [Walls] 448 Ordinal 1 3 1.72 .679 
E.4.3. [TV] 450 Dummy 0 1 .50 .501 
E.6.1. [Moto] 450 Dummy 0 1 .27 .445 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 450 Scale .00 30 2.43 2.48 
AssetOrdinal 450 Ordinal 0 3 1.40 .767 
G.3 [HH Diet] 449 Ordinal 1 3 2.07 .542 
G.9. [HH Large Expenses – Ordinal] 450 Ordinal 1 3 1.53 .601 
G.11. [HH Health Expenses – 
Ordinal] 449 Ordinal 1 4 1.46 .674 
G.12. [HH Social Capital – Ordinal] 449 Ordinal 2 4 3.42 .562 
CopingReduceSold 450 Ordinal 0 3 .31 .740 
 
Therefore, and as a summary, in the construction of AMK-PCA model, indicators were accepted 
if their values for communality were above 0.36 obtaining an overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) index of 0.818, which is considered a rather good adequacy result. 
 
 
Step 4: Save the poverty component scores of the final model as a poverty index variable 
Once the final model for computing the “wellbeing score” has been decided, it is possible to 
establish relative poverty comparisons between client and nonclient households based on this 
index, running it on the total sample of 450 (instead of the sample of 90 nonclients that was used 
to calculate the score).242   
 
                                                 
242 It is important to highlight that the model is not to be changed even if the measures of good fit declined slightly 
when introducing the sample of existing clients.  This is because the MFI client cases cannot be used to set the 
model specifications since the random sample of MFI clients cannot be considered an unbiased representation of the 
local population.   
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 When AMK-PCA was applied to the sample of 450, the model adequacy using the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test was still rather good at 0.848.   
 
The detailed results of the AMK-PCA applied to the complete sample can be found in Tables 
VII-14 to VII-18 below.   
 
Table VII-14: AMK-PCA Applied to the Complete Sample (450) - KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Test Value 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .848 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 3097.983 




Table VII-15: AMK-PCA Applied to the Complete Sample (450) - Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Food Security [Q.G.2.]. 1.000 .450 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .163 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .055 
ClothingPC 1.000 .241 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .126 
C.7.2. 1.000 .070 
C.11.2. 1.000 .130 
AccRankFood 1.000 .046 
D.7.1. 1.000 .228 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .354 
E.3.1. 1.000 .224 
E.3.2. 1.000 .344 
E.3.3. 1.000 .433 
E.4.3. 1.000 .312 
E.6.1. 1.000 .420 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .197 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .524 
G.3 1.000 .418 
G.9. 1.000 .374 
G.11. 1.000 .227 
G.12. 1.000 .201 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .224 




 Table VII-16: AMK-PCA applied to the complete sample (450) - Total Variance Explained 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 







1 5.762 26.190 26.190 5.762 26.190 26.190 
2 2.119 9.630 35.819    
3 1.500 6.818 42.637    
4 1.264 5.748 48.384    
5 1.146 5.210 53.594    
6 1.049 4.767 58.362    
7 .988 4.490 62.852    
8 .933 4.239 67.091    
9 .860 3.907 70.998    
10 .780 3.543 74.542    
11 .693 3.151 77.693    
12 .647 2.943 80.636    
13 .619 2.813 83.449    
14 .572 2.598 86.047    
15 .552 2.510 88.557    
16 .467 2.122 90.678    
17 .452 2.055 92.733    
18 .442 2.009 94.743    
19 .401 1.825 96.567    
20 .322 1.461 98.029    
21 .260 1.183 99.212    
22 .173 .788 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table VII-17: AMK-PCA Applied to the Complete Sample (450) - Component Matrix 
 Component 
 1 






















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  1 components extracted. 
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 Finally, Figure VII-9 shows the distribution of the wellbeing score in standardized form.243  
Poverty scores shown in the graph range from -2.76 and 3.19 with the great majority of the 
households falling in the range between -1 and 1. 
 
Figure VII-9: Distribution of Wellbeing Score 
























Methodology applied to the Food Expenditure Measure  
 
The second methodology applied to the study, compares the daily per capita expenditure in food 
with the Cambodian food poverty line.  The food poverty line is defined by a food basket that 
provides at least 2,100 calories of energy per day.  Therefore, someone who consumes less that 
this food poverty line is not receiving the minimum amount of calories necessary to maintain 
their health.  The following paragraphs detail how the daily food expenditure per capita is 
                                                 
243 Standardizing a variable strips away the units in which a variable is measured.  A standardized variable has a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.  This standardization is performed automatically by SPSS before 
running PCA. 
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 calculated drawing from the relevant questions in the survey tool as well as how the Cambodian 
food poverty line for rural areas has been updated to 2006. 
 
 
Calculating the Daily Food Expenditure per capita 
 
Daily food expenditure figures include not only the cash expenses in food items but also quantify 
the consumption from household’s own production (including rice and other crops, vegetables or 
animals) and from other food items gathered, collected or fished.  In order to calculate the 
household expenditures in food items, the following steps are followed.  First, the WEEKLY FOOD 
EXPENDITURE IN CASH BY HOUSEHOLD is calculated as follows: 
 




Normal (average) daily expense in food in the 
household (Question D.1.1) * 7 days per week + Average Weekly Expenditure in Food in the household (Question D.1.3)) 
 
 
Secondly, ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION is calculated as follows: 
 
ANNUAL CASH EXPENDITURE AND MARKET VALUE OF FOOD PRODUCED AND CONSUMED 
WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD =  
 
Value or rice 
consumed by 
the household 
during the year 
(Question 
D.2.3) 
Value of other 
food produced for 
household 
consumption 






= 1 to 10 
months) 






* 52 weeks per 
year 
+ 
Value of other 
food gathered, 
collected or fished 
for household 
consumption 







                                                 
244 Calculating food expenditures as the average between reported daily expenditures * 7 and the self-reported 
weekly expenses was originally tested by FINCA (Hatch, 2002).  Also, note that question D.1.2 is used as a filter for 
assessing correct responses but it is not used in the final calculation. 
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 The value of additional rice bought by households is included only in those households that 
report resorting to cash expenditures in rice for more than 1 month but less than 10 months a year 
(both inclusive).  This is because when households do not produce rice, they buy rice regularly 
and thus, the expenditure will be included in the WEEKLY FOOD EXPENDITURE IN CASH BY 
HOUSEHOLD described above.  However, if households are rice self-sufficient for part of the year, 
it is likely that they will be rice self-sufficient at the time of the interview (right after harvest), 
and thus rice is likely to be bought not on daily or weekly bases but yearly in sacks/bags.  In 
order to avoid an underestimation of rice consumption (which is the staple in the Cambodian 
diet), a monetization of the consumption during these months is attributed.  This monetization 
basically multiplies the number of months with cash purchases in rice, estimating 20 Kg of rice 
per adult and 10 Kg of rice per child at an average price of R 600 per Kg. 
 
Thirdly, the DAILY PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE IN FOOD is calculated as follows:  
 
DAILY FOOD EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA =  
 
ANNUAL CASH EXPENDITURE AND MARKET VALUE OF FOOD PRODUCED 
AND CONSUMED WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD (calculated above) 365 days 
 





Updating the Food Poverty Line for rural areas 
 
On the other hand, the food poverty line in rural areas was estimated in 2004 but had to be 
updated with the corresponding inflation at the time of the fieldwork.   
 
The World Bank estimates the international (dollar-a-day) poverty line in 2004 at R 1,382 per 
capita per day (or USD 0.34 in 2004 current prices).  The same report advocates for the use of 
the national poverty line instead of the dollar-a-day international poverty line.  While the 
international poverty line is invaluable for rough comparisons between countries and over time, 
“for the purposes of national level analysis it is preferable to use a national poverty line 
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 constructed following accepted international principles and with reference to a country-specific 
consumption bundle” (World Bank, 2006:38).  The overall Cambodian poverty line for rural 
areas was set at R 1,753 and the Cambodian food poverty line for rural areas is set at R 1,389 in 
2004 (Table VII-18).   
 
The Cambodian food poverty line allows a person to consume a food basket that provides at least 
2,100 calories of energy per day and this basket of food is based on the quantities of foods 
consumed by persons in the third quintile of the per capita consumption distribution (World 
Bank, 2006:20).  However, updating the poverty line in Cambodia is not such a straight forward 
exercise because rural inflation figures are not available and there is no baseline inflation data for 
1993.245   
 
Due to the lack of rural inflation figures, in order to update to Food Poverty Line in 2004 to the 
prices at the time of finishing the fieldwork the rural food poverty line was updated with the 
Phnom Penh Consumer Price Index (CPI) for food and beverages only.  The proxy has been 
calculated as follows: 
 






Phnom Penh CPI for 
“Food, beverages and 
tobacco” May 2006 
Phnom Penh CPI for 
“Food, beverages and 
tobacco” Dec 2004 122.22 – 109.54 
 




Thus, the Proxy Food Poverty Line for Rural Areas as of May 2006 (the time in which fieldwork 
finished) is calculated as 1,389*1.1158= 1,550, as shown in Table VII-18.   
 
                                                 
245 In fact, the World Bank updated the food poverty line to 2004 applying the average annual rates of inflation in 
food prices in rural areas, i.e. using food price inflation in Phnom Penh (weighted by the reference 1993/94 food 
bundle) and household survey data to estimate regional differences in food prices.  The 1993/94 baseline food prices 
are median values calculated from household responses on the value and quantity of foods consumed. 
246 CPI Inflation (end of period) in Phnom Penh was 6.66 percent in 2005 and 2.81 percent in 2006.  Note that period 
average inflation in 2005 was 5.9 percent and 4.7 percent in 2006. 
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 Table VII-18: Food Poverty Lines (FPL) 
 CambodianFPL 2004  AMK Proxy FPL 2006  
 Riel (per day)  Riel (per day) USD (per day)*  
Phnom Penh 1,782  1,988 $0.49  
Other Urban 1,568  1,750 $0.43  
Rural 1,389  1,550 $0.38  
Food Poverty Line (FPL) 2004: World Bank (2006: 20) 
 
*Note: The exchange rate of 1USD =KHR 4,096 is the average of the exchange rate from March to 




 Chapter VIII  - ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
Two poverty measurements are now available for the sample.  The AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score is 
a relative poverty score and measures whether a household is worse off or better off compared to 
other households.  AMK Daily Food Expenditure figure is an absolute poverty measure that is 
benchmarked against the Cambodian food poverty line for rural areas.  On the other hand, the 
AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score is a multidimensional measure of poverty covering expenditures, 
physical and human assets as well as vulnerability and food security while the AMK Daily Food 
Expenditure figure only measures the expenditure dimension.  Chapter VIII analyzes the results 
from both poverty measures and compares these results to assess their adequacy. 
 
 
AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score: Measuring Relative Poverty 
 
The AMK wellbeing score is a relative poverty score and measures whether a household is 
worse off or better off compared to other households.  In Chapter VII each household was 
assigned a wellbeing score: the lower the score, the poorer the household relative to all other 
households with higher scores.  The following pages will analyze the data by applying the 
following analytical tools: 
 
? The cumulative frequencies of the score of clients and nonclients 
? The average wellbeing score by client status and seniority  
? Tercile and quartile analysis 
 
Figure VIII-1 displays the cumulative frequency of the wellbeing score for AMK client and 
nonclient households and shows that a margin of difference exists between the two groups except 
for the poorest 25 percent of the households.  Thus, beyond the poorest 25 percent of households 
(where no difference in wellbeing/poverty levels can be seen between client and nonclient), 
nonclient households seem to enjoy higher wellbeing scores than those of AMK client 
households. 
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Figure VIII-2 shows the average wellbeing score by client status.  The average wellbeing score 
for AMK clients was -0.06 and the average wellbeing score for nonclients was 0.24.  Since the 
lower the wellbeing score, the poorer the household is compared to all others with higher scores, 
the average scores show that clients seem poorer than nonclients.   
 



















 However, to truly measure the depth of poverty outreach of an MFI, data should be restricted to 
the poverty levels of new clients only.  As Matin et al. argue, “the measurement of any form of 
depth of outreach is fraught with methodological problems” (1999: 25) and what is crucial is to 
find the level of poverty of clients at the time of joining as opposed to the current poverty 
information on current participants.  The current poverty status of a client may not be the same 
as the poverty status of the client at the time of joining, presumably (among other reasons) 
because access to microfinance services should help clients precisely in overcoming poverty.247  
In order to assess the depth of outreach for those clients joining AMK, three different categories 
have been defined:248 
 
? New clients are defined as those that borrowed for the first time in the last 12 months; 
? Beginner clients are defined as those households who have been clients for at least one 
year but less than 2 years.   
? Senior clients are those who have been clients of AMK for 2 years or above  
 
Note that the senior category is only relevant for Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat 
branches since Battambang and Siem Reap only started operations in 2005; for the same reason, 
all clients in Battambang and Siem Reap are new clients as there is no beginner client category in 
those two provinces. 
 
Figure VIII-3 shows that the average wellbeing score for new clients was -0.06 and the average 
wellbeing score for nonclients was 0.24, indicating that new clients seem poorer than the 
nonclients households category.  Interestingly, it is the beginner category that shows the lowest 
wellbeing score.  This finding may indicate that the second cycle of a loan may be the most 
vulnerable period for a borrowing households and it will be further explored in the tercile 
analysis. 
 
                                                 
247 The second methodological problem is the difficulty in factoring in the dropouts into the analysis.  This is 
because the set of current participants may be a biased sample of all participants that ever joined because dropout 
behavior might not be random and independent of initial endowment (Matin et al., 1999:25). 
248 As of 31 December 2005, the date in which sampling took place. 
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The t-test of the means of clients and nonclients for the total sample is statistically significant (t 
(123) = 2.28, p = 0.025) as it is for new clients and nonclients (t (240) = -2.13, p = 0.034).  
Detailed information of the t-tests of means is available in Annex 33. 
 
Nevertheless, the most interesting analytical tool to compare the relative poverty of the clients 
and the control group is tercile analysis.  Tercile analysis divides the wellbeing score results into 
three separate groups of client and nonclient households to be compared: the poorer group, the 
middle group and the better-off group.  The following steps were followed to analyze the tercile 
results: 
 
? First, the 90 nonclient sample were sorted in ascending order according to their wellbeing 
scores (i.e. the greater the value of the score, the relatively wealthier the household). 
? Second, this sample was divided into terciles based on the wellbeing scores: the bottom 
third of the nonclient households are grouped into the “poorer” group, followed by the 
“middle”-ranked group, and finally, the “better-off” group.  Since there are 90 nonclients, 
each group contains 30 households.  The cutoff scores for each tercile define the limits of 
each poverty group and they were -0.183 and 0.822.   
? Third, the 360 client households were then categorized into the same three groups based 
on their household scores using the cutoff scores defined above for the AMC-PCA case 
(i.e. -0.18 and 0.82). 
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 If the pattern of poverty among client households matches exactly that of nonclient households, 
the client households will divide equally among the three wellbeing groupings in the same way 
as nonclient households, with 33 percent falling into each group.  Any deviation from this equal 
proportion would signal a difference between the client and nonclient populations.  The results 
are shown in Figure VIII-4 below:  clients are overrepresented within the poorest tercile and 
underrepresented in the highest tercile.  Therefore, AMK shows an extensive poverty outreach, 
reaching a larger share of the poorer households than is found in the general population.   
 


























The significance test for these terciles confirms that the difference is statistically significant 
(Chi-Square (2, N = 450) = 11.82, p = 0.003).  For further information on significance tests and 
graphical examples of MFIs with equal and lower depth of poverty outreach please see Annex 
34.  
 
The tercile analysis by seniority of clients is particularly useful to estimate the depth of outreach 
of an MFI.  As Figure VIII-5 shows, new clients are still overrepresented in the poorer category 
and underrepresented in the richer category, which again corroborates that brand new client 
households seem poorer than nonclient households.  What is interesting of this last analysis is 
that it is actually the beginner category that shows the largest discrepancy (proportionally), with 
the highest overrepresentation in the poorest category and the lowest underrepresentation in the 
better-off category.  This finding seems to indicate that the first cycle of a loan may be the most 
vulnerable period for borrowing households:  for the first year of borrowing from a formal 
source, households are likely to undergo budget constraints in order to service the loan with the 
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 profits or cash-flows generated in the period and it is only after the second year that the analysis 
hints on a (relative) improvement in wellbeing for borrowing households when senior clients 
start to reduce their (proportional) representation in the poorer category and increase their 
(proportional) representation in the better-off category.   
 
Figure VIII-5: Terciles by Seniority 



































The significance test for these terciles confirms that the difference is statistically significant 
(Chi-Square (6, N = 450) = 16.87, p = 0.01) but note that the senior category is only relevant for 
Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat branches.  For further information please see 
Annex 34.  
 
Finally, this dissertation also tested a quartile analysis.  This is because the results of focus group 
discussions in the most recent qualitative study (Ballard, ed., 2006) show villagers self-selecting 
themselves in both three and four wealth groups.  Concretely, in the 24 villages where the 
qualitative study took place, 13 villages identified and defined four wellbeing ranking (i.e. rich, 
medium income, poor and destitute or very poor) while in the other 11 villages people identified 
and defined only three wellbeing rankings but with some degree of variation, i.e. in some 
villages there was not a category for rich and in other villages no category for destitute (Ballard, 
2007c:58).249   
                                                 
249 The Khmer terms for each of these categories are not always easy to translate.  As footnoted in Ballard, people 
mostly used the Khmer words neak mean for rich households or individuals, although some used neak thou thear.  
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 The preference for tercile analysis stem primarily because of this lack of consensus.  
Nevertheless, the results of the quartile analysis are also interesting and shown below.  Figure 
VIII-6 shows that while clients remain underrepresented in the better-off category, clients are 
also clearly overrepresented in the poor category but representation is nearly equivalent in the 
poorest category.   


























Figure VIII-7 displays the quartile analysis by seniority group and corroborates the previous 
findings:  brand new client households seem (relatively) poorer than nonclient households.  
Figure VIII-7 also corroborates that it is the beginner category that shows the largest (relative) 
discrepancy, with the largest overrepresentation in the poorest category and the lowest 
underrepresentation in the better-off category, likely because households are most vulnerable to 
poverty during the second cycle of a loan.  Once past the third or fourth cycle of a loan, however, 
access to financial services becomes more secured and, after their first full year AMK client 
households have simultaneous access to AMK emergency loans in cases of crises (as seen in the 
product description in Chapter VI).  
                                                                                                                                                             
For medium income households and individuals, people used neak mathium.  For the poor people used neak kror.  
For the destitute, people mostly used neak toal, although some used neak kror nah or neak ath (2007c: 58).   
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 Figure VIII-7: Quartiles by Seniority 






































The significance tests show that the difference is statistically significant between client and 
nonclients (Chi-Square (3, N=450) = 7.89, p= 0.048) but the test fails to show that the difference 
is statistically significant by seniority (Chi-Square (9, N = 450) = 16.60, p= 0.055).  Please see 
Annex 35 for details on the calculations necessary for the quartile analysis as well as the 
significance tests for clients and nonclients and by seniority of client household.   
 
 
Food Security versus Expenditure in Clothing and Footwear:  Choice of AMK-PCA model 
 
As it was introduced before, the empirical section of this dissertation actually tested two 
potential benchmarks: Clothing and Footwear and Food Security in order to decide which one 
would produce the best AMK-PCA model.  The best score was defined as the one that portrayed 
a more complete picture of how poverty and vulnerability affect rural households in Cambodia, 
based on the literature review of the poverty profile discussed in Chapter IV.   
 
The conclusion of the testing was that Food Security provided a better benchmark to define 
wellbeing in rural Cambodia.  This is because, when applying the same statistical steps to 
construct the score, the indicators that define the score when Food Security is used as a 
benchmark cover some key dimensions of poverty and vulnerability (such as education and 
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 health) that are not covered when the wellbeing score is built using Clothing and Footwear as a 
benchmark.   
 
This section details how data has been analyzed in order to assess which would become the 
chose AMK-PCA model.  The following pages summarize the statistical comparison of both 
models as well as the specific reasons why the model based on Food Security is preferred over 
the model based on Clothing and Footwear per capita. 
 
The results of both scores are, in fact, very similar.  Figure VIII-8 shows the distribution of the 
AMK-PCA household wellbeing score applying Clothing and Footwear per capita in 
standardized form while Figure VIII-9 shows the cumulative frequency for nonclients and AMK 
clients.   
 
Figure VIII-8: Household Wellbeing Score (Test: Clothing and Footwear pc) 
-3.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
TEST- Household Wellbeing Score          























Comparing Figure VIII-8 with Figure VIII-1 (the first graph of the chapter), the similarities are 
striking.  In both cases the great majority of the households fall in the range between -1 and 1.  
The distribution ranges from -2.76 and 3.19 in the case of Food Security as a benchmark and 
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 from -2.34 and 3.64 in the case of Clothing and Footwear per capita as a benchmark.  Similarly, 
the comparison of Figure VIII-9 with Figure VII-9 (the last graph of Chapter VII) highlights that, 
in both cases, a margin of difference exists between the poverty levels of clients and nonclients 
except for the poorest 25 percent of the households where no difference is seen between the 
groups.   
 



































































In both cases, the average wellbeing score for AMK clients was -0.06 for and the average 
wellbeing score for nonclients was 0.24 in the case of AMK-PCA: Food Security and 0.23 in the 
case of AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear pc.  These figures further confirm that both scores 
produce very similar results.  Also, the t-test of the means of clients and nonclients for the total 
sample is statistically significant in both cases:  AMK-PCA: Food Security (t(123)=2.28, 
p=0.025) and AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear: (t(120)=2.17, p=0.032).  Further information 
on t-test of means is available in Annex 33 and last section of Annex 36, respectively. 
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 However the composition of the score is slightly different.  The AMK-PCA: Food Security score 
has been constructed with 22 indicators while the AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear has been 
constructed with 20 indicators.  Table VIII-1 shows that both scores share 17 indicators. 
 
Table VIII-1: Common Indicators by Dimensions of Analysis 
 Common Indicators to AMK-PCA Score (17) 
Expenditures ?Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC 
?Total HH Expense in Food  
Assets  
- Physical Assets ?Total land owned 
?House floor, wall & roof materials 
?HH owns a television / motorcycle + ordinal ownership of assets of modest-, mid- or high- value  
- Human Assets ?Number of adults  
- Social Capital ?Number of good friends / neighbors in community 
Vulnerability ?Food Security  
?HH diet in the last year  
?Self-reported level of difficulty in affording large expenses 
?Incidence of reducing quality of foods  
?Main HH income generating activities include casual labor (agri + non-agri) or temporary 
migration (domestic or international)  
?Savings / Reinvestment behavior 
 
However, the AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear score also includes three additional indicators 
and AMK-PCA: Food Security also includes 5 additional indicators.  Table VIII-2 show each of 
these additional indicators. 
 
 Table VIII-2: Comparison of Additional Indicators by Dimensions of Analysis 
 Additional Indicators  
 AMK-PCA: Food Security AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear 
Expenditures ?HH Outflows include: inputs/reinvest 
nonfarm income activities + buying HH 
materials / durable assets 
?Main HH expenditures include food 
?Expenses in Clothing/Footwear for head 
of HH  
?New clothes for Khmer New Year for all 
HH members in HH last 2 years 
Assets   
- Physical Assets  ?Toilet type 
- Human Assets ?Health: Strategies in order to pay for 
healthcare 
?Education: Literacy of HH head 
 
Vulnerability ?Coping strategies include reduce food 
consumption/eat worse foods/ eat fewer 
times  a day, reduce other non-food 




 Therefore, while the statistical results of both scores are very much comparable, the composition 
of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score based on the Food Security benchmark portrays a more 
complete picture of the wellbeing of rural households in Cambodia (as depicted in the second 
section of Chapter IV: Poverty Profile) and better responds to the concepts of poverty and 
vulnerability as outlined in the last section of Chapter III – Reasons behind the choice of poverty 
measurement tools).   
 
In particular, the indicators that make the AMK-PCA Food Security Score preferable are those 
that cover two basic human asset areas, specifically:  
? Health, as measured as the strategies applied in order to pay for health care, and  
? Education, as measured as the literacy level of the head of the household.   
 
Annex 36 provides the detailed PCA procedure when applying clothing at footwear as a 
benchmark, following exactly the same structure as the procedure for the AMK-PCA when 




Analysis of Food Expenditure per Capita: An Absolute Poverty Benchmark 
 
The AMK wellbeing score calibrates relative poverty but does not provide information on the 
absolute level of poverty, i.e. it measures the extent to which a household is worse off or better 
off compared to other households, but does not assess the actual level of deprivation of the 
poorer category of households or the level of affluence of the better-off.  To estimate absolute 
levels of poverty, AMK compares the daily food expenditure per capita with the food poverty 
line in rural areas. 
 
Figure VIII-10 below shows the histogram of the daily food expenses per capita for AMK clients 
and compares it with the updated rural food poverty line, confirming that most AMK clients are 
consuming less than the minimum calorie intake per day and thus can be classified as poor.   
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 Figure VIII-10: AMK Clients 
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Std. Dev. = 797.15696
N = 359
National (Rural) Food Poverty Line 
(proxy update May 06) = R 1,550
 
The equivalent analysis for nonclients further confirms the findings from the AMK-PCA 
Wellbeing Score.  Figure VIII-11 shows the Daily Food Expenses per capita for nonclients, 
illustrating that there are fewer nonclients consuming less than the minimum calorie intake per 
day than AMK clients.  
 
Figure VIII-11: Nonclients 














Std. Dev. = 
1,059.18182
N = 90
National (Rural) Food Poverty Line (proxy 
update May 06) = R 1,550
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 In terms of measuring exclusively the depth of outreach, Figure VIII-12 shows the Daily Food 
Expenses per capita for new clients only (i.e. those who borrowed for the first time in the last 12 
months), further confirming that most new clients in AMK consume less than the minimum 
calorie intake per day required for wellbeing (i.e. extensive poverty outreach). 
 
Figure VIII-12: New Clients 
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Std. Dev. = 904.38814
N = 152
National (Rural) Food Poverty Line 
(proxy update May 06) = R 1,550
 
 
Table VIII-3 below show the information in percentage terms: 75 percent of AMK clients 
consumed less than the Cambodian (rural) food poverty line (R 1,550) while 57 percent of 
nonclients consumed less than this benchmark.  Further, 75 percent of new clients, 78 percent of 
beginner clients and 73 percent of senior clients consumed less than the food poverty line (please 
note that senior category is only relevant for Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat).   
 
The significance tests show that the differences are statistically significant:  By status of 
household as client (Chi-Square (1, N = 450) = 11.43, p= 0.001) and by seniority of client 
households (Chi-Square (3, N = 450) = 12.12, p = 0.007).  Please see Annex 37 for further 
details on the percentages below the food poverty line for rural areas and the corresponding 
significance tests. 
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 Table VIII-3: Households below AMK Proxy 2006 Food Rural National Poverty Line (R1,550)  











By Client Seniority 
New Client  








Number  320 51 269 114 60 95 
Percentage  71% 57% 75% 75% 78% 73% 
 
The data further suggests that the poverty incidence in the areas where fieldwork took place is 
much higher than the national average.  About 57 percent of the control group of nonclient 
households (which represent the general rural population) consume less per day than the food 
rural poverty line while the general poverty headcount in rural areas was 39 percent.  
Furthermore, the benchmark is not directly comparable because the information on Cambodian 
poverty headcount refers to the Overall Poverty Line (which includes both food and other non-
food items) while the AMK’s Daily Food Expenditure per capita, only computes and compares 
against the Food Poverty Line.  However, the comparison may reflect the fact that AMK does 
work in areas with higher poverty incidence (see Figure VI-2 in page 198 for details).   
 
As was discussed in Chapter IV, poverty in Cambodia is fundamentally a rural phenomenon with 
90 percent of the poor living in rural areas and with very high spatial concentration of poverty: of 
the existing 1,628 communes, 104 communes in rural areas constitute more than 75 percent of 
the poor, while 394 others constitute 50-75 percent of the poor (see map in Annex 8 and the 
spatial concentration section of the Nature of Poverty in Cambodia in Chapter IV, page 128).   
 
Poverty estimates by region indicate that the geographic areas with the highest incidence of rural 
poverty are precisely those where AMK works.  Table VIII-4 summarizes the poverty headcount 
(and its rural and urban estimates) by region showing that while the overall rate is 35 percent, the 
Plateau / Mountains and the Tonle Sap regions have the highest incidence of poverty (52 and 
43% % respectively).  But because poverty is higher in rural areas, these geographic zones also 
have the highest incidence of rural poverty (56% and 45% respectively).  Four provinces of the 
five provinces where fieldwork took place are in the Tonle Sap area (BMC, BTB, SRP and PST) 
and one in the Plateau/ Mountain Area (KSP).  Furthermore, when the same analysis is 
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 performed at the provincial level, four of the five provinces are well above the overall poverty 
line and one is barely below (BTB at 34 percent poverty headcount).250   
 
Table VIII-4: Summary Poverty Headcount by Region 
 Total Rural Urban 
Geographical Zones    
Phnom Penh Zone 5% 9% 1% 
Plains Zone 32% 33% 14% 
Tonle Sap Zone 43% 45% 28% 
Costal Zone 27% 30% 20% 
Plateau / Mountains Zone 52% 56% 33% 
Total Cambodia 35% 39% 18%* 
* Total 18%; Phnom Penh = 5%; Other Urban Areas = 24% 
Source: RGC (2006: 46-53).  Full details Table IV-2, page 131 
 
Table VIII-5 provides data on the poverty headcount by province as well as the distribution of 
the sample: about 36 percent of the interviews took place in provinces with the highest incidence 
of poverty (52-57% in SPR and KSP), 56 percent of the interviews took place in provinces with 
the second-high incidence of poverty (37-40% in BMC and PST) and only 7 percent of the 
interviews took place in province with lower poverty incidence that the national average (BTB 
with 34%).   
 
Table VIII-5: Summary Poverty Headcount by Province and Sample (in %) 
Provinces where fieldwork took place
(by Geographic Zone) 
Poverty Headcount 
Index (%)  
AMK 
Sample (%) 
Tonle Sap Zone   
Banteay Meanchey (BMC)  37%  33% 
Battambang (BTB)  34%  7% 
Siem Reap (SRP)  52%  23% 
Kampong Chhnang / Pursat (PST)  40%  23% 
Plateau / Mountains Zone    
Kampong Speu (KSP)  57%  13% 
Source: RGC (2006: 46-53). Details in Table IV-2, page 131 and Table VII-4, page 222. 
 
                                                 
250 The provinces with the highest incidence of poverty (i.e. above the national average of 35%) are, in decreasing 
order: Kampong Speu (57%), Siem Reap (52%), Kampong Thom (52%), Kampong Chhnang/Pursat (40%), Other 
provinces: Kratie, Mondolkiri, Preah Vihear, Ratanakiry, Stung Treng, Oddar Mean Chey and Pailin (46%), Banteay 
Meanchey (37%), Kampong Cham (37%), Prey Veng (37%) and Svay Rieng (36%).  Source: Table IV-2: page 131. 
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 Given all the figures on spatial concentration of poverty highlighted above and the fact that 
poverty is higher in remote rural areas and the villages sampled are indeed remote,251 this figure 
of 57 percent of nonclients below the food poverty line in rural areas is within sensible limits.   
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that applying a monetary one-dimensional poverty measurement 
tool the results corroborate the finding of AMK’s relative poverty measurement tool, with 




Comparing Results of Absolute and Relative Poverty Measures 
 
Table VIII-6 below provides a simple comparison in order to assess whether the results of both 
relative and poverty measures, as well as multidimensional versus one-dimensional poverty 
measures are in fact compatible.   
 
Table VIII-6: Comparing Tools: % of Wellbeing Groups Below Food Poverty Line 
Wellbeing Groups n (n = 360) 
% Client Households Below AMK Proxy 2006 Food 
Rural National Poverty Line (R1,550) 
TERCILE ANALYSIS   
Poorer 162 88% 
Medium 136 69% 
Better-off 62 53% 
QUARTILE ANALYSIS   
Poorest 98 93% 
Poor 131 76% 
Medium 79 66% 
Better-off 52 50% 
 
The analysis of the data further confirms the reliability of results.  When applying tercile 
analysis, the group of poorer client households also has the highest percentage of being a 
                                                 
251 See histogram: distance from the branch to the village measured in minutes traveled (Figure VII-1, page 223). 
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 household below the food (rural) poverty line while the better-off group shows the lowest 
incidence of households with daily consumption below the food (rural) poverty line.   
 
On the other hand, when the analysis is further refined for four categories (quartile analysis), the 
group of the poorest client households has the highest percentage of household below the food 
(rural) poverty line and that this percentage continues decreasing to reach a minimum at the 
better-off group shows, which shows the lowest incidence of households with daily consumption 
below the food (rural) poverty line.  
 
The same conclusion remains when the analysis is reversed; i.e. comparing the number of clients 
with daily consumption below the food (rural) poverty line with their classification within the 
relative poverty groups of the AMK-PCA analysis.  Table VIII-7 shows the results by tercile and 
by quartile analysis:  those clients spending in food consumption less than R 1,550 per day are 
more likely to be classified in the lower and lowest categories of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing 
Score, with 53 percent of “Below Food Poverty Line” households located in the poorer category 
of the tercile analysis and 71 percent of “Below Food Poverty Line” households located in the 
combined poorest and poor category of the quartile analysis.   
 
Table VIII-7: Comparing Tools: % of clients below Poverty Lines by Wellbeing Group 
Client Households n (n=360) 
Tercile Quartile 
Poorer Medium Better-off Poorest Poor Medium 
Better-
off 
BELOW AMK Proxy 2006 
Food Rural National Poverty 
Line (R1,550) 
269 53% 35% 12% 34% 37% 19% 10% 
ABOVE AMK Proxy 2006 Food 
Rural National Poverty Line 
(R1,550) 
91 22% 46% 32% 8% 34% 30% 29% 
 
The significance tests for both type of comparisons confirm that the differences are statistically 
significant with (Chi-Square (2, N = 360) = 31.74, p = 0.000) in the case of terciles and (Chi-
Square (3, N = 360) = 37.38, p = 0.000) in the case of quartiles.  Please refer to Annex 38 for 
details on the significance tests. 
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 The comparison of both tools is also consistent with the findings of van de Ruit and May (2003) 
comparing the IFPRI/CGAP Poverty Assessment Tool with a participatory wealth ranking on 
one hand and the nationwide South African Income and Expenditure Survey on the other.  As 
was reported in the section on Measuring Poverty (end of heading starting in page 69) Van de 
Ruit and May conclude that households in the lower third of the distribution of the IFPRI/CGAP 
Poverty Assessment Tool are more likely to be classified as poor using the a conventional 
money-metric measure (based on the national Income and Expenditure Survey) with 60 percent 
of “USD 1 a day” poor households located in the bottom two deciles of the Poverty Assessment 
Tool score (2003:31).   
 
Finally, because the analysis of depth of outreach must be performed over the clients that join an 
MFI as opposed to the whole client base of the MFI, the following page provides the same 
comparison analysis between the results of the two poverty measures (absolute versus relative as 
well as multidimensional versus one-dimensional) in order to assess whether both results remain 
compatible for the category of new clients only.   
 
Table VIII-8: Comparing Poverty Tools for New Clients - % of Wellbeing Groups Below Food 
Poverty Line 
Wellbeing Groups n (n = 152) 
% New Client Households Below AMK Proxy 2006 Food 
Rural National Poverty Line (R1,550) 
TERCILE ANALYSIS   
Poorer 70 90% 
Medium 53 66% 
Better-off 29 55% 
QUARTILE ANALYSIS   
Poorest 42 93% 
Poor 53 79% 
Medium 33 61% 
Better-off 24 54% 
 
Table VIII-8 shows that the group of poorer households among the new clients also has the 
highest percentage of household below the food (rural) poverty line while the better-off group 
shows the lowest incidence of households with daily consumption below the food (rural) poverty 
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 line.  When applying quartile analysis, the group of the poorest client households has the highest 
percentage of household below the food (rural) poverty line and that this percentage continues 
decreasing to reach a minimum at the better-off group shows, which shows the lowest incidence 
of households with daily consumption below the food (rural) poverty line.  
 
Table VIII-9 shows the results when the analysis is reversed:  new client households that spend 
in food consumption less than R1,550 per day are more likely to be classified in the lower and 
lowest categories of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score in both tercile and quartile analysis.   
 
Table VIII-9: Comparing Poverty Tools for New Clients - % of clients below Poverty Lines by 
Wellbeing Group 
Client Households n (n=152) 
Tercile Quartile 
Poorer Medium Better-off Poorest Poor Medium 
Better-
off 
BELOW AMK Proxy 2006 
Food Rural National Poverty 
Line (R1,550) 
114 55% 31% 14% 34% 37% 18% 11% 
ABOVE AMK Proxy 2006 Food 
Rural National Poverty Line 
(R1,550) 
38 18% 47% 34% 8% 29% 34% 29% 
 
 
As was the case for the total client base of AMK, the significance tests for these comparisons 
confirm that the differences are statistically significant:  Terciles: (Chi-Square (2, N = 152) = 
16.75, p = 0.000); Quartiles: (Chi-Square (3, N = 152) = 16.85, p = 0.001).  Please refer to 
Annex 39 for further details on the significance tests. 
 
Therefore, comparing the results for absolute and relative measures of poverty as well as for 
multidimensional versus one-dimensional poverty measures further confirms the reliability of 
results with measures being comparable for both the whole client base of AMK as well as the 
category of new client households. 
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 SUMMARY OF THE THIRD SECTION (EMPIRICAL STUDY) 
 
The Third Section of this dissertation and discusses the main methodological questions of the 
empirical study and constructs the poverty and vulnerability measurements.  The AMK-PCA 
Wellbeing score is a relative poverty score and measures whether a household is worse off or 
better off compared to other households.  The AMK Daily Food Expenditure figure is an 
absolute poverty measure that is benchmarked against the Cambodian food poverty line for 
rural areas.  On the other hand, the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score is a multidimensional measure 
of poverty covering expenditures, physical and human assets as well as vulnerability and food 
security while the daily food expenditure figure only measures the expenditure dimension.   
 
The main conclusion of the analysis of both measuring tools is that AMK is reaching a larger 
share of poorer households than what is found in the general population.   
 
The results of the tercile and quartile analysis of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score show that new 
clients are overrepresented in the poorer (and poorest) category and underrepresented in the 
richer category, corroborating that joining client households are poorer than nonclient 
households. 
 
The results of comparing the Daily food Expenditure per capita for AMK clients with the 
updated food poverty line for rural areas show that, indeed, 75 percent of new clients consumed 
less than the food poverty line compared with 57 percent of nonclients that consumed less than 
the food poverty line.  These results have to be benchmarked with the national poverty levels in 
rural areas: 39 percent of the rural population of Cambodia lives below the poverty line but 
there are great regional variations in poverty levels (and AMK’s areas of operation have higher 
poverty headcount indexes). 
 
Finally, the comparison of the findings of the measuring tools concludes that both tools provide 





 SECTION 4 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter IX  – CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE WORK AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
The objective of this dissertation was to find the best tool for measuring poverty and 
vulnerability to poverty in microfinance clients and to provide the results for the case of Angkor 
Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea) (AMK), a microfinance institution operating in rural Cambodia.  
The main underlying hypothesis was that while it is not possible to create a universal poverty 
measure, it should be possible to create a system that is relevant for households in rural 
Cambodia.   
 
The study is based on two main premises: that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and 
that examining poverty necessarily implies incorporating the concept of vulnerability to poverty.  
Vulnerability is understood as the risk of falling into poverty in the future (even if the person is 
not necessarily poor now) and is used as a shorthand for “vulnerability to poverty” throughout 
this dissertation.  The concept has been included in order to study poverty in a dynamic context 
(instead of a static one), and because vulnerability is, in itself, an inherently important dimension 
of wellbeing.   
 
Since it is not possible to find a multidimensional poverty assessment tool that could be 
comparable across the MFIs’working areas as well as across different MFIs in different 
countries, this dissertation applies two complementary tools in order to measure poverty and 
vulnerability to poverty: one indicator that understands poverty as a multidimensional 
phenomenon and a simplified expenditure indicator that allows comparability by concentrating 
only on one dimension of poverty: food consumption.     
 
The following pages provide a summary of the main conclusions of this dissertation, laid out in 
the same order as the paper (theoretical framework, the Cambodian context and the results of the 
empirical study).  The chapter ends with the identification of the agenda for future research as 
well as the policy implications. 
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 The first section provided an overview of how microfinance programs reach the poor and how to 
best measure their participation.  On theoretical grounds, Chapter I and Chapter II argued that 
MFIs define a credit contract that reaches the poor by excluding the wealthy and better-off either 
directly (by not allowing them to be eligible for the program) or indirectly (by charging market-
related interest rates that will discourage elites from attempting to capture the loans; by providing 
loans so small that only the poor will want them; and by adopting requirements that will force 
the rich to auto-exclude themselves).  This theory is supported by empirical evidence, wich 
shows that MFI clients are clustered around the poverty line.  Chapter III explored how to best 
measure poverty and vulnerability to poverty, dividing the literature review between one-
dimensional measures of poverty (monetary and non-monetary) and multidimensional tools 
(participatory and indicator-based methodologies).  Some key examples of poverty assessment 
tools applied by MFIs were reviewed.  Three of the examples were one-dimensional: the 
ACCION-Income Tool, the expenditures section of the FINCA-FCAT tool and the Housing 
Indexes.  Four examples were multidimensional tools: the CGAP/Grameen/Ford Progress Out of 
Poverty Index; Participatory Wealth Ranking; Net Worth / Check Lists; and the CGAP/IFPRI 
Poverty Assessment Tool.   
 
The objective of the literature review was to find a multidimensional poverty assessment tool 
that could be comparable not only across different locations within the MFI’s operating area but 
ideally also across countries.  None of the tools reviewed fit both requirements.  Monetary one-
dimensional tools are comparable but do not portray the whole picture of poverty.  On the other 
hand, non-monetary one-dimensional tools share the same weakness of the monetary tools, while 
being less prone to comparisons.  Multidimensional tools based on participatory wealth ranking 
have the advantage of applying different dimensions to poverty, and more importantly, letting 
people themselves choose how to organize and weight these dimensions, but become impractical 
for microfinance because they do not allow a simple comparison among different operating areas 
(that is, the poor in village A may or may not be classified as poor in village B).  Of the 
multidimensional indicator-based methodologies, none are comparable in absolute terms, but at 
least results can be compared nationally among different operating areas.  Of the tools reviewed, 
those based on a robust methodology were preferred over those that depend on arbitrarily 
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 selected indicators and weights, and those with a proven record in other countries and contexts 
were preferred over those tools that cannot show much in terms of results yet. 
 
Given the lack of a clear “winner” among indicators, the conclusion of the literature review has 
been to apply two different poverty assessment tools: a multidimensional relative poverty tool 
based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and an absolute one-dimensional poverty tool 
based on food expenditure per capita, modifying as necessary in order to fit the rural Cambodian 
context. 
 
The second section provided an overview of this Cambodian context.  Chapter IV discussed the 
historical context and current economic and sociopolitical environment while Chapter V 
explored rural finance and the microfinance situation in the country.  Chapter VI provided an 
overview of AMK and its evolution over time from a Concern Worldwide program to a licensed 
independent Cambodian MFI, precisely as a response to the Cambodian environment and the 
regulations regarding microfinance services.  This information is relevant because AMK has 
become the case study for the empirical testing of these two poverty tools. 
 
The main conclusion of the second section was that poverty in Cambodia is widespread and very 
much a rural phenomenon, with more than 84 percent of the population classified as rural and 
more than 90 percent of the poor living in rural areas.   
 
Microfinance is not a panacea and does not create economic opportunities, but it does provide 
access to financial services (and more specifically to credit) that allow people to take greater 
advantage of existing economic opportunities.  The other relevant conclusion of the second 
section was that Cambodia’s financial sector is at a rudimentary state: rural households remain 
underserved by rural finance ant there is high regional disparity in terms of access to 
microfinance services in rural areas (with the north and north-east of the country and Koh Kong 
province particularly underserved).  The Cambodian microfinance sector can be more accurately 
described as a microcredit sector with savings and insurance needs largely underserved.  Also, 
there is little reliable information on cash flows, livelihoods strategies and the sources and uses 
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 of credit but evidence suggests that rural households currently have outstanding debts and likely 
demand other financial products besides credit.   
 
Currently, the providers of rural finance and microfinance offer mainly credit and are ACLEDA 
Bank; licensed and registered microfinance operators; and the informal financial sector.  Within 
those, the top-nine microfinance operators are one commercial bank and eight licensed MFIs.  
The commercial bank is ACLEDA Bank, albeit limited to its Micro and Small Loan portfolio.  
The eight licensed MFIs are: PRASAC; AMRET; CEB; TPC; VisionFund; Hattha Kaksekar; 
AMK; and CREDIT.  Together these top-nine microfinance operators capture 93 percent of all 
outstanding loans and serve 94 percent of the clients. In terms of loan portfolio and deposits, 
ACLEDA is the clear market leader; however in terms of clients served, AMRET is slowly 
surpassing the hegemony of ACLEDA Bank for (small and micro) borrowers.   
 
The analysis of the evolution of all microfinance providers reporting to the NBC from 2000 to 
2006 concluded that the Cambodian microfinance sector appears to be splitting into two groups: 
(i)  the MFIs maintaining a focus on small-balance loans and outreach, composed mainly by 
AMK, TPC and AMRET and, to a lesser extent, by VisionFund and PRASAC. 
(ii)  the MFIs working with a mixed product offering of micro- and SME-loans, composed by 
CEB, ACLEDA Bank, Hattha Kaksekar and CREDIT.   
 
The seven-year analysis further suggested that microentrepreneurs (and small enterprises) have 
benefited more than rural households from the increase in loans available to rural areas and that 
new entrants into the formal banking system also tend to focus more on microentrepreneurs and 
small enterprises.   
 
The last part of the section provided an overview of the financial and operational highlights of 
AMK and concluded that the transition from a program established by an international non-
governmental organization (Concern Worldwide) into a Cambodian independent microfinance 
institution can be classified as a success.  A review of the products and services, methodologies 
and geographic coverage further confirmed that AMK concentrates on reaching poorer and rural 
populations.  In comparative terms, AMK has maintained below-market average loan sizes and it 
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 is the fastest growing microfinance operator in terms of outreach: moving from 5 percent of the 
market in 2000 to 11 percent in 2006.  Currently it is the fourth microfinance institution in terms 
of borrowers and it is growing at the highest rate per year (34 percent on average).  
 
AMK seems well ahead in the road towards financial sustainability, with figures of Operational 
Self-Sufficiency (OSS) above 100% and positive Return on Assets (RoA) figures.  However, 
complete success for microfinance institutions calls for a balance between social and financial 
performance.  AMK’s current institutional structures seem geared towards this end with a market 
and social research function at the management level and a pioneering system of social and audit 
committees reporting to the Board of Directors.  The information provided on client and village 
profiles (Chapter VI) also seem to corroborate this image of AMK reaching poorer clients by 
working in poorer areas, but confirmation can only be provided by the analysis of the empirical 
study discussed in the Third Section (Chapters VII and VIII).   
 
The third section discussed the summary of the empirical study undertaken in AMK as well as 
the highlights of the results.  Chapter VII provided an overview of the methodology applied for 
both poverty assessment tools.  This included details on the sample size, its representativeness 
and other selection issues as well as the survey tool applied and how it evolved over time in 
order to match the specificities of rural Cambodia.  A brief cross-check was then performed with 
the demographics of the sample and the characteristics found in national studies.  The result of 
this benchmark analysis was that the characteristics of AMK clients (and villages) are similar to 
the characteristics of rural households found by other studies, albeit client households seem to 
tend toward the poorer segments of the rural population.   
 
Two different (but complementary) poverty assessment tools were then constructed.  First, the 
relative measure of poverty, the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score, including all the statistical steps 
and the reasons behind all choices taken in order to reach the best-fit model for assessing the 
multidimensionality of poverty and vulnerability in rural Cambodia.  Secondly, the absolute 
measure of poverty, the Daily Food Expenditure measure was constructed, detailing the 
calculations undertaken to reach a monetary per capita figure as well as the assumptions and 
indexes applied in order to update the food poverty line that served as a benchmark. 
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 Chapter VIII summarized the results of both relative and absolute measures of poverty, detailing 
what can be implied or ascertained from the findings and comparing the results of both types of 
tools for clients, corroborating that both provide consistent information on the depth of outreach 
of AMK.   
 
The AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score calibrates relative poverty and thus, measures the extent to 
which a household is worse off or better off compared to other households sampled.  When 
tercile analysis was performed on the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score, the main conclusion was that 
AMK is, indeed, reaching poor clients because the distribution is skewed: clients are 
overrepresented within the poorest tercile and underrepresented in the highest tercile (i.e. 
reaching a larger share of the poorer households than is found in the general population).  When 
quartile analysis was performed on the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score, the same conclusion held 
true: AMK is reaching poor clients because clients remain underrepresented in the better-off 
category and overrepresented in the poor category and nearly equivalent in the poorest category.   
 
However, a proper analysis of the depth of outreach of microfinance institutions should be 
further restricted to newly-joining clients as opposed to the current clients.  This is because the 
current poverty status of an existing client may not be the same at the time of joining, 
presumably (among other things) because access to microfinance services should have helped 
these client households.  Thus, a seniority analysis has been performed dividing the AMK client 
group into new clients, beginners and senior clients.  New client households are those that have 
been clients for less than one year.  Beginner client households are those that have been clients 
for at least one year but less than two years.  Senior client households are those that have been 
borrowing for two years or longer.  Note, however, that this senior household category is only 
relevant for Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speu and Pursat branches and that in Battambang and 
Siem Reap all client households sampled are classified as new clients (there is no beginner client 
category in provinces that started operations in 2005 as the cut-off date for the sample was  
December 2005). 
 
The results of this seniority analysis further corroborated the previous findings: when three 
wellbeing groups are analyzed, new clients are overrepresented in the poorer category and 
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 underrepresented in the richer category; when four wellbeing groups are applied to the analysis 
new clients are again overrepresented in the poorest category.  
 
Finally, in order to estimate absolute levels of poverty (i.e. to assess the actual level of 
deprivation of the poorer category of households or the level of affluence of the better-off), this 
dissertation compared the Daily Food Expenditure per capita with the Cambodian Food Poverty 
Line in rural areas and concluded that 75 percent of AMK clients consumed less than the updated 
Cambodian (rural) Food Poverty Line (KHR 1,550) while 57 percent of nonclients consumed 
less than this benchmark.  Furthermore, restricting the analysis only to joining clients: 75 percent 
of new clients consumed less than the food poverty line, compared with the 57 percent of 
nonclients who consumed less than the food poverty line.  Thus, AMK’s performance regarding 
depth of poverty outreach is well above the level of poverty generally found in rural areas also 
when applying a monetary one-dimensional poverty measurement tool. 
 
As was discussed in Chapter III – Measurement of Poverty and Vulnerability, one-dimensional 
measures of poverty (particularly the monetary ones) are useful for benchmarking, but do not 
provide a holistic view of poverty because they concentrate on a single dimension as opposed to 
all areas of poverty and wellbeing.  The AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score is the response to this gap:  
while it is a relative measure of poverty and thus not easily comparable with other national or 
international figures, it provides very relevant information on poverty, when understood as a 
multidimensional concept (including vulnerability to poverty).   
 
In addition, both measurement tools (the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score as well as the AMK Daily 
Food Consumption below the Food (rural) Poverty Line) have been adapted to incorporate the 
main conclusions of the literature review of the first section as well as the context of rural 
Cambodia explored in the second section.  While the specific details of these adaptations are 
detailed and interspersed throughout the text of this dissertation, the following paragraphs 
provide a succinct summary of some of the main examples of how these main conclusions or 
highlights have been incorporated.   
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 In the design of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score, indicators were included which have been 
linked not only to poverty but also to the concept of vulnerability to poverty.  Vulnerability has 
been included in the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score by incorporating those indicators that are 
generally found in the general literature on vulnerability as well as those found relevant by recent 
qualitative and quantitative studies of poverty and poverty profiles in Cambodia.  Also, in search 
for a multidimensional score that would best reflect Cambodia’s rural realities, the PCA score 
was tested using two benchmarks: Clothing and Footwear per capita and Food Security.  While 
Clothing and Footwear per capita has produced the best results in other geographical contexts 
and studies, in the case of rural Cambodia a preference was given to applying Food Security as a 
benchmark because it was consistent with the vulnerability profile of rural households in 
Cambodia and because it also covered two key dimensions of poverty and vulnerability (namely 
education and health) that were not covered when the score was constructed using Clothing and 
Footwear as a benchmark. 
 
In the design of AMK’s Daily Food Consumption, an explicit module was created for 
monetizing the value of production that is consumed within the households.  This module is also 
linked to the particularities of Cambodian rural households, as was discussed in the design phase 
of the survey tool.  For instance, the survey asks for a yearly estimation of rice consumption, as 
opposed to the standard practice of asking for weekly or monthly estimates.  
 
The main highlights of the review of literature on poverty and vulnerability measurement, as 
well as the specific findings of recent poverty profiles of rural Cambodia, not only contributed to 
the design of the survey tools (i.e. the questions) and the measuring tools (i.e. the indicators) 
which were explored in detail in Chapter VII, but have also been incorporated into the analyses 
of results.  For instance, both tercile and quartile analysis is performed routinely in all outputs 
presented precisely because participatory studies of rural households have found evidence of 
households self-selecting themselves equally into both types of categores; some villages chose 
only three wellbeing categories and some villages chose four wellbeing categories, with no 
category being more prominent among the sample.   
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 Another example of how the findings of the literature review have been applied is the use of the 
word “wellbeing” instead of “poverty” when naming the AMK-PCA Score.  The AMK-PCA 
Wellbeing Score (as opposed to the AMK-PCA Poverty Score) attempts to concentrate on what 
rural households have, as opposed to what they lack, and has been inspired by Moser’s work on 
asset management and vulnerability issues, as was discussed in Chapter III. 
 
The comparison of the results of both measuring tools has further confirmed the reliability of 
results, with the group of poorer (and poorest) client households showing the highest percentage 
of households below the food (rural) poverty line.  At the same time, the client households with 
Daily Food Consumption below the food (rural) poverty line were more likely to be classified in 
the lower and lowest categories of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score.   
 
Therefore, the main conclusion of this dissertation is that poverty and vulnerability to poverty 
can be assessed in microfinance clients by applying two different but complementary measuring 
tools: a wellbeing score based on a robust methodology to incorporate the multidimensionality of 
poverty and, simultaneously, a simplified and easily comparable expenditure indicator that 
concentrates solely on food consumption.  Both are the result of a combined research effort and 
have been adjusted to the specific characteristics of rural Cambodia: in the case of the wellbeing 
score the benchmark chosen was food security; and in the case of the daily per capita 
expenditure, care was taken in monetizing the value of production that is consumed within the 
households (including rice).  To my knowledge, of the different poverty assessment tools applied 
by microfinance operators, food security has not been applied before as a poverty benchmark for 
the statistical steps of PCA and no assessment has been previously performed applying a Daily 
Food Expenditure per capita that monetizes food produced and consumed within the household.  
Other contributions of this dissertation include the up-to-date analysis of microfinance and rural 
finance in Cambodia and the summary of the state of social performance within the recent 
changes in the microfinance industry. 
 
The agenda for future research would include the analysis of impact or transformation effects on 
households.  It is envisioned that these same depth of poverty measures will allow robust 
conclusions when the longitudinal comparison of AMK-PCA Wellbeing Scores (and number of 
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 households below rural Cambodia’s Food Poverty Line) is undertaken during 2008.  That 
remains as future work.  The assumption is that the study of the changes in wellbeing scores over 
time in the same households will allow some conclusions to be drawn about the impact of access 
to microfinance services compared with the evolution observed in nonclient households.  The 
crux of the matter in impact analysis is the attribution of the effects at the household level to 
access to credit.  The possibility to assign attribution will depend on the behavior of the client 
and control group in the repeat interviews, i.e. on how many of the clients and nonclients 
interviewed previously will be available for another interview for  the impact assessment and if 
the sample (and its distribution) is representative enough to reach robust conclusions.  The 
timing of benefits will also need to be assessed as only short and medium term benefits, such as 
increase in nutrition or consumption, can be assessed after one or two years of access to finance.  
It will take a much longer assessment period to gauge long-term potential effects, such as 
substantial changes in their asset base or improved education opportunities for their children.  It 
would be also be quite interesting to test the conclusions of other impact studies.  Given the high 
number of AMK clients that can be classified as poor at the time of joining, it would be 
particularly interesting to establish whether AMK’s future impact assessment is consistent with 
the finding that the poor (and the very poor) benefit mainly from access to microfinance because 
of consumption smoothing (by borrowing) or because of improved asset management 
(particularly of their savings) while clients above the poverty line seem to benefit largely because 
of productive uses of their loans.  In other words, does access to finance help the very poor by 
providing some sort of insurance or decreasing their vulnerability, while helping the not-so poor 
by providing investment opportunities?  If the future AMK impact study can provide quantitative 
evidence of such a finding, the most interesting analysis would certainly be its policy 
implications because it may corroborate the hypothesis that access to financial services may 
improve the welfare of the very poor but cannot by itself lift them out of poverty. 
 
Regarding policy implications, Meyer and Zeller (2002) in their analysis of the “triangle of 
microfinance” argue that the lack of rigorous techniques for measuring depth of outreach has 
resulted in very limited quantitative knowledge about the trade-offs between outreach, impact 
and financial sustainability.  Incidentaly, the concept of cost-effectiveness becomes crucial.  
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) argued that even if a “perfect” positive net impact 
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 evaluation were to be available, it would not necessarily translate instantly into overall success 
for a microfinance institution because cost-effectiveness matters as well and microfinance should 
be judged against the costs and benefits of alternative approaches, including other ways of doing 
microfinance.  As Sharma and Buchenrieder (2002) point out, the challenge remains in reducing 
the costs of providing financial services to the poor – and, whatever the current size of impact, 
any further improvement in the benefit per dollar invested depends on cost-saving innovations.  
Indeed, only those institutions (and their shareholders) that rely on robust quantitative 
methodologies will be able to assess whether they are meeting their goals regarding both their 
financial performance as well as their outreach objectives.  In turn, only those insititutions with 
robust methodologies in place will be able to properly assess if the cost-saving innovations they 
envision for their future long-term strategies are working more towards the concept of synergies 
or more towards the concept of trade-offs between financial and social performance. 
 
While information on impact is not yet available, this dissertation has been able to show that in 
the case study of AMK, synergy (as opposed to trade-off) is the operative word to describe the 
relations between financial sustainability and depth of outreach.  In AMK’s case, financial 
sustainability and depth of poverty outreach have happened simultaneously.  The comparison of 
operational and financial data from 2003 and 2006 has allowed an assessment of AMK’s 
financial performance.  The analysis of the multidimensional and the monetary measuring tools 
have also allowed an assessment of the depth of poverty outreach.  Both have gone hand in hand, 
and indeed, data so far does not suggest trade-offs between them but rather synergies.  AMK 
(2007b), Chetan (2007) and Torres et al. (2007) further corroborate this concept of synergy and 
the balance between AMK’s social and financial performance. 
 
In that regard, it is hoped that this dissertation has been able to contribute to increasing the 
quantitative knowledge about synergies between outreach and financial sustainability and that 
the on-going work of the AMK management team (along with the research department) will 
provide further information to assess synergies between impact, outreach and financial 












 Product Appropriate Clientele 
 Loan sizes:  US$100-3,000. 
Terms: 6 months to 5 years. 
Collateral is required (although flexibility is introduced, e.g. co-signers, character 
references, consumer goods, etc.) 
Interest rates: higher than formal sector but lower than informal sector loans.   
Mandatory savings might or not be required. 
Training and technical assistance might be provided (sometimes training is 
mandatory or provided on a per-fee-basis). 
Clients are most likely urban 
enterprises or small farmers (men 
and women) and may be medium-
income small business, 
microbusiness and production 
enterprises. 
 
SOLIDARITY GROUP LENDING 







 Loan sizes: US$100-300. 
Terms: 6 months to 1 year and payments are made weekly. 
Interest rates: 20 per cent a year. 
Savings are compulsory (pre-qualifying for the loan and during the loan term). 
Pre-credit orientation is provided but there is minimal technical assistance.  
Tests are performed to assure outreach to the very poor. 
From rural or urban (densely 
populated) areas and are usually 
(but not exclusively) women from 
low-income groups pursuing 







Loan sizes:  Initial loan amounts are US$100-200 and short-term (<1year). 
Subsequent loans have no upper limit. 
Payment are made weekly at the program office. 
Interest rates are often high (service fees are also charged). 
Mandatory savings are often required (often deducted from the loan amount at the 
time of disbursement rather than requiring clients to save prior to receiving a loan).  
Very few voluntary savings are offered. 
Incorporates minimal technical assistance (training and organization building). 
Mostly urban (men and women) 
who have small to medium 
incomes (microbusiness, 
merchants and traders) and 









 Initial loans are usually short term (4 to 6 months) and small (US$50), to be repaid in 
weekly installments. 
Loans have commercial rates (1 to 3 % per month) and higher interest rates if they 
are from the internal account. 
The amount of the second loan is determined by the accumulated savings of each 
member during the first period.   
Some banks also provide education about agricultural innovations, nutrition and 
health. 
Usually from rural or sparsely 
populated but sufficiently 
cohesive areas.  They have very 
low incomes but savings capacity 
and are predominantly women 
(although it is also adequate for 








n Products include savings, current accounts and term deposits.  Loans are short-term, working capital loans (there is no direct link between loans and accumulated savings 
amounts).   
Interest rates are set by each village (the more remote the area the higher the interest 
rate tends to be). 
Loans are paid in one installment.   
Management committees, managers and members all receive extensive training.  
Some programs also provide technical assistance to start-up microentrepreneurs.  
Mostly from rural areas and 
include both men and women 
with low to medium incomes and 
some savings capacity. 
(Compiled from Ledgerwood, 1999) 
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 Annex 2: Measuring Sustainability (OSS, FSS, ROA, ROE)252 
 







While loan loss provision is an accounting feature (recorded as an expense in the income statement) that 
estimates future loan losses, the loan loss reserve is the cumulative amount of loan loss provisions 
 
The adjusted cost of capital is the cost of maintaining value of equity relative to inflation (the market rate 
of equity) and the costs of accessing commercial rate liabilities (the market rate of liabilities).  
 




Operating expense (including provision for loan losses)




While adjusted operating income is equivalent to net income, adjusted operating expense 
includes: operating costs + financial costs + provision for loan losses + imputed costs of capital 
(including inflation). 
 
Sustainability can also be measured through the Return on Assets or Equity (ROA or ROE).  The 
Return on Assets (ROA) ratio measures the net income earned on the assets of a MFI while 
Return on Equity (ROE) ratio provides management and investors with the rate of return earned 
on the invested equity.  The ROA measures how well the assets in which the MFI has invested 
have been able to generate profit.  In contrasts, ROE measures the return on funds that are owned 
by the MFI rather than the total assets (which by definition includes both liabilities and equity).  
Both ROA and ROE are important measures because they provide indications of the rate of 
return of the MFI.  In turn, positive rates of return would allow MFIs to access commercial 
funds.  When calculating the ratios, adjusted ratios are preferred.  Adjusted ratios mainly mean 
that the figures have been adjusted for both subsidies and inflation. 
 






The Adjusted Return on Equity (AROE) ratio is calculated as follows: 
 
                                                 
Adjusted net operating income 
Average total assets
Adjusted net operating income 
Average total equity
252 Compiled from Ledgerwood (1999) 
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 Annex 3: ACCION Social Scorecard 
 
ACCION Social Scorecard is a poverty outreach report that disaggregates commonly used 
indicators by the poverty levels of the clients.  ACCION affiliates should incorporate this report 
as part of a regular report in their Management Information Systems.  The Social Score card 
reporting format is intended to be part of the data reported regularly by the management to the 
Board of Directors and eventually is expected that management will set targets for the levels of 
these indicators in strategic and business plan exercises (Biggar and Reddy, 2006:37). 
 
ACCION Social Scorecard Model 
  
Source:  Dewez et al (2006:12) based on the Model prepared by ACCION 
International using the database of Apoyo Integral as of October 2005 
 
The accuracy of the scorecard was tested using the expenditure data from the more detailed 
household surveys for 4 affiliates: BancoSol, Mibanco, Sogesol and Apoyo Integral.253  The 
findings show that between 42% to 60% of the microfinance clients were categorized in the same 
poverty level for the household survey and the loan evaluation data.  ACCION concluded that 
“since approximately half of the clients in the sample are sorted into the correct poverty level, 
using credit evaluation data in a social scorecard format provides the MFIs with practical, low 
cost tool to regularly monitor the poverty levels of clients” (Bigger and Reddy, 2006:39).   
 
In the most recent accuracy report in Apoyo Integral, the level of accuracy was only 42%.  While 
in the latest report they acknowledge that “this level of accuracy is not ideal” the authors reiterate 
that the tool does not impose additional data collection costs on Apoyo Integral and that its level 
of accuracy is comparable to Prizma’s poverty scorecard so that they conclude again that “using 
the credit evaluation data to create a Social Scorecard provides Integral with a practical, low-cost 
tool for regular poverty monitoring” (Dewez et al 2006:13). 
 
                                                 
253 Accuracy tests range from 42% in Apoyo Integral, El Salvador; 45% in BancoSol, Bolivia; 36% in Mibanco, 
Peru and 60% in Sogesol, Haiti. 
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 Annex 4: FINCA FCAT  
 
Section of the FCAT questionnaire covering Household Expenditures  
 
The following pages cover questions 36 to 46 of the FINCA-FCAT survey, which seeks to 
achieve the final Daily Per-Capita Expenditures (DPCE) figure. 
 
ESTIMATED HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES  
 
      36                37                   38                  39       40          41              42                   43                   44                45              46              
Food School Health Home Utilities Fuel Transp. Clothing Savings Other Total 
           
 
36-46—Estimated Monthly Household Expenditures:  This whole section of ten expenditure 
categories is provided to facilitate the calculation of one variable—Monthly Total 
(Expenditures)—as a proxy for Total Family Income (35). Such a calculation becomes an easier 
“second opinion” when the respondent (usually a woman) has insufficient capacity, control, or 
knowledge to estimate income earned by male adults in her household. What she is most likely 
to know is the amount of income she has earned, and/or what male household members have 
given her to meet household expenditures—i.e., funds that she has personally managed. The way 
to ask this question is to first ask for a total estimate (48): “How much do you spend each month 
to support your family?”  Next, to validate the answer (if necessary), use items 36-45 as a 
worksheet, with each expenditure type becoming a prompt which collectively adds up to produce 
a new, more accurate total (46).  It may be easier for the respondent to give weekly estimates. If 
so, these need to be multiplied by 4 to get a monthly figure 
 
36. Food: Ask: “What do you normally spend each week for food to support your household?” 
Only include food purchases in cash, not home-grown food. Next, take this answer and multiply 
by four to get a monthly estimate. Be attentive to the possibility that the respondent may have 
already estimated home-grown food in question 34 above.  
 
37. School: Ask: “What do you normally spend each week for the education of children in your 
household?”  Next, take the answer and multiply by four to get a monthly estimate. Be attentive 
to the possibility that the respondent may have already estimated educational expenses in 
question 29 above.  
 
38. Health: Ask: “What do you normally spend each week for medicine and medical services to 
support your own health and that of other household members? Here there are two possible 
situations. The first is that the respondent will reply that there have been no health-related costs 
because nobody in the household has been sick recently. The second situation is that the 
respondent will readily report a given amount for health expenditures—either because (a) 
someone was recently sick or (b) because someone is always or predictably sick—i.e., they suffer 
from a chronic illness. In this second case it is useful to ask the following prompts: (1) Have you 
had to recently hospitalize a member of your family? (2) Does your household have a chronically 
ill member? (3) If so, what is their illness? And (3) –especially for interviewers in Africa—Does 
the chronically ill member suffer from HIV/AIDS?  In any event, for special cases of a non-
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 chronic illness or hospitalization, take the estimated cost of hospitalization or treating the patient 
and divide by 12 months to get a monthly estimate of health costs. For the family with the 
chronically-ill patient, apply the estimated weekly cost of medicine and medical services to treat 
that patient, then multiply by four to get the monthly cost.  
 
39. Home: Ask: “Do you rent or own your home or live in a relative’s home?” What does your 
household spend each month to rent (or for house payments)?” 
 
40. Utilities:  Ask: “During a normal month, what does your household pay each month for 
utilities—for electricity, water, sanitation, telephone, heat, etc.?” These costs normally include 
monthly payments for electricity, water, sanitation, telephone, and in some cases (especially NIS 
clients) heating and cooking-fuel costs. 
 
41. Fuel:  Ask: “During a normal month, what does your household spend for cooking fuel (if 
not included in utilities)? In cold-climates this item will refer exclusively to fuel for heating and 
cooking. In tropical climates this item will refer to cooking fuel only. If wood is used, the 
respondent might be asked: “What do you spend each week on firewood?”, then multiply the 
answer by four. If gas is used, a single propane tank could last 2-4 weeks. So the prompt 
questions need to focus on what fuel is used, what is the standard purchase unit, and how many 
units would be consumed in an average month.  
 
42. Transportation: Ask: “What do you normally spend each week on transportation expenses?” 
Prompts might include: (a) To get your children to and from school, (b) to go to and from your 
work, and (c) travel to purchase supplies for your business?”. Multiply by four to get a monthly 
average. 
 
43. Clothing: Ask:  “Normally how often does your family buy clothes?” During a normal month 
(or year), how much do you spend for this purpose?” If not a monthly estimate, take the annual 
cost and divide by 12.  In cold weather climates clothing expenses (especially boots and jackets) 
tend to far exceed the clothing demands of households in the tropics.  
 
44. Savings: Ask: “During a normal week (or month), how much do you (and other members of 
your household) set aside for savings?” Each FINCA loan installment payment includes 
principal, interest, and savings. FINCA clients are therefore very conscious of what they are 
saving for each weekly, biweekly, or monthly payment. If weekly, multiply by four, if bi-weekly 
multiply by 2, etc.  
 
45. Other: Ask: “Do you have any other major expenses we haven’t covered? For example, a 
wedding, funeral, birthday, entertainment, bribes or taxes, donations to your church, payment of 
debts, etc.” If an annual cost divide by12 to create a monthly estimate.    
 
46. Total Monthly Household Expenditures: Total sums 36-45. This amount will be subsequently 
divided by 30 days to reach a daily household expenditure, then divided again by total household 
members (24) to obtain daily per-capita expenditures (DPCE). This figure is then compared with 
daily per-capita income (DPCI) to determine which of the estimates represents a more accurate 
estimate of household income.   
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 Previous section of the FCAT questionnaire estimating Monthly Household Expenditures  
 
The following are examples suggested in earlier drafts of the methodology (2002) as prompting 
questions in order to estimate the average daily expenditures: 
 
1. To support your family, how much do you normally spend each on family necessities – 
on food, healthcare, education, housing, transportation and so on? 
2. For example, how much did you spend yesterday? 
3. Do you spend much more on some days than in others? 
4. If so, on what days do you spend more?  How much? 
5. On what days do you spend less?  How much? 
6. So in a normal week you would spend about how much? 
7. Do you have more to spend at certain seasons of the year and not others? 
8. If so, is this a high season for you or a low one? 
 
With prompts as these the interviewer can either: 
(1) construct and average daily expenditure, then multiply by 30 days to reach a monthly 
expenditure estimate or  
(2) construct and average weekly expenditure and multiply by 4 to get a monthly expenditure 
estimate.   
 
Prompts 3, 4 and 5 help the interviewer to correct yesterday’s estimate upward or downward.  
Prompts 6 and 7 help to adjust the normal week estimate. 
 
 
Section of the FCAT questionnaire covering SOCIAL METRICS 
 
The following pages cover questions 64 to 69 of the FINCA-FCAT survey, in order to achieve 




 64 65 66  67  68 69    70    
Food 
Security 






       
  U I  R P O F I  
 
 
Overview of Social Metrics:  The purpose of these questions is to measure to what extent 
participation in a FINCA microcredit program has resulted in gains in family well-being.  The 
social metric categories used in this questionnaire share a common architecture. This is because 
each question provides the respondent with a choice of four different scenarios, with the 
respondent’s task being to select the scenario that best fits the reality of her family. As shown 
below, while the scenario “script” varies by question, the four options generally reflect the same 
type of outcomes—namely, with outcome 1 = “excellent” or always; outcome 2 = “good” or 
sometimes; outcome 3 = “fair” or seldom; and outcome 4 = “poor” or never.  
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 64: Food Security: Ask: “Which of the following statements best describes the food eaten in your 
household?” (1) We can always afford enough of the food we need to eat; (2) We can usually 
afford the food we need to eat; (3) We sometimes do not have enough to eat; (4) We almost 
never have enough to eat.” 
 
65. Education:  Ask: “Which of the following statements best describes the situation regarding 
the education of children in your household?” (1) We can afford to keep all our school-age 
children in school—at least through secondary, vocational school, and even the university; (2) 
We can afford for our children to complete primary and secondary, but not all of them will 
complete vocational or university educations; (3) we can only afford for all of our children to 
complete primary education, but secondary schooling is doubtful; and (4) we can not afford for 
all our children to obtain even a primary education.” 
 
66. Housing:  Ask: “Which of the following statements best describes your housing situation? (1) 
Our house has full utilities (electricity, water, sanitation) and we can always afford needed 
repairs; (2) Our house has partial utilities and we can sometimes afford repairs; (3) Our house 
has electricity only and we can seldom afford repairs; (4) Our house has no utilities and we can 
never afford repairs.”  
 
67. Health:  Ask: “Which of the following statements best describes the health situation of your 
household.” (1) We can always afford the medicine and healthcare services we need; (2) We 
usually can afford the medicine and healthcare we need; (3) We sometimes can not afford to buy 
medicine or healthcare services; and (4) We never can afford to buy medicine or healthcare 
services.”  
 
68. Empowerment:  This variable has been broken down into three categories: Feeling respected 
(R ), participating in decision-making (P), and stating my opinion in public (O). Each category is 
scored always (1), sometimes (2), seldom (3), and never (4). These are then used to create a 
composite score based on the following scenarios. The respondent is asked: “Which of the 
following statements best describes your own situation?” (1) I always feel respected, often 
express my opinions in public, and participate in all major decisions of my family; (2) I 
sometimes feel respected, sometimes express my opinions in public, and participate in some of 
the  major decisions of my family; (3) I seldom feel respected, seldom express my opinions in 
public, and seldom participate in major family decisions; (4) I never \feel respected, never 
express my opinions in public, and never participate in major family decisions.” 
 
69. Social Capital:  This variable is broken down into two variables—a network of friends I can 
depend on (F) and involvement in the community (I). Each category is scored many (1), some 
(2), few (3), or none (4) These scores are then used to create a composite score based on the 
following scenarios. The respondent is asked: “Which of the following statements best describes 
your own situation?” (1) I have many friends and I’m very involved in community activities; (2) 
I have some friends and am somewhat active in my community; (3) I have a few friends and I’m 
rarely involved in community activities; and  (4) I have no friends and I never get involved in 
community activities.”  
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 70. Total Social Score: If all six social metrics are used, the highest aggregate score for a single 
respondent would be 24 (indicating the worst status) and the lowest would be six (indicating the 
highest status). This would allow us to test a working hypothesis that the higher the social 
metrics score the poorer the household, as follows: 
 
A household is… If its total social  metrics score is: 
Severely or absolutely poor 18-24 points 
Moderately poor 12-17 points 









  Adaptation to South India  Adaptation to China  
Size of the house:  Size of the house:  Size of the house:  
Category Point Category Point Category Point
Small 0 Small <20 sq. meters 0 Small 0 
Medium 2 Medium 20-29 sq. meters 2 Medium 2 
Big 6 Big >29sq. meters 4 Big 4 
Structural condition:     Structural condition:  
Category Point    Category Point
Dilapidate 0    Dilapidated 0 
Average 2    Average 2 
Good 6    Good 6 
Quality of walls:  Height and materials of walls:  Quality of walls:  
Category Point Category Point Category Point
Poor 0 <4 feet mud 0 Poor 0 
Average 2 4 feet mud 2 Average 2 
Good 6 >5 feet mud 6 Good 6 
Quality of roof:  Quality of roof:  Quality of roof:  
Category Point Category Point Category Point
Thatch/Leaves 0 Thatch/Leaves 0 None/Mud 0 
Tin/Iron sheets 2 Tin/Iron sheets 2 Partial stone 2 
Permanent roof 6 Tiles and other good materials 6 Cement/Concrete 6 





Annex 6: CGAP-Grameen-Ford Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) 
 
The following tables present examples of the Progress out of Poverty Index (or the original 
Poverty Score Card) for the Philippines, Mexico and South Africa.  The last table of South 
Africa also includes the specific index values for the MFI Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) as 
of July 2007. 
 
 






Mexico Progress Out of Poverty Index :  
Ten Indicators     
 
     
 
 Indicator Attributes     Points 
            
1 Does the house have a shower?    No 0 
Yes 
5  
           
2 How many household members are from 0 to 17 years old? 










           





           





           





Two ore more 
7  
           
6 Highest degree of study of the female head of households/wife?   
Up to 6th grade of 
Primary school 
0 
Up to 6th semester or 3rd year 
of Vocational school 
4 
7th semester of High 
School or more  
16 
 
           





           
8 
In the past 3 months, has clothing been 
purchased for household members of 17 
years of age or more? 
   No 0 
Yes 
6  
           





Wood or Tile 
11  
            





            
Source Biggar (2006) 
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PPI Example - from SEF - Jul-07 
    
    
* Affirmative answers are highlighted in red   
    
 Indicator Value Points 
        
1 What is the main source of energy/fuel for this household? Wood, coal, dung, solar, other, none 0 
  Gas, paraffin, electricity from generator 14 
  Electricity from mains  20 
        
2 Does your household own a motor vehicle? No 0 
  Yes 15 
        
3 What is the main source of income for this household? Remittances, pensions and grants, sales of 
farm products and services, other non-farm 
income, other, no income 
0 
  Salaries and/or wages 21 
        
4 What type of toilet facility is available for this household? Other 0 
  Flush toilet 12 
        
5 Does your household own a VCR? No 0 
  Yes 8 
        
6 Does your household own a microwave? No 0 
  Yes 6 
        
7 Does your household own a washing machine? No 0 
  Yes 6 
        
8 What is the main material used for the walls of the main 
dwelling? 
Other 0 
  Cement block/concrete, corrugated iron/zinc, 
wood 
3 
  Bricks 5 
        
9 Does your household own a landline telephone? No 0 
  Yes 4 
        
10 What is the household's main source of water? Other 0 
  Piped (tap) water on site or in yard 1 
  Piped (tap) water in dwelling 3 
        






Annex 7: Cambodia Fact Sheet 
 
Key Facts (a of 2007) Cambodia
Official name Kingdom of Cambodia 
Capital Phnom Penh 
Area (Km2) 181,035 
Roads (2005) 40,000 Km: Paved and unpaved roads 
4,802 Km: Primary and secondary national 
roads 
6,705 Km: Provincial roads  
28,000 Km: Tertiary or rural roads 
Paved roads: 16% of total roads (2000) 
Population density (per km2, 2006) 82 
Population (millions, 2006) 14.4 
Population under 15 years old (as % of total, 2004) 38% 
Population under 25 years old (as % of total, 2004) 60% 
Annual population growth rate (%, 1975-2004) 2.3% 
Fertility rate (per woman 2000-2005) 4.1 
Rural population (as % of total-2004): 81% 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) PPP per capita (2006) US$ 2,920 
Gross national income (per capita-2006) US$480  
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%, 1990-2005) 5.5% 
Real GDP Growth (2006) 10.5% (5.4 in 2000) 
Structure of GDP (%- 2005) 
  Agriculture  
  Industry  




Population below national poverty line (%) 47% (1994) 35% (2004) 
Life expectancy at birth: 42 (1960), 56 (2000), 57 (2004), 59 (2006) 
Mortality rate under 5 years old (per 1,000) - (1960), 135 (2000), 141 (2004), 82 (2006) 
Underweight children under age-five (% -1996-2004) 45 
Undernourished people (% of total population) 33% (2001-03), 43% (1990-92) 
People living with AIDS (% age 15-49) 2.80% (2001), 1.6% (2005) 
Adult literacy rate (%-2004) 
  Total  
  Men  




Human development index (HDI)  
(Report 2007/8, value 2005) 
0.598 (2005), 0.545 (00), 0.536 (95).  Rank: 
131 (2005)  
Gender-related development index (GDI)  
(Report 2007/8, value 2005) 
0.594 (2005), 0.537 (00) 
Rank: 115 (2005) 
Access to clean water (2004)
  Total population using improved drinking water sources 
  Urban access  




AID per capita (ODA per capita, US$, 2005) 38.2 
 
 
Compiled by author. Sources: UNDP (2007/08); UNCTAD (2005); World Bank (2006a and World Development Indicators 
database as of April 2007); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2002) and CEA (2006). 
 Annex 8: Poverty Map of Cambodia   
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Source: IMF, 2006:iv. 
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 Annex 10: Cambodia Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs)  
 
 




GOAL 1:  Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger         
Percentage share of income or consumption held by poorest 20%   8.5     7 11 
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)     33    20.5 
Poverty headcount, national (% of population)  47     35 19.5 
Prevalence of underweight in children (under five years of age)   45     26.2 
GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education         
Net primary enrollment (% of relevant age group)  67  85 93   91 100 
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)    53 69 81   100 
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade    70 58   59 100 
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)  73 76 79 80  83  100 
GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women         
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)    8 7 7 10 17 30 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)  73  83 85   90 100 
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)  81 84 89 90  90 90 100 
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%).. 41 46.. 52 53  53   
GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality         
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)  34 62 65 52 65 65  90 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)  80 88 95  97 97 66 50 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)  115 120 135.  140 140 82 38.3 
GOAL 5: Improve maternal health         
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)   32     80 
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)   450     250 
GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases         
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)  577 549 523 513.. 508 508   
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population 15-49)     3 3 2  
GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability         
Access to an improved water source (% of population)    34     
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)     16     
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Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)      19 19   
GOAL 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development         
Aid per capita (current US$)  4 50 31 37 38 38   
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people)  0.. 2 12 30 38 38   
Internet users (per 1,000 people)    0. 2 2. 3   
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)   0.. 1 2 2 2   
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)   1.. 2 1 1    
GOAL 9: De-mining, UXO and assistance         
Annual numbers of civilian casualties recorded   1,691     797 0 
Percentage of suspected contaminated areas cleared  10. 10     50 100 
Other         
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)  6   4.. 4 4   
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) *   280 280 290 300 320   
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) *   3.1 3.5 3.8 4.1 4   
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) * 8 15 17 22 22 23   
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  50   54 54 54   
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)  62 64 68 69  74   
Population, total (millions)  9.6 11.2 12.7 13.2 13.4 14   
Trade (% of GDP)  19. 80 114 127 133 146   
Source IMF (2007b: 24) based on World Development Indicators Database, UNHDI Report (2003) Cambodia MDG 2005 Update and staff estimates.  
 
Notes:  
Figures in italics refer to periods other than those specified. 
* Do not reflect recent revisions to GDP estimates. 
 
. 
 Annex 11: Main Focus areas - Financial Sector Development Strategy 2006-
2015  
 





Vision: Appropriate legal, institutional and policy foundations to promote 
market based finance and support good governance and the rule of law. 
 
Preconditions for Financial Development and Economic Growth: (a) 
Effective governance; (b) Property rights and their protection; (c) 
Enforcement of contracts and resolution of commercial disputes (d) • 
Human capital development 
 
Institutional Underpinnings of Finance: (a) Secured transactions and 
leasing; (b) company law; (c) sustainable fiscal and taxation system; (d) 
macroeconomic and monetary policy and related institutional framework; 
and (e) rule of law 
 
Financial Market Infrastructure: (a) Insolvency; (b) Financial 






Banking - Vision: A competitive, integrated and efficient banking system 
that is properly regulated and supervised and effectively mobilizes 
savings to provide financing to support economic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
 
Microfinance Vision: A viable, pro-poor and effective microfinance 
system that will provide affordable financial services to enable the poor to 
enhance income and reduce poverty. 
 
Non-Bank Finance  
 
Insurance - Vision: An insurance sector that protects businesses and 
individuals from catastrophic events and a pension system that will 





Vision: Financial markets which appropriately address risks, remove 
obstacles to financial development and support risk management and 





Vision: Openness to financial product and institution innovation that 
creates more balanced financial structure, increases the depth of the 
financial sector, and promotes competition in the context of financial 
stability. 
 
Issues: a) Liberalization and Competition; (b) Financial Innovation (c) 
Regulatory Structure 
 




Annex 12: Profile of the Commercial Banking System in Cambodia   
 
 












 Annex 13: Summary of the Banking System in Cambodia   
 
 THE BANKING SYSTEM IN CAMBODIA  
As at 30 May 2007 
  NATIONAL BANK OF CAMBODIA 
(CENTRAL BANK) 
  
                         
            













1 State owned 
4 Privately owned 
- Krung Phnom Penh  
- Kampong Cham  
- Sihanouk Ville  
- Siemreap  
- Battambang  
- Svay Rieng  
- Kampot  
- Kandal  
- Prey Veng  
- Kampong Thom  
- Takeo  
- Pursath  
- Kampong Chhnaing  
- Kampong Speu  
- Koh Kong  
- Preah Vihear  
- Kratie  
- Ratanakiri  
- Mondolkiri  
- Stung Treng  
- Banteay Meanchey  
- Peng Heng S.M.E Limited 
- Cambodia Agriculture Industrial 
Specialized Bank (1 branch) 
- First Investment Specialized Bank 
- ANCO Specialized Bank 
 
  
1-AMRET Co. Ltd.  
2-Hatthakaksekar  
3-Tong Fang Micro finance Ltd.  
4-Thaneakea Phum Cambodia  
5-Cambodia Entrepteneur Building Ltd. 
6-Seilanithih  
7-Angkor Microheranhvatho Kampuchea  
8-Vison Fund (Cambodia) Ltd.  
9-Credit Co. Ltd.  
10-Prasac Micro Finance Institution  
11-Farmer Union Dev.Fund  
12-Cambodia Business Integrate in rural Development  
13-Maxima Mikroheranhvatho  
14-Inatean Poalroach rongroeung  
15- CHC Limited  
16- PISETH Akphiwat Sethakech  
17-Entean Akpevath pracheaun  
-  - May Bank 
- First Commercial Bank 
- Krung Thai Bank (1 branch) 
 
- Foreign Trade Bank *** 
- Advanced Bank of Asia  
- Cambodia Asia Bank  
- Canadia Bank Ltd.  (11 branches) 
- Cambodian Commercial Bank (3 branches)* 
- Cambodia Mekong Bank (4 branches) 
- Cambodian Public Bank (5 branches)*  
- Singapore Banking Corporation  
- Union Commercial Bank (3 branches) 
- Vattanac Bank (1 branch) 
- ACLEDA Bank Limited (30 branches) 
- ANZ Royal Bank Cambodia (7 branches) 
- Rural Development Bank 
iUnregistered  around
60 NGOs 
- Standard Chartered 
- Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development 
  Registered  3,972 
-Phnom Penh     630 
-Provincial       3.342 
 
17 Licensed 
    NGOs 
2 Representative Offices
3 Foreign Branch Banks  12 Locally incorporated 
15 Commercial Banks 5 Specialized Banks 21 NBC Provincial Branches Micro Finance Institutions 
i 25 Registered** 
* Subsidiairy of Foreign Bank 




1- Agriculture & Tourism Development Association  
2- Aid Farmers Association  
3- Association for Business Initiative  
4- Association for Development of Diversified Khmer Nation  
5- Association of Samnang Rural Development  
6- Buddhism for Development Association and Supporting Environment 
7- Cambodia Community Saving Federation.  
8- Cambodia Credit to Abolish Poverty Organization.  
9- Cambodia Mutual  
10- Cambodia Rural Economy Development Organization  
11- Cambodia Women's Development Agency  
12- CICM Cambodia  
13- Crop Supporting National Association.  
14- Islamic local development organization  
15- Khmer rural development association  
16- Kratie Women Welfare Association  
17- Lutheran World Federation Organization  
18- Ministry of Rural Development Credit Scheme  
19- Northwest Development Association  
20- Rural Development Association  
21- Rural Economic Development  
22- Rural Family Development  
23- Social Development in Rural  
24- Ta Ong Soybean Development Association  






BANK BRANCHES No CLOSED BANKS  23 Date of withdrawal 
Cambodian Commercial Bank (3 branches) - Battambang, Siemreap, 
Sihanouk Ville 3 1. Credit Bank of Cambodia license withdrawn 06-May-95 
Canadia Bank Ltd.  (11 branches) - Sihanouk Ville, Olimpic, Battambang, 
Kampong Cham, Pailin, Charle de Gaule, Siemreap, Poipet, Kampot , 
shopping center Sorya, Banteay Meanchey 
11 2. Cambodia development Bank (Voluntary liquidated)                                       24-Jun-96 
Cambodian Public Bank (5 branches) - Regency Square, Siemreap, 
Sihanouk Ville, Daun Penh, Phsar Kandal 5 3. Royal Cambodia bank            (Voluntary liquidated)                                        1996 
Union Commercial Bank (3 branches) - Sihanouk ville, Siemreap, 
Battambang. 3 4. Municipal Bank closed 04-Apr-98 
ACLEDA Bank Limited (30 branches) - ACLEDA Bank: Provincial 
branches 30 5. Siam City Bank P.Penh branch (ceased operation) 01-Nov-98 
Cambodia Mekong Bank (4 branches) - Siemreap, Sihanouk ville, 
Battambang, Olimpic  4 6. P.T.Lippo Bank P.Penh branch (ceased operation) 25-Jun-99 
Krung Thai Bank (1 branch) - Siemreap (sub-branch) 1 7. Chansavangwonk Bank Corporation (Voluntary liquidated) 31-Jul-00 
Vattanac Bank (1 branch) – Siemreap 1 8. Cambodia bank International (Voluntary liquidated) 31-Jul-00 
ANZ Royal Bank Cambodia (7 branches) - Independence Monument, 
Riverside, Olimpic Market, Kramoun Sar, Siem Riep 7 9. Cambodia Farmers Bank       (Compulsory liquidated) 31-Jul-00 
Cambodia Agriculture Industrial Specialized Bank (1 branch)  - Takhmau 1 10. Angkor Bank                          (Voluntary liquidated)                                      31-Jul-00 
Total 66 11. Global Commercial Bank       (Voluntary liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  12. Great International Bank Ltd. (Voluntary liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  13. Pacific Commercial bank Ltd. (Voluntary liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  14. Phnom Penh City Bank          (Voluntary liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  15. Bangkok Bank Public Co.Ltd. P.P branch (Voluntary liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  16. Rich Nation Bank                     (Compulsory liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  17. Agriculture-Commercial bank   (Compulsory liquidated) 08-Dec-00 
  18. Thai Farmers B.Public Co.Ltd.P.P branch (Voluntary liquidated) 30-Mar-01 
  19. First Overseas Bank              (Compulsory liquidated) 19-Mar-02 
  20. Singapore Commercial Bank  (Voluntary liquidated) 19-Mar-02 
  21. Emperor International Bank   (Voluntary liquidated) 04-Apr-02 
  22. Standard Chartered Bank downgrade to representative Office 01-May-02 
  23. Credit Agricole Indosuez Bank (Voluntary liquidated) 18-Sep-02 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia (NBC, 2007) and IMF 2007 – As at May 2007 
 Annex 14: Legal Status of Microfinance Operators  
 
MFI/NGOs NAME Full Name STATUS WITH NBC
Main Microfinance Operators (1 Commercial Bank and 9 Licensed MFIs) 
ACLEDA Bank PLC ACLEDA Bank Public Limited  CB 
AMRET AMRET Co Ltd L 
HATHAKAKSEKAR Hattha Kaksekar L 
TPC Thaneakea Phum (Cambodia) Ltd.  L 
CEB Cambodia Entrepreneur Building Ltd  L 
AMK Angkor Mikroheranhvatho (Kampuchea)  L 
VISION FUND VISION FUND (Cambodia)  L 
CREDIT  CREDIT Co Ltd. L 
PRASAC PRASAC Microfinance Institution Co. Ltd.  L 
Other Microfinance Operators (9 [small] licensed MFI, 29 registered Microfinance Operators) 
[Smaller] Licensed Microfinance Institutions (MFI): < 10,000 Borrowers and 10,000 Million Portfolio 
TFM Tong Fang Micro-finance L 
SEILANITHIH SEILANITHIH Ltd L 
FUDF Farmer Union Development Fund L 
CBIRD Cambodia Business Integrated in Rural Development  L 
MAXIMA MAXIMA Micro Finance L 
IPRR Intean Poalroath RongRoeurng Ltd. L 
CHC CHC Ltd. (ex-Cambodia Health Committee) L 
PAS Pisith Akphiwat Sethakech L 
EAP Entean Akpevath Pracheachun L 
Registered Microfinance Operators
CREDO Cambodia Rural Economic Development Organization R 
SDR Social Development in Rural R 
KRDA Khmer Rural Development Association R 
RDA Rural Development Association R 
CWDA Cambodian Women’s Development Agency R 
LWFO Lutheran World Federation Organization  R 
CCAPO Cambodia Credit to Abolish Poverty Organization R 
WSDC Women's Saving and Development Cooperative R 
AFA Aid Farmers Association R 
ILDO Islamic Local Development Organization R 
KWWA Kratie Women Welfare Association R 
RED Rural Economic Development R 
MRD Credit Scheme Ministry of Rural Development Credit Scheme R 
ADDKN Association for Development of Diversified Khmer Nation R 
CCSF Cambodian Community Savings Federation R 
BDASE Buddhism for Development Association and Supporting Environment R 
ABI Association for Business Initiative R 
RUFADE Rural Family Development R 
CSNA Crop Supporting National Association R 
NWDA Northwest Development Association R 
ATDA Agriculture and Tourism Development Association R 
CICM Centre International du Credi Mutuel R 
TOSDA Ta Ong Soybean Development Association R 
Cambodia Mutual Cambodia Mutual  R 
ASARD Association of Samnang Rural Development R 
CEN  R 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) Banking Supervision Department, as of January 2007 
Legal Status: CB: Commercial Bank; L: Licensed MFI; R: Registered NGO; 
 
Note:  As compared with the figures from 2002 four previously registered organizations seem 
to have collapsed or reduce their portfolio in order to avoid the supervision of the Central 
Bank: Buddhism for Development (BFD); SAMAKITHOR; ARUNREAH and Help the 
Widow Organization (HTW).  Source of information for 2002 (Torres, 2004: 38) 
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 Annex 15: Licensing and Key Prudential Regulation for Microfinance Operators 
 
The prakas stipulates that the licensing requirements for MFIs entail, among others:254  
? Legal incorporation as Limited Liability Company or cooperative.255 
? Identification of permanent shareholding, in particular the influential shareholders 
holding 20% or more of the capital. 
? Identification with detailed curricula vitae of at least two persons responsible for the 
effective management of the MFI’s operations. 
? Identity of the members of the decision making board. 
? Description of the planned activities over the next three years. 
 
Key prudential regulations for MFIs include the following: 
? 5 percent of registered capital must be kept in a permanent account with the NBC that 
bears no interest.256 
? Capital adequacy ratio: ‘eligible capital’ (including perpetual subordinated debts) 
must be at least 20 percent of ‘weighted risks.’ 
? Reserve requirement: minimum 5 percent of voluntary savings (compared to 8% for 
commercial banks). 
? Liquidity ratio: liquid assets of at least 25 percent of voluntary savings.257  
? Aggregate loan commitment to any one client cannot exceed 10 percent of net 
worth.258 
Loan classification and provisioning regulation as ‘substandard,’ ‘doubtful,’ and ‘loss’  
 
                                                 
254 Prakas B7-00-06.  
255 All the currently licensed MFIs have become Limited Liability Companies and not cooperatives.  This choice 
has been forced by the fact that a law on cooperatives does not yet exist in Cambodia. 
256 Prakas 7.02-45 of 25 February 2002 covers the specific calculation.  The minimum capital for MFIs is Riel 
250 million (USD 62,500). 
257 Prakas 7.02-48 of 25 February 2002 covers the details. 
258 Prakas No. B 7-01-137, amended by prakas 7.02-146 of June 7, 2002. 
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Minimum Capital USD 13 million (KH 50 billion) 
USD 2.5 million 
(KH 10 billion) 
USD 70,000 (KH 
250 million) n/a 
Guarantee with NBC 
(Art.16) 
At least 5% of 
minimum capital 
raised to 10% 
5% minimum capital 5% minimum capital n/a 
Reserve rate for deposits 5% of deposits 5% of deposits 





License Valid 3 years Valid 3 years Valid 3 years n/a 
Most demanding reporting 
interval Daily Daily Monthly Quarterly 
Ownership No restriction on number shareholders or the % of their shares, but a review for excessive concentration or wide dispersal (Art.25)  
Ownership 
Influential shareholder, at least 20% of share capital or voting rights, 
will be enjoined to increase net worth until solvency standards are 
met (Art. 27) 
 






specific lenders, and 




defined as “the 
delivery of financial 
services such as 
loans and deposits to 





amount of portfolio 
and deposits 
Taxes Commercial Rates Commercial Rates Commercial Rates n/a 
Clark, Heather (2006:150) based on the following sources:  Law on Banking and Financial Institutions (1999), Prakas on the 
Licensing of Micro-Financing Institutions and Prakas on Licensing of Specialized Banks (2000). 
 
 
Two new parkas issued on 13 September 2006 are of direct relevance to MFIs: (1) the Prakas 
on amendment to Prakas on fee for increase of capital of banks and financial institutions 
which requires prior authorization from the NBC for any increase in capital and establishes a 
fee of 0.03% of the increased amount and (2) the prakas amending the Prakas on Licensing of 
Microfinance Institutions which establishes that licenses, once awarded, becomes 
325 
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indefinite259 and requires MFIs to maintain 5% of their registered capital in permanent 
accounts with the NBC (interest will be paid semi-annually by the NBC).  In addition, MFIs 
have to pay a sum of 100,000 riels for each page of the Article of Association they amend.  
(EIC, 2007:36-39) 
 
Note that the Prakas on Credit Information Sharing (CIS) issued in June 2006 and launched 
in September 2006 with the objective of allowing banks to share, through a website, negative 
information about their clients’ credit status is not applicable to microfinance institutions 






259 Note that while the license is granted indefinitely, there is still an annual license fee of Riel 1 million per 
MFI, regardless of the number of branches. 
260 A code of conduct, regulating information collection, management and misuse, was signed by the 18 member 
banks (EIC, 2007:35) 
 Annex 16: Network Information of Microfinance Operators (as of May 2007)  
NAME 
NUMBER OF LOANS OUTSTANDING DEPOSIT BALANCES 
N. EMPLOYEES 
DISTRICTS COMMUNES VILLAGES 
AMOUNT N. BORROWERS AMOUNT N. DEPOSITORS 
(million Riels) MALE FEMALE TOTAL (million Riels) MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
SPECIALIZED BANK 
ACLEDA - MicroLoans + Small Loans       384,547 -   -   159,659               
TOTAL       384,547     159,659               
LICENSED MFIs 
AMRET (ex-E.M.T) 70 551 2,886 95,472.90 27,603 133,164 160,767 2551.46 131   131 412 108  520  
HATHA KAKSEIKAR 54 300 1,574 30,012.42 4,453 8,992 13,445 1328.78 7,194 8,790 15,984 150 62  212  
TFMF 13 38 46 380.55 155 620 775       0 9 5  14  
TPC 68 507 2,606 36,940.55 6,705 56,101 62,806 518.52 4,383 36,462 40,845 168 77  245  
CEB 40 359 1,741 58,963.27 1,422 15,592 17,014 2668.04   13,767 13,767 227 86  313  
SEILANITHIH 34 157 488 9,947.54 1,232 2,571 3,803 890.81 1,297 2,712 4,009 72 21  93  
AMK 66 407 2,060 28,343.15 12,492 70,272 82,764 268.14 1,671 5,478 7,149 204 58  262  
VisionFund 53 232 1,556 32,233.63 7,231 35,054 42,285 330.1 5 4 9 162 100  262  
CREDIT 54 308 1,181 26,781.00 0 12,683 12,683 4457   13,056 13,056 125 54  179  
PRASAC 97 893 5,730 100,462.13 38,928 47,754 86,682 789.28 2,713 368 3,081 586 105  691  
FUDF 7     3,054.00 0 2,509 2,509       0 6 2  8  
CBIRD 15 74 298 3,552.48 515 1,099 1,614 570.18 660 1,462 2,122 40 13  53  
MAXIMA 13 36 127 2,689.90 235 1,351 1,586 515.15 21 11 32 16 9  25  
IPRR 15 47 160 6,946.61 0 2,485 2,485       0 25 9  34  
CHC 16 87 234 4,942.42 1,064 4,149 5,213 27.64   3,326 3,326 46 8  54  
PAS 4 9 24 647.97 157 166 323 0.1 1   1 5 2  7  
EAP 17 45 62 4,275.68 22 71 93       0 10 8  18  
TOTAL 636 4,050 20,773 445,646.20 102,214 394,633 496,847 14,915.20 18,076 85,436 103,512 2,263 727  2,990  
REGISTERED NGOs 
CREDO 9 22 98 342.43 593 1,597 2,190 73.57 314 1,050 1,364 4 2  6  
SDR 7 27 82 1,766.50 685 716 1,401 80.00 685 635 1,320 7 3  10  
KRDA 2 13 71 505.17 618 1,143 1,761 200.50 1,199 1,996 3,195 8 4  12  
RDA 1 3 7 125.86 517 672 1,189       0 1   1  
CWDA   10 28 155.00 15 788 803 9.00 15 867 882 4 4  8  
LWFO 5 25 94 67.52 298 353 651       0     -   
CCAPO 1 4 7 573.00 20 185 205 464.00   136 136 10   10  
WSDC 1 8 16 286.00   1,280 1,280 35.00   925 925   4  4  
AFA 7 24 53 5,553.50 724 150 874 122.09 701 150 851 11   11  
ILDO 3 4 11 18.00 64 82 146 1.40 64 82 146 8 7  15  
KWWA 2 13 31 192.95 15 512 527 27.62 14 863 877 1 4  5  
RED 2 2 5 388.90 40 391 431       0 5 4  9  
MRD Credit Scheme 6 21 75 1,020.20 3310 2293 5,603       0 5 4  9  




NUMBER OF LOANS OUTSTANDING DEPOSIT BALANCES 
N. EMPLOYEES 
DISTRICTS COMMUNES VILLAGES 
AMOUNT N. BORROWERS AMOUNT N. DEPOSITORS 
(million Riels) MALE FEMALE TOTAL (million Riels) MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
CCSF 12 76 357 3,755.35   1852 1,852 492.64 9,053 16,428 25,481 28 23  51  
BDASE 3 6 18 80.18 671 974 1,645 20.72 778 1,052 1,830 3 1  4  
ABI 2 6 20 96.09 100 415 515       0 7 8  15  
RUFADE 2 6 13 125.01 6 89 95 0.87   84 84 2 2  4  
CSNA   4 7 87.00     0       0     -   
NWDA 6 43 81 2,305.06 136 165 301 86.60 139 165 304 8 5  13  
ATDA 1 3 7 80.00 12 18 30 4.00 12 18 30 7   7  
CICM 3 6   175.69 63 82 145 845.00 874 1,156 2,030 19 16  35  
TOSDA 1 1 13 866.04 258 305 563 1.57 135 22 157 9 1  10  
Cambodia Mutual 7 42 65 1,311.76 63 87 150       0 25 12  37  
ASARD       377.22     0       0     -   
CEN 2 9 49 522.65 135 268 403 96.53 3   3 4 1  5  
TOTAL 86 379 1,213 20,857.08 8,370 14,424 22,794 2,661.11 13,986 25,675 39,661 179 107  286  
GRAND TOTAL reported by NBC 722 4,429 21,986 466,503 110,584 409,057  519,641 17,576 32,062 111,111 143,173 2,442 834  3,276  
GRAND TOTAL  
(including micro+small loan portfolio 
reported directly by ACLEDA Bank) 
722 4,429 21,986 851,050 110,584 409,057  679,300 17,576 32,062 111,111 143,173 2,442 834  3,276  




 Annex 17: Legal Names and Previous Names of the Main Microfinance 
Operators  
 
 Full Legal Name Other Previous Names 
ACLEDA Bank PLC ACLEDA Bank Public Limited  ACLEDA Bank Ltd and Association of Cambodia Local Economic Development Agencies (ACLEDA) 
AMRET AMRET  EMT: Ennatien Moulethan Tchonnebat 
PRASAC 
PRASAC Microfinance 
Institution Co. Ltd.  
EU-PCA (Prasac Credit Association)/ Programme de Réhabilitation et 
d'Appui au Secteur Agricole du Cambodge 
AMK 
 Angkor Mikroheranhvatho 
(Kampuchea)  TPT / CONCERN Worldwide 
TPC 
Thaneakea Phum (Cambodia) 
Ltd.  CRS/TPC: Catholic Relief Services/TPC 
VISION FUND VISION FUND (Cambodia)   World Vision International (Cambodia), MED program 
CEB 
Cambodia Entrepreneur Building 
Ltd  Cambodia Community Building (CCB) 
HATHA KAKSEKAR Hattha Kaksekar  
CREDIT   CREDIT World Relief Cambodia/CREDIT) 




 Annex 18: Geographic Coverage of Top Nine Microfinance Operators  
 
 
Geographical coverage, ranked in descending order as of June 2007 
 
 















187 branches or offices, distributed as follows:  45 Branches; 1 
Operations office; 43 District offices; and 98 Service posts 





















67 427 2,198 

















97 910 5,839 


















71 558 2,986 
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79 544 2,329 











66 515 2,684 




























56 303 1,603 








54 308 1,181 






Annex 19: List of Provinces and Population Densities  
 
List of provinces of Cambodia by population density in ascending order:  
 
Ranking Population Density 
in Cambodian Provinces 
Inhabitant per 
Km2  
1. Mondolkiri  2.3 
2. Stung Treng  7.3 
3. Preah Vihear  8.6 
4. Ratanakiri  8.7 
5. Oddar Mean Chey  11.1 
6. Koh Kong  11.8 
7. Kracheh  23.7 
8. Pursat  28.4 
9. Krong Pailin  28.5 
10. Kompong Thum  41.2 
11. Siem Riep  67.6 
12. Battambang  67.8 
13. Kompong Chhnang  75.7 
14. Kompong Speu  85.3 
15. Krong Kep 85.3 
16. Banteay Mean Chey 86.5 
17. Kampot 108.4 
18. Svay Rieng 161.2 
19. Kompong Cham 164.2 
20. Krong Preah Sihanouk 179.4 
21. Prey Veng 193.7 
22. Takeo 221.8 
23. Kandal 301.3 
24. Phnom Penh 3,447.6 





 Annex 20: Additional MIX Market Benchmarks 
 
Additional Benchmarks for Comparing Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Cambodia, as produced by the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX).   
 
Indicator Bolivia  Bosnia  Cambodia 
 2004 2005 2006  2004 2005 2006 2006  2004 2005 2006 
Count 9 9 9  12 12 12 13  9 9 9 
             
Capital/ Asset Ratio 13.5% 11.5% 11.1%  37.3% 30.4% 27.1% 27.8%  66.7% 59.7% 37.8% 
 Debt/Equity  6.41 7.72 7.99  1.68 2.29  2.70 2.59  0.50 0.68 1.64 
Deposits to Loans 43% 44% 49%  0% 0% 0% 0%  0% 1% 1% 
             
Median Borrowers 48,496 64,517 74,106  8,573 10,610  14,431 11,611  20,502 36,221 55,860 
 Gross Loan Portfolio  17,500,000 18,900,000 23,900,000  9,301,687 11,300,000  19,500,000 15,900,000  3,533,294   4,426,465 7,109,964 
ALB 1,357 1,425 1,581  1,240 1,229  1,589 1,583  113 136 234 
ALB/GNI 141% 149% 157%  61% 60% 59% 59%  35% 43% 54% 
 Number of Voluntary Depositors  86,658 76,587 79,992  -   -   -  1  172 145 431 
 Voluntary Deposits  11,700,000 17,000,000 20,000,000  -   -   -   -    3,364 25,536 240,737 
             
Return on Assets 1.5% 1.8% 1.9%  6.7% 4.3% 4.3% 3.7%  1.8% 2.6% 3.4% 
Return on Equity 12.7% 9.8% 16.6%  18.0% 16.1% 16.0% 14.9%  2.6% 5.6% 13.5% 
             
Financial Revenue / Assets 21.1% 20.2% 20.5%  25.3% 24.9% 24.5% 23.5%  28.2% 30.3% 28.6% 
Nominal Yield 22.0% 22.2% 22.0%  30.2% 28.1% 28.0% 27.3%  39.6% 37.6% 32.0% 
             
Financial Expense / Assets 4.6% 4.6% 4.7%  3.5% 5.2% 6.7% 6.6%  4.1% 5.2% 5.7% 
Provision for Loan Impairment / Assets 1.0% 1.0% 1.2%  0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 1.5%  0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 
Operating Expense / Assets 13.8% 12.3% 12.2%  14.6% 13.1% 12.6% 12.5%  21.8% 18.6% 16.1% 
             
Operating Expense/ Loan Portfolio 16.0% 15.4% 15.2%  17.4% 15.1% 14.3% 14.0%  26.3% 22.2% 20.4% 
Personnel Expense/ Loan Portfolio 8.3% 7.6% 7.6%  11.5% 9.4% 9.2% 9.3%  14.9% 13.2% 10.8% 
             
 Borrowers per Loan Officer  298 235 119  241 236  239 242  260 209 288 
             
Portfolio at Risk> 30 Days 1.60% 1.50% 2.20%  0.50% 1.00% 0.60% 0.80%  0.70% 0.60% 0.30% 
Source: Additional Benchmarks for Microfinance Information eXchange (2007)  
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 Annex 21: Comparison Microfinance Operators 2000 to 2006   
 
 
MARKET SHARE LOAN 
OUSTANDING 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA 56% 58% 56% 57% 57% 54% 48% 
PRASAC 12% 10% 15% 13% 11% 10% 12% 
AMRET  10% 10% 10% 11% 10% 10% 10% 
CEB 2% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
TPC 5% 2% 3% 4% 5% 4% 4% 
VISIONFUND 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 
HATHA KAKSEIKAR 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
AMK 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 
CREDIT   2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 
Analysis by author from NBC’s data 
 
 
RANK LOAN OUSTANDING 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA  1   1   1   1   1   1   1  
PRASAC  2   2   2   2   2   3   2  
AMRET   3   3   3   3   3   2   3  
CEB  7   6   4   5   4   4   4  
TPC  4   5   6   4   5   5   5  
VISIONFUND  6   8   9   9   8   7   6  
HATHA KAKSEIKAR  5   4   5   6   6   6   7  
AMK  8   9   8   8   9   9   8  
CREDIT   7   7   7   7   8   9  




MARKET SHARE NUMBER OF 
BORROWERS 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA 16% 20% 25% 27% 27% 26% 24% 
PRASAC 9% 9% 19% 16% 17% 16% 15% 
AMRET  20% 21% 26% 25% 24% 24% 23% 
CEB 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
TPC 9% 8% 7% 9% 9% 8% 9% 
VISIONFUND 5% 4% 3% 3% 5% 5% 6% 
HATHA KAKSEIKAR 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
AMK 5% 4% 3% 4% 5% 7% 11% 
CREDIT     2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Analysis by author from NBC’s data 
 
 
RANK NUMBER OF BORROWERS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ACLEDA 2  2  2  1  1  1  1  
PRASAC 3  3  3  3  3  3  3  
AMRET  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  
CEB 8  8  9  8  8  8  7  
TPC 4  4  4  4  4  4  5  
VISIONFUND 5  5  6  6  6  6  6  
HATHA KAKSEIKAR 7  7  8  9  9  9  8  
AMK 5  5  5  5  5  5  4  
CREDIT     7  7  7  7  9  





 Annex 22: Synopsis Evolution AMK Geographical Coverage and Incidence of Poverty by Province   
2004 [Coverage: 3 provinces] 
 
2005 [Coverage: 5 provinces] 
 
2006 [Coverage: 9 provinces] 
 
2007 [Coverage: 15 provinces] 
 
Analysis by author. Sources: AMK Annual Report 2006 RGC (2006: 46, 53, 55) 
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Distance to all infrastructures (Km) 
Freq % Avg Median Mode Std. Min Max 
? Referral Hospital 0 0% 10.5 10 5 6.94 0.5 25 
? Health Center 2 8% 5.15 4 3 4.31 0.5 15 
? Private Clinic with midwife 20 80% 3 3 3 2.47 0.5 7 
? Primary School 12 48% 2.57 3 0.1 2.25 0.1 7 
? Lower Secondary  School 2 8% 5.66 5 5 4.81 0.2 20 
? Upper Secondary School 0 0% 9.36 7 5 7.97 1 40 
? Market/bazaar/trading center 4 16% 4.93 5 5 3.45 0.5 12 
? Shop for pesticide… 5 20% 6.68 5 5 5.07 0.5 20 
? Livestock/Agricultural worker 18 72% 7.3 5 5 10.38 0.1 30 
? Access to Electricity 6 24% 9.5 7 20 6.92 1.5 20 
? Access to piped drinking water 1 4% 23 20 20 20.38 0.5 70 
? Access to network for mobile phone 25 100%       
Source: Khlok et al, 2007 
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 Annex 24: Summary Sampling Methodology  
 
Sampling: Stage 1  
 
27 Villages (Prpnal to 
size by Province: 
9BMC, 2BTB, 7KSP, 
6PST, 3SRP) 
Commune District Province 
Date of 
Fieldwork 
Boeng Veng               Ta Lom                   Mongkol Borey BMC         13-Mar-06 
Kok Lun                  Chup Vary                Preah Neak Preah BMC         14-Mar-06 
Prey Changha Lich        Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borey        BMC         15-Mar-06 
Ta Trai                  Kokathen                 Thmar Pouk             BMC         4-Apr-06  
Chhouk                   Makak                    Serey Sophoan         BMC         7-Apr-06 
Tanorng                  Koy Meng                 Mongkol Borey        BMC         6-Apr-06 
Andong Khlong            Banteay Chmar / Kumru Thmar Pouk             BMC         5-Apr-06  
Svay Sor II              Pon Ley                  Phnom Srock            BMC         8-May-06 
Poy Snuol                Poy char                 Phnom Srok             BMC         9-May-06 
CHHOUNG Tradak           Roka                     Sangke                   BTB          19-May-06 
Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Russey         BTB          18-May-06 
Trapaing Antong          Chan Seng                Oudong                  KSP 22-May-06 
Chumpuo Preuk            Chumpuo Preuk            Oudong                  KSP 10-Mar-06 
Taing Banteay B          Veal Pun                 T'pong                   KSP 11-Apr-06 
Phnear Orng              Tumpor Meas              Samrong Tong         KSP 12-Apr-06 
Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Somrongtong           KSP 6-Mar-06 
Kraing Tachor            Rong Roeung              Thpong                   KSP 7-Mar-06 
Teuk Long IIB            Rong Roeung              Thpong                   KSP 13-Apr-06 
Toul Thmor               Talo                     Bakan                    PST           20-Mar-06 
Kandal                   Phteah Rong              Kravanh                 PST          21-Mar-06 
Prey Srokum              Chsa                     Kandieng                PST           22-Mar-06 
Buor Srange              Trapeang Chong           Bakan                    PST           23-Mar-06 
Prey Smach               Ror Kat                  Phnom Kra Vanh     PST           3-May-06 
Kampeng                  Pro Nill                 Phnom Kravanh       PST           4-May-06 
Phum Prie Kchorng        Khum Krouch Kor          Srok Kro Lanh         SRP 24-Apr-06 
Phum Pak Pann            Khum Sorso Sdom          Srok Puok               SRP 25-Apr-06 
Phum Anlung              Khum Ta An               Srok Kro Lanh         SRP 26-Apr-06 
3 Villages (Random 
among all 34,332 
clients) 
Commune District Province CO 
Phum Run                 Khum Chonleas Dai       Srok Kro Lanh         SRP 27-Apr-06 
Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong           Bakan                    PST 5-May-06 















Preah Netr Preah 
Serei Saophoan 
Thma Puok 
























 Sampling: Stage 2  
 
The specific individuals interviewed in each of the villages are the following: 
 
Random Client  
in each village 
Questionnaire 
# 




SEY Chenda               2006040501 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
CHHORN CHHORB            2006040502 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
Phas Neoeus              2006040505 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
Sok Leat                 2006040521 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
Prek Sokha               2006040522 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
Chan Thavy               2006040523 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
Sang Soeut               2006040524 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC            x   
Sok Lorb                 2006040503 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC             x  
Lan Vy                   2006040504 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC             x  
Nan Sorn                 2006040506 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC             x  
Theav Nai                2006040525 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC             x  
Chao Rathsy              2006040526 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC             x  
Non Chheun 2006040507 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC              x
Nam Yim 2006040527 Andoung Khlong           Kumru Thma Pouk BMC              x
Khuon Ley 2006040528 Andoung Khlong          Kumru Thma Pouk BMC              x
DOUNG Sai Doeung         2006031301 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Ly Chann Uon             2006061302 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
HAKK Kun                 2006091303 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
LY Hai Bey               2006121304 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Tul Teab                 2006151305 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Suong Pheun              2006181306 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Seng Heng                2006031323 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Sut Prorm                2006031325 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Urm Muy Ky               2006031326 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Sun Sin                  2006031321 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
DOUNG Pang               2006031322 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Sut Prem                 2006031324 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Chhouk Boun 2006031307 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Meng Sokha 2006031327 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Chhom Nga 2006031328 Boeng Veaeng              Ta Lam                   Mongkol Borei BMC              x
SRE Toes                 2006040701 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
Mao Puon                 2006040703 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
Rem Loeb                 2006040705 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
CHHORM Chhoeury          2006040706 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
VY Chhan                 2006040721 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
BOU Roeury               2006040722 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
SAM POR Sa Vy            2006040723 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
NHEB Chen                2006040724 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
Noeurng Niev             2006040725 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
SREY DY                  2006040726 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC            x   
340 
 Random Client  
in each village 
Questionnaire 
# 




Brakk Phorlly            2006040702 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC             x  
KHOEURN Khoeurth         2006040704 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC             x  
Vinh Veur 2006040707 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC              x
Thorng Net 2006040727 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC              x
Nhark Leub 2006040728 Chhuk                   Mkak                    Serei Saophoan BMC              x
Chou Leang               2006051002 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Meoung Ry                2006051004 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Tout Sarun               2006051005 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Hem Ven                  2006051021 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
Chork Phav               2006051023 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
DOEURN Diem              2006051024 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
My loeu                  2006051001 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Mean Phen                2006051003 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Khang Chann              2006051006 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Khang Chorn              2006051022 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Noeun Chhut              2006051025 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Ma Hatt                  2006051026 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
Mao Touch 2006051007 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Chheoun Pheap 2006051027 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Kang Much 2006051028 Ph'av Thmei Kouk Ballangk              Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Linh Lout                2006031401 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Ngov Sao                 2006031404 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Yot Soeur                2006031405 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Chann Yem                2006031406 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Nor Savy                 2006031421 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Chann On                 2006031424 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Suon Mom                 2006031425 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Dok Duk                  2006031426 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC x   
Thoeuk Ean               2006031423 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC  x  
Mao Sina                 2006031422 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC  x  
Lous Tes                 2006031402 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC  x  
Soun Phary               2006031403 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC  x  
Nem Kim 2006031407 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC   x
Sun Son 2006031427 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC   x
Prom Khen 2006031428 Kouk Lun                  Chob Veari Preah Netr Preah BMC   x
Soeun Suom               2006031501 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Teb Sambath              2006031502 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Chhoeurn Chhan           2006031503 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Chat Roeun               2006031504 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Lam Som Vuthea           2006031505 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Mith Moeut               2006031506 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Sat Pring                2006031521 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Leang Sambath            2006031522 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Brang Sothy              2006031523 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Loeum Rom                2006031524 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
Pen Rorng                2006031525 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC x   
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Loem Oeur                2006031526 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC  x  
Tong Chantha 2006031507 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC   x
Chhay Saveng 2006031527 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC   x
Hem Chantha 2006031528 Prey Changha Lech       Banteay Neang            Mongkol Borei BMC   x
MOA Vuy                  2006050901 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
LONG Sa Ngiem            2006050903 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
PANN Sophat              2006050904 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
HONG Lai Sik             2006050905 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
LY Phouv                 2006050906 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
SREY Mory                2006050921 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
TANN Hoeum               2006050922 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
PHON Pyrom               2006050923 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
SUON Phalla              2006050924 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
MUY Sork                 2006050925 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
HONG Nuon                2006050926 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC            x   
THANN Horn               2006050902 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC             x  
Kim Leap 20060050907 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC              x
Kong Panlim 2006050927 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC              x
Moeun Tom 2006050928 Paoy Snuol                Paoy Char                 Phnum Srok              BMC              x
HOUY Sa Lev              2006050801 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
Luos Mann                2006050803 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
Hor Kim Seang            2006050804 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
Me SaTom                 2006050805 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
An Aang                  2006050806 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
Yei Chom Neanh           2006050821 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
Hun Sao Ky               2006050823 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC x   
Sorn Phut                2006050824 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC  x  
Rem Lmey                 2006050825 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC  x  
Srep Hornn               2006050826 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC  x  
Sab Ngek                 2006050802 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC  x  
Pach Roth                2006050822 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC  x  
Pen Sy 2006050807 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC   x
Vann Phen 2006050827 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC   x
Ty Mun 2006050828 Svay Sa II              Ponley                  Phnum Srok             BMC   x
BAN Loeury               2006040601 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
NORM Yuom                2006040602 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
PHOEK Seang Hin          2006040603 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
SREY Sarorb              2006040604 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
MIN Ly                   2006040606 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
NUT Hieb                 2006040621 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
BAN Nou                  2006040623 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
KANN Ya                  2006040624 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
THORNG Soeng             2006040625 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
EK Heng                  2006040626 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC            x   
NORM Koeurng             2006040605 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
HOENG Vann Sy            2006040622 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC             x  
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Pol San 2006040607 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Kim Lorm 2006040627 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC              x
Sam Ly 2006040628 Ta Nong                  Koy Maeng                 Mongkol Borei BMC              x
YEN Viem                 2006040401 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
Pan Chek Mach            2006040402 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
KONG Hing                2006040403 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
Bun Than                 2006040405 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
MORM Vy                  2006040406 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC           x   
TOUCH Yeam               2006040421 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
Natt Chab                2006040423 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
SRORB Pheap              2006040424 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC            x   
CHHUT Nhess              2006040404 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC             x  
Broek Sai                2006040422 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC             x  
Chhut Som Ban            2006040425 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC             x  
CHHUT Borey              2006040426 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC             x  
Vong Chorm 2006040407 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC              x 
Korn Satt 2006040427 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC              x 
Kak Ly 2006040428 Ta Trai                  Kouk Kakthen               Thma Puok              BMC              x 
SAK Yoeum                2006051901 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB            x   
CHEAV Ban                2006051902 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
BAN Chhorn               2006051903 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
KONG Pov                 2006051904 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
NOEUM Poeun              2006051905 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
YET Yan                  2006051924 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
YIB Ya                   2006051925 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
BAN Chanthy              2006051926 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB             x   
KHOT Kong                2006051906 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB              x  
BIN Khom                 2006051923 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB              x  
PHAN Phath               2006051922 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB              x  
CHEAV Bai                2006051921 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB              x  
Reun Ky 2006051907 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB               x
"Unknown" 2006051927 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB               x
Chak Sear 2006051928 CHHOUNG Tradak      Roka                     Sangkae                   BTB               x
SAO Thoeub               2006051802 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
TENG Chhort              2006051803 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
PHUONG Mao               2006051805 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
AM Pov                   2006051806 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
HOM Sokh Roeung          2006051821 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
SOEUM Sarum              2006051822 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
TANN Rann                2006051825 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
SAT Chhieng              2006051826 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB             x   
TANN Rorn                2006051801 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB              x  
HAM Rort                 2006051804 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB              x  
CHEA Kong                2006051824 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB              x  
VIEN Ley                 2006051823 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB              x  
Chum Chhert 2006051807 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB               x
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Touch Heong 2006051827 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB               x
Pov Sok 2006051828 Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Ruessei   BTB               x
Chhorn Thim              2006031001 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Chhorn Kea               2006031002 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Vann Phoat               2006031003 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Hoeurn Socheat           2006031004 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Yen Phin                 2006031006 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Nheng Leakhena           2006031021 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Chhuon Soeun             2006031022 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Pon Sok Yen              2006031024 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP x   
Yen Tin                  2006031005 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP  x  
Chhom Se                 2006031023 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP  x  
Phan Pen                 2006031025 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP  x  
Tel Yun                  2006031026 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP  x  
Eam Sokra 2006031007 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP   x
Chhlong Shem 2006031008 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP   x
Koat Sum 2006031027 Chumpu Proeks           Chumpu Proeks           Odongk                   KSP   x
Hor Sokhoeun             1991030606 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Sath Thorn               1988030621 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Ly Soklim                1985030622 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Prak Yath                1982030623 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Chhin Sen                1979030624 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Haur Savy                1973030626 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Im Thary                 2006030601 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Meach Lin                2003030602 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Chea Kim Tuon            1976030625 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Touch Kim Lon            2000030603 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Bun Sinath               1997030604 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Khath Tieng              1994030605 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Chun Kunthea 2006030607 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP   x
Sim Sitha 2006030627 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP   x
Sim Sok Khem 2006030628 Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Samraong Tong         KSP   x
Teung Reth               2006030701 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Von Sokhoeun             2006030702 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Chin Mao                 2006030703 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Khut Pring               2006030704 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Soeun Mom                2006030705 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Bann Nay                 2006030721 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Sok Eth                  2006030724 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Sin Ly                   2006030726 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP x   
Yan Chan Thy             2006030706 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP  x  
Phlou Yoeurn             2006030722 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP  x  
Liev Ol                  2006030723 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP  x  
Seang Sokun              2006030725 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP  x  
Sat Lun 2006030707 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP   x
Ngat Sok Ly 2006030727 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP   x
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Horn Pon 2006030728 Krang Ta Char            Rung Roeang              Thpong                   KSP   x 
Keo Samrong              2006041205 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Sun Ly                   2006041206 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Kheun Khan               2006041221 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Kim Dim                  2006041222 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Ros Phath                2006041226 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP x   
Rath Yoeung              2006041201 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Men Sam Nang             2006041202 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Prok Simorn              2006041203 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Run Phal                 2006041204 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Sam Yann                 2006041223 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Chea Him                 2006041224 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Sum Boeun                2006041225 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP  x  
Liv Vanthan 2006041207 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP   x
Sam Veun 2006041227 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP   x
Yeum Ron 2006041228 Panhea Aong              Tumpoar Meas             Samraong Tong         KSP   x
Lay Sun                  2006041102 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Sorn Sophal              2006041103 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Hem Yon                  2006041104 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Suon Phanny              2006041105 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Sao Ren                  2006041106 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Long Roeurn              2006041121 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Sor Pov                  2006041122 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Yorng Sin                2006041123 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Phal Sim                 2006041124 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Nom Nan                  2006041125 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Nov Phat                 2006041126 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP x   
Nov Oll                  2006041101 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP  x  
Thong Thal 2006041107 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP   x
Seng Theoun 2006041127 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP   x
Seoung Theng 2006041128 Tang Banteay B          Veal Pon          Thpong                   KSP   x
Namm Sokha               2006041302 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Yon Sokha                2006041304 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Hong Khim                2006041305 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Koch Chann               2006041306 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Pon Ron                  2006041321 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Mom Say                  2006041323 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Sieng So                 2006041324 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Pouk Pov                 2006041326 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP x   
Chin Pov                 2006041301 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP  x  
Poung Sok                2006041303 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP  x  
Lonh Ream                2006041325 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP  x  
Chim Chun                2006041322 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP  x  
Sak Kem 2006041307 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP   x
Sann Preum 2006041327 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP   x
Ly Yeng 2006041328 Tuek Long Pir B          Rong Roeang Thpong                   KSP   x
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Moul Ry                  2006052301 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Chres Khom               2006052302 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Sor Sarun                2006052304 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Bean Sean                2006052305 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Hum Sos                  2006052306 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Boeurn Thim              2006052321 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Pheng Poy                2006052322 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Muon Keav                2006052324 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Hok Phalla               2006052325 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Yea Pov                  2006052326 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP x   
Soem On                  2006052303 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP  x  
Keo Thol                 2006052323 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP  x  
Sab Nha 2006052307 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP   x
Naim Chantheoun 2006052327 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP   x
Som Nga 2006052328 Trapeang Antong         Chant Saen Odongk                   KSP   x
Chim Reum                2006032301 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST             x   
Chev Nath                2006032302 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
Sok Rorng                2006032303 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
SENG Sokha               2006032304 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
Chhorn Mao               2006032306 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
Ny Kunthear              2006032322 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
Chheum Ly                2006032324 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
Noung Ren                2006032326 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x   
Yeum Kheum               2006032305 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST               x  
Nob Hoeun                2006032325 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST              x  
Sok Sameth               2006032321 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST               x  
Mom Muth                 2006032323 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST               x  
Vet Khorn 2006032307 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST                x
Sen Oeun 2006032327 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST                x
Oeur Yoeur 2006032328 Buor Srangae              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST                x
Khloth Khom              2006050401 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
Sin Heng                 2006050405 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
DOEUN Khen               2006050423 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
Nuth Kim                 2006050402 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
TONG Chhoeun             2006050403 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
CHHUON Chhan             2006050404 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Chhun Kheang             2006050406 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Cham Sinath              2006050421 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
HOR Chea                 2006050422 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
VAN Nam                  2006050424 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Sao Sum                  2006050425 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Khan Choeun              2006050426 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST              x  
Khut Keun 2006050407 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
Khut Kan 2006050427 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
Bun Yun 2006050428 Kampeaeng                 Prongil           Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
LY Srey Rat              2003032101 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
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Nouy Thy                 2003032104 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
Chhum Kav                2003032105 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
KEO Thy                  2003032106 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
YOUM Chan                2003032121 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
Hem Ra                   2003032124 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
CHEM Ngek                2003032126 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
Peang Muon               2003032102 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
PHACH Kok                2003032103 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
NOUN Met                 2003032125 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Moeun Thoeun             2003032123 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Yun Ki                   2003032122 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST              x  
Say Phy 2006032107 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
Dy Ly 2006032108 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
Sok Vun 2006032127 Kandal                   Phteah Rung              Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
SOU Yorn                 2006050301 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST             x   
TUOCH Sarun              2006050302 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
PHUN Kosal               2006050303 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
THOANG Thavy             2006050306 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
PORK Suon                2006050322 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
HIM Dorn                 2006050324 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
CHHAN Siek               2006050326 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST              x   
SHORN Shi Tha            2006050304 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
HAS Ngorn                2006050305 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
SEN It                   2006050325 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
CHOEM Shim               2006050323 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
THACH Sok                2006050321 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST               x  
Khut Vorn 2006050307 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
Meas Sinuon 2006050327 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
Bo Ty 2006050328 Prey Smach               Rokat                  Phnum Kravanh        PST                x
POR Ek                   2006032201 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST              x   
PEN Khear                2003032202 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST              x   
BOY Heat                 2000032203 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST              x   
PHY Eam                  1994032205 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST              x   
PHE Lang                 1988032221 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST              x   
ROS Ky                   1997032204 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
BUOY Orn                 1991032206 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
KHAT Chrach              1973032226 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
EM Hoy                   1985032222 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
TEP Thou                 1982032223 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
LUY Thy                  1979032224 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
ROS Koeun                1976032225 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST               x  
Ek Heap 2006032207 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST                x
Un Phuy 2006032227 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST                x
 Cheut Meut 2006032228 Prey Srakum              Sya                     Kandieng                 PST                x
Tab Pov                  2006050501 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
Prum Nam                 2006050504 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
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Chhem Saroeun            2006050505 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
Khlong Touch             2006050522 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
Hoon Ngeot               2006050523 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
Yorng Yoeum              2006050525 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
Srey Yoeung              2006050526 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST x   
Pech Mak                 2006050502 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST  x  
HANG Thy                 2006050503 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST  x  
Tith Pock                2006050506 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST  x  
Tong Teng                2006050521 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST  x  
Yong Samath              2006050524 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST  x  
Vomg Som 2006050507 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST   x
Pech My 2006050527 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST   x
Lou Vy 2006050528 Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST   x
Choem Nguon              2006032001 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
Nuy Phatt                2006032002 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
DAV Phon                 2006032004 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
SEM Ton                  2006032021 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
OTH Yet                  2006032023 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
Sem Sokh                 2006032024 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
HIN Yong                 2006032026 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST              x   
MENG San                 2006032003 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST               x  
SUN Tha                  2006032005 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST               x  
Torch Ny                 2006032006 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST               x  
AUTH Yon                 2006032022 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST               x  
Vong Phanna              2006032025 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST               x  
Samret Oul 2006032007 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST                x
Lon Sophea 2006032027 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST                x
Rean Chreoun 2006032028 Toul Thma      Ta Lou                    Bakan                    PST                x 
PRIN Ra                  2006042601 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
BOS Doeun                2006042602 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
THIM Eat                 2006042603 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
TUN Sa Moeun             2006042605 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
REM Chinda               2006042606 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
SO Ang                   2006042621 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
PRIEM Bet                2006042622 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
PIT Lay                  2006042624 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
NHOR Nhet                2006042625 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
YOEUN Ni                 2006042626 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP x   
BOEUNG Tha               2006042604 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP  x  
THAING Sa Voeun          2006042623 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP  x  
Reth Reun 2006042607 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP   x
Rem Seok 2006042627 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP   x
Dam Ma 2006042628 Phum Anlong              Khum Ta Aan              Srok Krolanh          SRP   x
HING Sa Rom              2006042501 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
YORM Yon                 2006042503 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
CHHANN Tuot              2006042504 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
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OEUN Chhoy               2006042505 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
Mrs.SHIN Lun             2006042506 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
Mrs.YET Shin             2006042521 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
Mrs.YORNG Siem           2006042522 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
CHEAM Yun                2006042526 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP x   
SROEB Noeuk              2006042502 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP  x  
HEM Phean                2006042523 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP  x  
PUP Koeng                2006042524 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP  x  
BUNG Phi                 2006042525 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP  x  
Hem Lao 2006042507 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP   x
Doung Nan 2006042508 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP   x
Sak Sin 2006042527 Phum Pak Pan Khum Sasar Sadam       Srok Puok                SRP   x
VITH O'                  2006042401 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
LEAPH Nhet               2006042403 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
TAK Toeut                2006042404 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
YAV Yaing                2006042405 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
SOEUN Vy                 2006042406 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
YAV Yet                  2006042423 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
TAK Phien                2006042424 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
SOEUN Yann               2006042425 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
ROEUM Chhoerny           2006042426 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP x   
MORNG Sang               2006042402 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP  x  
THEAK Thet               2006042421 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP  x  
BIEN Noeut               2006042422 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP  x  
Eaun Sieng 2006042407 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP   x
Oeun San 2006042427 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP   x
Moa Dom 2006042428 Phum Prey Khyang      Khum Krouch Kor         Srok Kralanh SRP   x
BOENG Kean               2006042701 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
TAB Sa Rert              2006042703 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
MUT Tann                 2006042704 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
TEAV Tum                 2006042705 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
MAN Hoeum                2006042706 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
THLANG Norn              2006042721 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
MAI Muy                  2006042722 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
LUON Sa Moeuy            2006042723 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
VY Rie                   2006042724 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
Rat Noun                 2006042726 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP x   
SAO Thi                  2006042702 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP  x  
HOK Ha                   2006042725 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP  x  
Korb Kern 2006042707 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP   x
Pat Nhann 2006042727 Phum Run                 Khum Chonloas Dai      Srok Kralanh SRP   x
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The table below shows the average incidence of replacements by village and by province, 
confirming the patterns previously identified. 
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Boeng Veng               Ta Lom                   Mongkol Borey BMC      25%  100% 0% 
Kok Lun                  Chup Vary                Preah Neak Preah BMC      42%  60% 40% 
Prey Changha Lich        Banteay Neang           Mongkol Borey           BMC      8%  100% 0% 
Ta Trai                  Kokathen                 Thmar Pouk              BMC      33%  75% 25% 
Chhouk                   Makak                    Serey Sophoan           BMC      17%  0% 100% 
Tanorng                  Koy Meng                 Mongkol Borey           BMC      17%  50% 50% 
Andong Khlong            Banteay Chmar           Thmar Pouk              BMC      42%  40% 60% 
Svay Sor II              Pon Ley                  Phnom Srock             BMC      17%  50% 50% 
Poy Snuol                Poy char                 Phnom Srok              BMC      8%  0% 100% 
Phav Thmey               Kok Balang               Mongkol Borey           BMC 50%  50% 50% 
BMC     26%   
CHHOUNG Tradak           Roka                     Sangke                   BTB       33%  75% 25% 
Chrey I                  Chrey                    Moung Russey            BTB       33%  50% 50% 
BTB     33%   
Trapaing Antong          Chan Seng                Oudong                   KSP 17%  50% 50% 
Chumpuo Preuk            Chumpuo Preuk           Oudong                   KSP 33%  75% 25% 
Taing Banteay B          Veal Pun                 T'pong                   KSP 8%  0% 100% 
Phnear Orng              Tumpor Meas             Samrong Tong            KSP 58%  43% 57% 
Kraing Snoul             Pneay                    Somrongtong             KSP 50%  17% 83% 
Kraing Tachor            Rong Roeung             Thpong                   KSP 33%  75% 25% 
Teuk Long IIB            Rong Roeung             Thpong                   KSP 33%  50% 50% 
KSP     33%   
Toul Thmor               Talo                     Bakan                    PST        42%  40% 60% 
Kandal                   Phteah Rong              Kravanh                  PST        42%  60% 40% 
Prey Srokum              Chsa                     Kandieng                 PST        58%  71% 29% 
Buor Srange              Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST        33%  75% 25% 
Prey Smach               Ror Kat                  Phnom Kra Vanh        PST        42%  60% 40% 
Kampeng                  Pro Nill                 Phnom Kravanh          PST        75%  56% 44% 
Snay Toul                Trapeang Chong          Bakan                    PST 42%  40% 60% 
PST     48%   
Phum Prie Kchorng        Khum Krouch Kor       Srok Kro Lanh           SRP 25%  67% 33% 
Phum Pak Pann            Khum Sorso Sdom       Srok Puok                SRP 33%  75% 25% 
Phum Anlung              Khum Ta An              Srok Kro Lanh           SRP 17%  50% 50% 
Phum Run                 Khum Chonleas Dai     Srok Kro Lanh           SRP 17%  50% 50% 
SRP     23%   
Total Incidence 
Replacements 
    33% 57% 43% 
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Annex 26: Household Questionnaire 
 




1. Questionnaire number:   ____________________________   5. Date: _______________ 
2.a. Time started: ____________ 2.b. Time finished: _______________ 
3.a. Interviewer(s): _______________3.b. Supervisor : _________ 
4. Location 4.a. Minutes from branch to location: __________ CODES LOCATION 
4.b. Code Village                                          4.c.Commune                               4.d.District                      4.e.Province            .                               
Introduce yourself, TRAM/AMK and the purpose of your visit -- [*Notes]  
A. INDIVIDUAL and HOUSEHOLD (HH) INFORMATION                                                                    
A.1. 




Year joined AMK 
A.3. 
Number of cycles 
A.4.1. # of persons in HH who earned 
income over last 12 months.  
A.4.2.* Gender of primary 
income earner  
y  /  n     M  /  F  /  B 
A5 A.6.* A.7. * A.8. Only if age >=14 Only if 6-18 A.12.* A.13.* Clothing & A.14.
ID 
# 
Relation to HH head 
[cycle] 
Gender Age A.9.* Marital Status A.10. Can read & 
write a letter?








 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R____________    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R____________    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R____________    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R____________    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R____________    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R____________    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
 h / s / c / p / ss/ gc / o M  / F  s /  m / msm / d / w y   /  n y   /  n  R    . 
B. HOUSEHOLD INFLOWS in the past 12 MONTHS 
1. During the past 12 months, what were the major income 
earning activities and inflows in this HH (inc. food 
production or collection of CPR and gifts or remittances received 
from friends/relatives /NGOs/others)?  




4. Rank 1 to 3 
(more cash per 
year) 
ONLY FOR THOSE 3 RANKED IN B.4  
Months receiving cash income  
5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16 
B.1.1. Farm: Rice cropping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.1.2. Farm: Non-rice, chamkar & veget.cropping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.1.3. Farm: Fruit cropping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.2.1. Farm: Pig raising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.2.2. Farm: Poultry (Chicken or Duck) raising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.2.3. Farm: Cow or Buffalo raising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.3.1. Farm: Fishing/aquaculture (eels, fish, etc) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.3.2. Farm: Wood collection 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.3.3. Farm: Other Common Property Resource (CPR)* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.4.1. Casual/part time local labor (agri + non-agri) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.4.2. Temporary migration (domestic, int’al) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.4.3. Regular salary - civil service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.4.4. Regular salary - factory/services wage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.5.1.* Manufacturing - Code 510 = Food processing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Code 511 = Rice alcohol & other beverages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Code 512 = Textiles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 513 = Handicrafts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 514 = Thatch or mats 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 515 = Others [specify]________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
B.6.1.* Services – Code 610 = Petty trade or petty grocery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Code 611 = Transport  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 Code 612 = Sales in shops/stalls 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Code 613 = Grooming (hairdresser, clean serv) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 614 = Ceremonies planner & Entertainment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 615 = Others [specify]________________________     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
B.7.1. Remittances or gifts (domestic, int’al) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B.8.1.* Other inflows Code 810=Rental or provas (owned) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Code 811 = Asset sales (inc. land sale)     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 812 = Assets Pawned     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 813 = Rental or provas (used)     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 814 = Loans received     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Code 815 = Inflow back from loan given     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 




 Name: ______________________________ 
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\C. HOUSEHOLD OUTFLOWS in the past 12 MONTHS 
1. Rank the 3 principal ways you used your money in the last 12 months, tell me the one 
you used most money for, first]  
? 1.Rank 1-




ONLY FOR THOSE 3 RANKED IN C.1  
Months where expenses occur 
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
C.1. Food     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.2. Clothing     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.3. School expenses and schooling       1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.4. Medicine, doctors or healers and health related costs       1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.5. Inputs for agricultural crops (fertilizer, pesticides, labor, etc)   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.6. Inputs for animal raising (animals + feed + vaccine + etc.) or CPR   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.7. Re-invest in or inputs for other non-farm income activity     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.8. Pay loan principal and interests [ask separately if necessary]     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.9. Ceremonies, festivals, wat, gifts, bride-price, leisure, social events     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.10. Buying land   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.11. Buying households materials/equipment +durable assets   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.12. Buying gold or jewelry   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
C.13. Other [specify]:_____________________________________     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
D. HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES: (inc. Monthly Food Expense Estimate)  
D.1.1. To support your household during a normal (average) day this month, how much do you normally spend each 
day for buying food? [Include value of barter, if any] R__________day 
D.1.2. For example, what did you spend yesterday? [include value of barter, if any] R__________day 
D.1.3. Now, let us turn to what you spent on an average week during the past 12 months, how much does your 
household usually spend per week for buying food? [include also value of barter] R_________week 
D.2.1. How much rice did this HH produced in the last 12 months (rice yield)?  _____________Kg 
D.2.2. Of this yearly rice yield during the last 12 months, how much rice has this household sold? _____________Kg 
D.2.3. What is the market value of the rice that this household has consumed (instead of selling it) per year? R__________year 
D.3. Over the last 12 months, how many months did you have to buy rice for your household consumption? _______  months 
D.4. What is the value of other food that your household has produced on your farm/garden during the last 12 
months and that has consumed (instead of selling it) per year?   [Verify with B.1.2 ,  B.1.3 & B.2] R__________year 
D.5. What is the value of other food that your household has gathered, collected or fished from the forest or 
river/pond/lake and that has consumed (instead of selling it) per year?  [Verify w/ B.3.1&B.3.3] R__________year 
D.6. Considering the preparations for Khmer New Year during the last 2 years, in how many years did you buy new 
clothes for ALL members of the household including children?  [Verify with A.13] _______years 
D.7. Comparing all your income and all your expenses, ”is there leftover to save”? Y / N D.7.1... If Yes How did you save? 
1 = In cash (kept on hand)       3 = bought land                   5 = provide loan to others               7 = other [specify]: ______________ 
2 = In gold                                4 = bought other assets      6 = kept in bank or MFI                          ________________________________ 
E. HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 
E.1. If there was agricultural activity (If yes to B1, B2 or B3 or B.8.1=810). How much cultivable land do you own? 
Plot # Area of the Plot  Value*: Plot # Area of the Plot Value*: 
 ____ m2 / Are / Ha /Rai                      R / $ / Chi / Damloeng  ____ m2 / Are / Ha /Rai                     R / $ / Chi / Damloeng
 ____ m2 / Are / Ha /Rai                      R / $ / Chi / Damloeng  ____ m2 / Are / Ha /Rai                      R / $ / Chi / Damloeng
 ____ m2 / Are / Ha /Rai                      R / $ / Chi / Damloeng  ____ m2 / Are / Ha /Rai                      R / $ / Chi / Damloeng
E.2. How many large animals do you own at present?  [Ignore poultry] 
1= buffalo #:_______                     2= cows #:_______                       3 = pigs #:_______                      4 = goat/sheep #:_____                 
E.3.1. Type of floor                                 E.3.2. Type of roof                          E.3.3. Type of walls                                    E.3.4. Size of the house 
1= Mud floor or rudimentary stilts                1= thatch/leaves                              1= bamboo /thatch                                     
2= On wooden/stone stilts                           2= tin/zinc sheets                            2= low quality wood/logs                           ______m  x _____ m=   
3= Cement base/expensive wood stilts       3= tiles / other good materials         3= brick / cement / high quality wood             ___________m2 
E.4. Relatively Modest Value (<$100) 
1= Radio or tape player 
2= Plow+harrow / palm-sugar tools / equivalent 
3= Television (b/w) 
4= Bicycle   
5= Ox-cart   
6= Boat (simple)    
7 =Other ______________________   
E.5. Mid-range Value ($100-$500) 
1= Expensive tools, e.g. carpentry 
2= Boat (expensive boat) 
3= Water pump 
4= Rice mill machine     
5= Generator   
6= Mobile phone          
7= Other__________________  
E.6. High-range Value (>$500) 
1= Motorcycle  
2= Plowing/ threshing 
machine [‘electric cow’] 
3= Car/ pick-up/truck 
4= Tractor               
5= (Big) Karaoke    
6= Other  _______7= Other 
E.7. What type of  
toilet facility is available? 
 
1. Bush, field, no facility 
2. Shared pit toilet/latrine 
3. Own pit toilet / latrine  




F. LOAN and INDEBTEDNESS INFORMATION  
F.1. How much money does this household owe at this moment? (include all HH members)   R____________   
F.2. How much of this total money do you owe to AMK?                                    R____________  
F.3. Money owned to other credit providers [F.1 - F.2] R___________ F.4. How many loans are not fully repaid today? #_________
LOAN Information 
(all currently outstanding loans, from largest to smallest, repeat AMK loans F5 to F.10] 
1. Largest  
loan #1 
2. Medium 
loan # 2 
3. Small 
 loan # 3 
F.5. Amount / size of loan R R R 
F.6. Monthly interest rate (%)    
F.7. From what source?                                                   1 =Moneylender (cash) 
2=Trader (moneylender in-kind, paddy or rice) 
                                 3 = Relatives or close friends 
                                 4 = ACLEDA/Other bank 
5= AMK 
6 = Other MFI/MFO [specify] 






















F.8. Term of loan ____months ____months ____months 
F.9. Did you face or are you facing any difficulty repaying your loan? y   /   n   y   /   n y   /   n 
  If yes, F.9.1. What caused your repayment problems? [Do not read answers] 
1 = Enterprise problems (no profits in activity, animal died, problem w/sales on credit) 
2 = Illnesses in the family 
3 = Natural disasters (floods/drought/fire or natural calamity 



















F.10. In what did you use the loan? What did you buy with it? [Multiple resp. possible] 
1= Inputs for agriculture (rice, other crop/fruit production) 
2= Animals or inputs for animal raising (pig, duck, chicken, cow,  buffalo) 
3= Inputs for fishing, wood collection or other CPR 
4= Inputs manufacturing (food processing, textile, crafts, rice alcohol, palm sugar) 
5= Inputs for petty trade or petty grocery 
6= Inputs for other services (transport, grocery shop, food stalls, clean, hairdress) 
7= Costs of migration or costs of securing job/salary 
8= Buy land 
9= Buy house (house materials) or other assets (including small household items)   
10= Buy gold or jewelry 
11= Pay existing debt / repay other debt 
12= Give or loan the money to someone else 
13= Buy food 
14= Pay for health / hospitals costs 
15= Celebrations, festivals, gifts or leisure activities [“da leing’] 
16= Keep money on hand in case of an emergency or to repay the loan 




























































LOAN Evaluation  Loan #1 Loan # 2 Loan # 3 
F.11. Please name three things you like 





































F.12. Please name three things you like 
least about the source of the loan.  
What things made you unhappy about 






































G. HH INCOME and VULNERABILITY INFORMATION 
G.1. Over the last 12 months, has your overall 
household economic situation?  
       [Read answers]  
1 = Decreased Greatly 
2 = Decreased 
3 = Stayed the Same 
4 = Increased  
5 = Increased Greatly 
G.1.1. If decreased at all, Why?    [Do not read answers. Multiple answers possible] 
1. Household member (or self) has been sick/died  
2. Natural disaster (flood, earthquake). 
3. Poor agricultural season (not due to natural disasters) 
4. Poor sales (not due to natural disasters) 
5. Lost job 
6. Unable to get inputs or increased costs in business 
7. Could not collect credit due on sales 
8. Other [specify] :________________________ 
G.2. I will read 4 choices for your response.  Please tell me which
statement best describes the food situation in your HH 
1 = Often not enough to eat  
2 = Sometimes not enough to eat  
3 = Enough but not always what we want to eat  
4 = Enough and the kinds of food we want to eat 
G.3. During the last 12 months, has your household's diet [Read answers] 
 
1 = Worsened                                             [check consistency with G.1]            
2 = Stayed the same                                                                                
3 = Improved                     
 
G.4. Over the last 12 months, was there ever a time when your family ate< 3 meals/day because of a lack of food or money? 0 = No 1 = Yes 
G.5. During the last 12 months, was there ever a time when it was necessary for your household to eat less nutritious food (eat 
worse foods/ less delicious/nutrient foods) because of a lack of food or a lack of money to buy food?    0 = No 1 = Yes 
G.6.Over the last 12 months, have you ever faced with any of the following crises or major events?   
10 = Loss of household member  (# of members_______________)                       
11 = Household member very sick or badly injured 
12 = Paid bride-price for marrying son  
13 = Other family events such as death and funeral, birth 
14 = Paid compensation for accident, problem, etc.  
20 = Loss of enterprise asset (animal death, shop burned down, theft or being cheated) 
21 = Business shutdown or enterprise failure 
22 = Household member lost job/wage employment 
30 = Crop damage due to food/drought or other natural disaster (earthquake, thunder fire) 
31 = Other damage due to food/drought, fire or other natural disaster  
[Read and circle] 
[Multiple answers possible] 
32 = Land conflicts or land grabbing G.7.    If NO to all in G.6. 
G.8. Only if any YES in G.6, What did your household do to get through (to cope with) this difficult situation? [Do not read answers]  
10. Spent past savings                                                                                                  [Multiple answers possible] [Probe if necessary] 
20. Borrowed money/gold or food from family/friend at no cost [Is this from the same sources outlined in F.5-F.11- see below] 
21. Borrowed money/gold or food at cost [Is this from the same sources outlined in F.5-F.11- if different: from whom, how much, how long, etc…] 
30. Increase existing economic activities or undertake more CPR 
31. Rented personal property to others (land, house, cattle, transport, farm or household equipment) 
32. Self or someone else in family got local employment (including casual work)  
33. Self or someone else in family left area to seek employment (including casual work) 
40. Reduce food consumption/eat worse foods/eat less times per day 
41. Reduce other non-food expenses (school, clothes, etc) 
42. Sold personal property (land, house, cattle, transport, farm or household equipment) 
50. Other [specify]:____________________________________________________________________            
G.9. I will read 3 choices for your response.  Please tell me which describes best the 
situation in this HH about large expenses in the last 12 months 
3 = We had no difficulty to afford large expenses (plan ahead + save enough) 
2 = We had some difficulty to afford large expenses 
1 = We had great (a lot) difficulty to afford large expenses 
G.10. I will read 3 choices for your response.  Please tell me which describes best 
your school-age children attending school N/A      I 
1 = None of them are expected to complete secondary school 
2 = Not all of them are expected to complete secondary school 
3 = We expect all of them to complete secondary school 
G.11. I will read 4 statements.  Please tell me which describes best this HH 
situation when you need to pay for medicine & healthcare: 
1 = We never borrow money or sell assets  
2 = We seldom (rarely) need to borrow money or sell assets  
3 = We often (frequently, regularly) need to borrow money/sell assets 
4 = We always need to borrow money or sell assets (difficult) 
G.12. I will read 4 choices for your response.  Please tell me which best 
describes your HH in this community where you live… 
1 = We have few good friends/neighbors [>other village] 
2 = We have some good friends/neighbors  
3 = We have many good friends/neighbors 
4 = All the neighbors here are good friends of ours 
G.13. Are you or is someone in your household currently a member of any group, organization or association? [Probe 
with tongtine, civic group, pagoda group, youth group, farmers/traders group) etc.] 0 = No 1 = Yes 
G.14. Is there anything that you want to ask us or anything else that you want to say? Do you have any recommendation for AMK to improve 












Introduce yourself:  
 
For client households (HHs) 
? Identify yourself and introduce the difference between TRAM and the Credit Officer they know (make sure you know the CO’s 
name before you reach the village) 
? Inform the household of your purpose: “We want to learn from them to create better products and services; we want to improve 
AMK to better serve them” (please be careful, you do NOT say you want to know whose households are poorer or better-off; this 
will create biased info: do not mention it) 
? Explain why this household has been selected: “either because they are new clients or because they are old clients with a lot of 
experience about AMK products.”   
? Explain that those people not from this household cannot participate in or listen to the interview. Whether they are close friends, 
village leaders or elders, they will be asked to leave.  This is because we want them to respond freely and not to feel pressured or shy.  
Only people living in this household can stay during the interview. 
? Assure respondents of confidentiality:  “This study and your answers will be collected and kept confidentially within the TRAM 
department so that nobody can track your particular answers to the results of this study – please answer honestly to the question and 
help us understand clearly your situation, so that AMK can offer products that better fit your needs” 
 
For non-client HHs introduce yourself and start by asking “Do you know about AMK?” [briefly describe AMK if they do not].  Continue 
with “We understand that you are not a client, but we want to talk to you to see how AMK financial products and services may be 
relevant to you and how we can improve them so that they become more useful/relevant to you”, explain who can listen to the interview 
and assure them of confidentiality.  
 
 
A.2:  “Group of individuals who live together under the same roof and regularly share meals and expenses together (household 
members share the same food at least once a day).”  Family members away from home are not included unless they are:  
(a) Migrant spouse or migrant children that contributes regularly/ substantially to the HH expenses or  
(b) Children of head of household attending boarding school when the HH fully supports them financially. 
 
A.14:  Expenditures in clothes and shoes for all members of the household during the last 12 months:  Include also second hand and 
probe by members with time reference points: Khmer New Year, school, plowing /harvest or other celebrations.   Do not include gifts, do not 
include clothes passed by one member to another.  If sewn at home, provide costs of all materials: thread, fabrics, buttons, and needles. 
 
B.3.3:  Common Property Resources (CPR): Plants and animals collected from the field and forest, including fish and wood.  Other 
CPR include: bamboo, palm leaf, fruits, roots, wild vegetables, frogs, land crabs, birds, snakes, rats or rabbits, etc. 
 
G.4:  Refers to meals eaten and not cooked; e.g. a household might eat 3 times a day but cook only twice a day 
 
E.:  Household Assets are defined as equipment and durable goods, i.e. goods that last for a long time (some of them could be passed 
to their children): cultivable land, livestock, house, gold/jewelry, TV or radio, motorcycle, etc 
 
E.1.:  When asking the current value of cultivable land ask:  “If you were to sell that land today, how much money would you receive 






&A.7.    
M = Male 
F = Female 
B = Both 
Code A.6. 
H = Head (self) 
S = Spouse 
C = Children (son or daughter+in-laws) 
P = Parent (father or mother) 
SS = Single siblings 
GC = Grandchild 
O = Grandparent, niece/nephew,others 
Code A.9 
S = single 
M = married with the spouse living in the household 
Msm = married with spouse migrant for more than 6 
months/year (only if the migrant spouse supports the 
household) 
D = divorced or separated 
W = widow or widower 
Code A.12.  Highest class passed    
0 =    No class passed 
1-9 = Highest class passed (1 to 6 primary, 
7 to 9 secondary)  
12 = High School Certificate  
15 = Technical diploma/certificate 
20 = University degree 
 
Code B.5.1. 
510 = Food processing 
511 = Rice alcohol & other beverages 
512 = Textiles 
513 = Handicrafts 
514 = Thatch or mats 
515 = Others [specify]  
Code B.6.1. 
610 = Petty trade or petty grocery 
611 = Transport  
612 = Sales in shops/stalls 
613 = Grooming (hairdresser, cleaning serv) 
614 = Wedding planners & Entertainment 
615 = Others [specify]  
Code B.8.1.
810 = Rental or provas (owned) 
811 = Asset sales (including land sale) 
812 = Assets Pawned 
813 = Rental or provas (used) 
814 = Loans received 
815 = Inflow back from loan given 
816 = Other inflows [specify]  
 
 Additional Definitions and Notes: 
? Question A.12 ?  Primary: Grades 1 to 6 (proxy 6 to 12 years old) 
Lower Secondary: Grades 7 to 9 (proxy 13 to 15 years old) 
Upper Secondary: Grades 10 to 12 (proxy 16 to 18 years old) 
? Question B.8.1 ? Provas (“sharing” – whether “sharecropping or “sharelivestocking”) is considered a type of rental.  There are 
two main differences between traditional Khmer provas and common rental.   
a) in provas the “rental” is post-paid  (i.e. rice is given after harvest or the owner of the cow will get the first calf while 
the family caring after the cow will get the second calf) while other rental arrangements are usually pre-paid and  
b) in case of a natural calamity, no full payment is expected (at least not in cash) while in the other common rental 
arrangements, the full amount will be paid regardless of natural calamities or other external forces. 
? Question B.8.1 ? Pawning assets is considered as a “type of sale” (basically, selling at a worse price but it is also cheaper to buy 
back.   
? Question E.1: 1 Ha = 10,000 m2 = 100 Ares = 6.25 Rai; 1 Chi = 3.75 gr gold;  1 Damlooeng = 10 Chi 
? Question E.2: 1 tang = 2 tao = 24 Kg; 1 tao = 12 Kg.  Please note that self-suffiency requirement for rice has been estimated at 
10 tang (240 Kg) per adult per year and 5 tang (120 Kg) per child per year. (Conway, 1999) 
? Question  G.4 ? Number of meals per day refers to meals ate and not cooked; e.g. a household might eat 3 times a day but 
cook only twice a day. 
? Conversions: 
• Gold prices at the end of last quarter of 2005 were. 1 Chi = US$57  ? 1 Damloeng = US$570  
• US$ Conversion Rate ? 1 US$ = R 4,096 (average of exchange rate form March to May 2006). 
March 2006: 1US$ = 4,095 
April 2006: 1US$ = 4,092 






 Annex 27: Village/Community Questionnaire 
 
TRAM/AMK – Village/Community Questionnaire 
 
 
Instructions: This interview must be answered by the Credit Officer and / or the Area Manager in charge of the particular village / 
community where fieldwork has taken place.  Introduce yourself, TRAM and the purpose of this survey: “We want to find out the 
main characteristics of the villages where fieldwork has taken place” 
 
 
INDENTIFICATION / LOCATION  
1. Code Village                                          1.a. Commune                               1.b. District                      1.c. Province            . 
2.a. Date: ____________________________ 2.b. Time started: ______ : _____ 2.c. Time finished: ______ : _____  
3.a. Interviewer:______________________________________3.b Supervisor : ____________________________ 
4.a. Name and function of first respondent __________________________________________________ CO      AM 
4.b. Name and function of second respondent _______________________________________________ CO     AM 
4.a. Minutes from branch to location: __________minutes   4.a. Distance in Km from branch to location: ________Km 
4.c. Condition of road          Poor / bad                   Good                        Excellent 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VILLAGE  
 
 
A.1. How many households live in this Village? ________________households in the village 
A.2. What is the average household size? ________________persons per household 




 Response (Yes /  No) If YES, specify 











A.5. Are informal credit/finance (moneylenders, in-kind traders, etc. with 
more than 10 clients in the village) y   /  n 
 
______________households in the village 
using moneylenders or traders 
 
. ________________number of 
moneylenders with more than 10 clients 
operating in this village? 
 
________________number of in-kind 
traders with more than 10 clients operating 
in this village? 
 
A.6. Are there people that migrate more than 3 months a year in this 
village? y   /  n 
 
# _______________households with 
members that migrate to other area, 









Do you have in this village? Response (Yes /  No) If NO, how far away approx. (Km)? 
B.1.Government (District/Provincial) Referral Hospital y   /  n ____________Km 
B.2. Local Health Center (any type: Gov’t, NGO, missionary) y   /  n ____________Km 
B.3. Private clinic with midwife or traditional (kru) doctor only y   /  n ____________Km 
B.4. Primary school (any type, i.e. NGO, gov’t or private) y   /  n ____________Km 
B.5. Lower secondary school (any type) y   /  n ____________Km 
B.6. Upper secondary school (any type) y   /  n ____________Km 
B.7. Market/ Bazaar / Trading center y   /  n ____________Km 
B.8. Shop for pesticides, fertilizes and other agro-chemicals y   /  n ____________Km 
B.9. Livestock/Agricultural extension service / worker y   /  n ____________Km 
B.10. Access to electricity  y   /  n ____________Km 
B.11. Access to piped drinking water grid y   /  n ____________Km 
B.12. Access to network for mobile phone y   /  n ____________Km 
 
During the past 24 months, did (some) households in this village 
have access or benefited from  ….? 
Response (Yes /  No) 
If YES, what percentage of households 
benefited in the village? (percent) 
D.1. Food for work program y   /  n ____________% 
D.2. Relief assistance (free food, free seed)  y   /  n ____________% 
D.3. Self Help Groups of any kind (NGO, coop, savings, credit, etc) y   /  n ____________% 
 
 
C.1. In this village crops have been lost due to natural disasters (flood, 
drought, etc) 
   Every year 
     Once in 2-4 years 
     Once in 5-10 years 
     Never 
During the past 5 years, did this village have…? Response (Yes /  No) 
If YES, how would you rate its impact 
on the village?   
[If the same disaster occurred more than once 
during the last 5 years, this question refers to the 
most serious disaster during the past 5 years.] 
C.2. Drought/long dry spells (major crops failed) y   /  n 
     Devastating (majority affected) 
     Serious (half affected) 
     Manageable damage  
C.3. Flooding (major crops failed) y   /  n 
     Devastating  
     Serious  
     Manageable damage 
C.4. Other natural disasters (e.g. pests, fire, etc) y   /  n 
     Devastating  
     Serious 
     Manageable damage 
C.5. Other non-natural disasters ( e.g. land grabbing, no further access to 
CPR, etc) y   /  n 
     Devastating  
     Serious  
     Manageable damage 
 
Note to interviewer team: Thank the respondents for this interview and clarify all questions they may have about the survey or the 
TRAM fieldwork. 
 Annex 28: PCA Theory - Mathematical Summary and Procedure261 
 
In simple terms PCA is a very effective data reduction technique.  PCA decomposes the 
information into mathematical data (called loading vectors, factors, principal components, etc.) 
which represent the most common variations to all the data.  A set of scaling coefficients (called 
scores) for each factor can be calculated for every data set; in other words, PCA reduces data into 
a smaller set of representative numbers known as scores.  When the scores are multiplied by the 
loading vectors, and the results summed, the original spectra are reconstructed.  
 
The use of PCA allows a number of variables in a multivariate data set to be reduced while 
keeping as much as possible of the variation present in the original data set. This reduction is 
achieved by taking p variables X1, X2,…, Xp and finding the combinations of these to produce 
principal components (PCs, also known as “eigenvectors”) PC1, PC2,…, PCp, which are 
uncorrelated.  This lack of correlation among eigenvectors effectively means that the PCs are 
measuring different “dimensions" in the data.  However the PCs are ordered so that PC1 exhibits 
the greatest amount of the variation, PC2 exhibits the second greatest amount of the variation, 
PC3 exhibits the third greatest amount of the variation, and so on.  Thus, each “dimension of the 
data” is ordered according to the amount of variation that exhibits and var (PC1) ≥ var (PC2) ≥ 
var (PC3) ≥… ≥ var (PCp), where var (PCi) expresses the variance of PCi in the data set being 
considered and is also called “eigenvalue.”  In PCA it is hoped that the eigenvalues of most of 
the PCs will be so low as to be virtually negligible, because then the variation in the data set can 
be adequately described by means of a few PCs where the eigenvalues are not negligible.  Then, 
the variation in the original number of X variables can be described using a smaller number of 
new PCs variables. 
 
Procedure for PCA 
The analysis is performed on a data set of p variables (X1, X2, … , Xp) for n individuals, as set 
in the following data matrix table:  
 
From this data set, a squared covariance or correlation matrix can be calculated using the 
following equation: 
                                                 




The covariance matrix then has the following form: 
 
 
where S is the covariance matrix, sjk is the covariance of variables Xj and Xk when j ≠ k and the 
diagonal element sjjis the variance of variable Xj when j = k.   
 
PCA attempts to find the variances and coefficients of the data set (i.e. the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors of the sample correlation matrix).  The first principal component (PC1) is then a 
linear combination of the original variables X1, X2, … , Xp,  
 
that varies as much as possible for the individuals, subject to the condition that  
 
where a11 , a12 … , a1p are coefficients assigned to the original p variables for PC1. 
 
Therefore, the eigenvalue of PC1 is as large as possible given this constraint on the constant a1j. 
The constraint must be imposed in order to avoid the increasing of the eigenvalue of PC1 by 
simply increasing one or more of the a1j values.  
 
Similarly, the second principal component, 
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 is such that eigenvalues of PC2, is as large as possible subject to the constraint that: 
 
and also on the condition that PC2 is uncorrelated with PC1. The third principal component: 
 
is such that the eigenvalue of PC3 is as large as possible subject to the constraint that: 
 
and also on the condition that PC3, PC2 and PC1 are uncorrelated.  There can be up to p principal 
components if there are p variables.  Other important properties of eigenvectors or PCs are:  
 
1. Eigenvectors can only be found for squared matrices.  
2. Not all squared matrices have eigenvectors, however a correlation (or covariance) matrix 
will always have eigenvectors (the same number as there are variables).  
3. Length does not affect whether a vector is a particular eigenvector, direction does. 
4. Eigenvectors and eigenvalues always come in pairs. 
 
Any correlation between the dependent variable (outcome) and the PCs is captured by means of 
a regression model. The regression step can be done after the creation of the PCs and removal of 
some PCs that are believed to be unrelated or of little importance to the effects under study.  
 
In PCA, the number of components extracted is equal to the number of variables being analyzed 
but the components are chosen in sequence as the best descriptors of the data.  If the last few 
components do not account for much of the variance and can be ignored, it is important to assess 
how many PCs are needed to account for ‘most’ of the variation in the original variables.  Three 
criteria have been proposed to answer this question: 
 
? The first method is to look at the eigenvalue (which are ranked in order) to see how many 
are needed to explain a “sufficient percentage of the total” (some argue that “sufficient” 
involves those components which explain 70 to 80% of the total variation while others 
have suggested that a total percentage of 80 to 90% is adequate). 
? The second method (also known as the Kaiser criterion) retains only those PCs where 
eigenvalues are ≥ 1; this is because it is eigenvalues ≥ 1 accounts for a greater amount of 
variance than had been contributed by one variable since each observed variable 
contributes only one unit of variance to the total variance.  Those components or 
eigenvalue greater than 1 then accounts for a meaningful amount of variance and are 
worthy of being retained, while any eigenvalue less than 1 contains less information than 
362 
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one of the original variables and so is not worth retaining. (Nevertheless, when a cut-off 
of 1 retains too few variables, an eigenvalue of approximately 0.7 are used for retaining).   
? The third method of assessing the number of PCs to be retained is the screen graph or 
screen plot, where eigenvalues are plotted against PC numbers (with the PC numbers on 
the x-axis and the eigenvalues on the y-axis).  The PCs retained are those whose slope 
levels off with the decrease of eigenvalues.  (This method may lead to the inclusion of 












   
G.2 - [Food 
Security] 
G.2. Pearson Correlation 1  C.6.2. Pearson Correlation .120(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 
  N 450    N 450 
4.a. Pearson Correlation -.152(**)  C.7.1. Pearson Correlation -.249(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 
  N 450    N 126 
A.3 Pearson Correlation .162(**)  C.7.2. Pearson Correlation .250(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 360    N 450 
ClientSeniority Pearson Correlation -0.013  C.8.1. Pearson Correlation 0.184 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.781    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.182 
  N 450    N 54 
A.4.1. Pearson Correlation .142(**)  C.8.2. Pearson Correlation 0.001 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.988 
  N 450    N 450 
A.5.1. Pearson Correlation 0.073  C.9.1. Pearson Correlation 0.06 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.122    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.564 
  N 450    N 94 
NUMADULTS Pearson Correlation .202(**)  C.9.2. Pearson Correlation 0.052 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.275 
  N 450    N 450 
NUMCSA Pearson Correlation -.102(*)  C.10.1. Pearson Correlation 0.04 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.761 
  N 450    N 59 
NUMCBSA Pearson Correlation -0.007  C.10.2. Pearson Correlation .178(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.877    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NUMCHILDREN Pearson Correlation -0.054  C.11.1. Pearson Correlation -0.109 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.251    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.28 
  N 450    N 100 
PercentageChildrenLESS
Than6OverChildren Pearson Correlation 0.092  C.11.2. Pearson Correlation .190(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.062    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 412    N 450 
PercentageChildrenLESS
Than6OverTotalHH Pearson Correlation -0.051  C.12.1. Pearson Correlation -0.18 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.28    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.644 
  N 450    N 9 
PercentageIncomeEarner
OverTotalHH Pearson Correlation 0.09  C.12.2. Pearson Correlation .240(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.056    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
PercentageCASOverChild
ren Pearson Correlation -0.092  C.13.1. Pearson Correlation 0.522 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.062    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.478 
  N 412    N 4 
HHh#HHmember Pearson Correlation 0.042  C.13.2. Pearson Correlation 0.036 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.369    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.446 
  N 450    N 450 
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HHhAge Pearson Correlation 0.046  AccRankFood Pearson Correlation -.207(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.335    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 448    N 450 
HHhLiteracy Pearson Correlation .138(**)  Rank1Food Pearson Correlation -.157(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 449    N 450 
HHhHighEduc Pearson Correlation .144(**)  AccRankClothing Pearson Correlation -.103(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 
  N 448    N 450 
HHhClothing Pearson Correlation .154(**)  Rank1Clothing Pearson Correlation .(a) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 448    N 450 
A.1. Pearson Correlation 0.016  AccRankSchooling Pearson Correlation 0.051 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.736    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.283 
  N 450    N 450 
HHhAMKClient Pearson Correlation -0.001  Rank1Schooling Pearson Correlation 0.053 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.988    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.258 
  N 450    N 450 
AMKClient#HHmember Pearson Correlation 0.028  AccRankHeatlh Pearson Correlation -.110(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.59    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 
  N 360    N 450 
AMKClientAge Pearson Correlation 0.056  Rank1Heatlh Pearson Correlation -0.089 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.293    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.06 
  N 359    N 450 
AMKClientLiteracy Pearson Correlation 0.077  AccRankInputCrops Pearson Correlation -.120(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.145    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 
  N 360    N 450 
AMKClientHighEduc Pearson Correlation .116(*)  Rank1InputCrops Pearson Correlation 0.006 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.029    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.893 
  N 358    N 450 
AMKClientclothing Pearson Correlation .253(**)  AccRankInputLivestockCPR Pearson Correlation 0.029 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.539 
  N 360    N 450 
A.8.1. Pearson Correlation 0.038  Rank1InputLivestockCPR Pearson Correlation 0.037 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.422    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.429 
  N 448    N 450 
A.10.1. Pearson Correlation .138(**)  AccRankInputNonFarm Pearson Correlation .163(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 449    N 450 
A.12.1. Pearson Correlation .149(**)  Rank1InputNonFarm Pearson Correlation .123(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009 
  N 448    N 450 
A.13.1. Pearson Correlation .149(**)  AcdRankServiceLoans Pearson Correlation -.180(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 448    N 450 
B.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.026  AccRankServiceLoans Pearson Correlation -.180(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.584    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.075  Rank1ServiceLoans Pearson Correlation -.102(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.111    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 
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  N 450    N 450 
B.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.032  AccRankCeremonies Pearson Correlation .096(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.661    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.042 
  N 187    N 450 
B.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.007  Rank1Ceremonies Pearson Correlation 0.026 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.878    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.581 
  N 450    N 450 
B.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation 0.033  AccRankBuyLand Pearson Correlation .123(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.484    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009 
  N 450    N 450 
B.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation -0.14  Rank1BuyLand Pearson Correlation 0.077 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.46    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.102 
  N 30    N 450 
B.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation 0.069  AccRankBuyOAssets Pearson Correlation 0.082 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.143    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.084 
  N 450    N 450 
B.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation 0.042  Rank1BuyOAssets Pearson Correlation .118(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.376    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.012 
  N 450    N 450 
B.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation -0.194  AccRankBuyGold Pearson Correlation .191(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.677    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 7    N 450 
B.2.1.1. Pearson Correlation .100(*)  Rank1BuyGold Pearson Correlation .109(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.034    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 
  N 450    N 450 
B.2.1.3. Pearson Correlation .102(*)  AccRankOthers Pearson Correlation 0.046 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.335 
  N 450    N 450 
B.2.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.026  Rank1Others Pearson Correlation -0.003 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.746    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.956 
  N 152    N 450 
B.2.2.1. Pearson Correlation .112(*)  AccRankBasics Pearson Correlation -.179(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.2.2.3. Pearson Correlation .194(**)  AccRankFarmInvestmetns Pearson Correlation -.102(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031 
  N 450    N 450 
B.2.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.067  AccRankAssetBuilding Pearson Correlation .153(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.633    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 53    N 450 
B.2.3.1. Pearson Correlation 0.061  Rank1Basics Pearson Correlation -.148(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.199    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 450    N 450 
B.2.3.3. Pearson Correlation .144(**)  Rank1FarmInvestment Pearson Correlation 0.028 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.552 
  N 450    N 450 
B.2.3.4. Pearson Correlation -0.003  Rank1AssetBuilding Pearson Correlation .148(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.977    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 79    N 450 
B.3.1.1. Pearson Correlation -.150(**)  D.1.1. Pearson Correlation .208(**) 
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  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.3.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.025  D.1.2. Pearson Correlation .121(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.593    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 
  N 450    N 450 
B.3.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.167  D.1.3. Pearson Correlation .197(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.345    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 34    N 450 
B.3.2.1. Pearson Correlation -.105(*)  D.2.1. Pearson Correlation .128(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007 
  N 450    N 450 
B.3.2.3. Pearson Correlation -0.033  D.2.2. Pearson Correlation .134(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.489    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 
  N 450    N 450 
B.3.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.559  D.2.3. Pearson Correlation .148(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.327    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 5    N 449 
B.4.1.1. Pearson Correlation -.116(*)  D.3. Pearson Correlation -.095(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.044 
  N 450    N 450 
B.4.1.3. Pearson Correlation -.115(*)  D.4. Pearson Correlation 0.094 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.099 
  N 450    N 310 
B.4.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.108  D.5. Pearson Correlation .119(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.16    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026 
  N 171    N 348 
B.4.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.092  D.6. Pearson Correlation .186(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.051    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 448 
B.4.2.3. Pearson Correlation -0.092  D.7.1. Pearson Correlation .331(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.051    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.4.2.4. Pearson Correlation -0.002  D.7.1.1. Pearson Correlation .295(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.984    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 84    N 450 
B.4.3.1. Pearson Correlation .152(**)  D.7.1.2. Pearson Correlation .263(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.4.3.3. Pearson Correlation .152(**)  D.7.1.3. Pearson Correlation .160(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 450    N 450 
B.4.3.4. Pearson Correlation 0.004  D.7.1.4. Pearson Correlation .215(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.984    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 24    N 450 
B.4.4.1. Pearson Correlation .157(**)  D.7.1.5. Pearson Correlation -0.002 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.964 
  N 450    N 450 
B.4.4.3. Pearson Correlation .157(**)  D.7.1.6. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 450    N 450 
B.4.4.4. Pearson Correlation .280(*)  D.7.1.7.0. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
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  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 63    N 450 
B.5.1.0.1. Pearson Correlation .104(*)  ClothingPC Pearson Correlation .246(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.027    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 447 
B.5.1.0.3. Pearson Correlation .105(*)  WeeklyFoodExpenseHH Pearson Correlation .204(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.5.1.0.4. Pearson Correlation 0.123  OtherFoodProducYear0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.078 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.354    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.099 
  N 59    N 450 
B.5.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.039  OtherFoodGathered0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.035 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.413    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.462 
  N 450    N 450 
B.5.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.039  TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly Pearson Correlation .241(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.413    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 
B.5.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.055  TotalYearlyFoodExpensePC Pearson Correlation .170(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.859    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 13    N 449 
B.5.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.003  ClothingPCOverFoodExpensePC Pearson Correlation 0.041 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.943    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.382 
  N 450    N 446 
B.5.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation -0.003  DailyFoodExpensePC Pearson Correlation .170(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.943    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 




Pearson Correlation -.187(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.293    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 4    N 450 
B.5.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation 0.043  ClothingPCUS$ Pearson Correlation .246(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.367    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 447 
B.5.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation 0.043  DailyFoodPCExpenseUS$ Pearson Correlation .170(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.357    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 
B.5.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation 0.074  E.1. Pearson Correlation .136(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.743    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 
  N 22    N 448 
B.5.1.4.1. Pearson Correlation -0.071  HHTotalLandAreainHa Pearson Correlation .171(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.135    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.5.1.4.3. Pearson Correlation -0.053  HHTotalValueLandinRiel Pearson Correlation .212(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.264    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.5.1.4.4. Pearson Correlation 0.026  E.2.1. Pearson Correlation 0.072 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.923    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.133 
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  N 16    N 440 
B.5.1.5.1. Pearson Correlation -0.009  E.2.2. Pearson Correlation .193(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.847    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
N 450      N 434 
B.5.1.5.3. Pearson Correlation -0.009  E.2.3. Pearson Correlation .148(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.847    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 450    N 436 
B.5.1.5.4. Pearson Correlation -0.265  E.2.4. Pearson Correlation .096(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.289    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.042 
  N 18    N 443 
B.6.1.0.1. Pearson Correlation .211(**)  E.3.1. Pearson Correlation .216(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 
B.6.1.0.3. Pearson Correlation .211(**)  E.3.2. Pearson Correlation .254(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 
B.6.1.0.4. Pearson Correlation 0.13  E.3.3. Pearson Correlation .377(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.431    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 39    N 448 
B.6.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.063  E.3.4.1. Pearson Correlation .128(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.18    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 
  N 450    N 449 
B.6.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.065  E.3.4.2. Pearson Correlation .152(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.171    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 450    N 449 
B.6.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.163  E.3.4.3. Pearson Correlation .114(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.546    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.016 
  N 16    N 449 
B.6.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation .110(*)  E.4.1. Pearson Correlation .221(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation .110(*)  E.4.2. Pearson Correlation -0.012 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.803 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.073  E.4.3. Pearson Correlation .232(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.682    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 34    N 450 
B.6.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation -0.003  E.4.4. Pearson Correlation .147(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.949    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation -0.003  E.4.5. Pearson Correlation 0.006 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.949    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.897 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation .(a)  E.4.6. Pearson Correlation 0.061 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.194 
  N 2    N 450 
B.6.1.4.1. Pearson Correlation 0.04  E.4.7.0. Pearson Correlation .143(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.396    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.4.3. Pearson Correlation 0.04  E.5.1. Pearson Correlation 0.039 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.396    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.413 
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  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.4.4. Pearson Correlation 0.408  E.5.2. Pearson Correlation -0.071 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.495    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.134 
  N 5    N 450 
B.6.1.5.1. Pearson Correlation .200(**)  E.5.3. Pearson Correlation .094(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.047 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.5.3. Pearson Correlation .200(**)  E.5.4. Pearson Correlation .156(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 450    N 450 
B.6.1.5.4. Pearson Correlation -0.148  E.5.5. Pearson Correlation .099(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.419    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.035 
  N 32    N 450 
B.7.1.1. Pearson Correlation -0.026  E.5.6. Pearson Correlation .222(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.585    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.7.1.3. Pearson Correlation -0.026  E.5.7.0. Pearson Correlation .109(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.585    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 
  N 450    N 450 
B.7.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.037  E.6.1. Pearson Correlation .288(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.901    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 14    N 450 
B.8.1.0.1. Pearson Correlation 0.048  E.6.2. Pearson Correlation 0.07 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.309    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.137 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.0.3. Pearson Correlation 0.066  E.6.3. Pearson Correlation .135(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.161    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.0.4. Pearson Correlation 0.614  E.6.4. Pearson Correlation .095(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.078    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.043 
  N 9    N 450 
B.8.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.081  E.6.5. Pearson Correlation -0.002 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.088    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.975 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.081  E.6.6.0. Pearson Correlation 0.053 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.088    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.258 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.372  E.6.7.0. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.106    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 20    N 450 
B.8.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation -.123(**)  E.7. Pearson Correlation .219(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 448 
B.8.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation -.127(**)  FloorMud Pearson Correlation -0.006 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.891 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.51  FloorMedium Pearson Correlation -0.012 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.109    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.795 
  N 11    N 450 
B.8.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation -0.082  FloorExpensive Pearson Correlation .202(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.083    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
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  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation -0.073  RoofThatch Pearson Correlation -.233(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.122    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation -0.125  RoofMedium Pearson Correlation .113(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.749    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.016 
  N 9    N 450 
B.8.1.4.1. Pearson Correlation -0.017  RoofExpensive Pearson Correlation .165(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.715    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.4.3. Pearson Correlation -0.017  WallThatch Pearson Correlation -.286(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.719    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.4.4. Pearson Correlation 0.183  WallMedium Pearson Correlation 0.044 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.119    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.355 
  N 74    N 450 
B.8.1.5.1. Pearson Correlation .236(**)  WallExpensive Pearson Correlation .342(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.5.3. Pearson Correlation .236(**)  AssetsModestValue Pearson Correlation .117(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.5.4. Pearson Correlation 0.343  AssetsMidRangetValue Pearson Correlation .214(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.506    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 6    N 450 
B.8.1.6.1. Pearson Correlation 0.07  AssetsHighRangetValue Pearson Correlation .279(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.14    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.6.3. Pearson Correlation 0.07  AssetOrdinal Pearson Correlation .311(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.14    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
B.8.1.6.4. Pearson Correlation .(a)  F.1. Pearson Correlation -0.007 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.877 
  N 1    N 450 
FarmCropsCash0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.081  F.2. Pearson Correlation .149(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.087    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 450    N 450 
FarmLivestockCash0or1 Pearson Correlation .176(**)  F.3. Pearson Correlation -0.064 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.172 
  N 450    N 450 
FarmCPRCash0or1 Pearson Correlation -0.053  F.4. Pearson Correlation -.098(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.265    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.038 
  N 450    N 450 
NonFarmCasualLaborCas
h0or1 Pearson Correlation -.125(**)  G.1. Pearson Correlation .451(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NonFarmSalariedLaborC
ash0or1 Pearson Correlation .179(**)  G.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation -.278(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NonFarmManufacturingC Pearson Correlation 0.071  G.1.1.2. Pearson Correlation -.107(*) 
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  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.132    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 
  N 450    N 450 
NonFarmServicesCash0or
1 Pearson Correlation .272(**)  G.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation -.177(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NonRemittancesCash0or1 Pearson Correlation -0.026  G.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -.315(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.585    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NonRentSaleOtherCash0
or1 Pearson Correlation 0.045  G.1.1.5. Pearson Correlation -0.005 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.345    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.919 
  N 450    N 450 
NonRentUsedCash0or1 Pearson Correlation -0.073  G.1.1.6. Pearson Correlation -.176(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.122    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NonLoansReceivedCash0
or1 Pearson Correlation -0.017  G.1.1.7. Pearson Correlation -.286(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.719    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 Pearson Correlation .236(**)  G.1.1.8.0. Pearson Correlation -0.037 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.432 
  N 450    N 450 
FarmCash0or1 Pearson Correlation .178(**)  G.3 Pearson Correlation .712(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 
NonFarmCash0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.081  G.4. Pearson Correlation -.625(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.087    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
OtherInflowCash0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.001  G.5. Pearson Correlation -.583(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.991    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankCrops Pearson Correlation 0.054  G.6.10.0. Pearson Correlation 0.019 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.257    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.68 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1Crops Pearson Correlation 0.062  G.6.10.1. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.188    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 450    N 7 
AccRankLivestock Pearson Correlation 0.02  G.6.11. Pearson Correlation -0.063 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.676    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.181 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1Livestock Pearson Correlation 0.042  G.6.12. Pearson Correlation -0.005 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.372    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.919 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankCPR Pearson Correlation -0.082  G.6.13. Pearson Correlation 0.043 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.082    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.357 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1CPR Pearson Correlation -0.074  G.6.14. Pearson Correlation -0.002 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.117    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.975 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankCasualLabor Pearson Correlation -.168(**)  G.6.20. Pearson Correlation -0.028 
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G.2.-[Food 
Security] 
   
G.2 - [Food 
Security] 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.548 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1CasualLabor Pearson Correlation -.126(**)  G.6.21. Pearson Correlation -0.004 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.937 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankSalariedLabor Pearson Correlation .185(**)  G.6.22. Pearson Correlation -0.07 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.14 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1SalariedLabor Pearson Correlation 0.056  G.6.30. Pearson Correlation -0.083 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.237    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.08 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankServices Pearson Correlation .213(**)  G.6.31. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 450    N 450 
CashInflowFromPettyTra
deB610B612 Pearson Correlation .228(**)  G.6.32. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1InflowFromPettyTr
adeB610B612 Pearson Correlation 0.09  G.7. Pearson Correlation 0.08 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.057    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.091 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankInflowFromPett
yTradeB610B612 Pearson Correlation .186(**)  G.8.10. Pearson Correlation 0.036 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.444 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1Services Pearson Correlation .129(**)  G.8.20. Pearson Correlation -.312(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1Manufacture Pearson Correlation 0.03  G.8.21. Pearson Correlation -.319(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.521    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankManufacture Pearson Correlation 0.071  G.8.30. Pearson Correlation -0.005 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.134    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.911 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankRemittances Pearson Correlation -.137(**)  G.8.31. Pearson Correlation -0.059 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.214 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1Remittances Pearson Correlation -.115(*)  G.8.32. Pearson Correlation -.115(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.015    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.015 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankRentSaleOther Pearson Correlation -0.09  G.8.33. Pearson Correlation -.190(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.056    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1RentSaleOther Pearson Correlation -0.035  G.8.40. Pearson Correlation -.490(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.464    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankRentalUsed Pearson Correlation -0.037  G.8.41. Pearson Correlation -.503(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.432    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1RentalUsed Pearson Correlation .(a)  G.8.42. Pearson Correlation -.279(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
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G.2.-[Food 
Security] 
   
G.2 - [Food 
Security] 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankLoansReceived Pearson Correlation -.149(**)  G.8.50.0. Pearson Correlation -0.003 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.956 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1LoansReceived Pearson Correlation -0.09  G.9. Pearson Correlation .428(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.055    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 450 
AccRankLoansGiven Pearson Correlation .155(**)  G.10. Pearson Correlation -0.046 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.333 
  N 450    N 450 
Rank1LoansGiven Pearson Correlation 0.066  G.11. Pearson Correlation -.422(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.16    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 450    N 449 
C.1.1. Pearson Correlation .140(**)  G.12. Pearson Correlation .293(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 424    N 449 
C.1.2. Pearson Correlation .(a)  G.13. Pearson Correlation .101(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.032 
  N 450    N 450 
C.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.173  CrisisEventsHH Pearson Correlation -0.026 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.378    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.579 
  N 28    N 450 
C.2.2. Pearson Correlation 0.004  CrisisEventsEA Pearson Correlation -0.056 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.932    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.235 
  N 450    N 450 
C.3.1. Pearson Correlation -0.102  CrisisEventsExternal Pearson Correlation -0.083 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.619    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.08 
  N 26    N 450 
C.3.2. Pearson Correlation 0.061  CopingSavings Pearson Correlation 0.036 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.196    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.444 
  N 450    N 450 
C.4.1. Pearson Correlation 0.039  CopingBorrowing Pearson Correlation -.378(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.647    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 141    N 450 
C.4.2. Pearson Correlation -0.064  CopingEA Pearson Correlation -.161(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.172    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  N 450    N 450 
C.5.1. Pearson Correlation -0.091  CopingReduceSold Pearson Correlation -.525(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.211    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  N 192    N 450 
C.5.2. Pearson Correlation 0.012  CopingOther Pearson Correlation -0.003 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.797    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.956 
  N 450    N 450 
C.6.1. Pearson Correlation 0.055     
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.604     
  N 92     
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 





  Highly Ranked Indicators (166 variables) by  
Level of Association with Benchmark “Food Security” 
 








G.2. . 1 450 
NUMADULTS 0 .202(**) 450 
AMKClientclothing 0 .253(**) 360 
B.2.2.3. 0 .194(**) 450 
B.6.1.0.1. 0 .211(**) 450 
B.6.1.0.3. 0 .211(**) 450 
B.6.1.5.1. 0 .200(**) 450 
B.6.1.5.3. 0 .200(**) 450 
B.8.1.5.1. 0 .236(**) 450 
B.8.1.5.3. 0 .236(**) 450 
FarmLivestockCash0or1 0 .176(**) 450 
NonFarmSalariedLaborCash0or1 0 .179(**) 450 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 0 .272(**) 450 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 0 .236(**) 450 
FarmCash0or1 0 .178(**) 450 
AccRankCasualLabor 0 -.168(**) 450 
AccRankSalariedLabor 0 .185(**) 450 
AccRankServices 0 .213(**) 450 
CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 0 .228(**) 450 
AccRankInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 0 .186(**) 450 
C.7.2. 0 .250(**) 450 
C.10.2. 0 .178(**) 450 
C.11.2. 0 .190(**) 450 
C.12.2. 0 .240(**) 450 
AccRankFood 0 -.207(**) 450 
AcdRankServiceLoans 0 -.180(**) 450 
AccRankServiceLoans 0 -.180(**) 450 
AccRankBuyGold 0 .191(**) 450 
AccRankBasics 0 -.179(**) 450 
D.1.1. 0 .208(**) 450 
D.1.3. 0 .197(**) 450 
D.6. 0 .186(**) 448 
D.7.1. 0 .331(**) 450 
D.7.1.1. 0 .295(**) 450 
D.7.1.2. 0 .263(**) 450 
D.7.1.4. 0 .215(**) 450 
ClothingPC 0 .246(**) 447 
WeeklyFoodExpenseHH 0 .204(**) 450 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 0 .241(**) 449 
TotalYearlyFoodExpensePC 0 .170(**) 449 
DailyFoodExpensePC 0 .170(**) 449 
CountLESSorEQUALRuralFood 
PovertyLine1482Proxy2005 0 -.187(**) 450 
ClothingPCUS$ 0 .246(**) 447 
DailyFoodPCExpenseUS$ 0 .170(**) 449 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 0 .171(**) 450 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 0 .212(**) 450 
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E.2.2. 0 .193(**) 434 
E.3.1. 0 .216(**) 449 
E.3.2. 0 .254(**) 449 
E.3.3. 0 .377(**) 448 
E.4.1. 0 .221(**) 450 
E.4.3. 0 .232(**) 450 
E.5.6. 0 .222(**) 450 
E.6.1. 0 .288(**) 450 
E.7. 0 .219(**) 448 
FloorExpensive 0 .202(**) 450 
RoofThatch 0 -.233(**) 450 
RoofExpensive 0 .165(**) 450 
WallThatch 0 -.286(**) 450 
WallExpensive 0 .342(**) 450 
AssetsMidRangetValue 0 .214(**) 450 
AssetsHighRangetValue 0 .279(**) 450 
AssetOrdinal 0 .311(**) 450 
G.1. 0 .451(**) 450 
G.1.1.1. 0 -.278(**) 450 
G.1.1.3. 0 -.177(**) 450 
G.1.1.4. 0 -.315(**) 450 
G.1.1.6. 0 -.176(**) 450 
G.1.1.7. 0 -.286(**) 450 
G.3 0 .712(**) 449 
G.4. 0 -.625(**) 450 
G.5. 0 -.583(**) 450 
G.8.20. 0 -.312(**) 450 
G.8.21. 0 -.319(**) 450 
G.8.33. 0 -.190(**) 450 
G.8.40. 0 -.490(**) 450 
G.8.41. 0 -.503(**) 450 
G.8.42. 0 -.279(**) 450 
G.9. 0 .428(**) 450 
G.11. 0 -.422(**) 449 
G.12. 0 .293(**) 449 
CopingBorrowing 0 -.378(**) 450 
CopingReduceSold 0 -.525(**) 450 
4.a. 0.001 -.152(**) 450 
HHhClothing 0.001 .154(**) 448 
B.3.1.1. 0.001 -.150(**) 450 
B.4.3.1. 0.001 .152(**) 450 
B.4.3.3. 0.001 .152(**) 450 
B.4.4.1. 0.001 .157(**) 450 
B.4.4.3. 0.001 .157(**) 450 
AccRankLoansReceived 0.001 -.149(**) 450 
AccRankLoansGiven 0.001 .155(**) 450 
Rank1Food 0.001 -.157(**) 450 
AccRankInputNonFarm 0.001 .163(**) 450 
AccRankAssetBuilding 0.001 .153(**) 450 
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D.7.1.3. 0.001 .160(**) 450 
E.3.4.2. 0.001 .152(**) 449 
E.5.4. 0.001 .156(**) 450 
F.2. 0.001 .149(**) 450 
CopingEA 0.001 -.161(**) 450 
A.3 0.002 .162(**) 360 
HHhHighEduc 0.002 .144(**) 448 
A.12.1. 0.002 .149(**) 448 
A.13.1. 0.002 .149(**) 448 
B.2.3.3. 0.002 .144(**) 450 
Rank1Basics 0.002 -.148(**) 450 
Rank1AssetBuilding 0.002 .148(**) 450 
D.2.3. 0.002 .148(**) 449 
E.2.3. 0.002 .148(**) 436 
E.4.4. 0.002 .147(**) 450 
E.4.7.0. 0.002 .143(**) 450 
A.4.1. 0.003 .142(**) 450 
HHhLiteracy 0.003 .138(**) 449 
A.10.1. 0.003 .138(**) 449 
AccRankRemittances 0.004 -.137(**) 450 
C.1.1. 0.004 .140(**) 450 
D.2.2. 0.004 .134(**) 450 
E.1. 0.004 .136(**) 448 
E.6.3. 0.004 .135(**) 450 
C.7.1. 0.005 -.249(**) 126 
Rank1Services 0.006 .129(**) 450 
E.3.4.1. 0.006 .128(**) 449 
B.8.1.2.3. 0.007 -.127(**) 450 
Rank1CasualLabor 0.007 -.126(**) 450 
D.2.1. 0.007 .128(**) 450 
NonFarmCasualLaborCash0or1 0.008 -.125(**) 450 
B.8.1.2.1. 0.009 -.123(**) 450 
Rank1InputNonFarm 0.009 .123(**) 450 
AccRankBuyLand 0.009 .123(**) 450 
D.1.2. 0.01 .121(*) 450 
C.6.2. 0.011 .120(*) 450 
AccRankInputCrops 0.011 -.120(*) 450 
Rank1BuyOAssets 0.012 .118(*) 450 
AssetsModestValue 0.013 .117(*) 450 
B.4.1.1. 0.014 -.116(*) 450 
B.4.1.3. 0.014 -.115(*) 450 
Rank1Remittances 0.015 -.115(*) 450 
G.8.32. 0.015 -.115(*) 450 
E.3.4.3. 0.016 .114(*) 449 
RoofMedium 0.016 .113(*) 450 
B.2.2.1. 0.017 .112(*) 450 
B.6.1.2.1. 0.02 .110(*) 450 
B.6.1.2.3. 0.02 .110(*) 450 
AccRankHeatlh 0.02 -.110(*) 450 
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Rank1BuyGold 0.02 .109(*) 450 
E.5.7.0. 0.02 .109(*) 450 
G.1.1.2. 0.023 -.107(*) 450 
B.3.2.1. 0.026 -.105(*) 450 
B.4.4.4. 0.026 .280(*) 63 
B.5.1.0.3. 0.026 .105(*) 450 
D.5. 0.026 .119(*) 348 
B.5.1.0.1. 0.027 .104(*) 450 
AMKClientHighEduc 0.029 .116(*) 358 
B.2.1.3. 0.03 .102(*) 450 
AccRankClothing 0.03 -.103(*) 450 
Rank1ServiceLoans 0.03 -.102(*) 450 
NUMCSA 0.031 -.102(*) 450 
AccRankFarmInvestmetns 0.031 -.102(*) 450 
G.13. 0.032 .101(*) 450 
B.2.1.1. 0.034 .100(*) 450 
E.5.5. 0.035 .099(*) 450 
F.4. 0.038 -.098(*) 450 
AccRankCeremonies 0.042 .096(*) 450 
E.2.4. 0.042 .096(*) 443 
E.6.4. 0.043 .095(*) 450 
D.3. 0.044 -.095(*) 450 
E.5.3. 0.047 .094(*) 450 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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 Annex 30: PCA Stage 1 - Reduction from 166 to 47 Variables  
 
Reduction from 166 to 47 variables for Stage 1 of PCA  
(ordered by level of association with “Food Security”) 
Set of 166 highly correlated Variables  





Set of 47 initial variables chosen for 
PCA and reasons  for exclusion 
G.2. . 1 450 ► Benchmark: Food Security 
G.3 0 .712(**) 449 ► Chosen 
G.4. 0 -.625(**) 450 Covered in CopingReduceSold 
G.5. 0 -.583(**) 450 Covered in CopingReduceSold 
CopingReduceSold 0 -.525(**) 450 ► Chosen 
G.8.41. 0 -.503(**) 450 Covered in CopingReduceSold 
G.8.40. 0 -.490(**) 450 Covered in CopingReduceSold 
G.1. 0 .451(**) 450 ► Chosen 
G.9. 0 .428(**) 450 ► Chosen 
G.11. 0 -.422(**) 449 ► Chosen 
CopingBorrowing 0 -.378(**) 450 ► Chosen 
E.3.3. [Walls] 0 .377(**) 448 ► Chosen 
WallExpensive 0 .342(**) 450 Covered in E.3.3 Walls 
D.7.1. 0 .331(**) 450 ► Chosen 
G.8.21. 0 -.319(**) 450 Covered in CopingBorrowing 
G.1.1.4. 0 -.315(**) 450 Specific reasons for Decreased Income, main concept covered in G.1 
G.8.20. 0 -.312(**) 450 Covered in CopingBorrowing 
AssetOrdinal 0 .311(**) 450 ► Chosen 
D.7.1.1. 0 .295(**) 450 Specific forms of savings, main concept covered in D.7.1 
G.12. 0 .293(**) 449 ► Chosen 
E.6.1. [Motorcycle] 0 .288(**) 450 ► Chosen 
WallThatch 0 -.286(**) 450 Covered in E.3.3 Walls 
G.1.1.7. 0 -.286(**) 450 Specific reasons for Decreased Income, main concept covered in G.1 
G.8.42. 0 -.279(**) 450 Covered in CopingReduceSold 
AssetsHighRangetValue 0 .279(**) 450 Covered in AssetOrdinal 
G.1.1.1. 0 -.278(**) 450 Specific reasons for Decreased Income, main concept covered in G.1 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 0 .272(**) 450 ► Chosen 
D.7.1.2. 0 .263(**) 450 Specific forms of savings, main concept covered in D.7.1 
E.3.2. [Roof] 0 .254(**) 449 ► Chosen 
AMKClientclothing 0 .253(**) 360 Only relevant for AMK clients 
C.7.2. [Outflow reinvest NonFarm] 0 .250(**) 450 ► Chosen 
ClothingPC 0 .246(**) 447 ► Chosen 
ClothingPCUS$ 0 .246(**) 447 Duplicated from ClothingPC 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 0 .241(**) 449 ► Chosen 
C.12.2.[Outflow buy gold] 0 .240(**) 450 ► Chosen 
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 Set of 166 highly correlated Variables  





Set of 47 initial variables chosen for 
PCA and reasons  for exclusion 
B.8.1.5.1. [Inflow back loans given] 0 .236(**) 450 Covered inNonLoansGivenCash0or1 
B.8.1.5.3. [CashInflowBackLoanGiven] 0 .236(**) 450 Duplicated NonLoansGivenCash0or1 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 0 .236(**) 450 ► Chosen 
RoofThatch 0 -.233(**) 450 Covered in E.3.2 [Roof] 
E.4.3. [TV] 0 .232(**) 450 ► Chosen 
CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 0 .228(**) 450 ► Chosen 
E.5.6. [Mobile] 0 .222(**) 450 ► Chosen 
E.4.1. [Radio] 0 .221(**) 450 E.4.3. [TV] instead of radio 
E.7. [Toilet] 0 .219(**) 448 ► Chosen 
E.3.1.[Floor] 0 .216(**) 449 ► Chosen 
D.7.1.4. 0 .215(**) 450 Specific forms of savings, main concept covered in D.7.1 
AssetsMidRangeValue 0 .214(**) 450 Covered in AssetOrdinal 
AccRankServices 0 .213(**) 450 Covered in NonFarmServicesCash0or1 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 0 .212(**) 450 ► Chosen 
B.6.1.0.1. [Petty Trade] 0 .211(**) 450 Covered in CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 
B.6.1.0.3. [Cash Petty Trade] 0 .211(**) 450 Covered in CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B613 
D.1.1. [Daily expenditure Food HH] 0 .208(**) 450 Covered in TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 
AccRankFood 0 -.207(**) 450 ► Chosen 
WeeklyFoodExpenseHH 0 .204(**) 450 Covered in TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 
NUMADULTS 0 .202(**) 450 ► Chosen 
FloorExpensive 0 .202(**) 450 Covered in E.3.1 [Floor] 
B.6.1.5.1. [Other services] 0 .200(**) 450 Covered in NonFarmServicesCash0or1 
B.6.1.5.3. [Cash Other services] 0 .200(**) 450 Covered in NonFarmServicesCash0or1 
D.1.3. [Weekly Food Expenditure] 0 .197(**) 450 Covered in TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 
B.2.2.3. [Cash Poultry] 0 .194(**) 450 Covered in FarmLivestockCash0or1 
E.2.2. [Cows] 0 .193(**) 434 Animals as asset not included (province specific) 
AccRankBuyGold 0 .191(**) 450 Covered in C.12.2.[Outflow buy gold] 
G.8.33. 0 -.190(**) 450 Covered in CopingEA Below 
C.11.2.[Buy other HH materials / Durable 
Assets] 0 .190(**) 450 ► Chosen 
CountLESSorEQUALRuralFood 
PovertyLine1482Proxy2005 0 -.187(**) 450 Not relevant for PCA 
AccRankInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 0 .186(**) 450 Already covered in CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 
D.6. [Buy clothes KNY] 0 .186(**) 448 ► Chosen 
AccRankSalariedLabor 0 .185(**) 450 ► Chosen 
AcdRankServiceLoans 0 -.180(**) 450 ► Chosen 
AccRankBasics 0 -.179(**) 450 Covered mainly in AccRankFood 
NonFarmSalariedLaborCash0or1 0 .179(**) 450 Covered in AccRankSalariedLabor 
FarmCash0or1 0 .178(**) 450 ► Chosen 
C.10.2. [Buy land] 0 .178(**) 450 ► Chosen 
G.1.1.3. 0 -.177(**) 450 Specific reasons for Decreased Income, 
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 Set of 166 highly correlated Variables  





Set of 47 initial variables chosen for 
PCA and reasons  for exclusion 
main concept covered in G.1 
G.1.1.6. 0 -.176(**) 450 Specific reasons for Decreased Income, main concept covered in G.1 
FarmLivestockCash0or1 0 .176(**) 450 Covered in FarmCash0or1 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 0 .171(**) 450 ► Chosen 
TotalYearlyFoodExpensePC 0 .170(**) 449 Covered in TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 
DailyFoodExpensePC 0 .170(**) 449 Covered in TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 
DailyFoodPCExpenseUS$ 0 .170(**) 449 Duplicate of DailyFoodExpensePC 
AccRankCasualLabor 0 -.168(**) 450 ► Chosen 
RoofExpensive 0 .165(**) 450 Covered in E.3.2 [Roof] 
AccRankInputNonFarm 0.001 .163(**) 450 Covered in C.7.2. [Outflow reinvest nonfarm] 
CopingEA 0.001 -.161(**) 450 Covered in G.8.33 
D.7.1.3. 0.001 .160(**) 450 Specific forms of savings, main concept covered in D.7.1 
Rank1Food 0.001 -.157(**) 450 Covered in AccRankFood 
B.4.4.1. [InflowCasualLabor] 0.001 .157(**) 450 Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
B.4.4.3. [CashInflowCasualLabor] 0.001 .157(**) 450 Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
E.5.4. [Rice mill] 0.001 .156(**) 450 E.5.6 [Mobile] instead in the medium category 
AccRankLoansGiven 0.001 .155(**) 450 Covered in NonFarmLoansGivenCash0or1 
HHhClothing 0.001 .154(**) 448 ► Chosen 
AccRankAssetBuilding 0.001 .153(**) 450 ► Chosen 
4.a. [MFBL] 0.001 -.152(**) 450 ► Chosen 
B.4.3.1. [Inflow Regular Salary] 0.001 .152(**) 450 Covered in B.4.3.3.[Cash Inflow Regular Salary] 
B.4.3.3.[Cash Inflow Regular Salary] 0.001 .152(**) 450 Covered AccRankSalariedLabor 
E.3.4.2. [Length house] 0.001 .152(**) 449 Covered better in other dwelling indicators E31  E32 E33 
B.3.1.1. [Inflow from fish] 0.001 -.150(**) 450 Covered in FarmCash0or1 
AccRankLoansReceived 0.001 -.149(**) 450 ► Chosen 
F.2. 0.001 .149(**) 450 Only relevant for AMK clients 
A.3 0.002 .162(**) 360 Only relevant for AMK clients 
A.12.1. [Education level interviewee] 0.002 .149(**) 448 Use HHh education level instead 
A.13.1. [Clothign expend. interviewee] 0.002 .149(**) 448 Use HHh clothing instead 
Rank1Basics 0.002 -.148(**) 450 Covered mainly in AccRankFood 
Rank1AssetBuilding 0.002 .148(**) 450 Covered in AccRankAssetBuilding ans C.11.2 
D.2.3.  [Market value rice consumed] 0.002 .148(**) 449 ► Chosen 
E.2.3. [Pigs] 0.002 .148(**) 436 E.2.2 [Cows] already above 
E.4.4. [Bicycle] 0.002 .147(**) 450 Covered by E.4.3 [TV] instead 
HHhHighEduc 0.002 .144(**) 448 ► Chosen 
B.2.3.3. 0.002 .144(**) 450 Covered in FarmLivestockCash0or1 
E.4.7.0. [Other modest value assets] 0.002 .143(**) 450 Not specific enough, covered in Asset Ordinal 
A.4.1. [Literacy of interviewee] 0.003 .142(**) 450 ► Chosen 
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 Set of 166 highly correlated Variables  





Set of 47 initial variables chosen for 
PCA and reasons  for exclusion 
HHhLiteracy 0.003 .138(**) 449 ► Chosen 
A.10.1. [Literacy of interviewee] 0.003 .138(**) 449 Use HHh literacy instead 
C.1.1. [Food Ranked] 0.004 .140(**) 450 Covered in AccRankFood  
AccRankRemittances 0.004 -.137(**) 450 ► Chosen 
E.1. [# plots of land] 0.004 .136(**) 448 Covered better by total value and total area of land  
E.6.3. [Car] 0.004 .135(**) 450 E.5.1 [Moto] instead 
D.2.2. [Rice sold by HH] 0.004 .134(**) 450 ► Chosen 
C.7.1. 0.005 -.249(**) 126 Only relevant for AMK clients 
Rank1Services 0.006 .129(**) 450 Covered in NonFarmServicesCash0or1 
E.3.4.1. [Length of house] 0.006 .128(**) 449 Dwellings covered by E.3.1 E.3.2 E.3.3 
D.2.1. [Rice Yield] 0.007 .128(**) 450 ► Chosen 
B.8.1.2.3. [Assets pawned for cash] 0.007 -.127(**) 450 ► Chosen 
Rank1CasualLabor 0.007 -.126(**) 450 Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
NonFarmCasualLaborCash0or1 0.008 -.125(**) 450 Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
B.8.1.2.1. [Assets Pawned Yes or No] 0.009 -.123(**) 450 Covered in B.8.1.2.3. [Assets pawned for cash] 
Rank1InputNonFarm 0.009 .123(**) 450 Covered in c72Outflowreinvestnonfarm 
AccRankBuyLand 0.009 .123(**) 450 Covered in AccRankAssetBuilding 
D.1.2. [Amount spent yesterday] 0.01 .121(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only 
AccRankInputCrops 0.011 -.120(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only.
C.6.2. 0.011 .120(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
Rank1BuyOAssets 0.012 .118(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
AssetsModestValue 0.013 .117(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.4.1.1. 0.014 -.116(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.4.1.3. 0.014 -.115(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
Rank1Remittances 0.015 -.115(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
G.8.32. [Coping - Got local employment] 0.015 -.115(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
E.3.4.3. [Width house] 0.016 .114(*) 449 Significant at 0.05 level only
RoofMedium 0.016 .113(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.2.2.1. [Pig] 0.017 .112(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
AccRankHeatlh 0.02 -.110(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.6.1.2.1. [Sales in shop] 0.02 .110(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.6.1.2.3. [Cash Sales in shop] 0.02 .110(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
Rank1BuyGold 0.02 .109(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
E.5.7.0. [Other mid assets] 0.02 .109(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
G.1.1.2. 0.023 -.107(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.4.4.4. 0.026 .280(*) 63 Less than 450 number of cases and significant at 0.05 level only 
D.5. 0.026 .119(*) 348 Less than 450 number of cases and significant at 0.05 level only 
B.3.2.1. [Wood collection] 0.026 -.105(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.5.1.0.3. [Cash inflow food processing] 0.026 .105(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.5.1.0.1. [Inflow food processing Y/N] 0.027 .104(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
AMKClientHighEduc 0.029 .116(*) 358 Significant at 0.05 level only
AccRankClothing 0.03 -.103(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
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 Set of 166 highly correlated Variables  





Set of 47 initial variables chosen for 
PCA and reasons  for exclusion 
Rank1ServiceLoans 0.03 -.102(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.2.1.3. [Cash inflow from Pigs] 0.03 .102(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
NUMCSA 0.031 -.102(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
AccRankFarmInvestments 0.031 -.102(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
G.13. 0.032 .101(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
B.2.1.1. 0.034 .100(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
E.5.5. [Generator] 0.035 .099(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
F.4. [Number of active loans] 0.038 -.098(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
AccRankCeremonies 0.042 .096(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
E.2.4. [Goats] 0.042 .096(*) 443 Significant at 0.05 level only
E.6.4. [Tractor] 0.043 .095(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
D.3. [Buy rice for consumption] 0.044 -.095(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only
E.5.3. [Water pump] 0.047 .094(*) 450 Significant at 0.05 level only.
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 Annex 31: PCA Stage 2 and 3 - Tests and Results  
 
Test 1 – Complete 47 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
.643 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2857.364 
df 1081 
Sig. .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Communalities(a) 
  Initial Extraction 
G.2. 1.000 .819 
4.a. 1.000 .702 
A.4.1. 1.000 .873 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .879 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .902 
HHhHighEduc 1.000 .865 
HHhClothing 1.000 .823 
ClothingPC 1.000 .807 
B.8.1.2.3. 1.000 .697 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 1.000 .773 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 1.000 .769 
FarmCash0or1 1.000 .712 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .673 
AccRankSalariedLabor 1.000 .750 
CashInflowFromPettyTradeB610B612 1.000 .818 
AccRankRemittances 1.000 .665 
AccRankLoansReceived 1.000 .704 
C.7.2. 1.000 .768 
C.10.2. 1.000 .645 
C.11.2. 1.000 .776 
C.12.2. 1.000 .614 
AccRankFood 1.000 .729 
AcdRankServiceLoans 1.000 .610 
AccRankAssetBuilding 1.000 .818 
D.2.1. 1.000 .947 
D.2.2. 1.000 .896 
D.2.3. 1.000 .804 
D.6. 1.000 .536 
D.7.1. 1.000 .709 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .766 
E.3.1. 1.000 .753 
E.3.2. 1.000 .817 
E.3.3. 1.000 .803 
E.4.3. 1.000 .503 
E.5.6. 1.000 .789 
E.6.1. 1.000 .699 
E.7. 1.000 .649 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .816 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 1.000 .785 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .790 
G.1. 1.000 .743 
G.3 1.000 .825 
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   Initial Extraction 
G.9. 1.000 .726 
G.11. 1.000 .732 
G.12. 1.000 .784 
CopingBorrowing 1.000 .851 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .688 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 9.464 20.136 20.136 9.464 20.136 20.136 
2 4.628 9.847 29.982 4.628 9.847 29.982 
3 3.355 7.138 37.120 3.355 7.138 37.120 
4 2.539 5.402 42.522 2.539 5.402 42.522 
5 2.283 4.858 47.380 2.283 4.858 47.380 
6 2.164 4.605 51.985 2.164 4.605 51.985 
7 1.868 3.974 55.960 1.868 3.974 55.960 
8 1.624 3.456 59.415 1.624 3.456 59.415 
9 1.554 3.307 62.722 1.554 3.307 62.722 
10 1.442 3.069 65.791 1.442 3.069 65.791 
11 1.311 2.790 68.581 1.311 2.790 68.581 
12 1.210 2.574 71.155 1.210 2.574 71.155 
13 1.119 2.381 73.537 1.119 2.381 73.537 
14 1.040 2.212 75.749 1.040 2.212 75.749 
15 .952 2.025 77.774     
16 .936 1.991 79.765     
17 .856 1.821 81.586     
18 .780 1.661 83.246     
19 .760 1.617 84.863     
20 .655 1.395 86.258     
21 .595 1.267 87.524     
22 .579 1.233 88.757     
23 .499 1.062 89.820     
24 .476 1.013 90.833     
25 .424 .902 91.735     
26 .399 .848 92.583     
27 .381 .811 93.395     
28 .346 .737 94.132     
29 .322 .686 94.817     
30 .315 .671 95.488     
31 .284 .605 96.093     
32 .254 .540 96.633     
33 .237 .504 97.138     
34 .192 .409 97.547     
35 .186 .396 97.943     
36 .162 .345 98.288     
37 .148 .314 98.602     
38 .133 .283 98.885     
39 .102 .217 99.102     
40 .087 .186 99.288     
41 .079 .168 99.455     
42 .070 .150 99.605     
43 .060 .127 99.732     
44 .052 .112 99.844     
45 .038 .082 99.925     
46 .032 .069 99.994     
47 .003 .006 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
G.2. .657 -.503 .128 .002 -.097 .070 .018 -.188 .010 .101 .185 -.018 -.145 -.005 
4.a. -.221 -.106 -.080 .017 .118 .293 -.406 -.262 -.140 .112 .388 -.281 .073 .185 
A.4.1. .467 .332 .165 -.020 -.090 .354 .229 -.408 .295 -.170 -.104 .123 -.147 .046 
NUMADULTS .540 .317 .077 -.268 -.212 .269 .267 -.401 .145 -.079 -.091 .046 -.124 -.078 
HHhLiteracy .360 -.031 -.285 -.106 -.037 -.648 .325 -.318 .054 -.091 .105 .041 .166 .015 
HHhHighEduc .344 -.048 -.344 -.050 .040 -.621 .343 -.204 .054 -.007 .158 -.030 .178 .130 
HHhClothing .420 .283 .270 .156 .012 -.327 -.267 .182 .274 -.159 -.232 -.298 .113 -.044 
ClothingPC .523 .291 .237 -.085 -.149 -.137 -.038 .215 .380 -.044 -.226 -.229 .217 .016 
B.8.1.2.3. .102 .254 -.007 -.049 .149 .445 .168 -.143 .033 -.164 -.176 .020 .472 .262 
NonFarmServices Cash0or1 .441 -.134 .398 -.119 .615 -.022 .008 .046 .026 -.045 -.051 -.029 .027 -.009 
NonLoansGiven Cash0or1 .206 -.149 .038 -.166 .069 -.002 .524 .274 .221 .296 .333 -.239 -.115 -.058 
FarmCash0or1 .281 -.066 -.080 .286 -.021 .288 -.005 -.164 .105 -.025 .209 -.187 .098 -.574 
AccRankCasualLabor -.421 -.155 -.220 .151 .014 .228 .059 -.146 .431 .128 -.162 -.253 -.135 .116 
AccRankSalariedLabor .206 .119 .013 -.405 -.175 .221 .247 .360 -.081 -.316 .182 .168 -.168 .253 
CashInflowFromPetty  
TradeB610B612 .285 
-.142 .328 -.250 .657 .067 -.110 .153 -.027 -.100 -.147 -.021 -.183 -.089 
AccRankRemittances -.013 -.059 -.075 -.458 -.464 .092 -.065 .211 -.301 .204 -.187 .055 .005 .053 
AccRankLoansReceived -.004 .472 .351 .328 .013 -.179 .011 .123 -.194 .281 .207 .150 -.101 .105 
C.7.2. .393 -.369 .344 -.143 .538 -.080 -.037 -.003 .068 -.011 .081 .132 .012 -.112 
C.10.2. .233 -.251 .125 .270 -.154 .053 .067 -.093 -.466 -.032 -.290 -.153 .222 -.158 
C.11.2. .417 -.125 .163 .552 -.032 .124 .422 .075 -.081 .012 .003 .210 -.062 .032 
C.12.2. .243 -.087 -.066 -.014 .126 -.319 -.227 -.436 .097 .358 -.010 .187 -.018 .102 
AccRankFood -.340 .069 -.302 -.325 -.072 .025 -.007 .155 .433 -.026 .033 .379 .088 -.203 
AcdRankServiceLoans -.165 .535 .183 .213 -.060 -.089 .106 .212 .214 .233 -.215 -.028 -.049 .025 
AccRankAssetBuilding .315 -.200 .086 .707 -.237 .119 .258 -.016 -.106 -.018 -.131 .050 -.027 -.049 
D.2.1. .523 .249 -.694 .149 .198 .086 -.092 .078 .002 .141 -.060 .075 -.124 -.045 
D.2.2. .457 .173 -.696 .187 .201 -.051 -.038 .124 -.015 .177 -.107 .023 -.182 -.034 
D.2.3. .535 .327 -.490 .014 .138 .310 -.141 -.015 -.012 .032 .014 .169 .065 -.046 
D.6. .288 .113 .091 .258 -.032 -.107 -.222 .165 .183 -.194 .074 .393 .212 .026 
D.7.1. .532 -.375 .076 .256 .046 -.040 -.049 .182 -.029 -.021 .013 .378 .063 -.160 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly .650 .421 .221 -.006 .133 .187 -.005 -.027 .007 .175 .159 -.078 -.040 .021 
E.3.1. .488 .377 .117 .069 -.190 -.086 -.456 -.047 -.015 -.237 .089 .036 -.181 .028 
E.3.2. .677 .323 -.047 -.020 -.309 -.081 -.287 -.062 -.006 -.121 .094 -.059 -.179 -.072 
E.3.3. .645 .307 .196 .018 -.281 -.147 -.076 -.004 .002 -.182 .256 -.137 -.177 .007 
E.4.3. .632 -.069 .011 -.096 -.141 .003 .030 .020 -.081 .085 -.030 .012 -.055 .223 
E.5.6. .363 -.009 .022 -.471 -.318 .082 .065 .176 -.071 .392 -.010 -.006 .158 -.329 
E.6.1. .643 .209 .150 -.127 .213 -.011 .265 .036 -.267 -.077 .043 -.069 .034 .025 
E.7. .516 .204 .114 -.203 -.048 .027 -.187 -.224 -.069 .314 -.173 .118 .225 -.016 
HHTotalLandAreainHa .578 .268 -.572 .057 .149 .024 -.053 .187 -.051 -.035 .034 -.104 -.022 -.052 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel .396 .137 -.589 .138 .177 .043 .103 .231 -.114 -.146 -.036 -.247 .144 .171 
AssetOrdinal .761 .196 .064 -.284 .136 .086 .063 -.045 -.169 .044 .008 -.046 .141 -.055 
G.1. .507 -.530 -.028 .012 -.089 .018 -.046 .120 .204 .261 -.210 -.023 -.110 .114 
G.3 .623 -.498 .144 .131 -.081 .136 -.029 .063 .248 .123 -.049 -.066 -.084 .178 
G.9. .651 -.287 .102 -.078 -.145 -.235 -.091 -.012 -.139 .041 -.274 -.049 -.106 .092 
G.11. -.404 .596 .178 .122 .169 -.039 .007 -.015 -.064 .341 -.035 .049 -.063 .093 
G.12. .307 -.123 .202 .205 -.215 .147 -.155 .231 .196 .176 .421 -.030 .420 .148 
CopingBorrowing -.189 .801 .224 .108 .143 .079 .130 -.061 -.027 .225 .005 .085 .037 .056 
CopingReduceSold -.390 .570 .173 .020 -.039 -.241 .167 .032 -.061 -.046 -.004 -.136 -.051 -.255 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  14 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
The analysis of the component matrix of test 1 indicates the following indicators should be excluded:  
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Minutes from Branch to Location [4.a]. Component loading < 0.300
Other inflows: Assets Pawned for Cash [B.8.1.2.3.] Component loading < 0.300
Other Inflows: Inflow Back from Loans Given received in cash 
[NonLoansGiven Cash0or1] 
Component loading < 0.300
Inflow from Cash Activities received in Cash [FarmCash0or1] Component loading < 0.300
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 Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Cash Inflows from Salaried Labor ranked 1,2, or 3 in the 
household [AccRankSalariedLabor] 
Component loading < 0.300
Cash Inflows from petty trade and sales in shops or stalls 
[CashInflowFromPetty TradeB610B612] 
Component loading < 0.300
Cash Inflows from Remittances ranked 1,2, or 3 in the 
household [AccRankRemittances] 
Component loading < 0.300
Cash Inflows from Loans Received ranked 1,2, or 3 in the 
household [AccRankLoansReceived] 
Component loading < 0.300
Outflows: Buying Land [C.10.2.] Component loading < 0.300
Outflows: Buying Gold or Jewelry C.12.2. Component loading < 0.300
Cash Inflows from Services ranked 1,2, or 3 in the household 
[AcdRankServiceLoans] 
Component loading < 0.300
Number of years HH bought new clothes for all members in 
HH in the last 2 years [D.6.] 
Component loading < 0.300
Copying strategies in case of crisis include borrowing at costs 
or no cost [CopingBorrowing] 
Component loading < 0.300
 
 
Test 2 –34 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
.730 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2172.711 
df 561 
Sig. .000 




  Initial Extraction 
G.2. 1.000 .765 
A.4.1. 1.000 .906 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .881 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .913 
HHhHighEduc 1.000 .844 
HHhClothing 1.000 .818 
ClothingPC 1.000 .835 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 1.000 .765 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .750 
C.7.2. 1.000 .759 
C.11.2. 1.000 .782 
AccRankFood 1.000 .644 
AccRankAssetBuilding 1.000 .818 
D.2.1. 1.000 .926 
D.2.2. 1.000 .858 
D.2.3. 1.000 .819 
D.7.1. 1.000 .611 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .695 
E.3.1. 1.000 .775 
E.3.2. 1.000 .849 
E.3.3. 1.000 .806 
E.4.3. 1.000 .463 
E.5.6. 1.000 .781 
E.6.1. 1.000 .715 
E.7. 1.000 .594 
387 
 HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .821 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 1.000 .684 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .807 
G.1. 1.000 .726 
G.3 1.000 .816 
G.9. 1.000 .704 
G.11. 1.000 .561 
G.12. 1.000 .662 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .685 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.951 26.327 26.327 8.951 26.327 26.327 
2 3.640 10.706 37.033 3.640 10.706 37.033 
3 2.982 8.771 45.804 2.982 8.771 45.804 
4 1.951 5.739 51.543 1.951 5.739 51.543 
5 1.765 5.190 56.734 1.765 5.190 56.734 
6 1.649 4.849 61.582 1.649 4.849 61.582 
7 1.583 4.655 66.237 1.583 4.655 66.237 
8 1.183 3.480 69.717 1.183 3.480 69.717 
9 1.128 3.317 73.034 1.128 3.317 73.034 
10 1.007 2.961 75.995 1.007 2.961 75.995 
11 .904 2.659 78.654     
12 .869 2.555 81.208     
13 .748 2.199 83.407     
14 .678 1.993 85.400     
15 .577 1.696 87.096     
16 .515 1.513 88.609     
17 .466 1.370 89.979     
18 .399 1.174 91.153     
19 .385 1.134 92.287     
20 .341 1.003 93.290     
21 .337 .991 94.281     
22 .307 .901 95.182     
23 .256 .754 95.936     
24 .254 .748 96.684     
25 .217 .638 97.322     
26 .195 .573 97.895     
27 .150 .442 98.337     
28 .133 .391 98.728     
29 .126 .369 99.097     
30 .099 .291 99.388     
31 .088 .260 99.648     
32 .069 .202 99.850     
33 .047 .139 99.989     
34 .004 .011 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
G.2. .633 -.538 -.076 -.024 -.092 .102 .137 -.083 -.141 -.063 
A.4.1. .482 .159 .319 .255 -.223 -.082 .536 .270 -.169 .192 
NUMADULTS .556 .223 .317 .036 -.261 .032 .574 .119 -.051 .071 
HHhLiteracy .363 .104 -.219 -.573 .447 .141 .389 .047 -.019 .140 
HHhHighEduc .342 .099 -.329 -.540 .460 .111 .278 .087 -.004 .090 
HHhClothing .429 .120 .346 .054 .388 .148 -.408 .394 .054 -.020 
ClothingPC .535 .113 .360 -.023 .114 .204 -.161 .460 .326 .080 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 .417 -.285 .193 -.257 -.022 -.520 -.229 .227 -.173 .042 
AccRankCasualLabor -.426 -.035 -.261 .248 -.163 .090 .196 .587 -.037 -.137 
C.7.2. .360 -.471 .084 -.325 -.088 -.430 -.216 .086 -.150 .162 
C.11.2. .400 -.303 -.097 .465 .318 -.263 .270 -.118 .192 .104 
AccRankFood -.344 .221 -.157 -.208 -.337 .317 -.032 .075 .016 .434 
AccRankAssetBuilding .306 -.321 -.160 .598 .346 -.050 .276 -.107 .162 -.029 
D.2.1. .545 .493 -.575 .121 -.117 -.083 -.101 .006 -.074 -.060 
D.2.2. .474 .435 -.623 .093 .025 -.083 -.107 .045 .007 -.162 
D.2.3. .557 .469 -.316 .127 -.332 -.082 -.064 -.096 -.144 .145 
D.7.1. .501 -.426 -.200 .106 .102 -.058 -.145 -.161 .057 .253 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly .669 .223 .327 .132 -.139 -.224 -.039 .037 .000 .034 
E.3.1. .509 .274 .309 .165 .115 .266 -.213 -.118 -.418 .002 
E.3.2. .696 .305 .193 .104 .065 .364 -.080 -.147 -.216 -.108 
E.3.3. .662 .158 .360 .100 .255 .261 -.034 -.160 -.192 .080 
E.4.3. .635 -.117 -.018 -.084 -.063 .075 .042 -.026 -.086 -.140 
E.5.6. .359 .011 .132 -.236 -.397 .287 .064 -.212 .538 -.038 
E.6.1. .650 .098 .184 -.171 .047 -.435 .080 -.099 .107 -.002 
E.7. .531 .116 .251 -.102 -.266 .007 .020 -.063 .242 -.303 
HHTotalLandAreainHa .593 .489 -.419 .062 .000 -.052 -.154 .027 .100 .117 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel .403 .374 -.521 .067 .145 -.138 -.100 .131 .194 .029 
AssetOrdinal .766 .145 .182 -.213 -.193 -.241 .019 -.080 .129 -.036 
G.1. .486 -.505 -.276 -.004 -.176 .217 -.089 .182 .064 -.187 
G.3 .596 -.574 -.126 .165 -.107 .135 -.063 .230 -.040 -.004 
G.9. .645 -.309 -.002 -.143 .126 .170 -.023 -.047 .066 -.344 
G.11. -.378 .428 .315 .182 .076 -.233 -.098 .020 .118 -.137 
G.12. .310 -.286 .091 .238 -.042 .195 -.258 -.073 .250 .495 
CopingReduceSold -.367 .471 .416 .018 .315 -.103 .046 .014 .211 .008 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  10 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
The analysis of the component matrix of test 2 indicates the following indicators should be excluded:  
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Number of income earners in the HH [A.4.1.] Duplicates information with NUMADULTS and has lower 
component loading: 0.482 vs. 0.557 
Highest Education finished by the head of household 
[HHhHighEduc] 
Duplicates information with HHhLiteracyand has lower 
component loading 0.342 vs.0.363 
Cash Outflows for Asset Building ranked 1,2, or 3 in the 
household expenditures [AccRankAssetBuilding] 
Duplicates information with C.11.2 [Buying household 
materials / durable assets].  C.11.2 retained because the 
component loading is higher (0.400 vs. 0.306) 
Number of Kg of rice produced in the last year [D.2.1.] Poverty studies of rural households have found rich households 
that do not produce rice.  “Near-landleness” (i.e. <0.5 Ha per 
HH) is more the issue that landlessness.262  
                                                 
262 The majority of landless households do not obtain their main source of income from agriculture and thus, it is possible to find 
both relatively prosperous households and also impoverished households.  Further information in: Ramamurthy, Bhargavi Sik 
Boreak, Per Ronnås and Sok Hach (2001) Cambodia 1999-2000: Land, Labour and Rural Livelihood in Focus Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI) Working Paper 21. 
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 Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Number of Kg consumed (from the rice yield) [D.2.2.] Poverty studies of rural households have found rich households 
that do not produce rice.  “Near-landleness” (i.e. <0.5 Ha per 
HH) is more the issue that landlessness 
Market value of the rice consumed [D.2.3.] Poverty studies of rural households have found rich households 
that do not produce rice.  “Near-landleness” (i.e. <0.5 Ha per 
HH) is more the issue that landlessness 
Mobile phone [E.5.6.] Television and [E.4.3] and Motorcycle [E.6.1] have higher 
component loadings (0.635 and 0.650 vs. 0.359)  
Toilet in the HH [E.7.] Type of roof [E.3.2] and type of walls [E.3.3] have higher 
component loadings (0.696 and 0.662 vs. 0.531) 
Total Value of Land Owned [HHTotalValueLandinRiel] Duplicates information with HHTotalLandAreainHa (which 
has higher component loadings: 0.593 vs.0.403) 
Overall household economic situation in the last 12 months 
[G.1.] 
May duplicate information with G2 and G3 (and has lower 
component loadings).  Also it measures “economic situation” 
as opposed to “household income”  
 
 
Test 3 – 24 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
.804 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1014.104 
df 276 
Sig. .000 




  Initial Extraction 
G.2. 1.000 .743 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .696 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .645 
HHhClothing 1.000 .846 
ClothingPC 1.000 .773 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 1.000 .725 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .724 
C.7.2. 1.000 .764 
C.11.2. 1.000 .686 
AccRankFood 1.000 .579 
D.7.1. 1.000 .586 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .776 
E.3.1. 1.000 .666 
E.3.2. 1.000 .795 
E.3.3. 1.000 .762 
E.4.3. 1.000 .480 
E.6.1. 1.000 .744 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .381 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .815 
G.3 1.000 .814 
G.9. 1.000 .640 
G.11. 1.000 .644 
G.12. 1.000 .543 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .695 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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Total Variance Explained(a) 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.216 30.067 30.067 7.216 30.067 30.067 
2 2.910 12.124 42.191 2.910 12.124 42.191 
3 1.633 6.805 48.996 1.633 6.805 48.996 
4 1.489 6.204 55.200 1.489 6.204 55.200 
5 1.191 4.962 60.162 1.191 4.962 60.162 
6 1.081 4.505 64.667 1.081 4.505 64.667 
7 1.002 4.175 68.841 1.002 4.175 68.841 
8 .975 4.062 72.903     
9 .804 3.349 76.252     
10 .771 3.212 79.464     
11 .746 3.108 82.572     
12 .619 2.578 85.150     
13 .570 2.374 87.524     
14 .456 1.902 89.426     
15 .426 1.776 91.201     
16 .380 1.582 92.783     
17 .354 1.475 94.258     
18 .301 1.253 95.511     
19 .249 1.037 96.548     
20 .202 .843 97.391     
21 .186 .777 98.168     
22 .170 .707 98.875     
23 .158 .657 99.532     
24 .112 .468 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G.2. .672 -.496 -.148 -.028 -.143 .046 .028 
NUMADULTS .526 .291 -.041 -.341 -.280 .293 .229 
HHhLiteracy .325 .031 -.111 -.529 .283 -.308 .268 
HHhClothing .479 .378 .007 .456 .428 -.054 .282 
ClothingPC .563 .334 -.045 .238 .329 .238 .348 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 .487 -.220 .597 .120 .220 .139 -.026 
AccRankCasualLabor -.485 -.167 -.182 .118 -.158 .468 .411 
C.7.2. .436 -.428 .520 .038 .296 .080 -.161 
C.11.2. .399 -.254 .080 .197 -.458 -.407 .205 
AccRankFood -.399 .077 -.261 -.226 .388 .269 -.268 
D.7.1. .535 -.444 -.063 .105 .092 -.260 -.109 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly .665 .339 .229 .095 -.275 .268 -.101 
E.3.1. .528 .445 -.259 .193 .029 -.046 -.285 
E.3.2. .680 .428 -.370 -.009 -.006 -.038 -.102 
E.3.3. .710 .400 -.217 .112 -.063 -.158 -.094 
E.4.3. .641 -.091 -.109 -.136 -.130 .097 .058 
E.6.1. .666 .159 .432 -.277 -.102 -.026 -.023 
HHTotalLandAreainHa .465 .234 -.176 -.217 -.015 .060 -.168 
AssetOrdinal .756 .179 .263 -.302 -.042 .191 -.112 
G.3 .626 -.516 -.186 .237 -.031 .205 .149 
G.9. .675 -.200 -.118 -.072 .158 -.204 .243 
G.11. -.386 .517 .319 .272 -.227 -.031 .009 
G.12. .346 -.181 -.176 .510 -.060 .085 -.298 
CopingReduceSold -.349 .644 .269 .099 .030 -.215 .175 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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 a  7 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Expenditures in Clothing by head of household [HHhClothing] Duplicates information with Clothing PC and has lower 
component loadings (0.479 vs. 0.563).   
 
 
Test 4 – 23 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
.813 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 939.799 
df 253 
Sig. .000 




  Initial Extraction 
G.2. 1.000 .726 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .666 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .586 
ClothingPC 1.000 .463 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 1.000 .718 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .694 
C.7.2. 1.000 .770 
C.11.2. 1.000 .693 
AccRankFood 1.000 .572 
D.7.1. 1.000 .587 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .751 
E.3.1. 1.000 .661 
E.3.2. 1.000 .804 
E.3.3. 1.000 .773 
E.4.3. 1.000 .481 
E.6.1. 1.000 .734 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .348 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .783 
G.3 1.000 .797 
G.9. 1.000 .564 
G.11. 1.000 .652 
G.12. 1.000 .544 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .637 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.015 30.499 30.499 7.015 30.499 30.499 
2 2.803 12.185 42.683 2.803 12.185 42.683 
3 1.633 7.101 49.784 1.633 7.101 49.784 
4 1.392 6.053 55.837 1.392 6.053 55.837 
5 1.090 4.741 60.578 1.090 4.741 60.578 
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 6 1.071 4.655 65.233 1.071 4.655 65.233 
7 .975 4.239 69.472     
8 .852 3.702 73.174     
9 .803 3.492 76.666     
10 .755 3.282 79.949     
11 .700 3.044 82.992     
12 .617 2.685 85.677     
13 .562 2.442 88.119     
14 .443 1.925 90.044     
15 .409 1.780 91.824     
16 .377 1.639 93.464     
17 .348 1.513 94.977     
18 .269 1.170 96.147     
19 .229 .995 97.143     
20 .191 .830 97.972     
21 .183 .794 98.767     
22 .169 .734 99.501     
23 .115 .499 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 






1 2 3 4 5 6 
G.2. .695 -.454 -.148 .026 -.049 .107 
NUMADULTS .532 .355 -.038 -.180 -.043 .470 
HHhLiteracy .329 .062 -.108 -.620 -.242 -.135 
ClothingPC .529 .294 -.047 .075 .263 .141 
NonFarmServicesCash0or
1 .488 -.221 .596 .043 .263 -.061 
AccRankCasualLabor -.483 -.194 -.183 .112 .104 .604 
C.7.2. .445 -.428 .519 -.066 .287 -.183 
C.11.2. .408 -.240 .079 .310 -.605 .038 
AccRankFood -.398 .073 -.260 -.313 .479 -.117 
D.7.1. .546 -.436 -.064 .055 -.087 -.289 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYea
rly .659 .373 .229 .248 .122 .223 
E.3.1. .508 .448 -.260 .228 .142 -.249 
E.3.2. .667 .455 -.370 .044 .036 -.108 
E.3.3. .695 .420 -.217 .174 -.064 -.179 
E.4.3. .649 -.054 -.108 -.082 -.051 .190 
E.6.1. .668 .205 .435 -.199 -.110 .068 
HHTotalLandAreainHa .464 .271 -.174 -.158 .064 -.001 
AssetOrdinal .760 .234 .266 -.220 .119 .133 
G.3 .635 -.516 -.188 .197 .102 .205 
G.9. .677 -.187 -.118 -.157 -.158 -.085 
G.11. -.405 .495 .318 .366 -.084 .026 
G.12. .346 -.194 -.179 .531 .224 -.151 
CopingReduceSold -.377 .613 .268 .087 -.166 -.111 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  6 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Cash inflows from nonfarm activities in services (Yes or No 
question)[NonFarmServicesCash0or1] 
Duplicates information with C.7. 2 [Household outflows 
include reinvest/inputs for nonfarm income activities] C.7.2 is 
more general (includes services but also manufacturing 
activities)  
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 Test 5 – 22 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
.818 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 877.764 
df 231 
Sig. .000 




  Initial Extraction 
G.2. 1.000 .743 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .659 
HHhLiteracy 1.000 .583 
ClothingPC 1.000 .475 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .731 
C.7.2. 1.000 .628 
C.11.2. 1.000 .568 
AccRankFood 1.000 .642 
D.7.1. 1.000 .599 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYearly 1.000 .762 
E.3.1. 1.000 .688 
E.3.2. 1.000 .826 
E.3.3. 1.000 .787 
E.4.3. 1.000 .476 
E.6.1. 1.000 .790 
HHTotalLandAreainHa 1.000 .362 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .823 
G.3 1.000 .795 
G.9. 1.000 .609 
G.11. 1.000 .644 
G.12. 1.000 .649 
CopingReduceSold 1.000 .635 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.805 30.934 30.934 6.805 30.934 30.934 
2 2.768 12.583 43.517 2.768 12.583 43.517 
3 1.412 6.417 49.933 1.412 6.417 49.933 
4 1.380 6.273 56.207 1.380 6.273 56.207 
5 1.072 4.873 61.080 1.072 4.873 61.080 
6 1.036 4.707 65.787 1.036 4.707 65.787 
7 .946 4.302 70.089     
8 .832 3.783 73.872     
9 .772 3.509 77.381     
10 .741 3.369 80.751     
11 .699 3.178 83.929     
12 .588 2.671 86.600     
13 .508 2.309 88.908     
14 .431 1.957 90.865     
15 .409 1.861 92.726     
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 16 .348 1.584 94.310     
17 .318 1.444 95.754     
18 .260 1.182 96.936     
19 .198 .899 97.835     
20 .186 .846 98.681     
21 .171 .775 99.457     
22 .120 .543 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 






1 2 3 4 5 6 
G.2. .692 -.478 .079 -.021 .081 -.149 
NUMADULTS .545 .335 -.116 -.132 .432 -.177 
HHhLiteracy .335 .045 -.312 -.534 -.211 -.203 
ClothingPC .531 .287 .137 -.017 .217 .211 
AccRankCasualLabor -.484 -.192 .247 -.047 .592 -.214 
C.7.2. .407 -.388 -.388 .188 -.073 .347 
C.11.2. .406 -.251 -.031 .434 -.141 -.362 
AccRankFood -.390 .068 .111 -.487 .040 .485 
D.7.1. .541 -.452 .026 .056 -.294 .109 
TotalHHFoodExpenseYea
rly .656 .377 -.025 .324 .260 .125 
E.3.1. .518 .431 .433 -.050 -.211 -.010 
E.3.2. .690 .417 .342 -.199 -.108 -.093 
E.3.3. .712 .390 .276 .013 -.200 -.102 
E.4.3. .655 -.079 -.022 -.077 .166 -.083 
E.6.1. .661 .215 -.525 .148 .051 .081 
HHTotalLandAreainHa .477 .248 .037 -.222 .023 .146 
AssetOrdinal .755 .236 -.355 -.012 .179 .199 
G.3 .627 -.536 .246 .064 .222 -.016 
G.9. .676 -.207 -.027 -.172 -.143 -.242 
G.11. -.410 .528 .015 .438 .001 -.065 
G.12. .350 -.214 .430 .343 -.058 .417 
CopingReduceSold -.373 .636 -.136 .208 -.154 -.079 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  6 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Therefore the final AMK-PCA will include 22 indicators. 
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 Annex 32: Variables in the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score 
 
The corresponding questions or calculations form the survey tool that conform each of the 
variable of the AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score are the following. 
 
PHYSICAL ASSETS: 
1. TOTAL CULTIVABLE LAND AREA OWNED BY THE HOUSEHOLD [Computed Variable: 
HHTotalLandAreaHa] ? Sum of the lands of each of the plots of cultivable land own by 
the household in Hectares (up to a maximum of six plots per household) = Question E.1.2 
(converted in Hectares) + Question E.2.2 (converted in Hectares) + Question E.3.2 
(converted in Hectares) + Question E.4.2 (converted in Hectares) + Question E.5.2 
(converted in Hectares) + Question E.6.2 (converted in Hectares) 
2. FLOOR MATERIALS FOR THE HOUSE/DWELLING ? Question E.3.1 
3. WALL MATERIALS FOR THE HOUSE/DWELLING ? Question E.3.2 
4. ROOF MATERIALS FOR THE HOUSE/DWELLING ? Question E.3.3  
5. HOUSEHOLD OWNS A TELEVISION ? Question E.4.3  
6. HOUSEHOLD OWNS A MOTORCYCLE ? Questions E.6.1 
7. HOUSEHOLD OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS OF MODEST, MID OR HIGH VALUE [Computed Variable: 
AssetOrdinal]. ? Values of 1, 2, or 3, depending on the household’s ownership of at 
least one asset of modest value (i.e. less than US$100; Questions E.4.), mid-value (i.e. 
between US$100-US$500; Questions E.5) or high value (i.e. over US$500; Questions 
E.6).  Examples of assets of modest value include radios, bicycles, black and white 
television sets (battery operated), simple boats, ox-carts and simple agricultural tools.  
Examples of mid-value assets include water pumps, rice mill machines, generators, 
expensive tools, boats or mobile phones.  Examples of assets of high value include 
plowing machine, tractor, (quasi) professional music/karaoke machine, motorcycle, car, 
pick up or trucks.  Value of 1 implies that the household has at least one asset in only one 
of the 3 categories.  Value 2 implies that the household has at least one asset in 2 of the 3 
categories. Value 3 implies that the household has at least one asset in the 3 categories.  
 
EXPENDITURES: 
1. EXPENSES IN CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR PC [Computed Variable: Clothing PC] ? Sum 
of all clothing and footwear expenses in the household (Sum of Question A.13 for all 
members of the household with a maximum of 13) / Total number of members of the 
household (Question A.5, with a maximum of 13) 
2. TOTAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENSE IN FOOD [Computed Variable: 
TotaHHFoodExpenseYearly]  = Annual Cash Expenditure and Market Value of Food 
Produced and Consumed within the Household as defined on page 35  
3. OUTFLOWS OF THE HOUSEHOLD INCLUDE INPUTS/REINVESTMENT FOR NONFARM INCOME 
ACTIVITIES ? Question C11.2  
4. OUTFLOWS OF THE HOUSEHOLD INCLUDE BUYING HOUSEHOLD MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT 
AND DURABLE ASSETS ? Question C.7.2 
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 5. MAIN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES INCLUDE FOOD [Computed Variable: AccRankFood] 
? Question 3.1.1 has been ranked as 1,2 or 3 
 
HUMAN ASSETS: 
1. NUMBER OF ADULTS [proxy for income earners] [Computed Variable: NUMADULTS] 
? Number of household members who are 19 years old or older.  
2. HEALTH: STRATEGIES IN ORDER TO PAY FOR HEALTHCARE ? Question G.11 
3. EDUCATION: LITERACY OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD [Computed Variable: HHhLiteracy] ? 
Question A.12, if A.6=head of household 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL: 
1. NUMBER OF GOOD FRIENDS / NEIGHBORS IN COMMUNITY ? Question. G.12 
 
VULNERABILITY & FOOD SECURITY: 
1. FOOD SECURITY ? Question G.2 
2. HOUSEHOLD DIET IN THE LAST YEAR  ? Question G.3 
3. SELF-REPORTED LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY IN AFFORDING LARGE EXPENSES - ORDINAL ?  
Question G.9 
4. MAIN INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES INCLUDE CASUAL LABOR (agricultural and non-
agricultural) OR TEMPORARY MIGRATION (domestic or international) [Computed 
Variable: AccRankCasualLabor] ? Questions B.4.1.4 or Question B.4.2.4 had a value 
of 1, 2 or 3 (i.e. the household ranked at least one of them as one of their main income 
generating activities) 
5. SAVINGS AND REINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR ? Question D.7.1 
6. COPING STRATEGIES INCLUDE REDUCING FOOD CONSUMPTION/EATING WORSE FOODS/ 
EATING FEWER TIMES A DAY, REDUCING OTHER NON-FOOD EXPENSES (school, clothes, etc) 
OR SELLING PERSONAL PROPERTY (land, house, cattle, transport, farm or household 
equipment)  [Computed Variable: CopingReduceSold] ? Household answered G.8.40 





 Annex 33: AMK-PCA Significance Tests 
 
T- Test Wellbeing Score - Group Statistics: Clients and Nonclients 
  A.1. N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
 
HH Wellbeing Score [REGR factor score] No 90 .2354853 1.12918876 .11902695  
  Yes 360 -.0588713 .95771390 .05047595  
 
Independent Samples Test 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 












    2.277 122.904 .025 .29435668 .12928742 .03843818 .55027518 
 
 
T- Test Wellbeing Score - Group Statistics: New clients and Nonclients 
 ClientSeniority N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
HH Wellbeing Score [REGR 
factor score] 
New Client (<1 year) 152 -.0632801 1.00570216 .08157322 
NonClient 90 .2354853 1.12918876 .11902695 
 
Independent Samples Test 
   
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 



























 Annex 34: Tercile Analysis AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score 
 
POVERTY GROUPS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE – CROSSTABULATION 
 
Crosstab  
    
A.1. 
Total No Yes 
WellbeingGROUP3 Poorer Count 30 162 192 
% within A.1. 33.3% 45.0% 42.7% 
Medium Count 30 136 166 
% within A.1. 33.3% 37.8% 36.9% 
Better-off Count 30 62 92 
% within A.1. 33.3% 17.2% 20.4% 
Total Count 90 360 450 
% within A.1. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.824(a) 2 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 10.898 2 .004 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.529 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 450   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.40. 
 
 
The graph below shows the case of an MFI with equal poverty outreach (i.e. the pattern of 
poverty among client households matches exactly that of nonclient households), with client 
households dividing equally among the three poverty groupings in the same way as the nonclient 













On the other hand, the graph below shows the opposite pattern, with clients underrepresented in 
the lowest tercile and overrepresented in the highest tercile, indicating that the MFI is attracting 
















Crosstabs for New Client, Beginner, Senior and Nonclient Households 
    ClientSeniority 





WellbeingGROUP3 Poorer Count 70 39 53 30 192 
    % within ClientSeniority 46.1% 50.6% 40.5% 33.3% 42.7% 
  Medium Count 53 31 52 30 166 
    % within ClientSeniority 34.9% 40.3% 39.7% 33.3% 36.9% 
  Better-off Count 29 7 26 30 92 
    % within ClientSeniority 19.1% 9.1% 19.8% 33.3% 20.4% 
Total Count 152 77 131 90 450 
  % within ClientSeniority 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.868(a) 6 .010 
Likelihood Ratio 17.050 6 .009 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 9.604 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 450   




 Annex 35: Quartile Analysis AMK-PCA Wellbeing Score 
 
The following steps were followed to analyze the quartile results: 
 
? First, the 90 nonclient sample were sorted in ascending order according to their wellbeing 
scores (i.e. the greater the value of the score, the relatively wealthier the household). 
? Second, this sample was divided into quartiles based on the wellbeing scores: the bottom 
fourth of the nonclient households are grouped into the “poorest” group; followed by the 
“poor’ group; the “middle”-ranked group, and finally, the “better-off” group.  Since there 
are 90 nonclients the poorest and richest group contain 22 households and the poor and 
medium group contain 23 households.  The cutoff scores for each quartile define the 
limits of each poverty group and they were: -0.647, 0.219 and 0.993   
? Third, the 360 client households were then categorized into the same four groups based 
on their household scores using the cutoff scores defined above for the AMC-PCA case 
(i.e. -0.65, 0.22 and 0.99). 
 
If the pattern of poverty among client households matches exactly that of nonclient households, 
client households will divide equally among the three wellbeing groupings in the same way as 
nonclient households, with 25 percent falling into each group.  Any deviation from this equal 
proportion signals the difference between the client and nonclient populations.   
 
The significance test for these quartiles confirm that the differences for type of client and by 
seniority group are statistically significant: Type of Client: (Chi-Square (3,N = 450) = 7.89, p = 
0.048); Seniority: (Chi-Square (9, N = 450) = 16.60, p= 0.055). 
 
Crosstabulation 
    
A.1. 
Total No Yes 
WellBeingGroup4 Poorest Count 23 98 121
% within A.1. 25.6% 27.2% 26.9%
Poor Count 22 131 153
% within A.1. 24.4% 36.4% 34.0%
Medium Count 23 79 102
% within A.1. 25.6% 21.9% 22.7%
Better-off Count 22 52 74
% within A.1. 24.4% 14.4% 16.4%
Total Count 90 360 450
% within A.1. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.888(a) 3 .048
Likelihood Ratio 7.705 3 .053
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.285 1 .038
N of Valid Cases 450    





    ClientSeniority 
Total  





Senior    (>=2 
years) NonClient 
WellBeingGroup4 Poorest(4) Count 42 29 27 23 121
    % within 
ClientSeniority 27.6% 37.7% 20.6% 25.6% 26.9%
  Poor Count 53 27 51 22 153
    % within 
ClientSeniority 34.9% 35.1% 38.9% 24.4% 34.0%
  Medium Count 33 15 31 23 102
    % within 
ClientSeniority 21.7% 19.5% 23.7% 25.6% 22.7%
  Better-off Count 24 6 22 22 74
    % within 
ClientSeniority 15.8% 7.8% 16.8% 24.4% 16.4%
Total Count 152 77 131 90 450
  % within 
ClientSeniority 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 16.601(a) 9 .055
Likelihood Ratio 17.022 9 .048
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.351 1 .037
N of Valid Cases 450   




 Annex 36: Test AMK-PCA: Expenditures in Clothing and Footwear PC  
 
The following pages provide the detailed PCA procedure when applying clothing at footwear as 
a benchmark, following exactly the same structure as the procedure for the AMK-PCA when 
applied food security as the benchmark 
 
Step 1: Selecting a screened set of indicators that are significantly correlated with the poverty 
benchmark indicator using linear correlation coefficients 
 
There were 132 indicators with highest levels of association.  Of these 132 indicators, 45 were 
chosen for step 1 of the process and are ranked in Table 3 below on the basis of their correlation 
to the poverty benchmark indicator: clothing and footwear per capita.   
 
Table 3:  Ranked 45 Indicators by Level of Association with Benchmark “Clothing and Footwear pc” 
 






Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC - Clothing PC 
[Sum(Q.A.13) - Clothing for each member of the HH] 
 1 
447 
HHhClothing 0 .667(**) 447 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 0 .430(**) 446
WeeklyFoodExpenseHH 0 .403(**) 447 
NUMADULTS 0 .327(**) 447 
AssetOrdinal 0 .324(**) 447 
A.4.1. 0 .307(**) 447 
E.3.3. 0 .306(**) 445 
HHhAge 0 .287(**) 445 
E.3.2. 0 .257(**) 446
E.4.3. 0 .257(**) 447 
G.12. 0 .255(**) 446
D.6. 0 .254(**) 445
E.6.1. 0 .251(**) 447 
E.6.3. 0 .249(**) 447 
G.2. 0 .246(**) 447 
G.3 0 .237(**) 446
NUMCSA 0 -.236(**) 447 
E.7. 0 .236(**) 445
E.3.1. 0 .226(**) 446
HHTotalLandAreaHa 0 .221(**) 447 
D.2.3. 0 .219(**) 446 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 0 .206(**) 407
D.7.1. 0 .204(**) 447 
F.1. 0 .204(**) 447 
B.5.1.4.1. 0 -.201(**) 447 
G.9. 0 .198(**) 447 
E.5.6. 0 .185(**) 447 
AccRankServices 0 .178(**) 447 
E.3.4.3. 0 .173(**) 446
Rank1Ceremonies 0 .168(**) 447 
B.1.3.1. 0 .166(**) 447 
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E.5.1. 0.001 .162(**) 447 
AccRankCasualLabor 0.001 -.161(**) 447 
Rank1Food 0.001 -.150(**) 447 
G.5. 0.002 -.147(**) 447 
C.11.2. 0.002 .144(**) 447 
AccRankBuyGold 0.002 .143(**) 447 
4.a. 0.003 -.139(**) 447 
AccRankCPR 0.004 -.138(**) 447 
CopingSavings 0.005 .133(**) 447 
AccRankSalariedLabor 0.006 .129(**) 447 
G.6.12. 0.007 .127(**) 447 
NUMCHILDREN 0.008 -.126(**) 447 
D.2.1. 0.009 .123(**) 447 
E.1. 0.010 .122(**) 445 
 
The full correlation matrices, the summary of the 132 indicators with the highest levels of 
association and the reduction from 132 indicators to 45 variables for stage 1 of AMK-PCA: 
Clothing and Footwear can be found below. 
 
   Clothing PC    Clothing PC 
ClothingPC Pearson Correlation 1  C.5.1. Pearson Correlation 0.074 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.308 
  N 447    N 191 
4.a. Pearson Correlation -.139(**)  C.5.2. Pearson Correlation 0.028 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.551 
  N 447    N 447 
A.1. Pearson Correlation -.149(**)  C.6.1. Pearson Correlation -0.121 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.254 
  N 447    N 90 
A.3 Pearson Correlation -0.004  C.6.2. Pearson Correlation 0.048 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.937    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.31 
  N 358    N 447 
ClientSeniority Pearson Correlation -0.01  C.7.1. Pearson Correlation -0.107 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.848    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.235 
  N 358    N 126 
A.4.1. Pearson Correlation .307(**)  C.7.2. Pearson Correlation 0.033 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.484 
  N 447    N 447 
A.5.1. Pearson Correlation 0.086  C.8.1. Pearson Correlation 0.151 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.069    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.275 
  N 447    N 54 
NUMADULTS Pearson Correlation .327(**)  C.8.2. Pearson Correlation -0.052 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.269 
  N 447    N 447 
NUMCSA Pearson Correlation -.236(**)  C.9.1. Pearson Correlation -.316(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  N 447    N 94 
NUMCBSA Pearson Correlation -0.016  C.9.2. Pearson Correlation -0.006 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.731    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9 
  N 447    N 447 
NUMCHILDREN Pearson Correlation -.126(**)  C.10.1. Pearson Correlation -0.048 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.718 
  N 447    N 59 
A.8.1. Pearson Correlation .274(**)  C.10.2. Pearson Correlation 0.022 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.642 
  N 445    N 447 
A.10.1. Pearson Correlation 0.032  C.11.1. Pearson Correlation -0.023 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.502    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.821 
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  N 446  C.11.2. Pearson Correlation .144(**) 
A.12.1. Pearson Correlation .102(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031    N 447 
  N 445  C.12.1. Pearson Correlation -0.162 
A.13.1. Pearson Correlation .661(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.677 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 9 
  N 447  C.12.2. Pearson Correlation .110(*) 
A.8.2. Pearson Correlation .213(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 438  C.13.1. Pearson Correlation 0.397 
A.10.2. Pearson Correlation -0.008    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.603 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.874    N 4 
  N 431  C.13.2. Pearson Correlation 0.023 
A.11.2. Pearson Correlation -0.165    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.622 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.528    N 447 
  N 17  AccRankFood Pearson Correlation -0.092 
A.12.2. Pearson Correlation 0.02    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.053 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.676    N 447 
  N 435  Rank1Food Pearson Correlation -.150(**) 
A.13.2. Pearson Correlation .779(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 440  AccRankClothing Pearson Correlation .118(*) 
PercentageChildrenLE
SSThan6OverChildren Pearson Correlation .216(**) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.012 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 409  Rank1Clothing Pearson Correlation .(a) 
PercentageChildrenLE
SSThan6OverTotalHH Pearson Correlation -0.043 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.36    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankSchooling Pearson Correlation 0.085 
PercentageIncomeEarn
erOverTotalHH Pearson Correlation .265(**) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.073 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1Schooling Pearson Correlation 0.06 
PercentageCASOverC
hildren Pearson Correlation -.216(**) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.205 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 409  AccRankHeatlh Pearson Correlation -.095(*) 
AMKClient#HHmemb
er Pearson Correlation 0.048 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.044 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.362    N 447 
  N 359  Rank1Heatlh Pearson Correlation 0.001 
AMKClientAge Pearson Correlation .261(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.984 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 358  AccRankInputCrops Pearson Correlation -0.071 
AMKClientLiteracy Pearson Correlation -0.077    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.136 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.144    N 447 
  N 359  Rank1InputCrops Pearson Correlation -0.001 
AMKClientHighEduc Pearson Correlation -0.036    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.981 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.493    N 447 
  N 357 
 AccRankInputLivestockC
PR Pearson Correlation -0.004 
AMKClientclothing Pearson Correlation .721(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.936 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 359  Rank1InputLivestockCPR Pearson Correlation 0.074 
HHh#HHmember Pearson Correlation -0.035    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.118 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.463    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankInputNonFarm Pearson Correlation -0.003 
HHhAge Pearson Correlation .287(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.956 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 445  Rank1InputNonFarm Pearson Correlation 0.01 
HHhLiteracy Pearson Correlation 0.045    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.84 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.344    N 447 
  N 446  AcdRankServiceLoans Pearson Correlation -0.028 
HHhHighEduc Pearson Correlation .095(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.562 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.046    N 447 
405 
    Clothing PC    Clothing PC 
  N 445  AccRankServiceLoans Pearson Correlation -0.028 
HHhClothing Pearson Correlation .667(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.562 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1ServiceLoans Pearson Correlation -0.033 
HHhAMKClient Pearson Correlation -0.028    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.488 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.553    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankCeremonies Pearson Correlation 0.013 
B.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation -0.043    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.786 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.37    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1Ceremonies Pearson Correlation .168(**) 
B.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation -0.059    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.21    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankBuyLand Pearson Correlation -0.028 
B.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.035    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.554 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.633    N 447 
  N 186  Rank1BuyLand Pearson Correlation -0.002 
B.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.091    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.962 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.054    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankBuyOAssets Pearson Correlation .111(*) 
B.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation -0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.019 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.989    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1BuyOAssets Pearson Correlation 0.086 
B.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation -0.283    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.07 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.129    N 447 
  N 30  AccRankBuyGold Pearson Correlation .143(**) 
B.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation .166(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1BuyGold Pearson Correlation 0.052 
B.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation .118(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.269 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankOthers Pearson Correlation 0.041 
B.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation -0.218    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.384 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.639    N 447 
  N 7  Rank1Others Pearson Correlation 0.012 
B.2.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.086    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.805 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.068    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankBasics Pearson Correlation -0.075 
B.2.1.3. Pearson Correlation .114(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.113 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.016    N 447 
  N 447  AccRankFarmInvestmetns Pearson Correlation -0.044 
B.2.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.012    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.35 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.884    N 447 
  N 152  AccRankAssetBuilding Pearson Correlation 0.079 
B.2.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.088    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.095 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.062    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1Basics Pearson Correlation -.140(**) 
B.2.2.3. Pearson Correlation -0.044    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.352    N 447 
  N 447  Rank1FarmInvestment Pearson Correlation 0.043 
B.2.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.027    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.359 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.846    N 447 
  N 53  Rank1AssetBuilding Pearson Correlation 0.068 
B.2.3.1. Pearson Correlation -.103(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.151 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.029    N 447 
  N 447  D.1.1. Pearson Correlation .398(**) 
B.2.3.3. Pearson Correlation 0.061    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.198    N 447 
  N 447  D.1.2. Pearson Correlation 0.044 
B.2.3.4. Pearson Correlation .236(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.359 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.039    N 447 
  N 77  D.1.3. Pearson Correlation .402(**) 
B.3.1.1. Pearson Correlation -.215(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  D.2.1. Pearson Correlation .123(**) 
B.3.1.3. Pearson Correlation -0.044    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009 
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  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.358    N 447 
  N 447  D.2.2. Pearson Correlation .099(*) 
B.3.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.26    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.037 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.138    N 447 
  N 34  D.2.3. Pearson Correlation .219(**) 
B.3.2.1. Pearson Correlation -.141(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003    N 446 
  N 447  D.3. Pearson Correlation -0.014 
B.3.2.3. Pearson Correlation -0.08    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.772 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.089    N 447 
  N 447  D.4. Pearson Correlation 0.107 
B.3.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.527    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.061 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.362    N 307 
  N 5  D.5. Pearson Correlation 0.063 
B.3.3.1. Pearson Correlation -.152(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.242 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    N 345 
  N 447  D.6. Pearson Correlation .254(**) 
B.3.3.3. Pearson Correlation -.109(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.021    N 445 
  N 447  D.7.1. Pearson Correlation .204(**) 
B.3.3.4. Pearson Correlation -0.169    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.296    N 447 
  N 40  D.7.1.1. Pearson Correlation .119(*) 
B.4.1.1. Pearson Correlation -.175(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.012 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  D.7.1.2. Pearson Correlation .113(*) 
B.4.1.3. Pearson Correlation -.176(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  D.7.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.034 
B.4.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.103    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.479 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.18    N 447 
  N 170  D.7.1.4. Pearson Correlation .181(**) 
B.4.2.1. Pearson Correlation 0.047    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.32    N 447 
  N 447  D.7.1.5. Pearson Correlation -0.001 
B.4.2.3. Pearson Correlation 0.053    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.984 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.264    N 447 
  N 447  D.7.1.6. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
B.4.2.4. Pearson Correlation -0.123    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.264    N 447 
  N 84  D.7.1.7.0. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
B.4.3.1. Pearson Correlation .132(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005    N 447 
  N 447  WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH Pearson Correlation .403(**) 
B.4.3.3. Pearson Correlation .132(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005    N 447 
  N 447 
 OtherFoodProducYear0or
1 Pearson Correlation .095(*) 
B.4.3.4. Pearson Correlation 0.063    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.044 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.771    N 447 
  N 24  OtherFoodGathered0or1 Pearson Correlation -0.023 
B.4.4.1. Pearson Correlation .133(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.632 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005    N 447 
  N 447  TotalHHExpenseYearly Pearson Correlation .430(**) 
B.4.4.3. Pearson Correlation .133(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005    N 446 
  N 447  TotalYearlyExpensePC Pearson Correlation .341(**) 
B.4.4.4. Pearson Correlation 0.156    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.225    N 446 
  N 62 
 ClothingPCOverExpenseP
C Pearson Correlation .564(**) 
B.5.1.0.1. Pearson Correlation -0.057    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.23    N 446 
  N 447  DailyPCExpense Pearson Correlation .341(**) 
B.5.1.0.3. Pearson Correlation -0.057    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
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  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.228    N 446 
  N 447  E.1. Pearson Correlation .122(**) 
B.5.1.0.4. Pearson Correlation 0.059    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.655    N 445 
  N 59  HHTotalLandAreaHa Pearson Correlation .221(**) 
B.5.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.963    N 447 
  N 447  HHTotalValueLandinRiel Pearson Correlation .206(**) 
B.5.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.002    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.963    N 407 
  N 447  E.2.1. Pearson Correlation -0.009 
B.5.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.217    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.848 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.476    N 437 
  N 13  E.2.2. Pearson Correlation .096(*) 
B.5.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation 0.077    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.046 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.104    N 431 
  N 447  E.2.3. Pearson Correlation .123(*) 
B.5.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation 0.077    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.104    N 433 
  N 447  E.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.017 
B.5.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.506    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.718 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.494    N 440 
  N 4  E.3.1. Pearson Correlation .226(**) 
B.5.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation 0.031    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.512    N 446 
  N 447  E.3.2. Pearson Correlation .257(**) 
B.5.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation 0.038    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.425    N 446 
  N 447  E.3.3. Pearson Correlation .306(**) 
B.5.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation -0.043    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.848    N 445 
  N 22  E.3.4.1. Pearson Correlation .175(**) 
B.5.1.4.1. Pearson Correlation -.201(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 446 
  N 447  E.3.4.2. Pearson Correlation .206(**) 
B.5.1.4.3. Pearson Correlation -.125(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008    N 446 
  N 447  E.3.4.3. Pearson Correlation .173(**) 
B.5.1.4.4. Pearson Correlation -0.269    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.314    N 446 
  N 16  FloorMud Pearson Correlation -0.043 
B.5.1.5.1. Pearson Correlation -0.019    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.36 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.696    N 447 
  N 447  FloorMedium Pearson Correlation -0.079 
B.5.1.5.3. Pearson Correlation -0.019    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.096 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.696    N 447 
  N 447  FloorExpensive Pearson Correlation .260(**) 
B.5.1.5.4. Pearson Correlation 0.076    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.773    N 447 
  N 17  RoofThatch Pearson Correlation -.258(**) 
B.6.1.0.1. Pearson Correlation 0.09    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.057    N 447 
  N 447  RoofMedium Pearson Correlation .157(**) 
B.6.1.0.3. Pearson Correlation 0.09    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.057    N 447 
  N 447  RoofExpensive Pearson Correlation .136(**) 
B.6.1.0.4. Pearson Correlation -0.011    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.945    N 447 
  N 39  WallThatch Pearson Correlation -.221(**) 
B.6.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation .097(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.04    N 447 
  N 447  WallMedium Pearson Correlation 0.018 
B.6.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.089    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.704 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.059    N 447 
  N 447  WallExpensive Pearson Correlation .295(**) 
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B.6.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.205    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.447    N 447 
  N 16  E.7. Pearson Correlation .236(**) 
B.6.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation .120(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011    N 445 
  N 447  E.4.1. Pearson Correlation .141(**) 
B.6.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation .120(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011    N 447 
  N 447  E.4.2. Pearson Correlation -.163(**) 
B.6.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation 0.013    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.942    N 447 
  N 34  E.4.3. Pearson Correlation .257(**) 
B.6.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation 0.058    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.222    N 447 
  N 447  E.4.4. Pearson Correlation .187(**) 
B.6.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation 0.058    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.222    N 447 
  N 447  E.4.5. Pearson Correlation -0.08 
B.6.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation 1.000(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.093 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    N 447 
  N 2  E.4.6. Pearson Correlation 0.037 
B.6.1.4.1. Pearson Correlation 0.014    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.44 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.768    N 447 
  N 447  E.4.7.0. Pearson Correlation .102(*) 
B.6.1.4.3. Pearson Correlation 0.014    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.768    N 447 
  N 447  E.5.1. Pearson Correlation .162(**) 
B.6.1.4.4. Pearson Correlation 0.129    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.836    N 447 
  N 5  E.5.2. Pearson Correlation -0.044 
B.6.1.5.1. Pearson Correlation .155(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.348 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    N 447 
  N 447  E.5.3. Pearson Correlation .159(**) 
B.6.1.5.3. Pearson Correlation .155(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    N 447 
  N 447  E.5.4. Pearson Correlation 0.088 
B.6.1.5.4. Pearson Correlation 0.06    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.063 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.745    N 447 
  N 32  E.5.5. Pearson Correlation 0.081 
B.7.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.004    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.087 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.936    N 447 
  N 447  E.5.6. Pearson Correlation .185(**) 
B.7.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.004    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.936    N 447 
  N 447  E.5.7.0. Pearson Correlation 0.004 
B.7.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.024    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.928 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.935    N 447 
  N 14  E.6.1. Pearson Correlation .251(**) 
B.8.1.0.1. Pearson Correlation 0.046    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.335    N 447 
  N 447  E.6.2. Pearson Correlation 0.092 
B.8.1.0.3. Pearson Correlation 0.038    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.051 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.418    N 447 
  N 447  E.6.3. Pearson Correlation .249(**) 
B.8.1.0.4. Pearson Correlation 0.274    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.475    N 447 
  N 9  E.6.4. Pearson Correlation 0.054 
B.8.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.047    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.252 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.325    N 447 
  N 447  E.6.5. Pearson Correlation -0.008 
B.8.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation 0.047    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.862 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.325    N 447 
  N 447  E.6.6.0. Pearson Correlation 0.089 
B.8.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation -0.225    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.061 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.341    N 447 
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  N 20  E.6.7.0. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
B.8.1.2.1. Pearson Correlation 0.052    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.275    N 447 
  N 447  AssetsModestValue Pearson Correlation .116(*) 
B.8.1.2.3. Pearson Correlation 0.053    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.263    N 447 
  N 447  AssetsMidRangetValue Pearson Correlation .240(**) 
B.8.1.2.4. Pearson Correlation -0.285    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.396    N 447 
  N 11  AssetsHighRangetValue Pearson Correlation .281(**) 
B.8.1.3.1. Pearson Correlation -0.074    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.117    N 447 
  N 447  AssetOrdinal Pearson Correlation .324(**) 
B.8.1.3.3. Pearson Correlation -0.064    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.175    N 447 
  N 447  F.1. Pearson Correlation .204(**) 
B.8.1.3.4. Pearson Correlation 0.323    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.397    N 447 
  N 9  F.2. Pearson Correlation 0.006 
B.8.1.4.1. Pearson Correlation -0.01    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.895 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.838    N 444 
  N 447  F.3. Pearson Correlation .204(**) 
B.8.1.4.3. Pearson Correlation -0.004    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.94    N 447 
  N 447  F.4. Pearson Correlation 0.05 
B.8.1.4.4. Pearson Correlation -0.082    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.291 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.49    N 447 
  N 73  G.1. Pearson Correlation 0.082 
B.8.1.5.1. Pearson Correlation .121(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.083 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01    N 447 
  N 447  G.1.1.1. Pearson Correlation 0.012 
B.8.1.5.3. Pearson Correlation .121(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.797 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01    N 447 
  N 447  G.1.1.2. Pearson Correlation -0.047 
B.8.1.5.4. Pearson Correlation 0.342    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.325 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.507    N 447 
  N 6  G.1.1.3. Pearson Correlation -0.047 
B.8.1.6.1. Pearson Correlation 0.071    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.318 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.136    N 447 
  N 447  G.1.1.4. Pearson Correlation 0.064 
B.8.1.6.3. Pearson Correlation 0.071    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.176 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.136    N 447 
  N 447  G.1.1.5. Pearson Correlation -0.021 
B.8.1.6.4. Pearson Correlation .(a)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.653 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    N 447 
  N 1  G.1.1.6. Pearson Correlation -0.04 
FarmCropsCash0or1 Pearson Correlation -0.008    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.395 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.873    N 447 
  N 447  G.1.1.7. Pearson Correlation -0.005 
FarmLivestockCash0or
1 Pearson Correlation 0.091 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.914 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.055    N 447 
  N 447  G.1.1.8.0. Pearson Correlation 0.067 
FarmCPRCash0or1 Pearson Correlation -.126(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.157 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008    N 447 
  N 447  G.2. Pearson Correlation .246(**) 
NonFarmCasualLabor
Cash0or1 Pearson Correlation -.126(**) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007    N 447 
  N 447  G.3 Pearson Correlation .237(**) 
NonFarmSalariedLabo
rCash0or1 Pearson Correlation .129(**) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006    N 446 
  N 447  G.4. Pearson Correlation -.115(*) 
NonFarmManufacturin Pearson Correlation -0.058    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.015 
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gCash0or1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.224    N 447 
  N 447  G.5. Pearson Correlation -.147(**) 
NonFarmServicesCash
0or1 Pearson Correlation .177(**) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.10.0. Pearson Correlation 0.024 
NonRemittancesCash0
or1 Pearson Correlation 0.004 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.619 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.936    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.10.1. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
NonRentSaleOtherCas
h0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.079 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.095    N 7 
  N 447  G.6.11. Pearson Correlation .100(*) 
NonRentUsedCash0or
1 Pearson Correlation -0.064 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.034 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.175    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.12. Pearson Correlation .127(**) 
NonLoansReceivedCas
h0or1 Pearson Correlation -0.004 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.94    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.13. Pearson Correlation -0.066 
NonLoansGivenCash0
or1 Pearson Correlation .121(*) 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.161 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.14. Pearson Correlation -0.012 
FarmCash0or1 Pearson Correlation .101(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.792 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.032    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.20. Pearson Correlation 0.006 
NonFarmCash0or1 Pearson Correlation .098(*)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.899 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.038    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.21. Pearson Correlation -0.016 
OtherInflowCash0or1 Pearson Correlation 0.013    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.741 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.79    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.22. Pearson Correlation -0.064 
AccRankCrops Pearson Correlation -0.031    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.174 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.508    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.30. Pearson Correlation -0.066 
Rank1Crops Pearson Correlation 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.162 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.996    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.31. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
AccRankLivestock Pearson Correlation -0.001    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.991    N 447 
  N 447  G.6.32. Pearson Correlation .(a) 
Rank1Livestock Pearson Correlation -0.028    Sig. (2-tailed) . 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.556    N 447 
  N 447  G.7. Pearson Correlation -0.043 
AccRankCPR Pearson Correlation -.138(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.364 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.10. Pearson Correlation .133(**) 
Rank1CPR Pearson Correlation -.130(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.20. Pearson Correlation 0.06 
AccRankCasualLabor Pearson Correlation -.161(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.207 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.21. Pearson Correlation -0.058 
Rank1CasualLabor Pearson Correlation -0.056    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.218 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.237    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.30. Pearson Correlation -0.062 
AccRankSalariedLabor Pearson Correlation .129(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.193 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.31. Pearson Correlation 0.053 
Rank1SalariedLabor Pearson Correlation 0.078    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.267 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.101    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.32. Pearson Correlation 0.006 
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    Clothing PC    Clothing PC 
AccRankServices Pearson Correlation .178(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.905 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.33. Pearson Correlation 0.028 
Rank1Services Pearson Correlation .151(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.553 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.40. Pearson Correlation -.099(*) 
Rank1Manufacture Pearson Correlation -0.045    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.037 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.345    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.41. Pearson Correlation -0.081 
AccRankManufacture Pearson Correlation -0.045    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.089 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.34    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.42. Pearson Correlation 0.065 
AccRankRemittances Pearson Correlation 0    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.171 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.995    N 447 
  N 447  G.8.50.0. Pearson Correlation -0.055 
Rank1Remittances Pearson Correlation -0.015    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.246 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.753    N 447 
  N 447  G.9. Pearson Correlation .198(**) 
AccRankRentSaleOthe
r Pearson Correlation 0.014 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.769    N 447 
  N 447  G.10. Pearson Correlation -0.033 
Rank1RentSaleOther Pearson Correlation 0.006    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.487 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.903    N 447 
  N 447  G.11. Pearson Correlation -0.084 
AccRankRentalUsed Pearson Correlation -0.079    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.076 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.097    N 446 
  N 447  G.12. Pearson Correlation .255(**) 
Rank1RentalUsed Pearson Correlation .(a)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .    N 446 
  N 447  G.13. Pearson Correlation 0.085 
AccRankLoansReceive
d Pearson Correlation -0.026 
 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.071 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.588    N 447 
  N 447  CrisisEventsHH Pearson Correlation 0.084 
Rank1LoansReceived Pearson Correlation 0.053    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.077 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.264    N 447 
  N 447  CrisisEventsEA Pearson Correlation -0.033 
AccRankLoansGiven Pearson Correlation .131(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.49 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005    N 447 
  N 447  CrisisEventsExternal Pearson Correlation -0.066 
Rank1LoansGiven Pearson Correlation 0.065    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.162 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.17    N 447 
  N 447  CopingSavings Pearson Correlation .133(**) 
C.2.1. Pearson Correlation 0.01    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.961    N 447 
  N 28  CopingBorrowing Pearson Correlation -0.014 
C.2.2. Pearson Correlation .139(**)    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.774 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003    N 447 
  N 447  CopingEA Pearson Correlation 0 
C.3.1. Pearson Correlation -0.276    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.994 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.173    N 447 
  N 26  CopingReduceSold Pearson Correlation -0.049 
C.3.2. Pearson Correlation 0.038    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.298 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.42    N 447 
  N 447  CopingOther Pearson Correlation -0.055 
C.4.1. Pearson Correlation -0.155     
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.068     
  N 139     
C.4.2. Pearson Correlation -0.018     
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.701     
  N 447     
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Highly Ranked Indicators (132 variables) by  










A.13.2. 0 .779(**) 440 
AMKClientclothing 0 .721(**) 359 
HHhClothing 0 .667(**) 447 
A.13.1. 0 .661(**) 447 
ClothingPCOverExpensePC 0 .564(**) 446 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 0 .430(**) 446 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH 0 .403(**) 447 
D.1.3. 0 .402(**) 447 
D.1.1. 0 .398(**) 447 
DailyPCExpense 0 .341(**) 446 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 0 .341(**) 446 
NUMADULTS 0 .327(**) 447 
AssetOrdinal 0 .324(**) 447 
A.4.1. 0 .307(**) 447 
E.3.3. 0 .306(**) 445 
WallExpensive 0 .295(**) 447 
HHhAge 0 .287(**) 445 
AssetsHighRangetValue 0 .281(**) 447 
A.8.1. 0 .274(**) 445 
PercentageIncomeEarnerOverTotalHH 0 .265(**) 447 
AMKClientAge 0 .261(**) 358 
FloorExpensive 0 .260(**) 447 
RoofThatch 0 -.258(**) 447 
E.3.2. 0 .257(**) 446 
E.4.3. 0 .257(**) 447 
G.12. 0 .255(**) 446 
D.6. 0 .254(**) 445 
E.6.1. 0 .251(**) 447 
E.6.3. 0 .249(**) 447 
G.2. 0 .246(**) 447 
AssetsMidRangetValue 0 .240(**) 447 
G.3 0 .237(**) 446 
NUMCSA 0 -.236(**) 447 
E.7. 0 .236(**) 445 
E.3.1. 0 .226(**) 446 
WallThatch 0 -.221(**) 447 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 0 .221(**) 447 
D.2.3. 0 .219(**) 446 
PercentageCASOverChildren 0 -.216(**) 409 
PercentageChildrenLESSThan6OverChildren 0 .216(**) 409 
B.3.1.1. 0 -.215(**) 447 
A.8.2. 0 .213(**) 438 
E.3.4.2. 0 .206(**) 446 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 0 .206(**) 407 










F.1. 0 .204(**) 447 
F.3. 0 .204(**) 447 
B.5.1.4.1. 0 -.201(**) 447 
G.9. 0 .198(**) 447 
E.4.4. 0 .187(**) 447 
E.5.6. 0 .185(**) 447 
D.7.1.4. 0 .181(**) 447 
AccRankServices 0 .178(**) 447 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 0 .177(**) 447 
B.4.1.3. 0 -.176(**) 447 
B.4.1.1. 0 -.175(**) 447 
E.3.4.1. 0 .175(**) 446 
E.3.4.3. 0 .173(**) 446 
Rank1Ceremonies 0 .168(**) 447 
B.1.3.1. 0 .166(**) 447 
B.1.3.1. 0 .166(**) 447 
E.4.2. 0.001 -.163(**) 447 
E.5.1. 0.001 .162(**) 447 
AccRankCasualLabor 0.001 -.161(**) 447 
E.5.3. 0.001 .159(**) 447 
RoofMedium 0.001 .157(**) 447 
B.6.1.5.1. 0.001 .155(**) 447 
B.6.1.5.3. 0.001 .155(**) 447 
B.3.3.1. 0.001 -.152(**) 447 
Rank1Services 0.001 .151(**) 447 
Rank1Food 0.001 -.150(**) 447 
C.9.1. 0.002 -.316(**) 94 
A.1. 0.002 -.149(**) 447 
G.5. 0.002 -.147(**) 447 
C.11.2. 0.002 .144(**) 447 
AccRankBuyGold 0.002 .143(**) 447 
B.3.2.1. 0.003 -.141(**) 447 
E.4.1. 0.003 .141(**) 447 
Rank1Basics 0.003 -.140(**) 447 
4.a. 0.003 -.139(**) 447 
C.2.2. 0.003 .139(**) 447 
AccRankCPR 0.004 -.138(**) 447 
RoofExpensive 0.004 .136(**) 447 
B.4.4.1. 0.005 .133(**) 447 
B.4.4.3. 0.005 .133(**) 447 
G.8.10. 0.005 .133(**) 447 
CopingSavings 0.005 .133(**) 447 
B.4.3.1. 0.005 .132(**) 447 
B.4.3.3. 0.005 .132(**) 447 
AccRankLoansGiven 0.005 .131(**) 447 
Rank1CPR 0.006 -.130(**) 447 
AccRankSalariedLabor 0.006 .129(**) 447 
NonFarmSalariedLaborCash0or1 0.006 .129(**) 447 










NonFarmCasualLaborCash0or1 0.007 -.126(**) 447 
FarmCPRCash0or1 0.008 -.126(**) 447 
NUMCHILDREN 0.008 -.126(**) 447 
B.5.1.4.3. 0.008 -.125(**) 447 
D.2.1. 0.009 .123(**) 447 
E.1. 0.010 .122(**) 445 
B.6.1.3.4. . 1.000(**) 2 
B.8.1.5.1. 0.010 .121(*) 447 
B.8.1.5.3. 0.010 .121(*) 447 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 0.010 .121(*) 447 
E.2.3. 0.011 .123(*) 433 
B.6.1.2.1. 0.011 .120(*) 447 
B.6.1.2.3. 0.011 .120(*) 447 
D.7.1.1. 0.012 .119(*) 447 
AccRankClothing 0.012 .118(*) 447 
B.1.3.3. 0.013 .118(*) 447 
B.1.3.3. 0.013 .118(*) 447 
G.4. 0.015 -.115(*) 447 
B.2.1.3. 0.016 .114(*) 447 
D.7.1.2. 0.017 .113(*) 447 
AccRankBuyOAssets 0.019 .111(*) 447 
C.12.2. 0.020 .110(*) 447 
B.3.3.3. 0.021 -.109(*) 447 
B.2.3.1. 0.029 -.103(*) 447 
A.12.1. 0.031 .102(*) 445 
E.4.7.0. 0.031 .102(*) 447 
FarmCash0or1 0.032 .101(*) 447 
G.6.11. 0.034 .100(*) 447 
G.8.40. 0.037 -.099(*) 447 
D.2.2. 0.037 .099(*) 447 
NonFarmCash0or1 0.038 .098(*) 447 
B.2.3.4. 0.039 .236(*) 77 
B.6.1.1.1. 0.040 .097(*) 447 
AccRankHeatlh 0.044 -.095(*) 447 
OtherFoodProducYear0or1 0.044 .095(*) 447 
E.2.2. 0.046 .096(*) 431 
HHhHighEduc 0.046 .095(*) 445 
 
 
Reduction from 132 to 45 variables for Stage 1 of PCA  
(ordered by level of association with “Clothing and Footwear PC”) 
 
Set of 132 highly correlated 






Set of 45 initial variables Chosen for 
PCA and reasons for exclusion 
Clothing PC  1 ► Chosen: Reference variable 
A.13.2. 0 .779(**) Information is random (may be spouse, 
head of household or any other member in 
HH)  
AMKClientclothing 0 .721(**) Irrelevant for nonclient HHs 
HHhClothing 0 .667(**) ► Chosen 
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 Set of 132 highly correlated 






Set of 45 initial variables Chosen for 
PCA and reasons for exclusion 
A.13.1. 0 .661(**) Information is random (may be spouse, 
head of household or any other member in 
HH) 
ClothingPCOverExpensePC 0 .564(**) Redundant - Covered in ClothingPC and 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 0 .430(**) ► Chosen 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH 0 .403(**) ► Chosen 
D.1.3. 0 .402(**) Redundant - Covered in 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 
D.1.1. 0 .398(**) Redundant - Covered in 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 
DailyPCExpense 0 .341(**) Redundant - Covered in 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 0 .341(**) Redundant - Covered in 
TotalYearlyExpensePC 
NUMADULTS 0 .327(**) ► Chosen 
AssetOrdinal 0 .324(**) ► Chosen 
A.4.1. 0 .307(**) ► Chosen 
E.3.3. 0 .306(**) ► Chosen 
WallExpensive 0 .295(**) Redundant - Covered in E.3.3 
HHhAge 0 .287(**) ► Chosen 
AssetsHighRangetValue 0 .281(**) Redundant - Covered in Assets Ordinal 
A.8.1. 0 .274(**) Information is random (may be spouse, 




0 .265(**) Redundant – Covered in A.4.1 
AMKClientAge 0 .261(**) Irrelevant for nonclient HHs 
FloorExpensive 0 .260(**) Redundant – Covered in E.3.1 
RoofThatch 0 -.258(**) Redundant – Covered in E.3.2 
E.3.2. 0 .257(**) ► Chosen 
E.4.3. 0 .257(**) ► Chosen 
G.12. 0 .255(**) ► Chosen 
D.6. 0 .254(**) ► Chosen 
E.6.1. 0 .251(**) ► Chosen 
E.6.3. 0 .249(**) ► Chosen 
G.2. 0 .246(**) ► Chosen 
AssetsMidRangetValue 0 .240(**) Redundant – Covered in AssetsOrdinal 
G.3 0 .237(**) ► Chosen 
NUMCSA 0 -.236(**) ► Chosen 
E.7. 0 .236(**) ► Chosen 
E.3.1. 0 .226(**) ► Chosen 
WallThatch 0 -.221(**) Redundant – Covered in E.3.3 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 0 .221(**) ► Chosen 
D.2.3. 0 .219(**) ► Chosen 




0 .216(**) Redundant – Covered in 
NUMCHILDREN 
B.3.1.1. 0 -.215(**) Covered in AccRankCPR 
A.8.2. 0 .213(**) Information is random (may be spouse, 
head of household or any other member in 
HH) 
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 Set of 132 highly correlated 






Set of 45 initial variables Chosen for 
PCA and reasons for exclusion 
E.3.4.2. 0 .206(**) Redundant – Covered in E.3.4.3 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 0 .206(**) ► Chosen 
D.7.1. 0 .204(**) ► Chosen 
F.1. 0 .204(**) ► Chosen 
F.3. 0 .204(**) Not as useful as F.1. 
B.5.1.4.1. 0 -.201(**) ► Chosen 
G.9. 0 .198(**) ► Chosen 
E.4.4. 0 .187(**) Higher correlation for E.4.3  
E.5.6. 0 .185(**) ► Chosen 
D.7.1.4. 0 .181(**) Redundant – Covered in D.7.1 
AccRankServices 0 .178(**) ► Chosen 
NonFarmServicesCash0or1 0 .177(**) Covered in AccRankServices 
B.4.1.3. 0 -.176(**) Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
B.4.1.1. 0 -.175(**) Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
E.3.4.1. 0 .175(**) Redundant – Better covered by E.3.4.3 
E.3.4.3. 0 .173(**) ► Chosen 
Rank1Ceremonies 0 .168(**) ► Chosen 
B.1.3.1. 0 .166(**) ► Chosen 
E.4.2. 0.001 -.163(**) Higher correlation from E.4.3 
E.5.1. 0.001 .162(**) ► Chosen 
AccRankCasualLabor 0.001 -.161(**) ► Chosen 
E.5.3. 0.001 .159(**) Higher correlation from E.5.1 and E.5.3 
RoofMedium 0.001 .157(**) Already covered by E.3.2 
B.6.1.5.1. 0.001 .155(**) Covered in AccRankServices 
B.6.1.5.3. 0.001 .155(**) Covered in AccRankServices 
B.3.3.1. 0.001 -.152(**) Covered in AccRankCPR 
Rank1Services 0.001 .151(**) Covered in AccRankServices 
Rank1Food 0.001 -.150(**) ► Chosen 
C.9.1. 0.002 -.316(**) Covered in Rank1Ceremonies 
A.1. 0.002 -.149(**) Not relevant for nonclients 
G.5. 0.002 -.147(**) ► Chosen 
C.11.2. 0.002 .144(**) ► Chosen 
AccRankBuyGold 0.002 .143(**) ► Chosen 
B.3.2.1. 0.003 -.141(**) Covered in AccRankCPR 
E.4.1. 0.003 .141(**) Higher correlation from E.4.3 
Rank1Basics 0.003 -.140(**) A result of positive AccRankFood 
4.a. 0.003 -.139(**) ► Chosen 
C.2.2. 0.003 .139(**) Better covered in Expenses in Clothing 
and Footwear PC 
AccRankCPR 0.004 -.138(**) ► Chosen 
RoofExpensive 0.004 .136(**) Covered in E.3.2 
B.4.4.1. 0.005 .133(**) Covered in AccRankSalariedLabor 
B.4.4.3. 0.005 .133(**) Covered in AccRankSalariedLabor 
G.8.10. 0.005 .133(**) Redundant – Covered in CopingSavings 
CopingSavings 0.005 .133(**) ► Chosen
B.4.3.1. 0.005 .132(**) Covered in AccRankSalariedLabor 
B.4.3.3. 0.005 .132(**) Covered in AccRankSalariedLabor 
AccRankLoansGiven 0.005 .131(**)  Already covered in D.7.1 
Rank1CPR 0.006 -.130(**) Covered in AccRankCPR 
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Set of 45 initial variables Chosen for 
PCA and reasons for exclusion 
AccRankSalariedLabor 0.006 .129(**) ► Chosen 
NonFarmSalariedLaborCash0or1 0.006 .129(**) Covered in AccRankSalariedLabor 
G.6.12. 0.007 .127(**) ► Chosen 
NonFarmCasualLaborCash0or1 0.007 -.126(**) Covered in AccRankCasualLabor 
FarmCPRCash0or1 0.008 -.126(**) Covered in AccRankCPR 
NUMCHILDREN 0.008 -.126(**) ► Chosen 
B.5.1.4.3. 0.008 -.125(**) Redundant – Covered in B.5.1.4.1  
D.2.1. 0.009 .123(**) ► Chosen 
E.1. 0.010 .122(**) ► Chosen 
B.6.1.3.4. . 1.000(**) Covered in AccRankServices 
B.8.1.5.1. 0.010 .121(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.8.1.5.3. 0.010 .121(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
NonLoansGivenCash0or1 0.010 .121(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
E.2.3. 0.011 .123(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.6.1.2.1. 0.011 .120(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.6.1.2.3. 0.011 .120(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
D.7.1.1. 0.012 .119(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
AccRankClothing 0.012 .118(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.1.3.3. 0.013 .118(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.1.3.3. 0.013 .118(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
G.4. 0.015 -.115(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.2.1.3. 0.016 .114(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
D.7.1.2. 0.017 .113(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
AccRankBuyOAssets 0.019 .111(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
C.12.2. 0.020 .110(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.3.3.3. 0.021 -.109(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.2.3.1. 0.029 -.103(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
A.12.1. 0.031 .102(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
E.4.7.0. 0.031 .102(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
FarmCash0or1 0.032 .101(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
G.6.11. 0.034 .100(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
G.8.40. 0.037 -.099(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
D.2.2. 0.037 .099(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
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Set of 45 initial variables Chosen for 
PCA and reasons for exclusion 
NonFarmCash0or1 0.038 .098(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.2.3.4. 0.039 .236(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
B.6.1.1.1. 0.040 .097(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
AccRankHeatlh 0.044 -.095(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
OtherFoodProducYear0or1 0.044 .095(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
E.2.2. 0.046 .096(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
HHhHighEduc 0.046 .095(*) Only indicators with correlation  
significant at 0.01 were chosen 
   
 
 
Step 2:  Choosing the best explanatory variables to test a model and interpret the results 
 
The AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear final index has been constructed with 20 indicators; 
whereby closely related variables were screened in order to add to the PCA model only the 
strongest.  The interactive process and all the previous AMK-PCA models tested can be found in 
grey font at the end of the section.   
 
1. Absolute value of the coefficients for each indicator is above 0.300 
In AMK-PCA, all the selected coefficients have values between 0.327 to 0.765 as can be 
seen in Table 4.  Table 4 below shows the five components calculated from the 
indicators.   
 
Table 4:  Component Matrix 
 Component Loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC 
[Clothing PC] .615 .235 .257 .375 .212 
HHhClothing .514 .286 .507 .145 .050 
NUMADULTS .561 .226 -.379 -.021 .394 
AccRankCasualLabor -.488 -.149 .114 .101 .641 
D.6. .332 .009 .503 .128 -.243 
D.7.1. .481 -.540 .177 .008 -.355 
TotalHHExpenseYearly .700 .285 -.129 .183 .092 
HHTotalLandAreaHa .490 .159 -.053 -.123 -.129 
E.3.1. .590 .358 .334 -.410 .042 
E.3.2. .761 .241 .146 -.389 .130 
E.3.3. .745 .249 .173 -.322 .066 
E.4.3. .636 -.209 -.181 -.008 .059 
E.6.1. .638 .184 -.414 .207 -.293 
E.7. .552 .186 -.197 .259 .117 
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  Component Loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 
AssetOrdinal .765 .181 -.400 .210 -.146 
G.2. .613 -.622 -.126 -.091 .154 
G.3 .565 -.619 .112 .143 .244 
G.5. -.498 .644 .048 .188 -.021 
G.9. .647 -.324 -.047 -.137 -.034 
G.12. .327 -.173 .420 .446 -.030 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  5 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
2. Correct sign of each component coefficient  
.  Indicators were accepted if the component loading (i.e. the coefficients for each 
component) had the expected sign following theory.   
 
3. Eigenvalue of the component is at least 1  
The first component explains 34.6% of total variance; the second 11.6%; the third 7.8%; 
the fourth 5.5% and the fifth 5.3%. 
 
Table 5:  Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings  







1 6.918 34.589 34.589 6.918 34.589 34.589 
2 2.322 11.610 46.199 2.322 11.610 46.199 
3 1.559 7.795 53.994 1.559 7.795 53.994 
4 1.096 5.481 59.475 1.096 5.481 59.475 
5 1.057 5.283 64.758 1.057 5.283 64.758 
6 .973 4.865 69.623    
7 .922 4.610 74.234    
8 .860 4.300 78.534    
9 .699 3.497 82.032    
10 .639 3.194 85.226    
11 .543 2.714 87.940    
12 .428 2.139 90.079    
13 .423 2.113 92.192    
14 .360 1.801 93.994    
15 .269 1.344 95.337    
16 .250 1.248 96.586    
17 .220 1.098 97.684    
18 .197 .985 98.670    
19 .150 .751 99.420    
20 .116 .580 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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 The interactive process to reach the final 20 variables is detailed below. 
 
Test 1 – Complete 45 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .618 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2488.390 
df 990 
Sig. .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Communalities(a) 
  Initial Extraction 
ClothingPC 1.000 .771 
4.a. 1.000 .780 
A.4.1. 1.000 .843 
HHhAge 1.000 .742 
HHhClothing 1.000 .787 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .793 
NUMCSA 1.000 .725 
NUMCHILDREN 1.000 .801 
B.1.3.1. 1.000 .566 
B.5.1.4.1. 1.000 .612 
AccRankCPR 1.000 .645 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .718 
AccRankSalariedLabor 1.000 .759 
AccRankServices 1.000 .726 
C.11.2. 1.000 .714 
Rank1Food 1.000 .733 
Rank1Ceremonies 1.000 .863 
AccRankBuyGold 1.000 .787 
D.2.1. 1.000 .850 
D.2.3. 1.000 .803 
D.6. 1.000 .610 
D.7.1. 1.000 .728 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH 1.000 .790 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .853 
E.1. 1.000 .698 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .877 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 1.000 .769 
E.3.1. 1.000 .761 
E.3.2. 1.000 .837 
E.3.3. 1.000 .834 
E.3.4.3. 1.000 .810 
E.4.3. 1.000 .514 
E.5.6. 1.000 .761 
E.6.1. 1.000 .758 
E.6.3. 1.000 .822 
E.7. 1.000 .748 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .789 
F.1. 1.000 .761 
G.2. 1.000 .827 
G.3 1.000 .806 
G.5. 1.000 .777 
G.6.12. 1.000 .820 
G.9. 1.000 .719 
G.12. 1.000 .759 
CopingSavings 1.000 .718 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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Total Variance Explained(a) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 9.476 21.058 21.058 9.476 21.058 21.058 
2 3.261 7.246 28.304 3.261 7.246 28.304 
3 2.907 6.460 34.765 2.907 6.460 34.765 
4 2.643 5.874 40.638 2.643 5.874 40.638 
5 2.274 5.053 45.691 2.274 5.053 45.691 
6 1.965 4.367 50.058 1.965 4.367 50.058 
7 1.895 4.212 54.270 1.895 4.212 54.270 
8 1.725 3.834 58.104 1.725 3.834 58.104 
9 1.618 3.595 61.699 1.618 3.595 61.699 
10 1.447 3.215 64.914 1.447 3.215 64.914 
11 1.418 3.151 68.065 1.418 3.151 68.065 
12 1.313 2.919 70.983 1.313 2.919 70.983 
13 1.157 2.570 73.554 1.157 2.570 73.554 
14 1.064 2.365 75.919 1.064 2.365 75.919 
15 .921 2.047 77.966     
16 .817 1.815 79.781     
17 .798 1.773 81.554     
18 .729 1.619 83.173     
19 .685 1.522 84.695     
20 .623 1.386 86.080     
21 .611 1.357 87.438     
22 .578 1.285 88.723     
23 .549 1.221 89.944     
24 .506 1.125 91.068     
25 .456 1.013 92.081     
26 .410 .911 92.992     
27 .382 .848 93.841     
28 .350 .777 94.618     
29 .293 .651 95.269     
30 .281 .625 95.893     
31 .260 .577 96.470     
32 .207 .459 96.929     
33 .189 .420 97.349     
34 .185 .410 97.759     
35 .175 .390 98.149     
36 .158 .350 98.499     
37 .140 .311 98.809     
38 .135 .301 99.110     
39 .110 .244 99.355     
40 .091 .202 99.557     
41 .068 .151 99.708     
42 .052 .115 99.823     
43 .044 .097 99.920     
44 .035 .077 99.997     
45 .001 .003 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Component Matrix(a,b) 
  Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
ClothingPC .615 .018 .216 -.283 .085 -.033 .375 -.088 -.117 .241 .000 .180 -.007 -.070 
4.a. -.185 .034 -.088 -.057 .049 -.418 -.487 -.003 .291 -.121 .276 .243 .289 .042 
A.4.1. .531 .310 .301 .190 -.009 .182 -.119 .324 -.107 .368 .126 -.053 .133 -.041 
HHhAge .283 .378 .051 -.338 .288 -.059 -.036 -.300 -.177 .385 .174 -.070 .023 -.098 
HHhClothing .473 -.047 .142 -.213 -.115 -.206 .533 .074 -.215 .027 -.131 .272 .061 -.092 
NUMADULTS .603 .310 .315 .088 .135 .226 -.217 .169 -.139 .197 .027 -.120 .078 .023 
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 NUMCSA -.173 -.077 -.026 .575 -.047 .048 .279 .240 .013 -.349 .092 -.153 .212 .137 
NUMCHILDREN .064 .363 .042 .519 -.116 .100 .275 .176 .021 .027 .419 -.131 .219 .148 
B.1.3.1. .291 .131 -.354 .213 .119 -.262 .299 -.054 -.022 .158 -.085 -.032 .234 .174 
B.5.1.4.1. -.193 .197 .210 .318 .118 .167 -.187 .260 -.204 -.050 -.213 .389 -.075 .002 
AccRankCPR -.207 .146 .109 .120 -.095 -.004 -.335 .285 -.421 -.062 .144 -.078 -.245 -.291 
AccRankCasualLabor -.443 .071 -.034 -.054 .254 -.061 -.122 .303 .192 .475 -.083 .214 .149 .000 
AccRankSalariedLabor .256 .329 .067 .299 .222 .233 .030 -.393 .017 .009 .341 .163 -.298 .029 
AccRankServices .304 -.340 .204 -.079 -.203 .237 .068 -.331 .166 -.050 .125 .078 .297 -.346 
C.11.2. .333 -.311 -.117 .414 -.316 .190 .068 .144 -.060 .209 .265 -.118 -.150 -.081 
Rank1Food -.265 .357 -.019 -.252 -.016 .357 .233 -.235 -.075 .025 .130 .150 .265 .345 
Rank1Ceremonies .130 .404 .078 .367 .536 -.142 .071 -.217 .324 -.066 -.127 -.103 -.136 -.165 
AccRankBuyGold .289 -.191 .340 -.379 .402 .040 .088 .461 .120 -.037 .068 .056 .002 -.007 
D.2.1. .477 .271 -.671 -.131 -.056 .081 -.142 .150 -.024 .047 -.100 -.108 .070 .000 
D.2.3. .550 .348 -.469 -.086 -.073 .040 -.243 .179 .041 .018 -.020 -.225 -.003 -.030 
D.6. .333 -.054 -.109 .072 -.047 -.352 .314 .021 .034 .205 .150 -.169 .043 -.398 
D.7.1. .437 -.577 -.291 .125 .027 .047 .059 -.047 -.098 .106 .092 -.059 -.144 -.203 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseH
H .645 .022 .400 -.088 -.310 .050 -.044 .072 .222 -.022 .093 .202 .010 .022 
TotalHHExpenseYearly .764 .156 .216 -.095 -.325 .032 -.140 .130 .186 -.011 .057 .084 .014 .013 
E.1. .362 -.055 -.435 -.002 -.062 .016 .214 .287 .417 -.193 .122 .058 -.019 -.110 
HHTotalLandAreaHa .565 .264 -.586 -.212 .055 .156 -.012 .147 .014 -.065 .014 .138 -.166 .004 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel .329 .215 -.656 -.173 -.020 .218 .042 .009 .077 .011 -.028 .307 -.060 .010 
E.3.1. .584 .227 .049 .101 -.036 -.511 .124 .075 -.146 -.208 -.055 .053 -.036 -.015 
E.3.2. .743 .213 -.040 .102 .086 -.322 .057 .014 -.197 -.136 -.178 -.003 -.054 .145 
E.3.3. .706 .081 .152 .062 -.085 -.253 .046 -.004 -.343 -.141 .007 .137 -.198 .183 
E.3.4.3. .385 .035 .013 .019 .005 -.434 -.421 -.184 -.048 -.178 .397 .224 .131 -.040 
E.4.3. .599 -.107 -.075 .188 .144 .097 -.041 -.109 -.118 .058 -.053 -.083 .138 .110 
E.5.6. .393 -.018 .166 -.215 .453 .188 -.055 -.112 .120 -.215 .108 -.341 -.255 .153 
E.6.1. .639 .079 .062 .105 -.231 .365 -.050 -.194 .033 -.222 -.035 .142 .046 -.168 
E.6.3. .349 -.122 .279 -.400 .326 .106 .143 .429 .177 -.288 .083 -.011 -.019 -.058 
E.7. .583 .072 .175 -.219 .022 -.034 -.050 -.100 .152 -.010 -.230 -.441 .198 .010 
AssetOrdinal .773 .117 .038 -.037 -.080 .265 -.123 -.200 .046 -.154 -.062 .010 .093 -.067 
F.1. .355 .171 .252 -.047 -.530 -.225 -.195 -.014 .151 .098 -.281 -.217 .060 .088 
G.2. .561 -.531 .023 .249 .207 .051 -.261 .029 .037 .060 -.041 -.009 .070 .204 
G.3 .524 -.538 -.044 .223 .204 .046 -.044 .079 .080 .261 .015 .168 .037 .186 
G.5. -.433 .461 .195 -.244 -.269 .017 .268 .127 .064 -.076 .273 -.100 -.095 .127 
G.6.12. .056 .412 .149 .516 .376 -.065 .102 -.028 .324 -.020 -.162 .138 .048 -.221 
G.9. .566 -.405 -.020 .052 .221 .083 .018 -.052 -.288 -.199 -.064 .018 .189 .101 
G.12. .329 -.276 .014 -.075 -.083 -.303 .044 -.083 .307 .229 .321 -.046 -.343 .305 
CopingSavings .184 .015 .191 .272 -.359 .080 .036 -.058 .371 .148 -.379 .151 -.303 .124 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  14 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
The analysis of the component matrix of test 1 indicates the following indicators should be excluded:  
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
4.a. The component loading was below .0300 
HHhAge The component loading was below .0300
NUMCSA The component loading was below .0300
NUMCHILDREN The component loading was below .0300
B.1.3.1. The component loading was below .0300
B.5.1.4.1. The component loading was below .0300
AccRankCPR The component loading was below .0300
AccRankSalariedLabor The component loading was below .0300
Rank1Food The component loading was below .0300
Rank1Ceremonies The component loading was below .0300
AccRankBuyGold The component loading was below .0300
G.6.12. The component loading was below .0300
CopingSavings The component loading was below .0300
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 Test 2 –32 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .695 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1890.619 
df 496 
Sig. .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Communalities(a) 
  Initial Extraction 
ClothingPC 1.000 .739 
A.4.1. 1.000 .840 
HHhClothing 1.000 .828 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .872 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .780 
AccRankServices 1.000 .669 
C.11.2. 1.000 .758 
D.2.1. 1.000 .841 
D.2.3. 1.000 .810 
D.6. 1.000 .507 
D.7.1. 1.000 .681 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH 1.000 .799 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .860 
E.1. 1.000 .580 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .873 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel 1.000 .743 
E.3.1. 1.000 .748 
E.3.2. 1.000 .828 
E.3.3. 1.000 .828 
E.3.4.3. 1.000 .718 
E.4.3. 1.000 .492 
E.5.6. 1.000 .796 
E.6.1. 1.000 .757 
E.6.3. 1.000 .703 
E.7. 1.000 .748 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .793 
F.1. 1.000 .764 
G.2. 1.000 .809 
G.3 1.000 .781 
G.5. 1.000 .825 
G.9. 1.000 .667 
G.12. 1.000 .661 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.947 27.960 27.960 8.947 27.960 27.960 
2 2.805 8.767 36.726 2.805 8.767 36.726 
3 2.663 8.321 45.048 2.663 8.321 45.048 
4 1.763 5.511 50.558 1.763 5.511 50.558 
5 1.651 5.159 55.717 1.651 5.159 55.717 
6 1.591 4.973 60.690 1.591 4.973 60.690 
7 1.370 4.280 64.970 1.370 4.280 64.970 
8 1.247 3.897 68.867 1.247 3.897 68.867 
9 1.047 3.271 72.138 1.047 3.271 72.138 
10 1.015 3.173 75.311 1.015 3.173 75.311 
11 .944 2.951 78.261     
12 .846 2.645 80.906     
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 13 .702 2.193 83.099     
14 .677 2.115 85.214     
15 .641 2.004 87.217     
16 .536 1.676 88.893     
17 .493 1.539 90.432     
18 .443 1.386 91.818     
19 .410 1.280 93.098     
20 .380 1.188 94.286     
21 .320 .999 95.285     
22 .267 .836 96.121     
23 .254 .795 96.916     
24 .204 .637 97.553     
25 .188 .586 98.139     
26 .166 .520 98.659     
27 .119 .372 99.031     
28 .099 .310 99.341     
29 .087 .273 99.614     
30 .071 .223 99.837     
31 .050 .158 99.994     
32 .002 .006 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ClothingPC .592 -.033 -.249 .221 .360 -.036 .176 -.313 -.116 .062 
A.4.1. .527 .146 -.284 -.330 -.265 .018 .427 -.295 .069 -.079 
HHhClothing .471 -.003 -.211 .544 .285 .012 .055 -.387 -.167 .059 
NUMADULTS .598 .146 -.296 -.455 -.177 -.168 .237 -.244 .099 -.116 
AccRankCasualLabor -.453 .064 .092 -.117 -.096 -.131 .593 -.089 -.120 .386 
AccRankServices .309 -.369 -.144 -.094 .229 .430 -.245 -.038 -.113 .310 
C.11.2. .346 -.295 .192 -.008 -.226 .475 .219 -.132 .254 -.331 
D.2.1. .485 .501 .560 -.073 -.093 -.031 .003 .024 -.154 .032 
D.2.3. .558 .509 .367 -.136 -.140 -.044 .037 .190 -.163 -.031 
D.6. .320 -.043 .048 .446 -.064 .112 .200 .055 -.311 -.211 
D.7.1. .440 -.486 .425 .132 -.004 .146 .027 -.004 .010 -.179 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH .654 -.003 -.419 -.030 .074 .316 .119 .114 .105 .227 
TotalHHExpenseYearly .776 .186 -.278 -.067 -.026 .257 .108 .170 .018 .186 
E.1. .363 .147 .426 .174 .263 .270 .154 .204 .085 -.021 
HHTotalLandAreaHa .565 .478 .516 .000 .185 -.041 .045 -.052 .119 .072 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel .331 .431 .575 .011 .170 .170 -.008 -.168 .098 .148 
E.3.1. .582 .210 -.182 .458 -.222 -.245 -.070 .027 .078 .009 
E.3.2. .738 .176 -.051 .248 -.172 -.375 -.093 -.048 -.006 -.084 
E.3.3. .712 .037 -.222 .292 -.190 -.208 -.104 -.105 .286 -.044 
E.3.4.3. .393 -.001 -.089 .143 -.298 -.172 -.189 .277 .327 .444 
E.4.3. .599 -.189 .141 -.123 -.130 -.070 -.092 -.105 -.119 -.085 
E.5.6. .378 -.090 -.081 -.322 .441 -.393 .014 .300 .169 -.259 
E.6.1. .655 .052 -.066 -.231 .069 .315 -.340 -.172 .133 .001 
E.6.3. .342 -.048 -.164 -.066 .618 -.259 .250 .163 .014 .123 
E.7. .575 .071 -.247 -.193 .150 -.059 -.046 .266 -.425 -.187 
AssetOrdinal .783 .089 -.060 -.268 .122 .117 -.259 -.018 .019 -.020 
F.1. .364 .235 -.418 .017 -.343 .270 -.026 .268 -.371 -.015 
G.2. .566 -.578 .190 -.200 -.183 -.135 .064 .122 -.005 .087 
G.3 .520 -.576 .262 -.025 -.073 -.047 .272 -.009 -.029 .164 
G.5. -.437 .476 -.385 .078 .218 .217 .122 .012 .299 -.235 
G.9. .579 -.416 .135 -.025 .112 -.239 -.187 -.176 -.034 -.058 
G.12. .320 -.238 .004 .304 .007 .119 .315 .484 .211 -.127 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  10 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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 The analysis of the component matrix of test 2 indicates the following indicators should be excluded:  
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Number of income earners in the HH [A.4.1.] Duplicates information with NUMADULTS and has lower 
component loading: 0.527 vs.0.598 
Number of Kg of rice produced in the last year [D.2.1.] Poverty studies of rural households have found rich 
households that do not produce rice.  “Near-landleness” (i.e. 
<0.5 Ha per HH) is more the issue that landlessness.263  
Market value of the rice consumed [D.2.3.] 
 
Poverty studies of rural households have found rich 
households that do not produce rice.  “Near-landleness” (i.e. 
<0.5 Ha per HH) is more the issue that landlessness 
WeeklyFoodExxpenseHH Better covered in TotalHHExpenseYearly (which includes 
cash purchases plus consumption from farm production and 
has lower component loading 0. 654vs.0. 776  
Number of Plots of Agricultural Land [E.1] Poverty studies of rural households have found rich 
households that do not produce rice.  “Near-landleness” (i.e. 
<0.5 Ha per HH) is more the issue that landlessness 
HHTotalValueLandinRiel Duplicates information with HHTotalLandAreainHa (which 
has higher component loadings: 0.331 vs.0.565) 
Size of the dwelling in squared meters [E.3.4.3] Already covered in E.3.1, E.3.2 and E.3.3, which have 
higher component loadings 
Car/pick-up/truck [E.6.3] [E.6.1] has a higher component loading 
 
 
Test 3 – 24 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .804 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1020.436 
df 276 
Sig. .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Communalities(a) 
  Initial Extraction 
ClothingPC 1.000 .763 
HHhClothing 1.000 .811 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .561 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .488 
AccRankServices 1.000 .718 
C.11.2. 1.000 .618 
D.6. 1.000 .398 
D.7.1. 1.000 .696 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .693 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .550 
E.3.1. 1.000 .718 
E.3.2. 1.000 .828 
E.3.3. 1.000 .736 
E.4.3. 1.000 .487 
E.5.6. 1.000 .772 
E.6.1. 1.000 .758 
E.7. 1.000 .636 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .806 
F.1. 1.000 .830 
G.2. 1.000 .831 
                                                 
263 The majority of landless households do not obtain their main source of income from agriculture and thus, it is possible to find 
both relatively prosperous households and also impoverished households.  Further information in: Ramamurthy, Bhargavi Sik 
Boreak, Per Ronnås and Sok Hach (2001) Cambodia 1999-2000: Land, Labour and Rural Livelihood in Focus Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI) Working Paper 21. 
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 G.3 1.000 .766 
G.5. 1.000 .745 
G.9. 1.000 .631 
G.12. 1.000 .740 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.390 30.790 30.790 7.390 30.790 30.790 
2 2.573 10.721 41.511 2.573 10.721 41.511 
3 1.662 6.926 48.437 1.662 6.926 48.437 
4 1.441 6.006 54.443 1.441 6.006 54.443 
5 1.259 5.245 59.688 1.259 5.245 59.688 
6 1.171 4.881 64.569 1.171 4.881 64.569 
7 1.084 4.518 69.087 1.084 4.518 69.087 
8 .965 4.023 73.110     
9 .921 3.837 76.947     
10 .776 3.233 80.180     
11 .696 2.899 83.079     
12 .622 2.593 85.672     
13 .549 2.289 87.961     
14 .455 1.897 89.859     
15 .403 1.677 91.536     
16 .342 1.427 92.963     
17 .334 1.394 94.356     
18 .283 1.179 95.535     
19 .246 1.024 96.560     
20 .220 .918 97.477     
21 .193 .802 98.279     
22 .179 .745 99.025     
23 .124 .517 99.541     
24 .110 .459 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ClothingPC .609 .203 .185 .096 -.321 .413 -.184 
HHhClothing .497 .239 .487 .186 -.380 .150 -.260 
NUMADULTS .565 .242 -.329 -.227 .150 .034 -.001 
AccRankCasualLabor -.495 -.116 .109 -.207 .224 .308 -.172 
AccRankServices .342 -.203 -.229 .612 -.262 .030 -.252 
C.11.2. .359 -.355 .075 .358 .171 -.184 .408 
D.6. .327 -.002 .480 .195 .004 .077 .130 
D.7.1. .486 -.585 .180 .101 -.120 -.094 .227 
TotalHHExpenseYearly .713 .310 -.109 .169 .209 .009 .061 
HHTotalLandAreaHa .471 .130 .020 -.295 -.232 -.109 .397 
E.3.1. .569 .379 .416 -.166 .080 -.204 -.044 
E.3.2. .736 .279 .238 -.361 .039 -.133 -.056 
E.3.3. .732 .260 .255 -.162 .071 -.185 .043 
E.4.3. .627 -.185 -.098 -.138 .087 -.122 -.091 
E.5.6. .393 .004 -.376 -.339 -.135 .525 .262 
E.6.1. .651 .129 -.372 .265 -.195 -.236 .122 
E.7. .575 .248 -.280 .068 .182 .319 -.163 
AssetOrdinal .771 .162 -.391 .063 -.136 -.031 .090 
F.1. .349 .442 -.040 .336 .597 -.061 -.197 
G.2. .619 -.567 -.101 -.143 .282 -.015 -.128 
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 G.3 .566 -.604 .114 -.026 .156 .170 -.123 
G.5. -.485 .580 -.009 .194 -.053 .149 .333 
G.9. .642 -.334 -.037 -.168 -.222 -.020 -.167 
G.12. .340 -.153 .310 .200 .298 .474 .390 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  7 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Indicators to Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
AccRankServices Duplicates information with C.11.2 and has lower component loading (0.342 and 
0.459) 
Mobile phone [E.5.6.] Television and [E.4.3] and Motorcycle [E.6.1] have higher component loadings (0.635 
and 0.650 vs. 0.359) 
Current outstanding debt of the 
household F.1. 
Information biases towards active AMK clients  
 
 
Test 4 – 21 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .816 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 895.251 
df 210 
Sig. .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Communalities(a) 
  Initial Extraction 
ClothingPC 1.000 .702 
HHhClothing 1.000 .634 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .576 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .601 
C.11.2. 1.000 .593 
D.6. 1.000 .413 
D.7.1. 1.000 .686 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .638 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .303 
E.3.1. 1.000 .723 
E.3.2. 1.000 .810 
E.3.3. 1.000 .710 
E.4.3. 1.000 .488 
E.6.1. 1.000 .729 
E.7. 1.000 .464 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .810 
G.2. 1.000 .795 
G.3 1.000 .793 
G.5. 1.000 .733 
G.9. 1.000 .558 
G.12. 1.000 .530 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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 Total Variance Explained(a) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.036 33.503 33.503 7.036 33.503 33.503 
2 2.412 11.486 44.989 2.412 11.486 44.989 
3 1.560 7.427 52.416 1.560 7.427 52.416 
4 1.205 5.739 58.155 1.205 5.739 58.155 
5 1.076 5.125 63.280 1.076 5.125 63.280 
6 .994 4.733 68.013     
7 .922 4.392 72.405     
8 .873 4.159 76.563     
9 .807 3.841 80.405     
10 .695 3.308 83.713     
11 .566 2.697 86.409     
12 .542 2.582 88.992     
13 .425 2.022 91.014     
14 .395 1.881 92.895     
15 .341 1.622 94.517     
16 .268 1.277 95.794     
17 .223 1.060 96.854     
18 .212 1.010 97.864     
19 .194 .924 98.789     
20 .141 .673 99.462     
21 .113 .538 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 





1 2 3 4 5 
ClothingPC .606 .257 .257 .029 .449 
HHhClothing .507 .296 .508 -.016 .175 
NUMADULTS .557 .238 -.377 -.097 .240 
AccRankCasualLabor -.487 -.148 .109 -.237 .524 
C.11.2. .368 -.369 .042 .555 -.105 
D.6. .336 -.003 .507 .189 -.086 
D.7.1. .500 -.556 .177 .178 -.253 
TotalHHExpenseYearly .697 .285 -.122 .178 .155 
HHTotalLandAreaHa .485 .174 -.052 -.003 -.187 
E.3.1. .580 .380 .332 -.250 -.262 
E.3.2. .750 .284 .140 -.348 -.166 
E.3.3. .740 .262 .174 -.149 -.201 
E.4.3. .639 -.187 -.186 -.085 .050 
E.6.1. .641 .171 -.405 .343 -.081 
E.7. .545 .212 -.198 .015 .288 
AssetOrdinal .759 .201 -.397 .183 .045 
G.2. .622 -.592 -.138 -.189 .049 
G.3 .579 -.606 .104 -.070 .274 
G.5. -.498 .583 .066 .372 .055 
G.9. .650 -.294 -.055 -.203 -.073 
G.12. .335 -.190 .425 .384 .231 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  5 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Indicators Excluded Reasons for Exclusion 
Buying durable assets 
C.11.2. 
Information about assets already covered in Section E (C.11.2 only covers outflows the last 12 
months to acquire assets) 
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 Test 5 – 20 variables 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test(a) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .823 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 858.130 
df 190 
Sig. .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Communalities(a) 
  Initial Extraction 
ClothingPC 1.000 .685 
HHhClothing 1.000 .627 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .664 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .695 
D.6. 1.000 .439 
D.7.1. 1.000 .681 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .629 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .300 
E.3.1. 1.000 .758 
E.3.2. 1.000 .828 
E.3.3. 1.000 .754 
E.4.3. 1.000 .484 
E.6.1. 1.000 .741 
E.7. 1.000 .459 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .843 
G.2. 1.000 .810 
G.3 1.000 .795 
G.5. 1.000 .700 
G.9. 1.000 .545 
G.12. 1.000 .514 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Total Variance Explained(a) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.918 34.589 34.589 6.918 34.589 34.589 
2 2.322 11.610 46.199 2.322 11.610 46.199 
3 1.559 7.795 53.994 1.559 7.795 53.994 
4 1.096 5.481 59.475 1.096 5.481 59.475 
5 1.057 5.283 64.758 1.057 5.283 64.758 
6 .973 4.865 69.623     
7 .922 4.610 74.234     
8 .860 4.300 78.534     
9 .699 3.497 82.032     
10 .639 3.194 85.226     
11 .543 2.714 87.940     
12 .428 2.139 90.079     
13 .423 2.113 92.192     
14 .360 1.801 93.994     
15 .269 1.344 95.337     
16 .250 1.248 96.586     
17 .220 1.098 97.684     
18 .197 .985 98.670     
19 .150 .751 99.420     
20 .116 .580 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
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 Component Matrix(a,b) 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
ClothingPC .615 .235 .257 .375 .212 
HHhClothing .514 .286 .507 .145 .050 
NUMADULTS .561 .226 -.379 -.021 .394 
AccRankCasualLabor -.488 -.149 .114 .101 .641 
D.6. .332 .009 .503 .128 -.243 
D.7.1. .481 -.540 .177 .008 -.355 
TotalHHExpenseYearly .700 .285 -.129 .183 .092 
HHTotalLandAreaHa .490 .159 -.053 -.123 -.129 
E.3.1. .590 .358 .334 -.410 .042 
E.3.2. .761 .241 .146 -.389 .130 
E.3.3. .745 .249 .173 -.322 .066 
E.4.3. .636 -.209 -.181 -.008 .059 
E.6.1. .638 .184 -.414 .207 -.293 
E.7. .552 .186 -.197 .259 .117 
AssetOrdinal .765 .181 -.400 .210 -.146 
G.2. .613 -.622 -.126 -.091 .154 
G.3 .565 -.619 .112 .143 .244 
G.5. -.498 .644 .048 .188 -.021 
G.9. .647 -.324 -.047 -.137 -.034 
G.12. .327 -.173 .420 .446 -.030 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  5 components extracted. 
b  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
Therefore the final AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear will include 20 indicators. 
 
 
Step 3: Revise the test model until the results meet the performance requirements. 
Performance requirements involved: 
a) Testing the relative size of communalities.  
 
In the AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear, all commonalities were above 0.1 with values 
ranging from 0.300 to 0.843 and thus all fall within an acceptable range, proving they are 
highly explanatory of poverty.  
 
Table 6:  Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC 
[Clothing PC] 1.000 .685 
HHhClothing 1.000 .627 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .664 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .695 
D.6. 1.000 .439 
D.7.1. 1.000 .681 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .629 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .300 
E.3.1. 1.000 .758 
E.3.2. 1.000 .828 
E.3.3. 1.000 .754 
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  Initial Extraction 
E.4.3. 1.000 .484 
E.6.1. 1.000 .741 
E.7. 1.000 .459 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .843 
G.2. 1.000 .810 
G.3 1.000 .795 
G.5. 1.000 .700 
G.9. 1.000 .545 
G.12. 1.000 .514 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
b) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.  
In AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear, the overall model had a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) index of 0.823, which is a rather good adequacy result. 
 
 
Table 7:  KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Test Value 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .823 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
Approx. Chi-Square 858.130 
df 190 
Sig .000 
a  Only cases for which A.1. = No are used in the analysis phase. 
 
 
Step 4: Save the poverty component scores of the final model as a poverty index variable 
When AMK-PCA: Clothing and Footwear was applied to the sample of 450, the model adequacy 
using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test was still good at 0.839.  The complete results of step 4 
can be found below.   
 
Table 8: AMK-PCA applied to the complete sample (450): KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Test Value 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .839 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 3167.944 






 Table 9: AMK-PCA applied to the complete sample (450): Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC 
[Clothing PC] 1.000 .325 
HHhClothing 1.000 .203 
NUMADULTS 1.000 .178 
AccRankCasualLabor 1.000 .123 
D.6. 1.000 .099 
D.7.1. 1.000 .200 
TotalHHExpenseYearly 1.000 .408 
HHTotalLandAreaHa 1.000 .216 
E.3.1. 1.000 .254 
E.3.2. 1.000 .374 
E.3.3. 1.000 .454 
E.4.3. 1.000 .314 
E.6.1. 1.000 .400 
E.7. 1.000 .210 
AssetOrdinal 1.000 .525 
G.2. 1.000 .398 
G.3 1.000 .366 
G.5. 1.000 .260 
G.9. 1.000 .330 
G.12. 1.000 .198 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 10:  AMK-PCA applied to the complete sample (450): Total Variance Explained 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 







1 5.836 29.179 29.179 5.836 29.179 29.179 
2 1.913 9.565 38.744     
3 1.507 7.534 46.278     
4 1.320 6.602 52.880     
5 1.101 5.504 58.384     
6 .910 4.551 62.935     
7 .891 4.453 67.388     
8 .880 4.398 71.786     
9 .711 3.554 75.340     
10 .706 3.531 78.871     
11 .678 3.390 82.261     
12 .602 3.012 85.272     
13 .577 2.884 88.156     
14 .499 2.493 90.649     
15 .442 2.210 92.859     
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  Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of Cumulative 
Variance % 
16 .423 2.115 94.974     
17 .297 1.484 96.458     
18 .279 1.395 97.853     
19 .257 1.285 99.138     
20 .172 .862 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
. 
 
Table 11:  AMK-PCA applied to the complete sample (450): Component Matrix(a) 
 Component 
 1 
Expenses in Clothing and Footwear PC 




















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 





T- Test - Group Statistics: Clients and Nonclients 
  A.1. N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
 
REGR factor score   1 for analysis 2 No 90 .2301560 1.16554022 .12285873  





 Independent Samples Test 
    
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
REGR factor 














 Annex 37: Percentages Below National (Rural) Food Poverty Line 
 
BELOW NATIONAL (RURAL) FOOD POVERTY LINE (R 1,550) BY TYPE OF CLIENT– CROSSTABULATION 
 
Crosstabulation 
    
A.1. 
Total No Yes 
Below1550 0 Count 39 91 130
% within A.1. 43.3% 25.3% 28.9%
1 Count 51 269 320
% within A.1. 56.7% 74.7% 71.1%
Total Count 90 360 450




  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 11.426(b) 1 .001   
Continuity Correction(a) 10.564 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 10.813 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test     .001 .001
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.400 1 .001   
N of Valid Cases 450     
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.00. 
 
 
BELOW NATIONAL (RURAL) FOOD POVERTY LINE (R 1,550) BY SENIORITY OF CLIENT– CROSSTABULATION 
 
Crosstab 
    ClientSeniority Total 





Senior    (>=2 
years) NonClient   
Below1550 0 Count 38 17 36 39 130
    % within ClientSeniority 25.0% 22.1% 27.5% 43.3% 28.9%
  1 Count 114 60 95 51 320
    % within ClientSeniority 75.0% 77.9% 72.5% 56.7% 71.1%
Total Count 152 77 131 90 450
  % within ClientSeniority 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 12.125(a) 3 .007
Likelihood Ratio 11.580 3 .009
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.455 1 .001
N of Valid Cases 450   
a  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.24. 
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 Annex 38: Comparison of Absolute and Relative Tools for all Client Households 
 
COMPARISON FOR CLIENT HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Crosstab 
    
Below1550 
Total 0 1 
WellbeingGROUP3 Poorer Count 20 142 162 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 12.3% 87.7% 100.0% 
Medium Count 42 94 136 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 30.9% 69.1% 100.0% 
Better-off Count 29 33 62 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 46.8% 53.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 91 269 360 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 25.3% 74.7% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.774(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 32.136 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 31.614 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 360   




    
Below1550 
Total 0 1 
WellBeingGroup4 Poorest(4) Count 7 91 98 
% within WellBeingGroup4 7.1% 92.9% 100.0% 
Poor Count 31 100 131 
% within WellBeingGroup4 23.7% 76.3% 100.0% 
Medium Count 27 52 79 
% within WellBeingGroup4 34.2% 65.8% 100.0% 
Better-off Count 26 26 52 
% within WellBeingGroup4 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 91 269 360 
% within WellBeingGroup4 25.3% 74.7% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.383(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 39.713 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 36.916 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 360   





    
WellbeingGROUP3 
Total Poorer Medium Better-off 
UPDATEDBelow1550 0 Count 20 42 29 91 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 22.0% 46.2% 31.9% 100.0% 
1 Count 142 94 33 269 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 52.8% 34.9% 12.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 162 136 62 360 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 45.0% 37.8% 17.2% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.774(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 32.136 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 31.614 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 360   




    
WellBeingGroup4 
Total Poorest(4) Poor Medium Better-off 
UPDATEDBelow1550 0 Count 7 31 27 26 91 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 7.7% 34.1% 29.7% 28.6% 100.0% 
1 Count 91 100 52 26 269 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 33.8% 37.2% 19.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 98 131 79 52 360 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 27.2% 36.4% 21.9% 14.4% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.383(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 39.713 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 36.916 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 360   




 Annex 39: Comparison of Absolute and Relative Tools for New Client Households 
 
COMPARISON FOR NEW CLIENT HOUSEHOLDS [ONLY] 
 
Crosstab 
    
Below1550 
Total 0 1 
WellbeingGROUP3 Poorer Count 7 63 70 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
Medium Count 18 35 53 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 34.0% 66.0% 100.0% 
Better-off Count 13 16 29 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 44.8% 55.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 38 114 152 
% within WellbeingGROUP3 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.751(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 17.623 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 15.909 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 152   




    
Below1550 
Total 0 1 
WellBeingGroup4 Poorest(4) Count 3 39 42 
% within WellBeingGroup4 7.1% 92.9% 100.0% 
Poor Count 11 42 53 
% within WellBeingGroup4 20.8% 79.2% 100.0% 
Medium Count 13 20 33 
% within WellBeingGroup4 39.4% 60.6% 100.0% 
Better-off Count 11 13 24 
% within WellBeingGroup4 45.8% 54.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 38 114 152 
% within WellBeingGroup4 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.854(a) 3 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.846 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 16.292 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 152   






   
WellbeingGROUP3 
Total Poorer Medium Better-off 
UPDATEDBelow1550 0 Count 7 18 13 38 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 18.4% 47.4% 34.2% 100.0% 
1 Count 63 35 16 114 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 55.3% 30.7% 14.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 70 53 29 152 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 46.1% 34.9% 19.1% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.751(a) 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 17.623 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 15.909 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 152   




   
WellBeingGroup4 
Total Poorest(4) Poor Medium Better-off 
UPDATEDBelow1550 0 Count 3 11 13 11 38 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 7.9% 28.9% 34.2% 28.9% 100.0% 
1 Count 39 42 20 13 114 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 34.2% 36.8% 17.5% 11.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 53 33 24 152 
% within UPDATEDBelow1550 27.6% 34.9% 21.7% 15.8% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.854(a) 3 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.846 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 16.292 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 152   
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